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#760
by
JonathanD
on 30 Jan, 2020 16:52
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An odd thing to say for such a massive company, but this is where the "well we are going to get the contract anyway" hurts them for space/defense, and being in a commercial aviation duopoly. Hopefully these past 12 months have been a wake-up call, because they can do better.
It's been hard to watch. Boeing, certainly in terms of aviation, is more than just a company, it has been a source of national pride for decades. It's hard to find someone who has never known a person who works or has worked for Boeing, and in my experience their employees are very high quality folks. Goes to show that even the most accomplished organizations can atrophy, and perhaps are even the most vulnerable to it without vigilant action to prevent it. Hope they can figure it out across the board.
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#761
by
SoftwareDude
on 30 Jan, 2020 17:08
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A lot of talk about something called a "Boeing". There isn't just one Boeing. McDonnell Douglas Delta ended up with United Launch Alliance, where the old Thor-based Delta did just fine until retirement. Boeing shut down McDonnell Douglas commercial aircraft over time, but still runs the military side. Hughes Aircraft satellite business became part of Boeing Satellite. The old North American part of Rockwell was downsized and the Rocketdyne part sold off, etc. Today's Boeing entities of primary interest to this forum are working on Starliner and Space Launch System. I'm not sure that either of these can be cleanly traced back to anything that existed in 1997.
- Ed Kyle
So if Boeing is no longer the company it used to be back in the 90s and earlier, where all it's spacecraft experience was, where is all the "experience" today that Boeing is said to have in designing spacecraft over the years? What happened to the divisions that did that? What division today is building Starliner and has THIS division ever built a crew-capable spacecraft before?
Many, many years ago I worked for a company called Ohmweave. Their product used to be electrical resistance fabrics. Over time they acquired other companies, one of which was a steel fabrication business. That's the division I worked in. We designed, built and erected steel buildings and bridges. Eventually the the company sold off the resistance fabric division, and over the years the rest of the previous acquisitions, and became just a steel company that kept the original name "Ohmweave", but NOBODY that worked there after that had a clue how to design and make electrical resistance fabrics.
So Ohmweave today has no experience in its original product, but is still called Ohmweave.
Are you saying that the Boeing of today may be in a similar condition wrt crew-capable spacecraft?
Spirit AeroSystems make the fuselages of Boeing airliners; all of them. Smaller components of the airliners like ducts etc are made by Aerospace Manufacturing, LLC., DJ Engineering makes composite parts for the planes, etc, etc. Now we hear that some software for Max was outsourced, offshored. So, don't make the airframe, don't make the parts, don't write the software, at some point Boeing stops being an airplane manufacturer and becomes more of the financier. I am not saying this happened yet but they seem on their way.
Is this a problem with Starliner? It's hard to tell, We know DJ Engineering makes composite parts, like the entire interior and hatches for Starliner. Aerojet Rocketdyne:
Under the new contract, Aerojet Rocketdyne will provide seven shipsets of hardware with options for more. Each shipset will include four Launch Abort Engines (LAEs), 24 Orbital Maneuvering and Attitude Control (OMAC) engines, 28 Reaction Control System (RCS) engines, 164 valves, 12 tanks and more than 500 feet (152.4 m) of ducts, lines, and tubing. The four LAE’s can produce 40,000 pounds-force (177.9 kN) of thrust each to push the crew capsule out of danger in the event of a launch abort.
How much of Starliner is Boeing?
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#762
by
edkyle99
on 30 Jan, 2020 17:52
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Are you saying that the Boeing of today may be in a similar condition wrt crew-capable spacecraft?
All companies lose corporate experience over time after a product has ended. The most recent crew-capable spacecraft built by a Boeing predecessor was Space Shuttle. I have little doubt that some people who worked on Shuttle are now working on Starliner (I think I know one or two, though they refuse to be specific), but I would expect that very, very few if any of those who worked on Shuttle's original development during the 1970s are still working. Since SpaceX is in Hawthorne, California, it could have as many "old-hands" working on Crew Dragon as Boeing does working on Starliner.
- Ed Kyle
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#763
by
clongton
on 30 Jan, 2020 18:28
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Since SpaceX is in Hawthorne, California, it could have as many "old-hands" working on Crew Dragon as Boeing does working on Starliner.
- Ed Kyle
Agreed - whole heartedly, but that wasn't my point. The point was that Boeing has been cited by many on this forum as the most experienced crew-capable design/builders of anyone out there, going all the way back to project Mercury, and it now appears that may be quite an exaggeration. I have no hard spot against Boeing per say. I want BOTH spacecraft to succeed, very badly. But I see them tripping over their own shoelaces because they appear to not actually have the real-world design experience base in-house that so many others have credited them with. There's nothing wrong with winning a bid based on outsourcing. It's neither better nor worse than vertical integration - it's just different. So I don't really care that they outsource so much. All I care about is that in the end we end up with 2, very reliable, crew-capable spacecraft to get us back into the spaceflight game ourselves, and not have to rely on foreign capabilities. I want to see both spacecraft fly - and succeed. It's just difficult to accept that Boeing's in-house crew spacecraft capabilities now appear to be considerably less that previously touted by posters on this forum whose opinions I have respected so much.
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#764
by
Rocket Science
on 31 Jan, 2020 04:02
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Bill Boeing was Elon Musk before there was Elon Musk. What would he think of his company today...
“Boeing was a tech startup,” ... “Bill Boeing was very similar to a lot of the high tech entrepreneurs, a kind of progressive-era Elon Musk. There’s a mix of idealism and pragmatism in these people who create the companies that become era-defining.”
https://www.kuow.org/stories/meet-bill-boeing-granddaddy-seattle-s-tech-scene
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#765
by
clongton
on 31 Jan, 2020 13:57
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Bill Boeing was Elon Musk before there was Elon Musk. What would he think of his company today...
“Boeing was a tech startup,” ... “Bill Boeing was very similar to a lot of the high tech entrepreneurs, a kind of progressive-era Elon Musk. There’s a mix of idealism and pragmatism in these people who create the companies that become era-defining.”
https://www.kuow.org/stories/meet-bill-boeing-granddaddy-seattle-s-tech-scene
That's an awesome recounting of the beginnings of Boeing Corp. I hope everyone reads it. In a lot of ways, the early days of Boeing and SpaceX are nearly identical. In those days Boeing was also vertically integrated, making most of their own parts, including the propellers and engines, not just the airplanes. It's interesting to me that the most successful design/manufacturing companies all seem to share the same kind of beginning; an exceptionally talented, driven visionary at the top and vertical integration. Very cool story. Thanks.
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#766
by
ThePonjaX
on 31 Jan, 2020 19:33
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Since SpaceX is in Hawthorne, California, it could have as many "old-hands" working on Crew Dragon as Boeing does working on Starliner.
- Ed Kyle
Agreed - whole heartedly, but that wasn't my point. The point was that Boeing has been cited by many on this forum as the most experienced crew-capable design/builders of anyone out there, going all the way back to project Mercury, and it now appears that may be quite an exaggeration. I have no hard spot against Boeing per say. I want BOTH spacecraft to succeed, very badly. But I see them tripping over their own shoelaces because they appear to not actually have the real-world design experience base in-house that so many others have credited them with. There's nothing wrong with winning a bid based on outsourcing. It's neither better nor worse than vertical integration - it's just different. So I don't really care that they outsource so much. All I care about is that in the end we end up with 2, very reliable, crew-capable spacecraft to get us back into the spaceflight game ourselves, and not have to rely on foreign capabilities. I want to see both spacecraft fly - and succeed. It's just difficult to accept that Boeing's in-house crew spacecraft capabilities now appear to be considerably less that previously touted by posters on this forum whose opinions I have respected so much.
As any capability if you don't use it you lost it. I remember reading a note sometime ago about NASA basically starting from scratch the design of Lunar suits. People get old, retires, got assigned to another projects so they have to start again because nobody has go to the moon for 50 years.
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#767
by
guckyfan
on 01 Feb, 2020 07:48
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Assuming that Boeing will do a repeat of OFT. Before they refly, what will be and what should be the scope of the work needed before OFT 2? Just a software fix to make sure they have the right timer can't be the full scope or can it?
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#768
by
woods170
on 01 Feb, 2020 12:57
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Assuming that Boeing will do a repeat of OFT. Before they refly, what will be and what should be the scope of the work needed before OFT 2? Just a software fix to make sure they have the right timer can't be the full scope or can it?
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One of the things to do is to determine which of the available spacecraft is going to fly on OFT reflight. Is it going to be the original CFT spacecraft? Or will they refly the original OFT spacecraft? (which was originally to be refurbished for the first operational crew mission)
Also, IF an OFT reflight is going to happen you can expect NASA to be "on top of things" in a very much more intrusive manner than NASA did for the original OFT mission.
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#769
by
Lemurion
on 01 Feb, 2020 21:59
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The one major positive I take from this is that it's clear that neither Boeing nor NASA has written off the possibility of a possible OFT reflight at this juncture. I would be really leery if either side had pushed that off as impossible before they had completed a thorough review of what happened.
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#770
by
erioladastra
on 03 Feb, 2020 01:26
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Assuming that Boeing will do a repeat of OFT. Before they refly, what will be and what should be the scope of the work needed before OFT 2? Just a software fix to make sure they have the right timer can't be the full scope or can it?
There were hundreds, perhaps thousands of test objectives on OFT. Many were successfully completed. Unlike things like chutes rendezvous and docking were not the biggest worries. Therefore, I think it would be unlikely to re-fly OFT. Obviously in terms of software the issue is not so much is that bug fixed, but has the process that allowed that to get through been fixed and has sufficient *integrated* testing been performed.
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#771
by
Sam Ho
on 03 Feb, 2020 17:05
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#772
by
gaballard
on 03 Feb, 2020 19:21
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From the Q4 earnings, in the Segment Results for Defense, Space and Security, Boeing has reserved $410M in case an OFT reflight is needed.
Fourth-quarter operating margin decreased to 0.5 percent due to a $410 million pre-tax Commercial Crew charge primarily to provision for an additional uncrewed mission for the Commercial Crew program, performance and mix. NASA is evaluating the data received during the December 2019 mission to determine if another uncrewed mission is required.
https://investors.boeing.com/investors/investor-news/press-release-details/2020/Boeing-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-Results/default.aspx
It's smart, stick the $410M charge on the 2019 finances, which were terrible anyway. Then if they have to spend it on another OFT, they don't take a hit on their books, and if they don't have to spend it, hey, they just saved $410M this year!
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#773
by
Vettedrmr
on 03 Feb, 2020 20:49
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https://twitter.com/thesheetztweetz/status/1224422675034054660
Boeing officials told the GAO that refurbishing the Starliner capsule from December's uncrewed flight test will take 4 months.
twitter.com/thesheetztweetz/status/1224423799724158976
But NASA officials say "a
number of problems were found in recent" testing of Starliner's initiators – while Boeing's design was an accepted risk for the uncrewed test, NASA will require additional testing before a crewed flight.
https://twitter.com/thesheetztweetz/status/1224424361295319042
"Uncertainty remains about when operational missions can begin ... it also remains to be seen whether either contractor can finish manufacturing the hardware and training the astronauts in order to support NASA’s planned time frames"
Full GAO report: gao.gov/assets/710/704…
GAO report attached
I don't enjoy "liking" this update, but thanks for keeping info coming. Do we know how old that data on the initiators is? I always have a bit of skepticism towards GAO reports, but that wording is pretty specific.
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#774
by
abaddon
on 03 Feb, 2020 21:25
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I'm not sure about that part specifically, but most of the information in the report is older than November (meaning it's pretty out of date at this point).
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#775
by
HeartofGold2030
on 03 Feb, 2020 23:37
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If I’m correct, the initiators in this case are the explosive bolts used to separate sections of the capsule?
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#776
by
CyndyC
on 05 Feb, 2020 01:06
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Assuming that Boeing will do a repeat of OFT. Before they refly, what will be and what should be the scope of the work needed before OFT 2? Just a software fix to make sure they have the right timer can't be the full scope or can it?
One of the things to do is to determine which of the available spacecraft is going to fly on OFT reflight. Is it going to be the original CFT spacecraft? Or will they refly the original OFT spacecraft? (which was originally to be refurbished for the first operational crew mission)
Also, IF an OFT reflight is going to happen you can expect NASA to be "on top of things" in a very much more intrusive manner than NASA did for the original OFT mission.
There were hundreds, perhaps thousands of test objectives on OFT. Many were successfully completed. Unlike things like chutes rendezvous and docking were not the biggest worries. Therefore, I think it would be unlikely to re-fly OFT. Obviously in terms of software the issue is not so much is that bug fixed, but has the process that allowed that to get through been fixed and has sufficient *integrated* testing been performed.
Unless erioladastra knows more than I do or something I don't, to say hundreds of test objectives were at stake might be acceptable, but to say thousands seems overly dramatic, unless every light emitting diode and every redundant line of telemetry needs to be included in the count. This wasn't about a launcher that can have thousands of parts, it was about a service module and a crew capsule.
That said, just prior to the OFT I found myself suddenly thinking of the Ariane 5 VA241 launch anomaly that occurred around the same time as the Falcom Heavy Demo in early 2018. The thought seemed intrusive and completely unrelated at the time and I immediately discarded it, only after OFT the analogy seemed spot on. To me the misalignment of the 2 Ariane 5 IMUs seemed an honest mistake, since they were aligned according to every geostationary launch before VA241 instead of according to the special requirements. Either way it was a singular error that caused a similar amount of chaos -- an inclination of 20° instead of 3°, a trajectory over a crowded beach, a loss of telemetry due to the deviation, a failure to reach the targeted orbit, left to the satellites' propulsion instead. Here's what Ariane Space had to do following that investigation:
The underlying reasons for the direct cause have been clearly identified: a need to strengthen the processes for establishing, verifying and approving the specific operational procedures involving the IMU reference frame.
Recommendations to improve processes and quality control have been made. Furthermore, additional recommendations to enhance end-to-end verifications of mission-specific parameters used during the launch campaign were made.
ArianeGroup and Arianespace presented their action plan in response to the Independent Enquiry Commission findings and recommendations.
ESA Inspector General Toni Tolker-Nielsen expressed his satisfaction with the presented action plan, which not only addresses the current issue, but a general plan to improve processes and end-to-end verifications, in particular of the few parameters that are not verified because of their nature during the test on the Functional Simulator before each launch.
Thanks to the action plan of ArianeGroup and Arianespace, the reliability of the Ariane 5 launch system, which already had an outstanding series of mission successes establishing it as a market leader, will be further increased.
The actions will enable the next flight of this heavy-lift vehicle to be made this month.
The Steering Committee mandated the ESA Inspector General to monitor the satisfactory implementation of the action plan of ArianeGroup and Arianespace.
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=42215.msg1795013#msg1795013
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#777
by
LouScheffer
on 06 Feb, 2020 12:14
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That said, just prior to the OFT I found myself suddenly thinking of the Ariane 5 VA241 launch anomaly [...]. The thought seemed intrusive and completely unrelated at the time and I immediately discarded it, only after OFT the analogy seemed spot on. To me the misalignment of the 2 Ariane 5 IMUs seemed an honest mistake, since they were aligned according to every geostationary launch before VA241 instead of according to the special requirements. Either way it was a singular error that caused a similar amount of chaos -- an inclination of 20° instead of 3°, a trajectory over a crowded beach, a loss of telemetry due to the deviation, a failure to reach the targeted orbit, left to the satellites' propulsion instead.
I don't think the return-to-flight tasks for these two have much in common, other than both needing to correct a mistake obvious in hindsight. With Ariane, it was very likely that the one bug (bad alignment) was the one and only problem, since it had flown successfully for 15 years and almost 100 flights before that. With OFT we know there was one obvious bug, but we have much less knowledge of whether the rest of the system would have performed OK had the bug not been there. If there had been 100 successful CST-100 missions, then one with bad clock settings, then the two would be comparable.
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#778
by
edzieba
on 06 Feb, 2020 12:31
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This wasn't about a launcher that can have thousands of parts, it was about a service module and a crew capsule.
Yes. A stack that has to do all the same things as a booster (positioning/navigation, engine control, sequencing, etc) but also handling many more individual engines (and their associated redundant-but-also-seperate plumbing systems), along with a whole stack of additional more things on top of that (e.g. precision docking navigation, all that pesky PLSS stuff to keep the squishy meat cargo comfortable, etc). Thousands to tens of thousands of individual test line-items would not be unexpected, there is a LOT going on there. "Every LED" may also not be an exaggeration when it comes to testing;
lights coming on at inconvenient times may have unintended consequences.
The Ariane issue also highlights the two halves of the fault tree: you can work up the tree of "all the things that went wrong" to a single 'root cause', but then you need to branch up the other side of the tree to find out why the root cause could happen in the first place. That means not just "why was the IMU installed incorrectly?" or "why was the wrong timer polled?" but both "why did that get all the way through to prod without
correct testing?" and "why was the failure not caught during operation and handled elegantly" (for Ariane that would be the booster+launch complex system as a whole recognising the trajectory deviation and externally commanding a return to the desired trajectory, for OFT that would be catching an out-of-trend time value and either falling back to another timer or timer quorum or entering a safe mode with remote command capability). In either case, fixing the 'root cause' fixes the cascading failure, but does not address the factors that led to that failure.
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#779
by
abaddon
on 06 Feb, 2020 14:38
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for Ariane that would be the booster+launch complex system as a whole recognising the trajectory deviation and externally commanding a return to the desired trajectory
This is beginning to stray off-topic, but I've never heard of a launch system that can do what you're talking about, except maybe Shuttle in an abort scenario (that was never exercised)? In the case of the CST-100, once separated from the Atlas stack, it is of course a different conversation. Am I just ignorant here?
