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#1380 by erioladastra on 07 Mar, 2020 16:55
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An OFT re-flight has, as was just stated yesterday, not been decided yet (although it does seem a likely outcome at this point).
One question I haven't seen asked, if there is a re-flight, how long that will push out the first operational flight. I can't recall how many capsules Boeing is producing. They are currently refurbishing the OFT capsule and presumably that could be used for OFT re-flight based on current timelines (refurb time won't be a constraint). They have the other capsule they were building for the CFT before the OFT mishaps, so that should also be available. But another OFT followed by the CFT would use both of those capsules and then there would be the refurb time from likely which ever capsule came first. Does Boeing have another capsule being built? Just wondering if we need to pencil in refurb time before the first non-demo crewed flight.
Not sure it matters much, since the CFT is going to be a long duration mission, so there should be time to refurb the other capsule I suppose, but I was just curious about any insight into the capsule pipeline on the Boeing side.
I still think it is very unlikely they will refly from what I am seeing within NASA...but if they did I think they would use the CFT spacecraft since it is closer to flight, then finish refurbishing the OFT vehicle. Assuming things are all fixed for that flight then the crewed one should not be far after. Can't say how far though. -
#1381 by erioladastra on 07 Mar, 2020 16:59
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Amazing how "dragon is off topic" but the SpaceX people find their way over here to extol Starship...and denigrate Boeing, and advocate for a sole sourcing of SpaceX... but suddenly if someone points out a failing by SpaceX, they get all pissy and claim we shouldn't be addressing SpaceX failings in a Boeing thread...
It might have something to do with the fact that SS/SH is not funded by US taxpayers.
But Starliner is entirely funded by US taxpayers through the USG and NASA.
Don't know why you are saying that - that is not correct. Boeing got a lot from NASA but they did put in their own money.
[Edit - to make it clear I am referring to Boeing] -
#1382 by erioladastra on 07 Mar, 2020 17:01
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No one knows what could have happened and when. We only know that the first thing that was supposed to happen after separation didn't.<...> who knows when we would have found out about all the rest of this stuff.
Moments after the service module separated from the capsule, presumably
I think they're pretty sure what could have happened had they not resolved the jet mapping issue.
Actually...no they don't. No analysis was done. It *could* have gone perfectly fine. it could have been very close but ok. It could have caused a collision but minor enough hat everything worked. Or it could have caused a complete loss of vehicle. Only analysis on the proper config was done, the rest is engineering guess/judgement. -
#1383 by clongton on 07 Mar, 2020 17:07
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Don't know why you are saying that - that is not correct. They got a lot from NASA but they did put in their own money.Amazing how "dragon is off topic" but the SpaceX people find their way over here to extol Starship...and denigrate Boeing, and advocate for a sole sourcing of SpaceX... but suddenly if someone points out a failing by SpaceX, they get all pissy and claim we shouldn't be addressing SpaceX failings in a Boeing thread...
It might have something to do with the fact that SS/SH is not funded by US taxpayers.
But Starliner is entirely funded by US taxpayers through the USG and NASA.
[correction]
Don't want to go off topic but a correction needs to be made. Starship IS entirely funded by SX, there is NO NASA funding for it. It is a pure SX effort. Now please guys, no more in this thread about anything SX - at all - unless it is directly related to Starliner.
[/correction] -
#1384 by zubenelgenubi on 07 Mar, 2020 17:16
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Moderator:
Clongton is correct. Keep it on topic.
Please think before you post. -
#1385 by woods170 on 07 Mar, 2020 17:23
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Exactly. This budget provision is just a case of safeguarding against NASA playing hardball. But NASA won't play hardball IMO and will likely carry a substantial part of the cost of a potential OFT reflight.What is going on with this call?
Doug and Kathy from NASA spend multiple minutes describing why a decision on an OFT re-fly cannot be made yet, and will not be made without a thorough review of Boeing's forthcoming proposal. They fall over themselves explaining to the press why a decision is not yet warranted.
Following this, Jim Chilton of Boeing jumps in with a curt, "We're ready to re-fly, just need a decision from NASA."
Something about this contrast didn't feel right. Like Boeing either isn't playing ball, or is trying to pass the buck.
Probably a disagreement over who pays.
Bingo!
Boeing have already shelled up $410 million to potentially re-do OFT, so that’s obviously not the case. They will be paying for it.
Just bookkeeping. Boeing budgeted for the $410M, but they haven't paid it. -
#1386 by yokem55 on 08 Mar, 2020 01:43
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There is a path forward that has NASA 'pay' for a second OFT but doesn't unduly reward Boeing - convert one of the post certification flights to an OFT-2, and then buy an extra post-certification flight from SpaceX. Boeing isn't really 'punished' in terms of total contract value, but the contractor that's performed better comes out ahead.
Exactly. This budget provision is just a case of safeguarding against NASA playing hardball. But NASA won't play hardball IMO and will likely carry a substantial part of the cost of a potential OFT reflight.What is going on with this call?
Doug and Kathy from NASA spend multiple minutes describing why a decision on an OFT re-fly cannot be made yet, and will not be made without a thorough review of Boeing's forthcoming proposal. They fall over themselves explaining to the press why a decision is not yet warranted.
Following this, Jim Chilton of Boeing jumps in with a curt, "We're ready to re-fly, just need a decision from NASA."
Something about this contrast didn't feel right. Like Boeing either isn't playing ball, or is trying to pass the buck.
Probably a disagreement over who pays.
Bingo!
Boeing have already shelled up $410 million to potentially re-do OFT, so that’s obviously not the case. They will be paying for it.
Just bookkeeping. Boeing budgeted for the $410M, but they haven't paid it. -
#1387 by matthewota on 08 Mar, 2020 11:19
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I wonder specifically what the 61 gigs are and likely the first source of information to the public will be published on NASASpaceflight.com or in Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine.
Matthew Ota
Space Buff since 1961 -
#1388 by john smith 19 on 08 Mar, 2020 11:47
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Exactly. This budget provision is just a case of safeguarding against NASA playing hardball. But NASA won't play hardball IMO and will likely carry a substantial part of the cost of a potential OFT reflight.
I fear you are right.
But that is not the spirit of the contract.
These are multiple screwups by Boeing. They should either prove to NASA a reflight is not needed or do it on their dime. It is after all their fault.
Of course they could just walk away from the contract, as they just did with the so called "Phantom Express" XS-1 contract. -
#1389 by john smith 19 on 08 Mar, 2020 12:00
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https://starlinerupdates.com/boeing-starliner-program-update-today/
Just listened to the telecon and it makes weird hearing...
Apologies if some of these have come up already.
08:12 "Lot of surprises where the systems actually performed better than predicted"
Are you kidding me?
At this level and at this stage in the programme nominal performance should be a given. That would include making sure the on board time reference was correctly set.
Above nominal performance should be expected assuming adequate margins were designed in.
14:00 The thruster system performance was extremely good, once we turned off the safety system.
17:50 All of the teams performed flawlessly
Except the software development team.
Claimed no other software issues found.
28:08 2 different jet maps needed because the jets were controlled by 2 different pieces of equipment (capsule computer when SM mated to capsule and propulsion controller)
29:34 Many different process discipline step improvements. No kidding.
29:58 Not just what tests but hardware configuration as well in future
Wasn't something like this identified as an issue during Apollo? Or earlier?
32:08 We will run full from launch to docking scenario
But why didn't someone eyeball the time on the capsule Vs the time on the rocket?
39:27 Running a Russian legacy box for power conversion from Russian to US while linked to ISS.
40:33 Why no integrated (hardware in the loop?) end to end testing?
43:55 Does NASA have right to compel a second test?
48:56 NASA's choice wheather next flight will be crewed or uncrewed.
51:54 Checking requirements to code so far. Going to check which logic was not tested in the qualification tests.
57:33 Why did you not run full tests on the whole code.
Test team ran tests they thought were "adequate and comprehensive."
(52 thrusters on the SM).
1:08:00 Team thought it more logical to break testing into smaller logical chunks.
However Boeing should have had the history to know why this is important, because of the problems it has found historically. The "Safety is in our DNA" pitch.
1:10:10 The sensitivity of this MET was not recognized by the team.
What. Your fully autonomous spacecraft, which carries out a lot of complex manouvres running through a time line has an inaccurate clock with which to execute those instructions and you didn't think this important?
1:12:20 Capsule SW pulled MET time immediately it was powered up, not when LV in terminal count just prior to launch. The software was not coded right.
this should have been picked up in review.
No indication how the capsule computer have detected when LV was in terminal count (or not).
1:14:42 Jet mapping. Legacy box had own jet mapping on prop controller. Flight computer map did not match prop controller. Why not? X37b flight computer and SIGS heritage. -
#1390 by leovinus on 08 Mar, 2020 14:39
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You are not the only one. A copy of the list was requested during the press conference by at least two journalists, and also on this forum in the "Boeing's Starliner (CST-100) - Discussion Thread 4" during the press conference. For example,
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=47916.msg2055075#msg2055075
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=47916.msg2055096#msg2055096
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=47916.msg2055101#msg2055101
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=47916.msg2055162#msg2055162
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=47916.msg2055232#msg2055232
I would assume some of the journalists will do a FOIA but you could do one yourself and see what you get. Just go to https://www.foia.gov select "Nasa" "Headquarters" and ask for a copy of the report with 61 issues. Though they ask for how much money you are willing to spend on the copy, you might get it for free in the end. Happened to me with another document but no guarantees
The Nasa department handling FOIAs was actually friendly and helpful.
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#1391 by leovinus on 08 Mar, 2020 15:19
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40:33 Why no integrated (hardware in the loop?) end to end testing?
[snip]
51:54 Checking requirements to code so far. Going to check which logic was not tested in the qualification tests.
57:33 Why did you not run full tests on the whole code.
Test team ran tests they thought were "adequate and comprehensive."
(52 thrusters on the SM).
Thanks for your transcript summary. Not to flog a dead horse but I am still flabbergasted by the all the breakdowns on Boeing's software side which will make a good case-study in future CS classes.
As you know, in 2011, Nasa published the report The Legacy of Space Shuttle Flight Software, NTRS, 20110014946 with experience of 30 years of development, tests, improvements, on the Shuttle's Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) which lead to list of "Lessons learned". The software process was at CMM-5, i.e., the highest and best, most reproducible. We discussed the report and Lessons Learned in more detail in an earlier post.
Therefore, it is simply incomprehensible that one of Nasa's partners and contractors (Boeing) was allowed to build a new human spaceflight system (Starliner) without fully embracing those "Lessons learned" even though it included the end-to-end, hardware/software, system testing recommendation at least twice in Section IX "Lessons Learned", (c)(h), p33-35. In addition, the 2011 Nasa report was around the same time as the start of the Starliner development between IIRC between 2010 and 2012, i.e., hot from the press, and ready to used.
The question on why Boeing did not embrace "Lessons learned" from the best comparable human spaceflight system available (Shuttle, i.e. PASS) will one day make a very good article on this site after some investigative sleuthing and interviewing of the involved people. We can speculate that the list of 61 issues will relate to this question as well.
In the meantime, let's hope Boeing has learned it's lesson and we will get a safe and effective Starliner.
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#1392 by john smith 19 on 08 Mar, 2020 16:17
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As you know, in 2011, Nasa published the report The Legacy of Space Shuttle Flight Software, NTRS, 20110014946 with experience of 30 years of development, tests, improvements, on the Shuttle's Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) which lead to list of "Lessons learned". The software process was at CMM-5, i.e., the highest and best, most reproducible. We discussed the report and Lessons Learned in more detail in an earlier post.
To be completely accurate CMU defined CMM5 after they'd studied IBM Federal Systems (as it was). The organization literally set the benchmark for software development. One of the staff was a fairly regular poster here but reported they had a substantial reduction in force when they went from Shuttle to MPC/Orion.
However it looks like Boeing did not use them but used in house staff instead. Loral (as it became) was a software house, not an aerospace company that needed to write some software. *Quote from: leovinusTherefore, it is simply incomprehensible that one of Nasa's partners and contractors (Boeing) was allowed to build a new human spaceflight system (Starliner) without fully embracing those "Lessons learned" even though it included the end-to-end, hardware/software, system testing recommendation at least twice in Section IX "Lessons Learned", (c)(h), p33-35. In addition, the 2011 Nasa report was around the same time as the start of the Starliner development between IIRC between 2010 and 2012, i.e., hot from the press, and ready to used.
I can conceive it quite easily, unfortunately.
The question on why Boeing did not embrace "Lessons learned" from the best comparable human spaceflight system available (Shuttle, i.e. PASS) will one day make a very good article on this site after some investigative sleuthing and interviewing of the involved people. We can speculate that the list of 61 issues will relate to this question as well.
In the meantime, let's hope Boeing has learned it's lesson and we will get a safe and effective Starliner.
From the report Pg 33 Para b, 3rd lineQuoteIt is important to insure that proper initialization will occur under all scenarios supported by the software.
I think that's a pretty succinct description of exactly what did not happen with the MET software error.
*In reality it's now becoming very hard to find complex products that don't have some sort of processor, right down to the circuit breakers in your home (I could not believe this was true, but it is
)
So wheather they like or not pretty much every company that makes an electrically powered product is now in the software development business, wheather they like or not.
And I think it's clear some are better at it than others. -
#1393 by erioladastra on 08 Mar, 2020 16:40
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40:33 Why no integrated (hardware in the loop?) end to end testing?
[snip]
51:54 Checking requirements to code so far. Going to check which logic was not tested in the qualification tests.
57:33 Why did you not run full tests on the whole code.
Test team ran tests they thought were "adequate and comprehensive."
(52 thrusters on the SM).
Thanks for your transcript summary. Not to flog a dead horse but I am still flabbergasted by the all the breakdowns on Boeing's software side which will make a good case-study in future CS classes.
As you know, in 2011, Nasa published the report The Legacy of Space Shuttle Flight Software, NTRS, 20110014946 with experience of 30 years of development, tests, improvements, on the Shuttle's Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) which lead to list of "Lessons learned". The software process was at CMM-5, i.e., the highest and best, most reproducible. We discussed the report and Lessons Learned in more detail in an earlier post.
Therefore, it is simply incomprehensible that one of Nasa's partners and contractors (Boeing) was allowed to build a new human spaceflight system (Starliner) without fully embracing those "Lessons learned" even though it included the end-to-end, hardware/software, system testing recommendation at least twice in Section IX "Lessons Learned", (c)(h), p33-35. In addition, the 2011 Nasa report was around the same time as the start of the Starliner development between IIRC between 2010 and 2012, i.e., hot from the press, and ready to used.
The question on why Boeing did not embrace "Lessons learned" from the best comparable human spaceflight system available (Shuttle, i.e. PASS) will one day make a very good article on this site after some investigative sleuthing and interviewing of the involved people. We can speculate that the list of 61 issues will relate to this question as well.
In the meantime, let's hope Boeing has learned it's lesson and we will get a safe and effective Starliner.
(Not defending just noting...)
What makes you say that Boeing did not actually follow the NASA standards, based on those lessons learned? Per requirements the partners had to meet certain software requirements. Those requirements came from years of experience and lessons learned. CCP then had to evaluate each partner's processes and determine if they were meeting those requirements. I think what you are really poking on though is saying you will follow a certain process and actually doing that said process are not necessarily the same thing. Either subconsciously ("ooops, missed that") and/or consciously ("well, we think this is good enough" - and it is CCP's job to say 'ok, show me why') Boeing missed the boat big time. -
#1394 by leovinus on 08 Mar, 2020 18:13
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40:33 Why no integrated (hardware in the loop?) end to end testing?
[snip]
51:54 Checking requirements to code so far. Going to check which logic was not tested in the qualification tests.
57:33 Why did you not run full tests on the whole code.
Test team ran tests they thought were "adequate and comprehensive."
(52 thrusters on the SM).
Thanks for your transcript summary. Not to flog a dead horse but I am still flabbergasted by the all the breakdowns on Boeing's software side which will make a good case-study in future CS classes.
As you know, in 2011, Nasa published the report The Legacy of Space Shuttle Flight Software, NTRS, 20110014946 with experience of 30 years of development, tests, improvements, on the Shuttle's Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) which lead to list of "Lessons learned". The software process was at CMM-5, i.e., the highest and best, most reproducible. We discussed the report and Lessons Learned in more detail in an earlier post.
Therefore, it is simply incomprehensible that one of Nasa's partners and contractors (Boeing) was allowed to build a new human spaceflight system (Starliner) without fully embracing those "Lessons learned" even though it included the end-to-end, hardware/software, system testing recommendation at least twice in Section IX "Lessons Learned", (c)(h), p33-35. In addition, the 2011 Nasa report was around the same time as the start of the Starliner development between IIRC between 2010 and 2012, i.e., hot from the press, and ready to used.
The question on why Boeing did not embrace "Lessons learned" from the best comparable human spaceflight system available (Shuttle, i.e. PASS) will one day make a very good article on this site after some investigative sleuthing and interviewing of the involved people. We can speculate that the list of 61 issues will relate to this question as well.
In the meantime, let's hope Boeing has learned it's lesson and we will get a safe and effective Starliner.
(Not defending just noting...)
What makes you say that Boeing did not actually follow the NASA standards, based on those lessons learned?
(Not defending, just clarifying the discussion ) Fair question but that is not what I meant. Though I studied the DoD software development standards in the past, I am not familiar with current Nasa or Boeing software development standards. Learning a lot on this thread though. Therefore, tried to choose my words to point out that is seems like the "Lessons learned" from the quoted Nasa report were not taking into account. At this stage, we can only speculate on the "how?" and "why?".
Seeing these engineering, investigations and improvements unfold in real-time is really interesting. In the best possible way, it is fascinating to see what we can learn when we look at software processes, verification, development and failures taught in academic Computer Science vs the practice in industry, as well as the differences in software development practices between Silicon Valley and air & space industry.QuotePer requirements the partners had to meet certain software requirements. Those requirements came from years of experience and lessons learned. CCP then had to evaluate each partner's processes and determine if they were meeting those requirements. I think what you are really poking on though is saying you will follow a certain process and actually doing that said process are not necessarily the same thing. Either subconsciously ("ooops, missed that") and/or consciously ("well, we think this is good enough" - and it is CCP's job to say 'ok, show me why') Boeing missed the boat big time.
Something like that, yep. -
#1395 by dccraven on 08 Mar, 2020 19:12
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Here is a link to March 6 audio of NASA/Boeing Status Report on the Stanliner OFT & Investigation of Anomalies
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#1396 by ChrisC on 09 Mar, 2020 01:06
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Posted in discussion thread:
Here is a link to March 6 audio of NASA/Boeing Status Report on the Stanliner OFT & Investigation of Anomalies: [AmericaSpace Youtube]
Posted in update thread:Unofficial Youtube replay of the NASA-Boeing media teleconference held at 11 a.m. EST Friday, March 6: [Raw Space Youtube]
For both, FINALLY. Thank you!
Edit: RawSpace is missing the first 4 minutes, include Doug Loverro's declaration of "high visibility close call". -
#1397 by joek on 09 Mar, 2020 20:31
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Not sure how many times it has to be said: There is no such thing as FAA "certification" for human spaceflight.[1] While it is a work-in-progress, it has little or nothing to do with commercial aviation. This conflation with commercial spaceflight and Boeing's 737 is a canard; they are completely different animals.
[1] NASA yes, but NASA "certification" is again a completely different animal. -
#1398 by AJW on 09 Mar, 2020 21:20
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Not sure how many times it has to be said: There is no such thing as FAA "certification" for human spaceflight.[1] While it is a work-in-progress, it has little or nothing to do with commercial aviation. This conflation with commercial spaceflight and Boeing's 737 is a canard; they are completely different animals.
[1] NASA yes, but NASA "certification" is again a completely different animal.
Canard is the perfect term, especially if you understand French. If it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, we have at least to consider the possibility that we have a small aquatic bird of the family Anatidae on our hands.[2] The parallels between the congressional committee investigating Boeing using the term 'Culture of concealment' to describe their behavior, and Boeing's initial denials of the whistleblower's report in the Orlando Sentinel, bear more than a slight resemblance. Stating that the public didn't need to know about the mapping failure because they caught it mid-flight is another indicator. Now with over 61 areas that have been identified that require addressing, and claiming that they never discussed disclosing this list, and still haven't decided on a re-flight has me hearing 'quack quack', or quite appropriately in French 'coin coin'.
[2] Credit Douglas Adams -
#1399 by QuantumG on 09 Mar, 2020 23:19
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So much for NASA oversight.
that poses the question of what NASA may have missed with SpaceX then as well. Perhaps Dragon should be grounded until NASA is "fixed."
That question has already been answered... Boeing was supposedly better.
What. Your fully autonomous spacecraft, which carries out a lot of complex manouvres running through a time line has an inaccurate clock with which to execute those instructions and you didn't think this important?
The Nasa department handling FOIAs was actually friendly and helpful.
)