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#240
by
arachnitect
on 26 May, 2022 16:31
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At post landing press conference they said they were able recover RCS thrusters after undocking. They also tried the OMAC thrusters again and were not able to recover them. The thrusters did fire, but they again showed low pressure signatures. Working through fault tree and will probably conduct tests but do not anticipate major redesign.
They suspect one of the capsule RCS thrusters may have dropped out just before drogue parachute deployment. Need to review because it happened immediately before they all shut down anyway.
Valves that caused last scrub reportedly worked fine. They are comfortable with mitigations but did not rule out a redesign.
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#241
by
Surfdaddy
on 26 May, 2022 17:55
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The individual thrusters failed as a system. They didn't do what they were supposed to do, so alternate thrusters were used.
The "failed" thrusters may not have actually hardware failed, but it really doesn't matter the cause if they became unavailable and backups needed to be used.
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#242
by
Jim
on 26 May, 2022 18:24
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The thrusters (and cooling loop) just got added to the list. Yes maybe it was just red lines set too tightly. And the cooling loops was just water in the coolant.
It doesn't inspire confidence.
Go see early Dragon flights and see how close they were to losing one.
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#243
by
meekGee
on 26 May, 2022 18:30
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The thrusters (and cooling loop) just got added to the list. Yes maybe it was just red lines set too tightly. And the cooling loops was just water in the coolant.
It doesn't inspire confidence.
Go see early Dragon flights and see how close they were to losing one.
Whataboutism. I remember that flight very well.
And as others have said above - SpaceX's attitude before and after those incidents is what defined them and why they do inspire confidence.
They didn't think that simulations can replace tests, and they didn't think that "remediating" failed components makes a vehicle flyable.
And they didn't have that many independent and preventable failures at any time.
None of the failures I counted above were surprises, and it took 3 tries (and one lost and one almost lost vehicle) to get even this success to squeeze under the wire.
Basically, comparisons with SpaceX are not really serving your cause right now.
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#244
by
Jim
on 26 May, 2022 18:42
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and it took 3 tries (and one lost and one almost lost vehicle) to get even this success to squeeze under the wire.
Basically, comparisons with SpaceX are not really serving your cause right now.
it was only two, if you want make it three, then blowing up one after flight counts as a loss.
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#245
by
meekGee
on 26 May, 2022 18:45
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and it took 3 tries (and one lost and one almost lost vehicle) to get even this success to squeeze under the wire.
Basically, comparisons with SpaceX are not really serving your cause right now.
None lost and they didn't blow one up.
They tried to launch it and it broke badly enough that they had to discard it after getting to the broken parts.
The SpaceX unit was not about to launch. It was part of extra testing done just to be sure, and unlike Boeing's, it uncovered a real surprise.
Again, the whataboutism is both off-point and really not helping make Boeing look good here.
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#246
by
Lee Jay
on 26 May, 2022 18:50
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The individual thrusters failed as a system. They didn't do what they were supposed to do, so alternate thrusters were used.
The "failed" thrusters may not have actually hardware failed, but it really doesn't matter the cause if they became unavailable and backups needed to be used.
The cause most certainly does matter, both during the mission and after. The response to the failure changes entirely depending on if the cause was software, ground preparations, environment, or hardware failure (as examples). Some can be fixed on-orbit, some must be fixed on the ground, some require a simple fix, some require a re-design and re-qualification, and a lot of variation in between.
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#247
by
baldusi
on 26 May, 2022 19:52
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and it took 3 tries (and one lost and one almost lost vehicle) to get even this success to squeeze under the wire.
Basically, comparisons with SpaceX are not really serving your cause right now.
None lost and they didn't blow one up.
They tried to launch it and it broke badly enough that they had to discard it after getting to the broken parts.
The SpaceX unit was not about to launch. It was part of extra testing done just to be sure, and unlike Boeing's, it uncovered a real surprise.
Again, the whataboutism is both off-point and really not helping make Boeing look good here.
I think that Jim is stating with all his extensive prose, that SpaceX had just as many anomalies with the first flight, so did Energyia with Soyuz and Progress, and am pretty sure Shuttle, ATV, HTV and Shenzou also had their own set.
OFT-1 was another thing altogether. Since NASA got all their eyes on Starliner team and the necessary organizational changes were pushed, OFT-2 is par for the course for this sort of project.
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#248
by
meekGee
on 26 May, 2022 19:55
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and it took 3 tries (and one lost and one almost lost vehicle) to get even this success to squeeze under the wire.
Basically, comparisons with SpaceX are not really serving your cause right now.
None lost and they didn't blow one up.
They tried to launch it and it broke badly enough that they had to discard it after getting to the broken parts.
The SpaceX unit was not about to launch. It was part of extra testing done just to be sure, and unlike Boeing's, it uncovered a real surprise.
Again, the whataboutism is both off-point and really not helping make Boeing look good here.
I think that Jim is stating with all his extensive prose, that SpaceX had just as many anomalies with the first flight, so did Energyia with Soyuz and Progress, and am pretty sure Shuttle, ATV, HTV and Shenzou also had their own set.
OFT-1 was another thing altogether. Since NASA got all their eyes on Starliner team and the necessary organizational changes were pushed, OFT-2 is par for the course for this sort of project.
Right, agreed on that, but OFT-2 was flight attempt #3, and the reactions here incorporate the entire saga, including Boeing's responses.
Imagine if flight attempt #1 would have gone down like OFT-2. THAT would have been par.
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#249
by
SoftwareDude
on 27 May, 2022 04:01
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At the last news conference at 54:23 Marcia Smith asked a question similar to what I asked back on thread 5, for which I was um... well never mind. Anyway Martha Smith asked the following:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, they reviewed your program a couple of weeks ago. They came back and they said, they urged NASA and Boeing not to rush to CFT. And, certainly you've been saying this evening that you are not going to do that. But, I'm just curious. have they talked about a concern about the staffing level at Boeing; about the parachute and just how difficult it is to go from an uncrewed to crewed flight. So, I guess for Steve and Mark, could you just talk about how your feeling these days after the successful landing; about CFT after successful landing... Are you still looking at the end of the year? Or, realistically is it like in the first quarter of next year?
from here
I hadn't heard about the safety panel when I asked this:
What we see SpaceX do on each crewed launch does not happen by accident.
We learned at the news conference Boeing is going open the Starliner door on the pad and then close it and seal it again. Not an exact quote but something like, "Our guys will go up there and open the door."
Is Boeing flight operations ready? I noticed Boeing has an opening for a position in the Commercial Crew Program within Space & Launch, Job ID 00000315362, as Flight Operations Manager of Crewed Flight , in Titusville (see below). There are no other openings for crewed launch. Notice the date posted is 5/12/2022. Yeah, better get started, oh wait first must hire the manager. Check out the job description. It looks like Boeing has done nothing to get ready for crewed flight operations.
from here
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=51346.msg2369792#msg2369792Neither Steve nor Mark answered the question about staffing but did seem to hedge on the first quarter of next year. It seems to me that Boeing isn't ready for CFT based on what Marcia is saying. Why wouldn't they have opened this job much earlier? Why aren't there a ton more jobs open? Is there something going on at Boeing where the executives haven't bought into Starliner's future until OFT-2's success?
Also, what's the deal with the parachutes? Neither Steve nor Mark answered anything about a parachute problem as earlier everyone seemed so happy with the parachutes despite what the Safety Panel says. It almost sounds like the emphasis has been on getting Starliner to fly sans humans and not with them on board.
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#250
by
Surfdaddy
on 27 May, 2022 04:15
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The individual thrusters failed as a system. They didn't do what they were supposed to do, so alternate thrusters were used.
The "failed" thrusters may not have actually hardware failed, but it really doesn't matter the cause if they became unavailable and backups needed to be used.
The cause most certainly does matter, both during the mission and after. The response to the failure changes entirely depending on if the cause was software, ground preparations, environment, or hardware failure (as examples). Some can be fixed on-orbit, some must be fixed on the ground, some require a simple fix, some require a re-design and re-qualification, and a lot of variation in between.
Oh the cause matters, but if it can't be fixed on-orbit, then it failed regardless of cause, so the hair-splitting distinction of whether "the thruster hardware failed" versus "there was a failure that rendered a thruster inoperable" is really academic.
Luckily there are many redundancies in this case.
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#251
by
Jim
on 27 May, 2022 15:59
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Neither Steve nor Mark answered the question about staffing but did seem to hedge on the first quarter of next year. It seems to me that Boeing isn't ready for CFT based on what Marcia is saying. Why wouldn't they have opened this job much earlier? Why aren't there a ton more jobs open? Is there something going on at Boeing where the executives haven't bought into Starliner's future until OFT-2's success?
Also, what's the deal with the parachutes? Neither Steve nor Mark answered anything about a parachute problem as earlier everyone seemed so happy with the parachutes despite what the Safety Panel says. It almost sounds like the emphasis has been on getting Starliner to fly sans humans and not with them on board.
Just stop already. You are seeing things.
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#252
by
edzieba
on 27 May, 2022 17:04
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Also, what's the deal with the parachutes? Neither Steve nor Mark answered anything about a parachute problem as earlier everyone seemed so happy with the parachutes despite what the Safety Panel says. It almost sounds like the emphasis has been on getting Starliner to fly sans humans and not with them on board.
The parachute issue ASAP discussed occurred in a test nearly three years ago. Nothing to do with the recent flight.
The individual thrusters failed as a system. They didn't do what they were supposed to do, so alternate thrusters were used.
The "failed" thrusters may not have actually hardware failed, but it really doesn't matter the cause if they became unavailable and backups needed to be used.
The cause most certainly does matter, both during the mission and after. The response to the failure changes entirely depending on if the cause was software, ground preparations, environment, or hardware failure (as examples). Some can be fixed on-orbit, some must be fixed on the ground, some require a simple fix, some require a re-design and re-qualification, and a lot of variation in between.
Oh the cause matters, but if it can't be fixed on-orbit, then it failed regardless of cause, so the hair-splitting distinction of whether "the thruster hardware failed" versus "there was a failure that rendered a thruster inoperable" is really academic.
Luckily there are many redundancies in this case.
It
was fixed on orbit: the multiply redundant thrusters took over and all burns completed successfully. That's why there are so danged many of them!
Without further information on what actually occurred, the issue could be anywhere from "thruster blew into bits" (unlikely, given photos form the ISS) to "control software had a limit set too conservatively, and there was no reason to override it given all other other fully functioning thrusters". Jumping to conclusions over 'faulty thrusters' is premature.
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#253
by
SoftwareDude
on 27 May, 2022 17:18
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From the AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL, there was no answer in the press briefing to Marcia's question about this:
Dr. Magnus stated that the Panel would first like to correct a factual error in the ASAP Annual
Report for 2021. The following statement made on page 25 is incorrect: “The Panel’s concern is
that during the OFT-2 Flight Readiness Review (FRR), NASA and Boeing differed in how they
characterized the risk that was brought to light by the stuck propulsion valves.” The subject
technical issue was not the stuck propulsion valves, which were discovered post-FRR, but rather
a difference in risk characterization regarding the parachutes, Dr. Magnus clarified. However,
the point the Panel was making remains the same—different methods and approaches to
identifying and tracking risk can result in a disconnect in priorities about where resources should
be applied in addition to reaching a clear, broad understanding of the actual risk posture.
From here:
https://oiir.hq.nasa.gov/asap/documents/ASAP_2022_First_Quarterly_Public_Meeting_Minutes-Final-1.pdf
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#254
by
edzieba
on 27 May, 2022 17:29
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That's not a 'parachute problem', that's a risk management methodology problem (or rather, a problem in communicating risk management methodology).
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#255
by
SoftwareDude
on 27 May, 2022 18:03
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That's not a 'parachute problem', that's a risk management methodology problem (or rather, a problem in communicating risk management methodology).
There is clearly a disagreement on the risk of the parachutes because they have different methodologies for assessing risk; You are saying that the panel is concerned about the difference in methodology, not the parachutes. I get that part.
However, Marcia Smith brought up the parachutes. Her bio is here:
https://spacepolicyonline.com/about-us/ So, I am confused because it sounds like there is disagreement on the safety of the parachutes.
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#256
by
Lee Jay
on 27 May, 2022 18:12
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The individual thrusters failed as a system. They didn't do what they were supposed to do, so alternate thrusters were used.
The "failed" thrusters may not have actually hardware failed, but it really doesn't matter the cause if they became unavailable and backups needed to be used.
The cause most certainly does matter, both during the mission and after. The response to the failure changes entirely depending on if the cause was software, ground preparations, environment, or hardware failure (as examples). Some can be fixed on-orbit, some must be fixed on the ground, some require a simple fix, some require a re-design and re-qualification, and a lot of variation in between.
Oh the cause matters, but if it can't be fixed on-orbit, then it failed regardless of cause, so the hair-splitting distinction of whether "the thruster hardware failed" versus "there was a failure that rendered a thruster inoperable" is really academic.
Luckily there are many redundancies in this case.
There's nothing "lucky' about it - this is the exact reason why redundancies are designed in.
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#257
by
ppb
on 28 May, 2022 20:08
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[zubenelgenubi: Embedded image deleted. Image of Starliner jettisonning heat shield to deploy landing airbags]
I’m sure this has been hashed and rehashed, but this picture vividly illustrates why I would never fly on this spacecraft. Yes, all space vehicles have a number of deployments that must go perfectly for any crew to survive. But the engineering design decision to return to land, necessitating the requirement to make the heat shield completely detachable, is I believe, a bridge too far. Especially when you consider a very heavy service module also must be jettisoned minutes before that heat shield is needed to protect the occupants from a now-unavoidable fiery plunge into the exponentially dense lower atmosphere. I’m reminded of the worry over Friendship 7’s heat shield before John Glenn rode it in on America’s first manned reentry, and now the fuss over a recent Dragon heat shield failing a pre-qualification test. The heat shield is such a critical part, and no other manned spacecraft has ever designed it to be detachable; this Boeing design just does not inspire confidence, IMHO.
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#258
by
Gliderflyer
on 28 May, 2022 21:40
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....and no other manned spacecraft has ever designed it to be detachable.....
Soyuz and Shenzhou both drop the heatshield before landing.
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#259
by
AS_501
on 28 May, 2022 21:46
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Perhaps the only opinion that really matters here is from the astronaut corps. They were asked to assess the interior layout of Starliner, so I'm sure they would have voiced concerns about the heatshield if necessary.