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#780
by
whitelancer64
on 06 Feb, 2020 14:53
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If I’m correct, the initiators in this case are the explosive bolts used to separate sections of the capsule?
Typically it is the nut that is frangible (they are usually designed to be broken cleanly in half), not the bolt, but yes.
If I understand it correctly, the issue is with the capture mechanism for the nut halves, which would ideally be such that debris is not created outside the spacecraft. It is either that or the nuts are not breaking cleanly and creating debris, either way they want more testing to ensure no debris is created.
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#781
by
FutureSpaceTourist
on 06 Feb, 2020 19:12
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https://twitter.com/nextspaceflight/status/1225508197223600129NASA ASAP recommends that NASA evaluates how the software issues managed to end up on the flight hardware and then make a determination on whether or not the Orbital Flight Test must be redone.
Surely having found another serious software issue they can’t justify taking the risk of going straight to CFT? Safety reviews can only cover so much and with known multiple software issues I’d want an OFT2.
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#782
by
SoftwareDude
on 06 Feb, 2020 19:16
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Jeff Foust on Twitter:
"ASAP member Paul Hill: a second software issue found with Starliner and corrected; could have led to “catastrophic failure” of spacecraft. Still evaluating root cause. Recommend review of Boeing’s verification processes."
Original tweetAbout the Boeing Response
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#783
by
kevinof
on 06 Feb, 2020 19:20
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As an ex-software guy and as a current software company owner, I am astounded by Boeings "poor" software quality. I'm assuming that a lot, if not all, their code is run against simulators and obviously passes. Says a lot about the quality of their simulators.
/rant off.
https://twitter.com/nextspaceflight/status/1225508197223600129
NASA ASAP recommends that NASA evaluates how the software issues managed to end up on the flight hardware and then make a determination on whether or not the Orbital Flight Test must be redone.
Surely having found another serious software issue they can’t justify taking the risk of going straight to CFT? Safety reviews can only cover so much and with known multiple software issues I’d want an OFT2.
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#784
by
ShaunML09
on 06 Feb, 2020 20:12
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They must fly another OFT
https://mobile.twitter.com/SciGuySpace/status/1225500361269620741This sounds like a disaster on what was supposed to be such a critical mission. How could they have uploaded critical software updates 48 hours before?? They cannot put people on this until it’s fully vetted. Order more Crew Dragon or Soyuz.
They are doing a safety review of Boeing now
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#785
by
Rebel44
on 06 Feb, 2020 20:45
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IMO, in these circumstances, Boeing should be told that they will have to redo the uncrewed test flight.
Major reviews of Boeing software design, QA and testing also appear to be appropriate.
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#786
by
acsawdey
on 06 Feb, 2020 20:48
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This sounds like a disaster on what was supposed to be such a critical mission. How could they have uploaded critical software updates 48 hours before?? They cannot put people on this until it’s fully vetted. Order more Crew Dragon or Soyuz.
They are doing a safety review of Boeing now
It's worse than that. It sounds like the software update went up just before the capsule returned. The 48 hours is in reference to the shortened duration of the mission:
https://twitter.com/SciGuySpace/status/1225499269991424002
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#787
by
ShaunML09
on 06 Feb, 2020 20:56
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You are right - and its even worse - just 2 hours before
However, as part of reporting on a story about Starliner software and thruster issues three weeks ago, a source told Ars about this particular problem. According to the source, Boeing patched a software code error just two hours before the vehicle reentered Earth's atmosphere. Had the error not been caught, the source said, proper thrusters would not open during the reentry process, and the vehicle would have been lost.
In a response to a query about this in mid-January, a Boeing spokesperson confirmed to Ars that software uploads were sent to Starliner "near the end of the mission." However, the spokesperson then downplayed the gravity of the situation, saying, "The final upload before landing's main purpose was to ensure a proper disposal burn of the Service Module after separation and had nothing to do with Crew Module reentry." Because this made the issue sound not serious, Ars omitted it from the published story.
But the public remarks by Hill on Thursday appear to underscore the seriousness of the issue, and the safety panel recommended several reviews of Boeing. "The panel has a larger concern with the rigor of Boeing's verification processes," Hill said. "As a result, the panel recommends that NASA pursue not just the root cause of these specific flight-software anomalies but also a Boeing assessment of and corrective actions for Boeing's flight-software integration and testing processes."
...
Finally, before the meeting ended, the chair of the safety panel, Patricia Sanders, noted yet another ongoing evaluation of Boeing. "Given the potential for systemic issues at Boeing, I would also note that NASA has decided to proceed with an organizational safety assessment with Boeing as they previously conducted with SpaceX," she said.
https://arstechnica.com/science/2020/02/starliner-faced-catastrophic-failure-before-software-bug-found/?utm_brand=arstechnica&utm_source=twitter&utm_social-type=owned&utm_medium=socialIts just mind blowing how much they downplay these things during press conferences and requests for comments.
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#788
by
GWH
on 06 Feb, 2020 21:19
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#789
by
Coastal Ron
on 06 Feb, 2020 21:46
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You are right - and its even worse - just 2 hours before
...
Finally, before the meeting ended, the chair of the safety panel, Patricia Sanders, noted yet another ongoing evaluation of Boeing. "Given the potential for systemic issues at Boeing, I would also note that NASA has decided to proceed with an organizational safety assessment with Boeing as they previously conducted with SpaceX," she said.
https://arstechnica.com/science/2020/02/starliner-faced-catastrophic-failure-before-software-bug-found/
Its just mind blowing how much they downplay these things during press conferences and requests for comments.
It sure seems like there are enough questions about the uncrewed orbital test flight OFT to consider re-flying it.
And these are just concerns that NASA has, what about the ISS partners?
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#790
by
Rebel44
on 06 Feb, 2020 21:58
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#791
by
ChrisWilson68
on 06 Feb, 2020 22:04
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Note that SpaceX was paid $5M for the safety review after Musk's infamous toke, Boeing was not.
https://www.space.com/amp/nasa-funds-spacex-safety-review-but-not-boeing.html
So Boeing didn't do one.
Patricia Sanders, chair of the panel, noted that NASA has decided to proceed with an “organizational safety assessment” with Boeing. NASA announced in 2018 it would conduct such reviews of both Boeing and SpaceX, the other commercial crew company, after SpaceX Chief Executive Elon Musk was seen briefly smoking marijuana during a podcast. NASA, while completing the SpaceX review, deferred the Boeing one, reportedly because of cost issues.
https://spacenews.com/nasa-safety-panel-calls-for-reviews-after-second-starliner-software-problem/
Partially because Boeing asked for a lot more (IIRC around $20M) to do the same review as SpaceX.
I'd say at this point it's the least that Boeing can do to consent to the safety review without charging the taxpayer a cent more.
Boeing should not be financially rewarded for having very serious flaws in its crew transportation system.
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#792
by
ZachS09
on 06 Feb, 2020 22:20
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Does SpaceX have to hold off on their DM-2 mission if the OFT 2 flight is imminent?
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#793
by
Wargrim
on 06 Feb, 2020 22:22
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I am just glad final certification is done by NASA, not by Boeing.
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#794
by
mgeagon
on 06 Feb, 2020 23:41
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Does SpaceX have to hold off on their DM-2 mission if the OFT 2 flight is imminent?
Since IDA 3 (International Docking Adapter) has been attached to the ISS, there has been capability to have two visiting capsules. Although there seems to be issues with scheduling spacecraft arrivals amongst other critical science and station maintenance, simply having two vehicles docked shouldn't be a problem, as long as the arrivals and departures are spaced appropriately apart. Whether an OFT2 or CFT is next for Boeing, seeing a Dragon capsule at the other end of Harmony module would not be unexpected.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Docking_Adapter
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#795
by
ChrisWilson68
on 07 Feb, 2020 00:04
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I am just glad final certification is done by NASA, not by Boeing.
Yeah, but it brings up the question: How did these Starliner problems not get caught by NASA? NASA has had intense oversight of both Starliner and Dragon 2. How did all those NASA reviews not catch on to the fact that two very serious software bugs could get past Boeing's proceedures? I don't expect NASA to read and verify every line of code, but they should have been investigating Boeing's processes that should have caught such bugs long before flight.
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#796
by
Vettedrmr
on 07 Feb, 2020 00:25
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I lived with this my entire career.
Code errors can get past NASA because the customer can't review all of the code. They can look at sample parts of the code and the established procedures, then trust the software developer to follow the procedures.
In my 1st career I was a software developer for safety-critical software on fighter aircraft. We had software peer review, low and high level testing, coding standards, etc. all in place. Our customer reps were always invited to peer reviews and formal qualification testing, and in the early phases they participated a lot. After they had confidence in our work then they only performed spot checks.
But if that trust is ever broken...
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#797
by
Rocket Science
on 07 Feb, 2020 00:36
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Self certification is a highly dubious process...
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#798
by
Comga
on 07 Feb, 2020 01:57
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February 07, 2020
MEDIA ADVISORY M20-023
NASA, Boeing to Provide Update on Starliner Orbital Flight Test Reviews
NASA and Boeing will host a media teleconference at 3:30 p.m. EST Friday, Feb. 7, to discuss the status of the joint independent review team investigation into the primary issues detected during the company’s uncrewed Orbital Flight Test in December as part of NASA’s Commercial Crew Program.
Participants in the briefing will be:
NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine
Jim Chilton, senior vice president, Boeing Space and Launch
Douglas Loverro, associate administrator, NASA’s Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate
Kathy Lueders, program manager, NASA’s Commercial Crew Program
John Mulholland, vice president and program manager, Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner Program
Audio of the teleconference will stream live online at:
https://www.nasa.gov/live
To participate in the teleconference, media must contact Kathryn Hambleton at [email protected] by 3 p.m. Friday for the dial-in information.
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#799
by
mlindner
on 07 Feb, 2020 03:45
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I am just glad final certification is done by NASA, not by Boeing.
Yeah, but it brings up the question: How did these Starliner problems not get caught by NASA? NASA has had intense oversight of both Starliner and Dragon 2. How did all those NASA reviews not catch on to the fact that two very serious software bugs could get past Boeing's proceedures? I don't expect NASA to read and verify every line of code, but they should have been investigating Boeing's processes that should have caught such bugs long before flight.
Powerpoint slides are not reviews of the actual code. If all the review is at the systems level (I'm personally not a fan of systems engineering) and nothing is reviewed about the actual implementation of all those fancy diagrams then they're not worth the paper they're printed on.
It also appears their test suite is incredibly lacking. SpaceX notably has extensive automated test systems. Automated testing is not a thing that's well known outside the software industry (as in the moment you check in new code it runs on real hardware and flies simulated missions automatically).
