Without reusability to lower costs, Antares will only ever launch Cygnus.
The question ultimately becomes "does Northrop Grumman want Antares to launch things other than Cygnus (and maybe occasional high-energy government launches)?" Because if Northrop buys Firefly (as many believe is on the agenda), they'll have MLV (née Firefly Beta) for the commercial market.
You bring up a very interesting point here. I've mentioned before that I think the "real" reason Northrop has continued to fly Antares up to this point, despite it being absurdly uncompetitive on the open market, is that every Antares they fly is an opportunity to sell a Castor 30XL upper stage to themselves.
We can deduce that the overall profit margin on Antares is relatively low (i.e., the actual cost of building and flying it is close to its published market price), because if it weren't, Northrop could be making more money by cutting its price to try to capture some of the commercial market. (Yes, the current Antares is a bit small to compete against Falcon 9, but it could take some of the low-end F9 payloads, as well as some of Soyuz's, which until recently was doing a brisk commercial business.) So if very little of Antares's price is actually profit for Northrop, what's in it for them to keep flying it? Why not just spend the same money buying Falcon 9s to launch Cygnus? (F9's list price may be in some cases higher than Antares's, but they could likely negotiate a discount to close that gap since the alternative would be SpaceX not getting any business at all.)
It only really makes sense when you realize that the Castor is the one part of Antares that actually matters from Northrop's business perspective. It doesn't matter that they could probably buy themselves a Falcon 9 for the same price as their internal cost to build and fly an Antares. What matters to Northrop is that a portion of those dollars spent on every Antares are being spent in-house, versus to a third party.
We've heard before that there's a lot of economics-of-scale synergy between Northrop's various solid-rocket lines (they pitched this as a major selling point for OmegA). This means the marginal cost of cranking out a few extra solid motors is probably quite low, relative to the high fixed costs of maintaining the necessary production infrastructure (most of which is likely already paid for by other programs). By "selling" even just a few Castors to the Antares program each year - even at-cost - they can amortize those fixed costs over a larger customer base, raising their profit margin across their whole solid rocket business.
If increasing their solid rocket production cadence by even this small amount can unlock better economics of scale, it's worthwhile for them to pursue, even if the entire rest of each Antares's cost is pure pass-through to the subcontractors they're buying it from. And it likely
is pretty close to pure pass-through, since the Antares 230 first stage is basically a kitbash of the old Zenit design: Ukrainian tankage mated to 2x Russian RD-181 engines. There's very little actual value-add by Northrop as integrator, besides the political edge of being able to sell an "American rocket" to win contracts that a Zenit-as-such wouldn't be able to compete for. (They like to sell up Northrop's avionics as a value-add, but Zenit had its own avionics that could have been - and maybe were - used as a starting point. Same situation Firefly will be in.)
This is different from, say, the situation ULA was in with Atlas V. Yes, they were buying engines from the Russians, but the Atlas V tankage, structure, and plumbing were all theirs. There was a clear value-add. Not so much with the Antares first stage.
What's fascinating is that whatever economics-of-scale boost Northrop is getting for its SRB business by making those couple extra Castors a year is evidently enough to outweigh the costs that Northrop has
already spent significantly redesigning the Antares first stage. (Going from NK-33s to RD-181s was surely not a trivial change.) It feels like they "should" have given up on Antares several times by now, but they haven't. Instead they're going to invest in a new, even more radical re-design of the first stage with Firefly, merely to support ~2 Cygnus launches per year for a few years.
In light of this, it makes sense that they are pursuing two parallel paths with Antares 330 vs. Firefly Beta/MLV. A330 is designed to meet the needs of the existing Castor upper stage - no more, no less. It will be utterly uncompetitive on the open market, but that's fine, because the ~2 Cygnus launches it'll get each year are (evidently) enough to make the business case close for Northrop.
If this were not so, then Northrop surely wouldn't be doing this. They'd just go all-in on Firefly Beta/MLV and launch Cygnus on that from the get-go. I don't completely buy the argument that Antares 330 will be a "stop-gap" to hold Cygnus over until Beta is available. Getting Antares 330 to fly will require maybe 90%+ of the effort to get the real Beta flying. The only significant difference is the upper stage, and that's not really the hard part compared to the first stage. Surely Firefly could hack together a "minimum viable product" kerolox upper stage for Beta in the same time it'll take them to develop
two distinct first stage variants. It's not like it needs to be amazingly efficient; even a low-Isp, overweight kerolox stage will blow away a solid Castor in performance. I just don't see the liquid upper stage being the long pole in Beta's tent.
I would not be surprised if Northrop wants to keep flying Cygnus on Antares 330
even after Beta is successfully flying. Beta will be great for capturing the commercial market (the profits of which Northrop will share in through their "50/50" partnership, and perhaps even as outright owner by then). But continuing to make a "special version" of the Beta first stage for Antares may remain worthwhile simply as an excuse to keep selling Castors to themselves.