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#180
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:21
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Resuming, Michael ?: How many issues is Boeing tracking, in those recommendations was another OFT recommended?
[Please Stand By: Audio Difficulties]
[It sounds like the NASA/Boeing side was disconnected from the call]
[While we're waiting, apologies for any transcription errors or omissions, particularly names...]
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#181
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:25
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Doug Loverro: [Was answering, adding on to Jim Chilton's answer regarding crossover to SLS] Great question, first thing we did was to look at issue and see where there was overlap. Structure of SLS is different from Starliner - NASA owns integration of different components. Looking across all those teams (Lockheed/Boeing/NASA).
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#182
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:30
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Michael Sheef? CNBC: Clarification on recommendations: how many specific issues from OFT are being tracked? Will next flight test be crewed or uncrewed?
John Mulholland: IRT specifically addressed three issues two software and comms issue. Team was very proscriptive, actions can be more easily absorbed planned and implemented. Additional "benign findings": CM prop zones getting a little colder, not cold enough for a problem but colder than expected, adding heater lines. Largely perf of spacecraft was very good.
Doug: Correct three primary issues, uncovering those things uncover design & process issues. More than three things there are findings about, hard to count number individually, qualifying "observation" versus "issue" fuzzy. Second: will we require another uncrewed OFT: still don't know. Boeing coming back with a plan to address issues, NASA will evaluate the plan and result of work, will do own inspection of work, will then decide if another test flight is required. Still a ways away for that, can't tell schedule yet. Depends on Boeing's correction action plan.
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#183
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:37
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Chris Davidson WaPo: Don't need a list of 61, but maybe a few of the more significant ones?
Leuders: Three important areas; looking at how to fix specific software issues that were involved in anomalies in OFT. MET, SM deorbit burn, had to fix those issues. Very specific fixes for those areas and understanding why those issues weren't caught prior. When fixing the specific areas of code you look at how do we do our software testing, how do we understand code errors, what were contributing causes to those errors coming through. Three key areas: how do I improve testing? Testing, test environment, right hardware and software in place. Systems engineering: making sure hardware and software team are working together to better understand code doing what's expected and understanding decisions about testing all the time and choices about where and what is tested, making sure understand how it will wring out code. Making sure code itself is done correctly. How to verify build, test, verification processes are fixed. NASA+Boeing joint team to asses products built, testing done, making sure process moving forward is fixed.
John: well stated
Lovarro: Two specific things: one thing in IRT we had a routine where there might have been four logical conditions, four ways the software could have run. Didn't check all four conditions, was a designer/tester choice. Not unusual you don't test all logical condition, do need to recognize we do need to test all logical conditions now. Process side, delegated too much authority to software board to approve changes and actions as it applies to software, software/hardware integration change should have been brought up all the way to engineering review board.
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#184
by
Chris Bergin
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:38
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#185
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:39
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Irene Kutz Avaition Week: (missed question)
Lovarro: No specific contractual obligations, bringing in team to do root cause investigation will bring impacts on both Boeing and NASA side. Will be extra work but no contractual issue. In terms of SpaceX no known crossover with SpaceX demonstration. If the team identifies something NASA did on Starliner effort which may have been replicated on other side will look at that, but don't forsee any real impact on this with SpaceX.
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#186
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:41
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Stephen Clark: If OFT reflight required, is cost of that on Boeing? How long will it take Boeing to come back with a plan for NASA to review to determine if OFT reflight is required. Any chance this year?
Lovarro: don't want to get into contractual issues, wouldn't be proper yet. Don't know timescale.
Leuders: shooting for end of month to have review between NASA and Boeing of that plan.
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#187
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:44
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Marsha Dunn (AP): What are you looking at in the coming months to decide OFT reflight?
Lovarro: can't give more details without having seen the Boeing plan yet. Looking at making sure Boeing has gone back and addressed issues and retested all their software, will validate that independently. Will look at all other recommendations from IRT 61 findings and corrective actions, look at resolution plans for that. Based on the work that Boeing will do, do we have enough confidence to find we are ready to fly with crew, or do we need another uncrewed flight. Difficult to tell pros and cons because it's more than a simple balance sheet, very complex system and complex to address. Not a math equation, a detailed engineering look that will need to be done. As soon as a conclusion is reached it will be shared so the reasoning is understood.
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#188
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:50
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Bill Hardwood CBS News: Requirement for OFT was docking with station. What's actual requirement, what do you need to see to not require that if OFT reflight doesn't happen.
Lovarro: was negotiated requirement to do a docking demo. Not an original govt requirement, which required confidence that flying crew would be safe. Boeing proposed docking mission, govt captured that in contract. Boeing could have not proposed a docking mission, could have substituted other things, NASA could have accepted that. There are ways to do it without that that will be required to be part of the proposal if they propose not to refly OFT. For instance, condition that can happen in docking where spacecraft gets stuck halfway, when that happens it means astros can't transfer over, and spacecraft can't separate, could be quite hazardous. One of the things being worked is if we entered that situation what would be our plan to go ahead and separate the capsule from the station regardless of OFT docking or not. Won't say will or won't but Boeing will come back with a proposal with an OFT reflight or other things that will give confidence that spacecraft safety is assured.
Leuders: Great answer, will add looking at best way to get to crewed flight. Understanding what we did and didn't learn on OFT. Original req was for one CFT. Each proposer proposed how to get there. Boeing proposed uncrewed demo as one of the steps. Conducted uncrewed demo that met some but not all objectives. What is path to get to crewed flight, what other mitigations could be put in place. Goal is to get to crewed flight without jeopardizing crew safety.
Chilton: Boeing stands ready to repeat OFT, eager to follow NASA's recommendations and want to align with NASA's preferences and crew safety.
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#189
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:52
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Joey from Reuters: Can NASA make public a list of 61 corrective actions either in full or lightly reactive. Since IRT is sticking around on speed dial what will their involvement look like.
Lovarro: Haven't had that conversation yet.
Leuders: IRT needs to stick around while a solution for comm outage is investigated (still being worked). Make sure from a NASA Boeing joint team perspective to make sure corrective actions are fully implemented and vetted.
John: Asked IRT as developing specific work plan, running back to IRT to make sure action fully captured. Make sure everyone agrees.
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#190
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 15:57
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Kenneth Chang NYT: End-to-end sim that could have found MET. One of the recommendations? Why did NASA not ask for that? Did they not know about it being broken up or did they think it was sufficient?
Leuders: one of the challenges, does the box acting like key component of vehicle do the job. With MET timer did have Starliner software integration lab, had KITE box which simulates Atlas V interface hardware. Didn't exactly behave like the box on the LV. Thought testing with right hardware sim, but found out it didn't fully characterize behavior. Didn't accurately behave like the flight box did. Had very high-fidelity test, basically wet dress, did integrated test on the pad with real hardware and it all looked beautiful at that stage. Test up to T-0 looked fine. Tested past T-0 with box all the way to orbital insertion burn. One of the actions is to go back and look at hardware boxes / emulators. Can't bring LV into software integration lab. Making sure those boxes are behaving like system they are characterizing.
John: One IRT action was to do end-to-end launch->docking and docked->landing.
Leuders: need to make sure we have correct hardware for testing.
John: agrees
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#191
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 16:01
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Tim from courts(?): Urges sharing IRT recommendations with public. Who lead IRT from NASA side, any examples of past high-visibility close call investigations?
Lovarro: NASA side Bobemic? (Bo) [Edit: Bo Bejmuk, thanks @Starlab90] lead, very experienced, been working on spaceships since Shuttle/Rockwell.
Two reasons; regulation NASA 86211c tells us what we're supposed to do when. Wasn't apparent when started OFT when MET incident occurred and evolving nature of deorbit correction that any individually met the criteria for high visibility close call. Looked at compilation after the fact, looking at letter of law felt needed to issue HVCC. Kicks off a process that looks everywhere in the system up to my desk where we need to be better and learn lessons. In terms of past ones, don't know the answer to that question, but immediately outside my door is a wall chart with every incident in human spaceflight (all nations) and they all fit into a category - close call, lost mission, loss of crew. Looking at chart one evening, what happened in OFT needs to be captured for future spaceflight. Stomach told him it needed to be done when looking at the chart.
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#192
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 16:03
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Maria (Atlantic): What corrections moving forward? Any oversight changes with Boeing?
Leuders: Working with Boeing further engaging in software dev process. Adding focused software lead, adding Boeing software dev process folks, beefing up support on both software review board and engineering review board, working with Boeing to add independent software verification folks from NASA side.
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#193
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 16:04
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Orlando Sentinel: Boeing said their verification is similar to other companies. Requiring for SpaceX or other programs to do end-to-end testing moving forward too?
Leuders: goal is always to perform end-to-end test. Issue previously was how test was performed in segmented way. Working with both SpaceX and Boeing on re-evaluating end-to-end testing, ensuring satisfied with hardware and how the testing is conducted.
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#194
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 16:08
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(Marsha Smith?) How does the HVCC learning inform agreements for human (moon) landing systems. Any changes/requirements?
Lovarro: Absolutely, lessons will be rolled back into human landing systems requirements. Any gaps in way NASA was managing will be applied to HLS. Will change how it was planned to manage HLS - not unusual, even if this incident hadn't occurred, got smarter between COTS and Crewed contract, govt/commercial relationship, had already factored that into how CCrew contracts were written. Everything we've learned to date will roll back into team issuing HLS contracts. From a big picture perspective we are going to make sure it's more proscribed testing and more proscribed kinds of testing in HLS than was perhaps written into the contracts. Was not a firm govt requirement at the time. Pick winners, spend three months with them figuring out how to validate requirements and operations for safe landing. This will make it better.
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#195
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 16:10
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Historical context of HVCC? do you foresee impacts on audits you do with other partners SpaceX or others?
Lovarro: Been working with commercial partners for years, understand strengths and dangers. This adds to my understanding of that and how govt works. Couldn't pick out specifics about how we will act differently from today. Relationship we've had with contractors for many years wasn't necessarily the right relationship. Don't believe there is anything inherently more or less dangerous with relationship. Learning to make it better all the time. Going to rely on these great firms out there whether old in commercial business like SpaceX or new like Boeing, will become better customers through these experiences and commercial efforts.
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#196
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 16:12
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Business Insider: New org assessment of NASA itself what will this look like and who will conduct it?
Lovarro: haven't been through process before, can't tell how it will work. Talked to head of safety, will bring forward two leads to do that. Not an org safety assessment, org root cause assessment. Understand org elements that might have contributed to issues. Are we organized correctly to go ahead and do this, tiny or big issues do they contribute and are part of root cause corrective actions we need to do?
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#197
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 16:15
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Florida Today: Diving more into HVCC, may not have examples, how serious is that type of issue? How many times have they been done?
Lovarro: don't know how many times, lowest level of call made in something like this. Not even in mishap category, other close call category. HVCC is a close call which has high visibility. (Laughs). We can all agree this was a close call. Could have lost a spacecraft twice during this mission, at the beginning. Thankfully good design and good controllers were able to recover it. Also talks about re-entry fix. Makes it an easy call. Unusual because it's not a NASA mission but a Boeing test flight. Seemed the right thing to do. Will do homework and find out how often it's been done in the past.
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#198
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 16:18
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Eric Berger: Some debate between contracting methods. Would have been caught in Cost+? Does this change thoughts contracting between FFP and Cost+?
Lovarro: have used every form of contracting over 40+ years, no form of contracting is free from error. Looking at all factors, oversight profiles, small/large teams, embedded/not, ~20 other items/issues. You can't look at one thing in an acquisition and say that's the problem, have to look at entire acquisition strategy. Had famously successful programs under fixed price, had some successful things under both, had disasters under both (not this). Have to make sure right features are chosen to create success. Don't believe it was fixed-price that contributed to this, was an oversight question.
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#199
by
abaddon
on 06 Mar, 2020 16:24
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Keith NASAWatch: Boeing has list of 61 things, if this is the result, what about SLS? Any impact on the schedule for SLS? An additional cost, who picks up the cost?
Lovarro: No impact to SLS schedule from this, translation of corrective action to plans has not been done, info being shared with SLS and they will evaluate if anything needs to be done. NASA owns software integration for SLS where end-to-end testing can be done between avionics/rocket and flight software/spacecraft. If common issues are found can be tested. Pacing on SLS are green run, engine testing, moving to Kennedy, erection at Kennedy, not software.
Jim: no schedule comment. Software perspective at Boeing, making all discoveries available. Have taken corrective actions to NASA and making them available to other programs within Boeing. Need to be end-to-end in time - don't like pieces decision - end-to-end in hardware, end-to-end in software logical conditions. Implementing everywhere, not asking for consideration anywhere.