Commercial Crew - Discussion Thread 3

[woods170]

You are making this too complicated. Commercial crew is $220 million per flight not counting development(specifically the crew dragon which is the cheaper of the two vehicles). You need two of these to replace a space shuttle flight

Conversely, you need 12.8 shuttle flights for the 14 day duration to replace the 180 day (six month) duration.  (With the note that anything that requires a longer than two week stay is impossible).  You also have to magically walk back that Shuttle was retired for being unfixably unsafe.

You don't know that. There were a myriad of changes introduced after Challenger and that specific issue never reoccured. There was also a myriad of changes post Columbia(all factored into Shuttle operational costs) including changes to the ET, on orbit repair and inspection and keeping shuttles on standby in the event a Shuttle was disabled on orbit or couldn't return and needed to be rescued. A lot of that is above and beyond what is being done on the follow on program.

You should go back in time and let everyone who shut the program down know that they were wrong.  As well as all of the folks who calculated the projected LOM/LOC at 1 in 90 at the time of the end of the program.  I am sure they will all be fascinated to hear that you think they're wrong.

It was more aimed at the issues being unfixable. According to one of the later probabilistic risk assessments, the 4 greatest risks to the orbiter and crew in order of severity were...

1. MMOD debris risk (1 in 277)
2. SSME failure (1 in 652)
3. ascent debris (1 in 840)
4. crew error on entry (1 in 1220)
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100005659.pdf

The ascent debris is traditionally the only thing that was looked upon as intractable due to the side mount configuration. The increased MMOD risk due to the size of the vehicle would apply to almost anything of large size, but was hardly an intractable problem (better tracking for instance would reduce risks). In fact, the current crew vehicle(s) will only operate in an environment with improved tracking - given the air force(space force?) only deemed the space fence operational in March 2020 (prior to the first crewed Commercial Crew flight).

Half the people who died on shuttle missions would not have died had the Shuttle had a proper launch escape system. Which would have required the shuttle to be on top of the stack, not hanging off the side of it. And in that case the Columbia disaster would not have happened either, with the shuttle sitting on top of the stack: no risk of it being hit by ET debris.

So, with a shuttle design sporting a proper launch escape system those 14 astronauts would not have been dead.

That's why Shuttle was unfixably unsafe: there was no way to correct THE major design flaw in shuttle: side-mounted crew vehicle.

All improvements made after Challenger and Columbia were only attempts to mitigate only some of the consequences of this design flaw. They did NOT fix the design flaw itself.

Fixing the design flaw would have meant an entirely new design. That's how fundamentally wrong the design-decision was to side-mount the orbiter.

[mandrewa]

Having said all of that -- my third take on this -- is that it is still a very interesting
question to compare the relative cost of using the Space Shuttle to maintain an astronaut
on a six-month mission to the ISS versus the Crew Dragon plus Cargo Dragon.  To answer that
question we need to include the cost of the Cargo Dragon missions.  But I will save that for
another comment.

I wanted to share this study with you in-case you had not seen it.

"An Assessment of Cost Improvements in the NASA COTS/CRS programs and implications for future NASA missions." Edgar Zapata

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170008895

Thanks very much for pointing this out.  No, I had not seen this.

I am in the midst of reading it -- I'm on page 11 -- and this is very good.  But even though the author and I seem to be on the same wavelength, for instance when he briefly mentions "life cycle costs" at the beginning then I am pretty sure this is going to turn out to mean comparing things with development costs included -- and that he gets why that may be a better way to look at things than operational costs -- still I have many comments to make on the paper.

For instance on page 8 he has the "operational reoccurring cost per actual kg of cargo delivered to the ISS" at $89,000 per kg in 2017 dollars for SpaceX versus $135,000 for Orbital ATK versus $272,000 for a hypothetical Space Shuttle scenario.  And then I think well is that really the right price? 

Because here is the problem, all of these vehicles have multiple roles, but some more than others.  Shouldn't we try to put a discount on the price per kg for the other objectives being achieved?  One function of a Cargo Dragon is the pressurized cargo section which is used to carry food, consumables, and scientific equipment and experiments.  This is comparable to the pressurized cargo section of the Cygnus and the MPLM module on the Space Shuttle, and the numbers above are basically comparing each vehicle assuming that for each of these the only purpose of the vehicle is to carry up cargo in the pressurized section.

But the Cargo Dragon also has a large unpressurized trunk, and even though the mass of what is transported in the trunk is included in the calculations, still the contents of the trunk are usually of higher value per kg than what is in the pressurized section.  As evidence for that I note that there is a long list of equipment waiting to go up in the trunk of the Cargo Dragon.

And even more important is the Cargo Dragon's ability to return experiments.  This has made it possible to do many kinds of research that were impossible to do in the absence of the Space Shuttle, and in fact the Cargo Dragon's science return capability is better than the Space Shuttle since it runs approximately three times a year.

And if this is true for the Cargo Dragon isn't it even more the case for the Space Shuttle?  Shouldn't there be a discount on the cargo price to reflect the value of the astronauts carried up and down?  Shouldn't there be a discount for the science experiments returned once a year?

Or another example, and this is huge.  I get the virtue of looking at things from an operational cost perspective while ignoring the development cost.  In some contexts that really is the best way to look at things.  But I hadn't realized that the operational cost estimates for the Space Shuttle exclude the large amounts of money being spent every year during the life of the program in the attempt to improve the Space Shuttle.  Of course Edgar Zapata makes that point.  I'm gratefully to him for pointing it out.  And I would never have guessed that people were ignoring it.

[woods170]

Having said all of that -- my third take on this -- is that it is still a very interesting
question to compare the relative cost of using the Space Shuttle to maintain an astronaut
on a six-month mission to the ISS versus the Crew Dragon plus Cargo Dragon.  To answer that
question we need to include the cost of the Cargo Dragon missions.  But I will save that for
another comment.

I wanted to share this study with you in-case you had not seen it.

"An Assessment of Cost Improvements in the NASA COTS/CRS programs and implications for future NASA missions." Edgar Zapata

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170008895

Thanks very much for pointing this out.  No, I had not seen this.

I am in the midst of reading it -- I'm on page 11 -- and this is very good.  But even though the author and I seem to be on the same wavelength, for instance when he briefly mentions "life cycle costs" at the beginning then I am pretty sure this is going to turn out to mean comparing things with development costs included -- and that he gets why that may be a better way to look at things than operational costs -- still I have many comments to make on the paper.

For instance on page 8 he has the "operational reoccurring cost per actual kg of cargo delivered to the ISS" at $89,000 per kg in 2017 dollars for SpaceX versus $135,000 for Orbital ATK versus $272,000 for a hypothetical Space Shuttle scenario.  And then I think well is that really the right price? 

Because here is the problem, all of these vehicles have multiple roles, but some more than others.  Shouldn't we try to put a discount on the price per kg for the other objectives being achieved?  One function of a Cargo Dragon is the pressurized cargo section which is used to carry food, consumables, and scientific equipment and experiments.  This is comparable to the pressurized cargo section of the Cygnus and the MPLM module on the Space Shuttle, and the numbers above are basically comparing each vehicle assuming that for each of these the only purpose of the vehicle is to carry up cargo in the pressurized section.

But the Cargo Dragon also has a large unpressurized trunk, and even though the mass of what is transported in the trunk is included in the calculations, still the contents of the trunk are usually of higher value per kg than what is in the pressurized section.  As evidence for that I note that there is a long list of equipment waiting to go up in the trunk of the Cargo Dragon.

And even more important is the Cargo Dragon's ability to return experiments.  This has made it possible to do many kinds of research that were impossible to do in the absence of the Space Shuttle, and in fact the Cargo Dragon's science return capability is better than the Space Shuttle since it runs approximately three times a year.

And if this is true for the Cargo Dragon isn't it even more the case for the Space Shuttle?  Shouldn't there be a discount on the cargo price to reflect the value of the astronauts carried up and down?  Shouldn't there be a discount for the science experiments returned once a year?

Or another example, and this is huge.  I get the virtue of looking at things from an operational cost perspective while ignoring the development cost.  In some contexts that really is the best way to look at things.  But I hadn't realized that the operational cost estimates for the Space Shuttle exclude the large amounts of money being spent every year during the life of the program in the attempt to improve the Space Shuttle.  Of course Edgar Zapata makes that point.  I'm gratefully to him for pointing it out.  And I would never have guessed that people were ignoring it.

You are going into this analysis all wrong IMO. The metric NASA used for COTS/CRS was very simple: a fixed price for a fixed amount of upmass. For example: paying SpaceX $1.6 billion to deliver 20 metric tons op upmass to the ISS. NASA did not make distinction between pressurized and unpressurized upmass. Similar for Cygnus.

[ncb1397]

You are making this too complicated. Commercial crew is $220 million per flight not counting development(specifically the crew dragon which is the cheaper of the two vehicles). You need two of these to replace a space shuttle flight

Conversely, you need 12.8 shuttle flights for the 14 day duration to replace the 180 day (six month) duration.  (With the note that anything that requires a longer than two week stay is impossible).  You also have to magically walk back that Shuttle was retired for being unfixably unsafe.

You don't know that. There were a myriad of changes introduced after Challenger and that specific issue never reoccured. There was also a myriad of changes post Columbia(all factored into Shuttle operational costs) including changes to the ET, on orbit repair and inspection and keeping shuttles on standby in the event a Shuttle was disabled on orbit or couldn't return and needed to be rescued. A lot of that is above and beyond what is being done on the follow on program.

You should go back in time and let everyone who shut the program down know that they were wrong.  As well as all of the folks who calculated the projected LOM/LOC at 1 in 90 at the time of the end of the program.  I am sure they will all be fascinated to hear that you think they're wrong.

It was more aimed at the issues being unfixable. According to one of the later probabilistic risk assessments, the 4 greatest risks to the orbiter and crew in order of severity were...

1. MMOD debris risk (1 in 277)
2. SSME failure (1 in 652)
3. ascent debris (1 in 840)
4. crew error on entry (1 in 1220)
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100005659.pdf

The ascent debris is traditionally the only thing that was looked upon as intractable due to the side mount configuration. The increased MMOD risk due to the size of the vehicle would apply to almost anything of large size, but was hardly an intractable problem (better tracking for instance would reduce risks). In fact, the current crew vehicle(s) will only operate in an environment with improved tracking - given the air force(space force?) only deemed the space fence operational in March 2020 (prior to the first crewed Commercial Crew flight).

Half the people who died on shuttle missions would not have died had the Shuttle had a proper launch escape system. Which would have required the shuttle to be on top of the stack...

No, sidemount didn't have anything to do with launch abort. Any launch abort system could work on a similar trajectory to the ejection seats early on. The problem was the two deck seating arrangement. Regardless, the control surfaces produced the separation force for shuttle escape from the ET/SRBs, something that wouldn't be possible on a top mount configuration.

[mandrewa]

You are making this too complicated. Commercial crew is $220 million per flight not counting development(specifically the crew dragon which is the cheaper of the two vehicles). You need two of these to replace a space shuttle flight(yes, we could go through the hoops of hypothetically suggesting 7 crew per flight, but we could also imagine putting significantly more people on Shuttle than the nominal 7 (in fact it did fly with 8 people on occasion). You also need 2-3 cargo vehicles to replace its logistics capability when paired with a MPLM. Those cargo vehicles tend to cost about $200 million per flight (it varies based on vehicle and CRS-2 prices are more opaque than CRS-1 prices). So, the Shuttle replacement cost is probably on the order of $840-$1040 million dollars. Shuttle costs were somewhat higher than that counting development, but Ken Bowersox's estimate of 20%-40% isn't terribly inaccurate (it indeed is in the ballpark, not surprising coming from the acting HEOMD AA). There are decent savings, but the savings are often exaggerated.

Per Edgar Zapata, page 15, the reoccuring or incremental cost of the Space Shuttle
projected forward to 2017 would have been approximately $5.6 billion per year.  This
is the projected sum of the Space Shuttle operations budget and the yearly upgrade
budget, and although that latter is part of the development budget it still should be
included in the incremental budget given that it happened every year prior to the
decision to end the Space Shuttle program.
 
By 2005 the Space Shuttle manifest had been reduced to supporting the ISS and its
assembly (plus one service mission for the Hubble Space Telescope) because of
unacceptable odds of loss of crew.  This would have meant two flights a year to support
the ISS, once assembly was completed, assuming the Space Shuttle program had been continued.

Thus in this scenario it would have cost something close to $5.6 billion a year for
the Space Shuttle to have supported the ISS including supply, crew rotation, and
minor improvements to the ISS.

Two Crew Dragon missions at $220 million apiece plus $500 million for the current
American cargo missions to support the ISS (I'm using your estimate as I have not checked
this) adds up to $940 million per year, or 17% of the $5.6 billion the Space Shuttle program
would have cost in 2017 per Edgar Zapata's paper "An assessment of cost improvements in
the NASA COTS/CRS program and implications for future NASA missions."

I know I'm missing the point a bit, since you are, I suspect, talking about what the Space Shuttle
would have cost if it had not lost two Space Shuttles.  But if that is the case you should make
it clear that this is what you are assuming.  Unfortunately, even if you and I would imagine also Ken
Bowersox are making that assumption -- and you make it clear that this is the case -- it is still not
going be easy to separate what costs are coming from the accidents and what would remain
behind if they had not occurred.

Note also that all of this is basically from an operational perspective.  If we include the full development
costs of the programs the disparity grows greater.

[woods170]

Half the people who died on shuttle missions would not have died had the Shuttle had a proper launch escape system. Which would have required the shuttle to be on top of the stack...

No, sidemount didn't have anything to do with launch abort. Any launch abort system could work on a similar trajectory to the ejection seats early on. The problem was the two deck seating arrangement. Regardless, the control surfaces produced the separation force for shuttle escape from the ET/SRBs, something that wouldn't be possible on a top mount configuration.

Emphasis mine.

No. It was understood early on that such a set up (partially horizontal pad abort trajectory) would result in driving the crew escape cabin into the ground before any chance of opening parachutes. Same problem as the highly insufficient crew escape ejection seats that were on Gemini: no chance of survival in case of an ejected pad abort.
The only viable launch escape system that provided sufficient pad-abort survivability was one that shot the crew escape cabin straight up. The only shuttle concepts providing the launch vehicle clearance for a straight up pad abort trajectory were the top-mounted designs. When the top mounted designs lost out to the side mounted designs the fates of 14 astronauts were sealed.

[Steven Pietrobon]

Per Edgar Zapata, page 15, the reoccuring or incremental cost of the Space Shuttle
projected forward to 2017 would have been approximately $5.6 billion per year.

For FY1997 to FY2004, the cost was about $4B a year in $2010. The budget then went up to fix the problems found by Columbia, and then settled to $3B a year for FY2009 to FY2010. Thus, I think a more reasonable number for Shuttle costs had the program continued would be about $4B a year.

http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Programcosts.html#Shuttle

[eric z]

 People and relevant robots, I don't have the intellectual firepower or technical prowess to contribute much on this, but with your indulgence let me throw out some stuff. I agree the lack of a good launch escape system was a shuttle flaw, but wasn't part of the rational bandied about was that airliners don't have protection for the people either? We should also remember, and this is the tragedy of it, the accidents were predictable. The o-ring problem was known about; and so was the foam/debris shedding. IMHO, there is just too much shuttle-bashing around here - move on, please. It was a fantastic, innovative, ballsy [stand under one at the museums and think what it took to get that thing the size of an airliner up there!] stab at a whole new way of looking at space. Warts and all it opened up space to the world.
 Now when it comes to comparing apples and pound-cake, uh, shuttle and commercial crew, a lot of fixed-costs usually get counted against the shuttle program and often development costs too. Does the cost of Dragon 2 include the costs of Falcon development? Does Starliner's cost include the decades-long costs of buffing the Atlas into the great rocket it is now? Do the commercial crew providers reimburse the Pentagon for the cost of the Space Fence?
 Who paid for all the roads and rails this stuff boogies around on to get to the launch pad? You get my drift.
 Overdoing these comparisons leads only to headache- though in small ways they may be useful here and there.
Stinck to Dragon vs. Starliner , and not keep bringing the long-retired shuttle into it may be the best bet. After all we don't go around arguing should we have built the interstate highways, or fought WW2 more "Efficiently".
 Next up, how in heck can they come up with these mmod Numbers?

[abaddon]

Bowersox opened that door.  Perhaps you should aim your lecture at him.

[mandrewa]

Per Edgar Zapata, page 15, the reoccuring or incremental cost of the Space Shuttle
projected forward to 2017 would have been approximately $5.6 billion per year.

For FY1997 to FY2004, the cost was about $4B a year in $2010. The budget then went up to fix the problems found by Columbia, and then settled to $3B a year for FY2009 to FY2010. Thus, I think a more reasonable number for Shuttle costs had the program continued would be about $4B a year.

http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Programcosts.html#Shuttle

Claude Lafleur's numbers are in 2010 dollars and Edgar Zapata's are in 2017 dollars.

NASA stopped funding new R&D to improve the Space Shuttle in 2005 when the decision was made
to restrict the Space Shuttle to ISS assembly.  The R&D programs that had already begun, and that
would include those that were initiated in response to the loss of Columbia were allowed to
play out, but basically the amount of money being spent on Space Shuttle development rapidly
ramped down.

Edgar Zapata's point of departure was the 2003 budget, or the sum of the Space Shuttle operational
budget and the Space Shuttle R&D budget before the loss of Columbia, and then project that
forward, adjusted for inflation.  And then if I understand him, he adjusted that number downward
since it would have been too large a percentage of NASA's actual budget in 2017.

Quote: "Another approach is to take the Shuttle’s costs and adjust upwards only for the budget
increases NASA has actually seen since the Shuttle was operational."

And that is the approach that Zapata followed.

The sad truth is that $5.6 billion probably understates the amount of money that NASA would have
been spending on the Space Shuttle in 2017 if the program had been continued.

[Hog]

Half the people who died on shuttle missions would not have died had the Shuttle had a proper launch escape system. Which would have required the shuttle to be on top of the stack...

No, sidemount didn't have anything to do with launch abort. Any launch abort system could work on a similar trajectory to the ejection seats early on. The problem was the two deck seating arrangement. Regardless, the control surfaces produced the separation force for shuttle escape from the ET/SRBs, something that wouldn't be possible on a top mount configuration.

Emphasis mine.

No. It was understood early on that such a set up (partially horizontal pad abort trajectory) would result in driving the crew escape cabin into the ground before any chance of opening parachutes. Same problem as the highly insufficient crew escape ejection seats that were on Gemini: no chance of survival in case of an ejected pad abort.
The only viable launch escape system that provided sufficient pad-abort survivability was one that shot the crew escape cabin straight up. The only shuttle concepts providing the launch vehicle clearance for a straight up pad abort trajectory were the top-mounted designs. When the top mounted designs lost out to the side mounted designs the fates of 14 astronauts were sealed.

Emphasis mine
That's pure poppycock.
The Gemini ejection seats provided sufficient envelop for a safe "pad abort" scenario. You are describing an often repeated falsehood about the Gemini ejection system.  The beliefs/attitudes of astronauts are one thing, but the data and first hand experiences of engineers involved in the testing/development of the system is quite another.

A brief excerpt from a Gemini project engineer
"I was the project test engineer on Gemini for Weber Aircraft.  We were tasked to design, test and qualify it for McDonnell Aircraft (MAC) and NASA.  We, Weber Aircraft spent three years in providing an escape system that was the most sophisticated and complex system ever envisioned.  It had to provide the astronaut occupants with safe egress and recovery from (1) a pad abort condition should the booster suffer a catastrophic failure.  The system had to eject the occupants more than 500 feet away and bring them safely to earth via a personal parachute, (2) a high speed max Q condition during the boost phase, (3) a high speed Mach 4 ejection at 45,000 and (4) a high altitude ejection up to 70,000 feet.  A whole lot more than those currently in service with the F-35, F-22, F-16, F-15, B-2, etc.  Weber also provided the lightweight systems used in NASA lifting bodies M2-F2, HL-10 and X-24 in addition to those for the LLRV and LLTV ( have the filmed footage of Neil Armstrong, Joe Algranti and Stuart Present ejecting from it).

Astronaut safety was the primary concern throughout the program and every conceivable failure mode and environment was considered.  "

 Pressure suits, or the lack thereof prevented them from retaining consciousness and prevented them from being able to attempt to escape from the crew cabin. Post STS-51-L flight manuals had manual bailout procedures specifically for Post liftoff, pre SRB-separation vehicle breakup scenarios located on the last page.

And why did the Orbiter move from the top mount to the side mount?  To allow for a larger cargo bay, which required a larger orbiter. And why did the Orbiter Vehicle need a larger payload bay?  There is no single answer.  STS was cancelled due to "safety".  Pure BS, it was a political move in the guise of "safety".  The American public was/is living in a culture that is 100% averse to adversity.  We can't seem to stomach death even though not a single one of us will escape it.  I'd rather "punch out" riding a rocket at 50 years of age, than die at 90 riding a bedpan. 
.
1 failed launch out of 135 attempts
1 failed entry out of 134 attempts.  If that's "inherently unsafe", I question exactly what people think "safe" is?

[woods170]

Half the people who died on shuttle missions would not have died had the Shuttle had a proper launch escape system. Which would have required the shuttle to be on top of the stack...

No, sidemount didn't have anything to do with launch abort. Any launch abort system could work on a similar trajectory to the ejection seats early on. The problem was the two deck seating arrangement. Regardless, the control surfaces produced the separation force for shuttle escape from the ET/SRBs, something that wouldn't be possible on a top mount configuration.

Emphasis mine.

No. It was understood early on that such a set up (partially horizontal pad abort trajectory) would result in driving the crew escape cabin into the ground before any chance of opening parachutes. Same problem as the highly insufficient crew escape ejection seats that were on Gemini: no chance of survival in case of an ejected pad abort.
The only viable launch escape system that provided sufficient pad-abort survivability was one that shot the crew escape cabin straight up. The only shuttle concepts providing the launch vehicle clearance for a straight up pad abort trajectory were the top-mounted designs. When the top mounted designs lost out to the side mounted designs the fates of 14 astronauts were sealed.

Emphasis mine
That's pure poppycock.
The Gemini ejection seats provided sufficient envelop for a safe "pad abort" scenario. You are describing an often repeated falsehood about the Gemini ejection system.  The beliefs/attitudes of astronauts are one thing, but the data and first hand experiences of engineers involved in the testing/development of the system is quite another.

A brief excerpt from a Gemini project engineer
"I was the project test engineer on Gemini for Weber Aircraft.  We were tasked to design, test and qualify it for McDonnell Aircraft (MAC) and NASA.  We, Weber Aircraft spent three years in providing an escape system that was the most sophisticated and complex system ever envisioned.  It had to provide the astronaut occupants with safe egress and recovery from (1) a pad abort condition should the booster suffer a catastrophic failure.  The system had to eject the occupants more than 500 feet away and bring them safely to earth via a personal parachute, (2) a high speed max Q condition during the boost phase, (3) a high speed Mach 4 ejection at 45,000 and (4) a high altitude ejection up to 70,000 feet.  A whole lot more than those currently in service with the F-35, F-22, F-16, F-15, B-2, etc.  Weber also provided the lightweight systems used in NASA lifting bodies M2-F2, HL-10 and X-24 in addition to those for the LLRV and LLTV ( have the filmed footage of Neil Armstrong, Joe Algranti and Stuart Present ejecting from it).

Astronaut safety was the primary concern throughout the program and every conceivable failure mode and environment was considered.  "

 Pressure suits, or the lack thereof prevented them from retaining consciousness and prevented them from being able to attempt to escape from the crew cabin. Post STS-51-L flight manuals had manual bailout procedures specifically for Post liftoff, pre SRB-separation vehicle breakup scenarios located on the last page.

And why did the Orbiter move from the top mount to the side mount?  To allow for a larger cargo bay, which required a larger orbiter. And why did the Orbiter Vehicle need a larger payload bay?  There is no single answer.  STS was cancelled due to "safety".  Pure BS, it was a political move in the guise of "safety".  The American public was/is living in a culture that is 100% averse to adversity.  We can't seem to stomach death even though not a single one of us will escape it.  I'd rather "punch out" riding a rocket at 50 years of age, than die at 90 riding a bedpan. 
.
1 failed launch out of 135 attempts
1 failed entry out of 134 attempts.  If that's "inherently unsafe", I question exactly what people think "safe" is?

Question all you want. It was NASA who decided that Shuttle's 1-in-90 proven chance of LOC was unacceptable. Had shuttle not been cancelled it would have been a matter of time before a third shuttle - and it's crew - would have been lost.

Also, I suggest you do not assume that - just because there are boost-phase bailout instructions - that such a bailout would actually save the lives of the astronauts.

[Lars-J]

Half the people who died on shuttle missions would not have died had the Shuttle had a proper launch escape system. Which would have required the shuttle to be on top of the stack...

No, sidemount didn't have anything to do with launch abort. Any launch abort system could work on a similar trajectory to the ejection seats early on. The problem was the two deck seating arrangement. Regardless, the control surfaces produced the separation force for shuttle escape from the ET/SRBs, something that wouldn't be possible on a top mount configuration.

Emphasis mine.

No. It was understood early on that such a set up (partially horizontal pad abort trajectory) would result in driving the crew escape cabin into the ground before any chance of opening parachutes. Same problem as the highly insufficient crew escape ejection seats that were on Gemini: no chance of survival in case of an ejected pad abort.
The only viable launch escape system that provided sufficient pad-abort survivability was one that shot the crew escape cabin straight up. The only shuttle concepts providing the launch vehicle clearance for a straight up pad abort trajectory were the top-mounted designs. When the top mounted designs lost out to the side mounted designs the fates of 14 astronauts were sealed.

Emphasis mine
That's pure poppycock.
The Gemini ejection seats provided sufficient envelop for a safe "pad abort" scenario. You are describing an often repeated falsehood about the Gemini ejection system.  The beliefs/attitudes of astronauts are one thing, but the data and first hand experiences of engineers involved in the testing/development of the system is quite another.

A brief excerpt from a Gemini project engineer
"I was the project test engineer on Gemini for Weber Aircraft.  We were tasked to design, test and qualify it for McDonnell Aircraft (MAC) and NASA.  We, Weber Aircraft spent three years in providing an escape system that was the most sophisticated and complex system ever envisioned.  It had to provide the astronaut occupants with safe egress and recovery from (1) a pad abort condition should the booster suffer a catastrophic failure.  The system had to eject the occupants more than 500 feet away and bring them safely to earth via a personal parachute, (2) a high speed max Q condition during the boost phase, (3) a high speed Mach 4 ejection at 45,000 and (4) a high altitude ejection up to 70,000 feet.  A whole lot more than those currently in service with the F-35, F-22, F-16, F-15, B-2, etc.  Weber also provided the lightweight systems used in NASA lifting bodies M2-F2, HL-10 and X-24 in addition to those for the LLRV and LLTV ( have the filmed footage of Neil Armstrong, Joe Algranti and Stuart Present ejecting from it).

Astronaut safety was the primary concern throughout the program and every conceivable failure mode and environment was considered.  "

You keep posting this same snippet, but where is the documentation that backs this up, other than the subjective view of an engineer that was involved? Surely there is footage and documentation from actual tests somewhere?

[jedsmd]

[leovinus]

Half the people who died on shuttle missions would not have died had the Shuttle had a proper launch escape system. Which would have required the shuttle to be on top of the stack...

No, sidemount didn't have anything to do with launch abort. Any launch abort system could work on a similar trajectory to the ejection seats early on. The problem was the two deck seating arrangement. Regardless, the control surfaces produced the separation force for shuttle escape from the ET/SRBs, something that wouldn't be possible on a top mount configuration.

Emphasis mine.

No. It was understood early on that such a set up (partially horizontal pad abort trajectory) would result in driving the crew escape cabin into the ground before any chance of opening parachutes. Same problem as the highly insufficient crew escape ejection seats that were on Gemini: no chance of survival in case of an ejected pad abort.
The only viable launch escape system that provided sufficient pad-abort survivability was one that shot the crew escape cabin straight up. The only shuttle concepts providing the launch vehicle clearance for a straight up pad abort trajectory were the top-mounted designs. When the top mounted designs lost out to the side mounted designs the fates of 14 astronauts were sealed.

Emphasis mine
That's pure poppycock.
The Gemini ejection seats provided sufficient envelop for a safe "pad abort" scenario. You are describing an often repeated falsehood about the Gemini ejection system.  The beliefs/attitudes of astronauts are one thing, but the data and first hand experiences of engineers involved in the testing/development of the system is quite another.

A brief excerpt from a Gemini project engineer
"I was the project test engineer on Gemini for Weber Aircraft.  We were tasked to design, test and qualify it for McDonnell Aircraft (MAC) and NASA.  We, Weber Aircraft spent three years in providing an escape system that was the most sophisticated and complex system ever envisioned.  It had to provide the astronaut occupants with safe egress and recovery from (1) a pad abort condition should the booster suffer a catastrophic failure.  The system had to eject the occupants more than 500 feet away and bring them safely to earth via a personal parachute, (2) a high speed max Q condition during the boost phase, (3) a high speed Mach 4 ejection at 45,000 and (4) a high altitude ejection up to 70,000 feet.  A whole lot more than those currently in service with the F-35, F-22, F-16, F-15, B-2, etc.  Weber also provided the lightweight systems used in NASA lifting bodies M2-F2, HL-10 and X-24 in addition to those for the LLRV and LLTV ( have the filmed footage of Neil Armstrong, Joe Algranti and Stuart Present ejecting from it).

Astronaut safety was the primary concern throughout the program and every conceivable failure mode and environment was considered.  "

You keep posting this same snippet, but where is the documentation that backs this up, other than the subjective view of an engineer that was involved? Surely there is footage and documentation from actual tests somewhere?

To back up Hog's account

The Gemini ejection seats provided sufficient envelop for a safe "pad abort" scenario.

, five minutes of searching on NTRS with Gemini+Weber leads to On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini. Search the document for e.g. Weber and simulated off-the-pad ejections (SOPE) and you'll find on p152-154 that the development was not easy but successful in the end. Includes pictures btw. Bonus points if you follow the word "safety" through the PDF which makes it clear it was very important for Gemini.

Someone else can dig up actual testing footage

[Lars-J]

You keep posting this same snippet, but where is the documentation that backs this up, other than the subjective view of an engineer that was involved? Surely there is footage and documentation from actual tests somewhere?

To back up Hog's account

The Gemini ejection seats provided sufficient envelop for a safe "pad abort" scenario.

, five minutes of searching on NTRS with Gemini+Weber leads to On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini. Search the document for e.g. Weber and simulated off-the-pad ejections (SOPE) and you'll find on p152-154 that the development was not easy but successful in the end. Includes pictures btw. Bonus points if you follow the word "safety" through the PDF which makes it clear it was very important for Gemini.

Someone else can dig up actual testing footage

Well that footage above certainly proved that the ejection seat can work, but not that it would be safe. (and no one doubted that am ejection seat can eject) That video in particular shows that depending on the wind, the astronauts would end up right back in the flaming fireball.

[leovinus]

You keep posting this same snippet, but where is the documentation that backs this up, other than the subjective view of an engineer that was involved? Surely there is footage and documentation from actual tests somewhere?

To back up Hog's account

The Gemini ejection seats provided sufficient envelop for a safe "pad abort" scenario.

, five minutes of searching on NTRS with Gemini+Weber leads to On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini. Search the document for e.g. Weber and simulated off-the-pad ejections (SOPE) and you'll find on p152-154 that the development was not easy but successful in the end. Includes pictures btw. Bonus points if you follow the word "safety" through the PDF which makes it clear it was very important for Gemini.

Someone else can dig up actual testing footage

Well that footage above certainly proved that the ejection seat can work, but not that it would be safe. That video in particular shows that depending on the wind, the astronauts would end up right back in the flaming fireball.

IMHO, the use of any escape system beats the alternative in case of a pad explosion.

Nice video, which probably should be discussed further in the Gemini Crew Rescue/Abort System thread.

[Hog]

Half the people who died on shuttle missions would not have died had the Shuttle had a proper launch escape system. Which would have required the shuttle to be on top of the stack...

No, sidemount didn't have anything to do with launch abort. Any launch abort system could work on a similar trajectory to the ejection seats early on. The problem was the two deck seating arrangement. Regardless, the control surfaces produced the separation force for shuttle escape from the ET/SRBs, something that wouldn't be possible on a top mount configuration.

Emphasis mine.

No. It was understood early on that such a set up (partially horizontal pad abort trajectory) would result in driving the crew escape cabin into the ground before any chance of opening parachutes. Same problem as the highly insufficient crew escape ejection seats that were on Gemini: no chance of survival in case of an ejected pad abort.
The only viable launch escape system that provided sufficient pad-abort survivability was one that shot the crew escape cabin straight up. The only shuttle concepts providing the launch vehicle clearance for a straight up pad abort trajectory were the top-mounted designs. When the top mounted designs lost out to the side mounted designs the fates of 14 astronauts were sealed.

Emphasis mine
That's pure poppycock.
The Gemini ejection seats provided sufficient envelop for a safe "pad abort" scenario. You are describing an often repeated falsehood about the Gemini ejection system.  The beliefs/attitudes of astronauts are one thing, but the data and first hand experiences of engineers involved in the testing/development of the system is quite another.

A brief excerpt from a Gemini project engineer
"I was the project test engineer on Gemini for Weber Aircraft.  We were tasked to design, test and qualify it for McDonnell Aircraft (MAC) and NASA.  We, Weber Aircraft spent three years in providing an escape system that was the most sophisticated and complex system ever envisioned.  It had to provide the astronaut occupants with safe egress and recovery from (1) a pad abort condition should the booster suffer a catastrophic failure.  The system had to eject the occupants more than 500 feet away and bring them safely to earth via a personal parachute, (2) a high speed max Q condition during the boost phase, (3) a high speed Mach 4 ejection at 45,000 and (4) a high altitude ejection up to 70,000 feet.  A whole lot more than those currently in service with the F-35, F-22, F-16, F-15, B-2, etc.  Weber also provided the lightweight systems used in NASA lifting bodies M2-F2, HL-10 and X-24 in addition to those for the LLRV and LLTV ( have the filmed footage of Neil Armstrong, Joe Algranti and Stuart Present ejecting from it).

Astronaut safety was the primary concern throughout the program and every conceivable failure mode and environment was considered.  "

 Pressure suits, or the lack thereof prevented them from retaining consciousness and prevented them from being able to attempt to escape from the crew cabin. Post STS-51-L flight manuals had manual bailout procedures specifically for Post liftoff, pre SRB-separation vehicle breakup scenarios located on the last page.

And why did the Orbiter move from the top mount to the side mount?  To allow for a larger cargo bay, which required a larger orbiter. And why did the Orbiter Vehicle need a larger payload bay?  There is no single answer.  STS was cancelled due to "safety".  Pure BS, it was a political move in the guise of "safety".  The American public was/is living in a culture that is 100% averse to adversity.  We can't seem to stomach death even though not a single one of us will escape it.  I'd rather "punch out" riding a rocket at 50 years of age, than die at 90 riding a bedpan. 
.
1 failed launch out of 135 attempts
1 failed entry out of 134 attempts.  If that's "inherently unsafe", I question exactly what people think "safe" is?

Question all you want. It was NASA who decided that Shuttle's 1-in-90 proven chance of LOC was unacceptable. Had shuttle not been cancelled it would have been a matter of time before a third shuttle - and it's crew - would have been lost.

Also, I suggest you do not assume that - just because there are boost-phase bailout instructions - that such a bailout would actually save the lives of the astronauts.

1) It was President Bush in his Vision for Space Exploration that deemed Shuttle to be retired.  It was NASA that made the requirement for 1/240 probability of LOC/V for Commercial Crew.  SLS is what, 1 in 87 chances albeit for a circumlunar mission.

2) I suggest that you actually read what I wrote.  I wrote "Pressure suits, or the lack thereof prevented them from retaining consciousness and prevented them from being able to attempt to escape from the crew cabin."  The "shirt sleeves" environment almost assuredly made escape at altitude impossible. The astronauts took a momentary G load equivalent to some ejection seats, ascended upwards for thousands of feet post breakup and descended for 10's of thousands of feet over 2-1/2 minutes.  A conscious crewmember would have had to blow the hatch and get through the hole.  Would it have been as "organized" as a gliding bailout, no, but there was no escape pole, nor harness to clip to it, just get through the hatch hole and freefall to 15,000 feet where the chute would open automatically. Still many hazards after canopy opening but I'd take a "fighting chance" over simply closing my eyes and hoping, anyday.

Just because todays Commercial Crew vehicles have escape/abort systems, crew survivability is not "assured".  Life is fragile.

[Hog]

You keep posting this same snippet, but where is the documentation that backs this up, other than the subjective view of an engineer that was involved? Surely there is footage and documentation from actual tests somewhere?

To back up Hog's account

The Gemini ejection seats provided sufficient envelop for a safe "pad abort" scenario.

, five minutes of searching on NTRS with Gemini+Weber leads to On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini. Search the document for e.g. Weber and simulated off-the-pad ejections (SOPE) and you'll find on p152-154 that the development was not easy but successful in the end. Includes pictures btw. Bonus points if you follow the word "safety" through the PDF which makes it clear it was very important for Gemini.

Someone else can dig up actual testing footage

Well that footage above certainly proved that the ejection seat can work, but not that it would be safe. (and no one doubted that am ejection seat can eject) That video in particular shows that depending on the wind, the astronauts would end up right back in the flaming fireball.

The subjective view of a test engineer (Gordon Cress- project test engineer on Gemini for Weber Aircraft) that was actually there, is good enough for me.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Really?   We are talking about space launches here.  The safest Commercial Crew vehicle is the one that stays on the drawing board/CAD screen, ie never flies. Papercuts/eyestrain notwithstanding.

[Nomadd]

 Getting out of bed isn't "safe". Staying in bed isn't "safe". Citing a failure to "prove something safe" is meaningless because there is no such thing. There are only odds and standards. If you have a system with a 1 in 90 chance of failure, and an escape scheme that works 80% of the time, you've met your 1 in 270 odds.
 
 If there are 100,000 people living in space or on other planets in 40 years, any actions you take safety wise will save lives that would have been lost, and will likely cost lives that wouldn't have been lost. If you can't find it within yourself to accept the responsibility, you shouldn't be in the game. That's why we use data and not cliches to make the decisions.