Just curious about some things from the NASA livestream of the CRS-21 docking.
You make some interesting assumptions, mainly that the windows that are monitoring the docking progress can do anything more than just that, monitor. You also assume that this isn't just a mirror workstation that is sending a full screen share from a control room monitor.
In either case, why would you be concerned about someone getting some kind of sensitive information from a public access livestream? I'm pretty confident neither SpaceX nor NASA are concerned about security breaches nor ITAR releases from a public access event.
As someone whose day job involves advanced operating systems security work - this is exactly right. ☝ Good security should not rely on obscurity (i.e. hoping people can't hack you because they don't know/can't guess your setup) for protection. It should rely on principles such as defense-in-depth and compartmentalization of sensitive information and functions to ensure security even against an adversary who knows exactly what he's attacking.
The workstation being livestreamed is almost certainly not the actual mission control workstation, but rather a low-security PAO workstation that's mirroring the live telemetry. We've seen evidence of such an arrangement in the past when (IIRC on the Demo-1 mission) the webcast hosts have said things like "the camera view we're showing you on our screen here isn't perfectly aligned with the docking port, but don't worry, the real one in mission control is".
In high-security setups like what NASA uses for mission control, the workstations that actually have access to and control of sensitive systems are typically connected only to internal networks that are firewalled off from the Internet and from less-secure internal networks. (Ideally they would be "airgapped", i.e. have no physical connection at all between them, but in practice there are probably a few careful, well-firewalled cross-links to allow one-directional flow of information such as live camera views and telemetry for broadcast.)
The ISS, for instance, has two separate computer networks on station: a "high-security" one for the computers that actually control things that matter, and a "low-security" one with Internet access for the astronauts to use for personal communication and downtime. This is why they can get away with critical station support computers still running old, out-of-date operating systems like Windows XP, because they are protected at a much higher level. (Frankly, if they were relying on keeping up on Windows updates to protect their critical computers from attack, they'd have already lost the battle, because well-resourced attackers have access to "zero-day" attacks which are unknown to the manufacturer and therefore not patched yet.) For this reason, you may notice that (counterintuitively) it's the
high-security computers on the station that are running the oldest and most out-of-date software. Having a channel in place to allow rapid updating could, in some respects, be itself a bigger attack vector than having their networks strongly compartmentalized. (It would also introduce the bigger problem of potentially breaking mission-critical control software due to its operating system changing out from under it; better to keep such things in a well-tested, known-stable configuration.)
So, if NASA's security team is doing their job
right (which they probably are, otherwise the ISS would have been hacked many times over by now - it's too high-profile a target to not have people knocking on its door), it shouldn't matter if they have "insecure" programs such as Internet Explorer or Outlook on their mission control computers. The
known insecurity of those computers' software goes far beyond a few "notorious" programs; a quick look at each month's update roster from any major software vendor makes it abundantly clear that
no commonly deployed operating system is trustworthy enough for protecting a system like this. That known insecurity, therefore, has to be mitigated at a higher level through strategies like compartmentalization and defense-in-depth. As much as it makes many of us "tech folks" cringe, I would in fact expect such computers to be using Internet Explorer internally (for accessing local sites on the firewalled intranet) for a long time to come - for the simple reason that they
don't have access to the Internet to maintain an up-to-date installation of a newer browser.
I don't want to sound like I'm coming down too hard on the OP, because this can be quite counterintuitive and contrary to popular advice (especially if one's exposure to the cybersecurity world is limited to personal computing and lower-security workplaces who are more concerned with liability and "best practices" than actual protection). Sadly, a lot of the "rules of thumb" people are told about how to "stay safe online" are vastly oversimplified and sometimes even counterproductive, and they break down most acutely in situations where high security is genuinely necessary.
(Apologies if this takes things off-topic; I often see these sorts of questions come up around space webcasts and wanted to chime in with some detailed answers. If this is too far afield for this thread, perhaps this sub-discussion could be moved to the "General ISS Q&A" thread.)