Commercial Crew - Discussion Thread 3

[TripleSeven]

Anyways, CCP was right to be more concerned with SpaceX's reliability than Boeing's. Boeing had a partially damaged service module while SpaceX has had triple parachute failures, destroyed capsules and 2 launch failures. If SpaceX wants to be treated the same, they have to be the same.

While we're clutching pearls on development failures, let's include the Atlas V failure on Cygnus OA-6.  If that would have happened with a 13000kg CTS-100 vs. a 7500kg Cygnus, it would have been LOM & possibly LOC.

this is what the Launch escape system is designed to deal with

[abaddon]

While we're talking about failures: https://spacenews.com/inspector-general-report-says-nasa-risks-losing-access-to-the-iss-in-2020/

while failures of two main parachutes on a cargo Dragon spacecraft in August 2018 required “additional work to improve load balancing on the planned crewed parachute system.”

Was this previously known?  If it was I completely missed it at the time.  Which mission was this?  Was there any adverse impact on the cargo return?

[ugordan]

https://twitter.com/thesheetztweetz/status/1195083288752402432

NASA letter in response to the latest OIG Commercial Crew report:

"NASA strongly disagrees with the OIG's characterization that NASA 'overpaid'" when granting Boeing $287.2 million in additional awards.

Naturally NASA disagrees with the OIG. If they would admit that OIG might have a point NASA would be shooting itself in the foot.

"... and also represents the value to NASA and the nation of having two independent U.S. human space transportation systems supporting ISS operations"

Am I reading too much into this statement, or is it actually NASA lowkey admitting that Boeing was about to pull out of comm. crew otherwise?

Boeing denies this and there is no solid evidence for it

Well, if Boeing denies it then that's that.

/s

[Stan-1967]

[

this is what the Launch escape system is designed to deal with

Then I guess CRS-7 & AMOS events can be brushed off since a D2 could have survived both events. 

[Stan-1967]

While we're clutching pearls on development failures, let's include the Atlas V failure on Cygnus OA-6.  If that would have happened with a 13000kg CTS-100 vs. a 7500kg Cygnus, it would have been LOM & possibly LOC.

LOM, very likely, although it seems plausible the CST SM could make up the shortfall.  LOC?  Seems very unlikely.  The CST-100+SM should be quite capable of a once-around orbit and immediate deorbit.  What would make LOC more likely than a normal deorbit, specifically?

“Possible LOC” was the operative part.  Abort scenarios have there own set of inherent risk.  In the case of the OA-6 failure mode,  how and when does the flight computer realize the performance shortfall?  If soon into the flight,  abort can happen early & a downrange water landing can be attempted.  If later into the Centaur burn,  there will be a point where it is too far downrange & maybe an abort to a lower orbit can be done.  That’s probably best case.  Are the CST-100 abort motors usefull for orbit raising and guidance to make up for a DV shortfall?  I have no idea,  but I’ve never heard the scenario discussed.  All of these have LOC risk compared to the nominal profile.

[ncb1397]

[

this is what the Launch escape system is designed to deal with

Then I guess CRS-7 & AMOS events can be brushed off since a D2 could have survived both events.

This is false equivalence.A disintegrating upper stage isn't the same as early shutdown of the first stage. OA-6 is most like the CRS engine out, which hasn't been listed here as a serious event(nor should it be). This is happening quite a bit here, as problems with propulsion systems, parachutes and launch vehicles have all been more serious on the SpaceX side.

Are the CST-100 abort motors usefull for orbit raising and guidance to make up for a DV shortfall?

Considering the nominal situation is a DV shortfall...

[meberbs]

[

this is what the Launch escape system is designed to deal with

Then I guess CRS-7 & AMOS events can be brushed off since a D2 could have survived both events.

This is false equivalence.A disintegrating upper stage isn't the same as early shutdown of the first stage. OA-6 is most like the CRS engine out, which hasn't been listed here as a serious event(nor should it be). This is happening quite a bit here, as problems with propulsion systems, parachutes and launch vehicles have all been more serious on the SpaceX side.

A disintegrating second stage during first stage flight is a trivial case for abort system to recognize and respond to, and is about as nominal of an abort as you could ask for. A slight performance shortfall leading to a failure to reach orbit is not an obvious abort scenario and it is unclear when and how it would be detected and what the appropriate response would be. Either one is loss of mission.

There is exactly zero evidence to support your claim that SpaceX failures are more serious. Your previous post claiming this included egregiously false statements.

[jjyach]

Having worked with various Boeing programs over the years, this doesn't surprise me at all.  It is pretty much their standard MO.  They underbid competitive contracts to a pint where they know they will not be able to finish without taking a loss then threaten to give up an extort more money right before finish.  It's happened on pretty much 75% of the programs I've dealt with them on.  The Proposal/Business development folks aren't held liable if the program cannot function as they get their incentives for winning the proposal, it's the poor sap Program Managers down the line who then have to execute the program with way too low of funding.  The problem is they've gotten on the bad side of many customers of late, and lost quite a few proposals which were pretty much slam dunks because of this.  Where this will probably hurt them is after this initial set of launches, this will surely factor into those considerations.

[TripleSeven]

[

this is what the Launch escape system is designed to deal with

Then I guess CRS-7 & AMOS events can be brushed off since a D2 could have survived both events.

I would agree that the CRS-7 situation would have been a good candidate for a Launch abort system save.  It would have been no worse or better then the Atlas shortfall.

AMOS? 

a pad explosion or an explosion of the launch vehicle during the early boost phase would in my view be a severe test of the launch escape system to get the crew away from peril.

NONE of the US (Or for that matter Chinese or Soviet/Russian) abort systems "test" an actual booster exploding or the pressure environment associated with a nearly full first stage and a full second stage going bang.  I think the Soviets have had an on pad abort and while it was successful it was "a wild ride"

the only "reference" point I have is my late wife ejected twice.   once was when in flight school another TA 4 joined up and rammed the tail of her plane...the second was when she was cold shot of the flattop.  Of course she was younger in flight school but as I recall she more or less treated it as "extreme parachuting" (which she did a lot of)

the one going off of number 4 cat was tough.  she was the last one to leave the airplane and the videos confirm that the plane was already under water...the airplane exploded right after she left. she could describe the entire chute ride from the water to the water.....the capsule would spare everyone the direct blast pressure and visual remembrances

but the ride itself should compensate for that.  I assume both (all three Orion included) would do the job but it would be an extreme test .

The AMOS incident would have been quite "jarring" ie there would be no warning of it.  you would be doing A and then wild ride

 I assume you have watched both aborts...?  the chute action low is very violent multi g.

[TripleSeven]

. A slight performance shortfall leading to a failure to reach orbit is not an obvious abort scenario and it is unclear when and how it would be detected

with current command and control systems in use at both companies...almost immediately upon the shortfall of performance. 

The Russians with very primitive systems compared to ours have done this...

[Arb]

While we're talking about failures: https://spacenews.com/inspector-general-report-says-nasa-risks-losing-access-to-the-iss-in-2020/

while failures of two main parachutes on a cargo Dragon spacecraft in August 2018 required “additional work to improve load balancing on the planned crewed parachute system.”

Was this previously known?  If it was I completely missed it at the time.  Which mission was this?  Was there any adverse impact on the cargo return?

Not well known, for sure.

A little Googling leads to:

It is reported that the Dragon spacecraft may have experienced some parachute anomaly during its flight to the ISS, but it did not prevent the capsule from successful splashdown.

which is referenced by linking an Eric Berger article:

Concern about the Crew Dragon parachutes was heightened last year, after a previously unreported parachute anomaly on a cargo flight to the space station. Two sources confirmed the incident to Ars, but they declined to go on the record. The problem apparently occurred during the CRS-15 mission, which returned to Earth in August 2018. The Dragon was ultimately safely recovered after it landed in the Pacific Ocean. When asked directly, Stich declined to provide details about this anomaly, as did other NASA and SpaceX officials.

[gongora]

This is just going in circles right now.  Let's take a little break.
edit: trimmed some posts

[edzieba]

Just to jump back to this:

While we're clutching pearls on development failures, let's include the Atlas V failure on Cygnus OA-6.  If that would have happened with a 13000kg CTS-100 vs. a 7500kg Cygnus, it would have been LOM & possibly LOC.

LOM, very likely, although it seems plausible the CST SM could make up the shortfall.  LOC?  Seems very unlikely.  The CST-100+SM should be quite capable of a once-around orbit and immediate deorbit.  What would make LOC more likely than a normal deorbit, specifically?

“Possible LOC” was the operative part.  Abort scenarios have there own set of inherent risk.  In the case of the OA-6 failure mode,  how and when does the flight computer realize the performance shortfall?  If soon into the flight,  abort can happen early & a downrange water landing can be attempted.  If later into the Centaur burn,  there will be a point where it is too far downrange & maybe an abort to a lower orbit can be done.  That’s probably best case.  Are the CST-100 abort motors usefull for orbit raising and guidance to make up for a DV shortfall?  I have no idea,  but I’ve never heard the scenario discussed.  All of these have LOC risk compared to the nominal profile.

Both SpaceX and Boeing have put a lot of work into closing up all the abort 'black zones' from pad to orbit. At all points in flight a deviation from nominal performance has an abort mode with a recovery plan. That can range from a pad-abort hopping a short distance off the coast to a high-altitude abort with a very far downrange recovery to an abort to orbit in the very final stages of flight.

[woods170]

While we're talking about failures: https://spacenews.com/inspector-general-report-says-nasa-risks-losing-access-to-the-iss-in-2020/

while failures of two main parachutes on a cargo Dragon spacecraft in August 2018 required “additional work to improve load balancing on the planned crewed parachute system.”

Was this previously known?  If it was I completely missed it at the time.  Which mission was this?  Was there any adverse impact on the cargo return?

Yes, this was known and the failures were partial failures. The Dragon did not splash-down under just one parachute. It came down under one fully deployed chute and two damaged, partially deployed chutes.

The harder-than-normal splash-down had no adverse effects on the returned cargo because the cargo Dragon system is designed to safeguard cargo return even in the worst-case scenario of just a single chute deploying.

[edkyle99]

I thought we knew about all of this, three or so years ago, when Boeing dug in its heels.  That was public news then.  I don't think it is a surprise that Boeing's costs were higher.  SpaceX, after all, had a head start on its spacecraft thanks to already-by-then-well-proven commercial cargo Dragon while Boeing was starting from scratch. 

 - Ed Kyle

[rockets4life97]

I thought we knew about all of this, three or so years ago, when Boeing dug in its heels.  That was public news then.  I don't think it is a surprise that Boeing's costs were higher.  SpaceX, after all, had a head start on its spacecraft thanks to already-by-then-well-proven commercial cargo Dragon while Boeing was starting from scratch. 

 - Ed Kyle

My understanding is the concern is not about development costs, but about costs per seat AFTER development is over. Particularly interesting given Boeing says its capsule is more reusable than SpaceX's capsule given the non-water landing.

[edkyle99]

I thought we knew about all of this, three or so years ago, when Boeing dug in its heels.  That was public news then.  I don't think it is a surprise that Boeing's costs were higher.  SpaceX, after all, had a head start on its spacecraft thanks to already-by-then-well-proven commercial cargo Dragon while Boeing was starting from scratch. 

 - Ed Kyle

My understanding is the concern is not about development costs, but about costs per seat AFTER development is over. Particularly interesting given Boeing says its capsule is more reusable than SpaceX's capsule given the non-water landing.

Isn't the per-seat cost on a program like this, with its limited number of missions, going to be tied tightly to the development cost?

 - Ed Kyle

[woods170]

I thought we knew about all of this, three or so years ago, when Boeing dug in its heels.  That was public news then.  I don't think it is a surprise that Boeing's costs were higher.  SpaceX, after all, had a head start on its spacecraft thanks to already-by-then-well-proven commercial cargo Dragon while Boeing was starting from scratch. 

 - Ed Kyle

Boeing was not starting from scratch. Starliner is based on the Grumman/Boeing's proposal for CEV. Tens of millions of tax-payer's dollars had already been poured into the design-work for CEV and that work was directly applied in the design of Starliner, including early tech development work.

Starliner's abort engines are not a "from-scratch" development either. It goes back to NASA's Bantam program for the late 1990's. So NASA basically handed Boeing a completely developed abort engine for Starliner.

Boeing "starting from scratch" on Starliner? As the British say: My foot!

[gongora]

I thought we knew about all of this, three or so years ago, when Boeing dug in its heels.  That was public news then.  I don't think it is a surprise that Boeing's costs were higher.  SpaceX, after all, had a head start on its spacecraft thanks to already-by-then-well-proven commercial cargo Dragon while Boeing was starting from scratch. 

 - Ed Kyle

My understanding is the concern is not about development costs, but about costs per seat AFTER development is over. Particularly interesting given Boeing says its capsule is more reusable than SpaceX's capsule given the non-water landing.

Isn't the per-seat cost on a program like this, with its limited number of missions, going to be tied tightly to the development cost?

 - Ed Kyle

You can discuss the cost per seat for the total program including development costs, or you can talk about the cost of a flight after development.  They're not the same thing.  In this case, the numbers publicized in the report (which have been known for a long time to anyone who bothered looking) for seat costs are supposed to be the cost of ordering a flight after development is done.

[spacetraveler]

My understanding is the concern is not about development costs, but about costs per seat AFTER development is over. Particularly interesting given Boeing says its capsule is more reusable than SpaceX's capsule given the non-water landing.

Isn't the per-seat cost on a program like this, with its limited number of missions, going to be tied tightly to the development cost?

 - Ed Kyle

You can discuss the cost per seat for the total program including development costs, or you can talk about the cost of a flight after development.  They're not the same thing.  In this case, the numbers publicized in the report (which have been known for a long time to anyone who bothered looking) for seat costs are supposed to be the cost of ordering a flight after development is done.

This is a problem for Boeing imo. The fact that the per seat cost will be higher than what we currently pay to Russia in spite of the fact that Boeing was paid a lot more money to develop their capability is a problem, at least in terms of optics. Commercial crew was supposed to return launches to US soil and provide a better price than the Russian option which has been increasing steadily over the last few years.