Failure: ABL RS1 (first launch) : DEMO-1 : Kodiak LP-3C : 10 Jan 2023 23:27 UTC

[Steven Pietrobon]

Some screen grabs from the short video. Exact launch time appears to 23:27:31 UTC.

[Kryten]

 Could it have been a thrust-termination FTS system? The user guide doesn't go into any detail on FTS, but the website has a vague note about 'thrust termination for flight safety'. Admittedly that could be about preventing recontact at stage separation instead.

[eeergo]

Could it have been a thrust-termination FTS system? The user guide doesn't go into any detail on FTS, but the website has a vague note about 'thrust termination for flight safety'. Admittedly that could be about preventing recontact at stage separation instead.

One would assume that, that early in the flight, a thrust-termination FTS "for flight safety" would prioritize the safety of the launch pad, which was not safeguarded in this case. See the infamous Proton-Glonass flight with the hammer-coerced upside-down IMU: in spite of 180-degree-inaccurate wild readings, the launcher -equipped with a thrust-termination FTS- kept it at full throttle to maximize chances to clear the pad, since it had just lifted off and was going so slowly as to ensure it would still remain within the blast danger area at liftoff no matter the true direction it was heading towards.

Of course, the counter-argument to that is the Soyuz-Foton flight that fell awfully close to its pad after its FTS commanded thrust termination just before the pitch program really took effect: this could have been a similar occurrence. I would hope this FTS was better designed to protect range assets after the recent high frequency of pad-damaging failures at Kodiak.

[Bananas_on_Mars]

I think Eeergo is mixing up FTS and AFTS.
„Flight Termination System“ and „Autonomous Flight Termination System“.

One has a human in the loop that pushes a button, the other one acts autonomously through a computer that makes the decision.
I‘m sure there‘s no AFTS on Proton…

The aim of all those systems to protect the public by making sure the rocket or its remains don‘t fall outside designated zones. That means to make sure the rockets engines stop when the rocket is out of control. This can be achieved by blowing up the whole rocket, or simply by REALLY making sure the engines stop.

Thrust termination system just means they have a reliable system to shut those engines off as part of their FTS. That way, they don‘t need explosives on their vehicle, which simplifies a lot of handling.

[eeergo]

I think Eeergo is mixing up FTS and AFTS.
„Flight Termination System“ and „Autonomous Flight Termination System“.

One has a human in the loop that pushes a button, the other one acts autonomously through a computer that makes the decision.
I‘m sure there‘s no AFTS on Proton…

The aim of all those systems to protect the public by making sure the rocket or its remains don‘t fall outside designated zones. That means to make sure the rockets engines stop when the rocket is out of control. This can be achieved by blowing up the whole rocket, or simply by REALLY making sure the engines stop.

Thrust termination system just means they have a reliable system to shut those engines off as part of their FTS. That way, they don‘t need explosives on their vehicle, which simplifies a lot of handling.

I'm pretty positive many Russian LVs include what could be defined as AFTS (not in the current US sense of having the vehicle track itself through GNSS among other parameters, but a system that monitors certain parameters and will command a thrust termination event if certain redlines are exceeded, without the intervention of a human on the loop). Many launches, including the Soyuz-Foton I mentioned earlier, happen during very poor visibility periods for range operators, and they historically haven't been bothered by that - yet terminations have occurred. I'm sure there'll be someone with a button checking radar too, but there is a level of "AFTS" in those vehicles, pertaining only to thrust termination, that doesn't exist in other LVs worldwide.

Regardless of what Russian launchers do, my first statement holds: if (A)FTS was involved in the accident and it only involved engine shuttoff with no explosive detonations in flight, its algorithm should have included range asset safety, including the pad's. Since the pad suffered relevant damage, and the Kodiak facilities have been several times through this kind of events in the recent past, unless one assumes that they would allow the same thing to happen again, it's likely the (A)FTS was not a relevant actor in the failure.

Astra's "sideways-flying" flight (I remember which quadruple-zero designator it was ) is a good example of how an (A)FTS prioritizes infrastructure safety over immediate vehicle health: flight parameters were immediately out of nominal bounds as soon as it lifted off, yet it kept going in order to have a chance at avoiding having it explode right on/nearby the pad - as well as for the "luxury" of gaining more in-flight data while it kept limping around.

[PM3]

... presuming that the AFTS system itself did not fail (bad sensors, software glitch, wiring error, whatever).

[eeergo]

... presuming that the AFTS system itself did not fail (bad sensors, software glitch, wiring error, whatever).

That might indeed be a much bigger issue (FTS *has* to work with an exceptionally low probability of failure) - but we have no evidence towards that, provided no destructive FTS was implemented, which appears to be the case.

[Foximus]

I would hope this FTS was better designed to protect range assets after the recent high frequency of pad-damaging failures at Kodiak.

High Frequency as in the following?

Polaris STARS IV Failure in 2014 on LP-1
Astra Rocket 3.0 Failure in 2020 on 3-B


There has been only 2x FTS commanded Terminates sent at Kodiak on 2 Later Astra flights- Flights 4 and Flight 6.  one that resulted in a clean up on range grounds but not near the pad.


Also Astra Rocket 3.0 did not have AFTS/ AFSS.  It ran a thrust termination command destruct, so your comments about the early part of Flight LV0006 do not make sense, sorry.  The system was based on a Range Safety Officer having a "kill switch" for the vehicle to shut down all the engines (Instead of ordinance to blow it up).  I believe ABL is running the same.  (Firefly, alternatively, uses ordinance)

[FutureSpaceTourist]

https://twitter.com/lmspace/status/1613567751687385092

Space is hard.

But this week's launch attempt was a step forward and an opportunity to collect and analyze data to be leveraged for the future. We remain committed to supporting @ABLSpaceSystems as it develops these vehicles, including for the UK's first vertical launch.

[eeergo]

I would hope this FTS was better designed to protect range assets after the recent high frequency of pad-damaging failures at Kodiak.

High Frequency as in the following?

Polaris STARS IV Failure in 2014 on LP-1
Astra Rocket 3.0 Failure in 2020 on 3-B


There has been only 2x FTS commanded Terminates sent at Kodiak on 2 Later Astra flights- Flights 4 and Flight 6.  one that resulted in a clean up on range grounds but not near the pad.


Also Astra Rocket 3.0 did not have AFTS/ AFSS.  It ran a thrust termination command destruct, so your comments about the early part of Flight LV0006 do not make sense, sorry.  The system was based on a Range Safety Officer having a "kill switch" for the vehicle to shut down all the engines (Instead of ordinance to blow it up).  I believe ABL is running the same.  (Firefly, alternatively, uses ordinance)

Mmmm why the antagonism?

In addition to the two you mentioned:

- Polaris STARS IV Failure in 2014 on LP-1, which forced closure of the spaceport and a major cleanup of surrounding terrains.
- Astra Rocket 1 failure in 2018 on LP-2, which didn't destroy major facilities but forced a major range cleanup (https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/14/20913959/rocket-launch-environment-cleanup-soil-water-pollution)
- Astra Rocket 2 Failure in 2018 on LP-2, with the same result as the previous one: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2218048-exclusive-rocket-test-in-alaska-polluted-230-tonnes-of-soil/
- Astra Rocket 3.0 Failure in 2020 on 3-B, which was actually a dress rehearsal failure causing total LV destruction on the pad.
- Astra Rocket 3.1 failure in 2020 within spaceport grounds, unknown whether it destroyed major facilities from what I could gather: https://www.facebook.com/64200934/videos/10100980788269883

That's 5 failures involving range infrastructure and/or terrain needing reconstruction, within 6 years (with the last four failures happening in under 2 years) - pretty high frequency if you ask me, almost once a year; unheard of in any other range worldwide. Add ABL's failure to that, and it's 6 failures affecting the spaceport within 8 years, keeping up the average.

Additionally, the LV0006 flight you mention -thanks for the serial- didn't fail on the spaceport's grounds, but caused relevant blast damage to both pad and surrounding areas. My comment highlighted that range safety, whether AFTS or officers with a thrust termination button, prioritized infrastructure safety over vehicle parameters, unlike during the 3.1 launch, allowing the rocket to hobble along outside of its nominal corridor until it was no longer endangering the spaceport ()https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Astra_rocket_launches), so I'm unsure as to how my statements "don't make sense".

[Foximus]

Apologies, it just feels like broad statements, when there is a lot of nuance here.  IMO pad damage means something preventing another flight from going, vs an environmental cleanup somewhere else on range.

Only the STARS and Astra's 3.0 pad explosion resulted in pad infrastructure damage.  LV 1(and the 3.0 repairs were much less than STARS) 1.0, 2.0, 3.1 all resulted in contaminated soil cleanup, but the pad was fine and still usable.  Land on range was affected, but someone could have launched off LP2 or 3B after all except the 3.0 explosion.   From ABL's tweets, it sounds like infrastructure, (and their own GSE) are heavily impacted on Pad 3-C from this weekends event.

For Context, Astra LV0006 did not cause significant damage to the launch infrastructure or the range, the repairs post were actually fairly minimal.  In its ground movement there was nothing placing the vehicle outside of its documented parameters that would have caused Range Safety to shut it down at the pad level / early seconds in flight.  It is not like the RSO was doing a favor by letting it fly away from GSE to help the spaceport or the operator.  Astra 3.1 was terminated also once it was deemed to be leaving its trajectory corridor, thus why it flew for a minute or so

For note, Kodiak is far more available and affordable than a federal range slot, thus why Astra, ABL, and formerly Vector, all were doing development launches out of there.  I think you will continue to see new launchers view Kodiak as anm option for early flights based on those two items.  There is 1 multi user pad at the Cape, that's pretty booked up (46) and one at Vandy (8) that is available, vs 2-3 pad options in Kodiak.  Relativity has spent a lot of money to turn LC-16 back online and get it ready for Terran-1's flight.

edit/gongora: turned off smileys so 8) would display

[JEF_300]

Well, let's remember that ABL is one of those 'we can launch from a concrete pad' companies. Pad damage is still gonna suck, but it will probably suck a lot less than it would for a company using a traditional launch complex.

All of the engines shutting off, ironically, suggests that it's not an engine issue but a control issue. Which is promising, because a faulty sensor or software error is a lot quicker and easier to fix than an engine problem.

I'd bet they launch again before Q4.

[lightleviathan]

I feel like that ABL felt that they just needed to fly RS1, for one reason or another. They said that they were going to update after the conclusion of the mission, which makes me feel like they were just going to send it even if there were issues. I agree that ABL can certainly just fly again, the flexibility of their GSE is one of their selling points. But I don't think it was just a control issue. All of the launch scrubs have been due to the engines. Something like Astra's Rocket 3.1 failure. Time will tell what the cause is.

[eeergo]

Sentinel imagery appears to show some major blast area on top of infrastructure. Unclear how much of it is lighting, but there certainly is a three-lobed scorch mark around the pad.

https://mobile.twitter.com/Harry__Stranger/status/1613699380711948288

[Daniels30]

Update from Harry O'Hanley: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/harry-o-hanley-27087382_flight-1-was-a-big-milestone-there-is-good-activity-7019366309398274048-bfkg?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop

"Flight 1 was a big milestone. There is good we’re proud of and bad we’ll grow from. We ran a clean operation, proved our hold down release system and demonstrated the rocket can safely control flight. This is a huge positive. Early in the mission, our engines shutdown unexpectedly. This caused the rocket to fall back to the pad, resulting in significant damage to our site. This is a setback.

From a personal perspective, watching RS1 lift off was absolutely incredible. The technology is exciting, but what its really about for me is team. Five and a half years ago, I was sitting alone in my kitchen trying to figure out how to start a company. Earlier this week, I sat in Mission Control and watched a small team in lock step, ruthlessly execute a complex launch operation. They were backed by a big machine of a team, also operating expertly across every technical and business domain. Leading the company through it all and there for the trickiest of decisions was my partner, Dan Piemont. Supporting me personally, through every up and down, was my wife Marjorie Crowley O'Hanley. When you’ve stared up the mountain alone, it makes you really appreciate climbing alongside a strong team.

From corporate leadership perspective, this is one of many scenarios for which we planned and prepared the company. Failure is unpleasant. Yet, to run a strong launch program, it’s a possible outcome that you must be capable of managing through. Our infrastructure strategy is modular and deployable. We have additional GS0 units that we’ll cycle up to the launch site. The Flight 2 vehicle is built and will go through stage testing shortly.

The launch business is unique. You can have your biggest leap forward and then a big step backwards all within thirty seconds. As tough as it is, with the team we’ve got, we’ve got this."

[litton4]

They've not released any video of the actual launch and failure, apart from the feed showing it disappear out of shot?

[TrevorMonty]

Unfortunate to loss vehicle so early in flights. A few minutes of flight time would've been nice.

[JEF_300]

They've not released any video of the actual launch and failure, apart from the feed showing it disappear out of shot?

Not yet. I wouldn't expect it either. ABL doesn't share a lot.

For the record, I don't think that's because they don't have a lot to share, or because they don't want to share, but just because they haven't put much effort in to PR. ABL has always come across as an engineer's technology company to me, if you know what I mean. Or at any rate, their emphasis on simplicity, the total focus on hardware in the little promotional content they have made, and the apparent lack of an outgoing CEO/Owner/PR-face, gives me that vibe. Like they're a company full of Wozniaks, without a Jobs in sight.

[Steven Pietrobon]

Sentinel imagery appears to show some major blast area on top of infrastructure. Unclear how much of it is lighting, but there certainly is a three-lobed scorch mark around the pad.

Images from the tweet. I think the resolution is too low to really see anything.

[Foximus]

They've not released any video of the actual launch and failure, apart from the feed showing it disappear out of shot?

Not yet. I wouldn't expect it either. ABL doesn't share a lot.

For the record, I don't think that's because they don't have a lot to share, or because they don't want to share, but just because they haven't put much effort in to PR. ABL has always come across as an engineer's technology company to me, if you know what I mean. Or at any rate, their emphasis on simplicity, the total focus on hardware in the little promotional content they have made, and the apparent lack of an outgoing CEO/Owner/PR-face, gives me that vibe. Like they're a company full of Wozniaks, without a Jobs in sight.

Also, expect very little until the FAA Mishap report closes.