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#1300
by
dglow
on 02 Mar, 2020 13:45
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I don't expect NASA to have the technical expertise to identify the software failures. I do expect them to be able to review the test coverage reports on the code, audit the traceability tables between the requirements and test cases, ensure that there are test cases that adequately exercise the defined interfaces, and finally to verify the integration tests between the various subsystems.
And I'm questioning whether NASA-level reviews, audits of test cases, and verifications would necessarily have caught nuanced errors that are deep in the weeds. And ultimately, it's Boeing engineering and QA's job to do that.
That's what our fighter aircraft customers did for every program I ever worked on.
That's great. For the things I build my customers expect us to do that ourselves. Maybe Boeing has grown too reliant on having others there to check their work.
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#1301
by
erioladastra
on 03 Mar, 2020 00:33
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Something didn't seem right to me for some time and I never shared it here. I found it strange when they had to add an aero-skirt to the spacecraft and to me it seemed like last minute patch to the stack's aerodynamics. I'm glad they caught it, but it just appeared to be odd and rather late in the aero program... Just my 2 cents...
Nothing really unusual there...you just don't see all the details in the day-to-day. Boeing was leveraging off of using the outer mold line of orion which had done a lot of wind tunnel work. From very early on Boeing identified a risk that they might have to add the perf ring or something similar while they continued to test hoping better data would show they were ok.
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#1302
by
Vettedrmr
on 03 Mar, 2020 00:42
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I don't expect NASA to have the technical expertise to identify the software failures. I do expect them to be able to review the test coverage reports on the code, audit the traceability tables between the requirements and test cases, ensure that there are test cases that adequately exercise the defined interfaces, and finally to verify the integration tests between the various subsystems.
And I'm questioning whether NASA-level reviews, audits of test cases, and verifications would necessarily have caught nuanced errors that are deep in the weeds. And ultimately, it's Boeing engineering and QA's job to do that.
That's what our fighter aircraft customers did for every program I ever worked on.
That's great. For the things I build my customers expect us to do that ourselves. Maybe Boeing has grown too reliant on having others there to check their work.
It's not an either/or. Of course we reviewed and tested our work, WAY before our customer did any independent reviews. Sometimes they'd participate in the code and test peer reviews with us, sometimes they did them on their own. We never depended on them to catch mistakes, that would be:
A. Lazy
B. Irresponsible
C. Obnoxiously reeking of entitlement.
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#1303
by
dglow
on 03 Mar, 2020 01:31
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I don't expect NASA to have the technical expertise to identify the software failures. I do expect them to be able to review the test coverage reports on the code, audit the traceability tables between the requirements and test cases, ensure that there are test cases that adequately exercise the defined interfaces, and finally to verify the integration tests between the various subsystems.
And I'm questioning whether NASA-level reviews, audits of test cases, and verifications would necessarily have caught nuanced errors that are deep in the weeds. And ultimately, it's Boeing engineering and QA's job to do that.
That's what our fighter aircraft customers did for every program I ever worked on.
That's great. For the things I build my customers expect us to do that ourselves. Maybe Boeing has grown too reliant on having others there to check their work.
It's not an either/or. Of course we reviewed and tested our work, WAY before our customer did any independent reviews. Sometimes they'd participate in the code and test peer reviews with us, sometimes they did them on their own. We never depended on them to catch mistakes, that would be:
A. Lazy
B. Irresponsible
C. Obnoxiously reeking of entitlement.
Very true. Recognize that I was commenting on Boeing and NASA, not you.
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#1304
by
Ike17055
on 04 Mar, 2020 16:51
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Note that for Commercial Cargo NASA have ended the contract for a supplier that failed to achieve its milestones.
Failure to achieve milestone --> No money paid for that milestone.
BTW Boeing required 63% more payment than SX to deliver so far substantially less.
SNC's Dream Chaser is still an option.
Of course it would be a massive blow to Boeing's corporate image, but isn't that Boeing's problem?
Dream Chaser is only "an option" over the very long term (so in other words, NOT an option). The manned version is very far behind any standard of useability.
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#1305
by
Ike17055
on 04 Mar, 2020 16:58
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(snip)
As soon as DM-2 is successful, NASA should end the Boeing contract.
Hold on.
The whole point of Commercial Crew is redundant and reliable crew transport to the ISS. SpaceX could do it alone. The question is, "should they?"
My answer: No way.
(snip)
Soyuz is our only backup, and THAT didn't look too good after October 2018 with Soyuz MS-10.
Way
That’s a well researched history but it doesn’t convince me.
Soyuz after MS-10 didn’t look good, but was adequate.
Soyuz and Dragon will be enough redundancy.
Boeing was asked how much money they wanted for capsule development and they didn’t include adequate test systems, integrated system testing, or modern software methodology at 1.5X SpaceX’s contract.
Allowing Boeing to continue will only reinforce their habit of wringing money out of NASA.
There should be real consequences for inexcusable failure.
Granted SpaceX has not yet flown their crewed mission.
They may still have a “tungsten” problem.
But after DM-2, Starliner will have served enough of its risk reduction purpose.
except the "real consequences" would be to the entire crewed program. The point is to create a commercial launch industry, NOT to substitute a SpaceX monopoly for the current NASA monopoly. SpaceX has proven much -- including the ability to blow up lots of vehicles -- among them being their most "successful" one that was "ready" to fly crew. Redundancy makes sense, and Boeing, for all its failures here, is the one who is by far the closest to bringing the redundancy intended.
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#1306
by
Ike17055
on 04 Mar, 2020 17:01
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Hold on.
The whole point of Commercial Crew is redundant and reliable crew transport to the ISS.
Absolutely correct. A real shame that Boeing is so far away from the "reliable" part of crew transport. SpaceX hasn't demonstrated that either, but there are no known roadblocks to achieving that.
I really hope that Boeing gets their act together. If they don't, they're getting close to a precipice that may be extraordinarily painful as a corporation to recover from.
Have a good one,
Mike
If SpaceX can recover from two F9 failures, Boeing can recover from this. I agree Boeing has work to do, but they are not on the verge.
Agreed. If Boeing is "on the verge" for this, then surely Starship is "on the verge" after blowing up two prototypes within weeks. Neither is anywhere near permanent failure.
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#1307
by
Ike17055
on 04 Mar, 2020 17:05
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So much for NASA oversight.
that poses the question of what NASA may have missed with SpaceX then as well. Perhaps Dragon should be grounded until NASA is "fixed."
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#1308
by
mn
on 04 Mar, 2020 17:08
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Hold on.
The whole point of Commercial Crew is redundant and reliable crew transport to the ISS.
Absolutely correct. A real shame that Boeing is so far away from the "reliable" part of crew transport. SpaceX hasn't demonstrated that either, but there are no known roadblocks to achieving that.
I really hope that Boeing gets their act together. If they don't, they're getting close to a precipice that may be extraordinarily painful as a corporation to recover from.
Have a good one,
Mike
If SpaceX can recover from two F9 failures, Boeing can recover from this. I agree Boeing has work to do, but they are not on the verge.
Agreed. If Boeing is "on the verge" for this, then surely Starship is "on the verge" after blowing up two prototypes within weeks. Neither is anywhere near permanent failure.
There's lots of silliness in this thread, but comparing a supposedly ready to fly vehicle with a development test article built for testing takes the cake. (ok not 100%, there are lots of posts that would compete for the prize).
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#1309
by
gaballard
on 04 Mar, 2020 19:02
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(snip)
As soon as DM-2 is successful, NASA should end the Boeing contract.
Hold on.
The whole point of Commercial Crew is redundant and reliable crew transport to the ISS. SpaceX could do it alone. The question is, "should they?"
My answer: No way.
(snip)
Soyuz is our only backup, and THAT didn't look too good after October 2018 with Soyuz MS-10.
Way
That’s a well researched history but it doesn’t convince me.
Soyuz after MS-10 didn’t look good, but was adequate.
Soyuz and Dragon will be enough redundancy.
Boeing was asked how much money they wanted for capsule development and they didn’t include adequate test systems, integrated system testing, or modern software methodology at 1.5X SpaceX’s contract.
Allowing Boeing to continue will only reinforce their habit of wringing money out of NASA.
There should be real consequences for inexcusable failure.
Granted SpaceX has not yet flown their crewed mission.
They may still have a “tungsten” problem.
But after DM-2, Starliner will have served enough of its risk reduction purpose.
except the "real consequences" would be to the entire crewed program. The point is to create a commercial launch industry, NOT to substitute a SpaceX monopoly for the current NASA monopoly. SpaceX has proven much -- including the ability to blow up lots of vehicles -- among them being their most "successful" one that was "ready" to fly crew. Redundancy makes sense, and Boeing, for all its failures here, is the one who is by far the closest to bringing the redundancy intended.
Let's be fair here.
OFT-1 was almost lost because of some really, really obvious and basic errors. DM-1 was lost because they ran into a failure mode that
no one knew existed.
Not to mention SpaceX did that test on their own dime. You think Boeing would have done the same? SpaceX caught it because they went above and beyond what was asked of them.
It's the kid failing Engineering 101 versus the doctorate student having a setback in their dissertation because they stumbled across previously unknown information.
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#1310
by
Ike17055
on 04 Mar, 2020 23:29
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Hold on.
The whole point of Commercial Crew is redundant and reliable crew transport to the ISS.
Absolutely correct. A real shame that Boeing is so far away from the "reliable" part of crew transport. SpaceX hasn't demonstrated that either, but there are no known roadblocks to achieving that.
I really hope that Boeing gets their act together. If they don't, they're getting close to a precipice that may be extraordinarily painful as a corporation to recover from.
Have a good one,
Mike
If SpaceX can recover from two F9 failures, Boeing can recover from this. I agree Boeing has work to do, but they are not on the verge.
Agreed. If Boeing is "on the verge" for this, then surely Starship is "on the verge" after blowing up two prototypes within weeks. Neither is anywhere near permanent failure.
There's lots of silliness in this thread, but comparing a supposedly ready to fly vehicle with a development test article built for testing takes the cake. (ok not 100%, there are lots of posts that would compete for the prize).
uh, read the earlier post: SPaceX crew dragon "ready to fly" then:kaboom
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#1311
by
meberbs
on 05 Mar, 2020 00:06
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Agreed. If Boeing is "on the verge" for this, then surely Starship is "on the verge" after blowing up two prototypes within weeks. Neither is anywhere near permanent failure.
There's lots of silliness in this thread, but comparing a supposedly ready to fly vehicle with a development test article built for testing takes the cake. (ok not 100%, there are lots of posts that would compete for the prize).
uh, read the earlier post: SPaceX crew dragon "ready to fly" then:kaboom
1. Crew Dragon has literally nothing to do with the bad comparison to Starship you made in this quote tree. (See the post above yours here for something that addresses the Crew Dragon argument, posting this statement right after a post clearly stating the difference between these 2 makes it seem like you aren't actually reading the thread)
2. Besides the pointed out fact that a Starship's and Starliners current phase of development are not even slightly comparable, "blowing up two prototypes within weeks" is something that hasn't happened on the Starship program unless you are distorting things by counting test-to-destruction articles. (It might happen in the future because of the style of development being employed, but since that is not comparable to Starliner's development strategy, that is irrelevant.)
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#1312
by
dglow
on 05 Mar, 2020 00:07
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Hold on.
The whole point of Commercial Crew is redundant and reliable crew transport to the ISS.
Absolutely correct. A real shame that Boeing is so far away from the "reliable" part of crew transport. SpaceX hasn't demonstrated that either, but there are no known roadblocks to achieving that.
I really hope that Boeing gets their act together. If they don't, they're getting close to a precipice that may be extraordinarily painful as a corporation to recover from.
Have a good one,
Mike
If SpaceX can recover from two F9 failures, Boeing can recover from this. I agree Boeing has work to do, but they are not on the verge.
Agreed. If Boeing is "on the verge" for this, then surely Starship is "on the verge" after blowing up two prototypes within weeks. Neither is anywhere near permanent failure.
There's lots of silliness in this thread, but comparing a supposedly ready to fly vehicle with a development test article built for testing takes the cake. (ok not 100%, there are lots of posts that would compete for the prize).
uh, read the earlier post: SPaceX crew dragon "ready to fly" then:kaboom
thank you for that supremely nuanced take
<searches for thumbs-down emoji>
Can we agree Crew Dragon is likely off-topic?
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#1313
by
john smith 19
on 05 Mar, 2020 06:08
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So much for NASA oversight.
that poses the question of what NASA may have missed with SpaceX then as well. Perhaps Dragon should be grounded until NASA is "fixed."
That "fix" would include the people who fund it and the people who oversee it. IOW the US Congress.
But that's not going to happen anytime soon and is OT for this thread.
What isn't OT is that Boeing received 63% more than SX to deliver a HSF rated crew transport and haven't delivered anything like the quality of something that is 63% more expensive.
It's almost as if all their claimed "pedigree" in past HSF rated vehicles was shredded when they took over those companies (that actually
did that work) to save some storage costs and they are struggling to recreate it from scratch.
Surely that can't be the case?
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#1314
by
john smith 19
on 05 Mar, 2020 06:26
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Note that for Commercial Cargo NASA have ended the contract for a supplier that failed to achieve its milestones.
Failure to achieve milestone --> No money paid for that milestone.
BTW Boeing required 63% more payment than SX to deliver so far substantially less.
SNC's Dream Chaser is still an option.
Of course it would be a massive blow to Boeing's corporate image, but isn't that Boeing's problem?
Dream Chaser is only "an option" over the very long term (so in other words, NOT an option). The manned version is very far behind any standard of useability.
On the basis of this test so is CST-100.

I wonder if Boeing are still eager for a down select to a single supplier?
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#1315
by
AJW
on 05 Mar, 2020 21:30
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So much for NASA oversight.
that poses the question of what NASA may have missed with SpaceX then as well. Perhaps Dragon should be grounded until NASA is "fixed."
That "fix" would include the people who fund it and the people who oversee it. IOW the US Congress.
But that's not going to happen anytime soon and is OT for this thread....
NASA engineers can go over a blueprint, verify the parts used, and probably do a pretty good overall review of the hardware. Not so with the software. Relying on the same contractor who wrote the software to verify it, just doesn't cut it. NASA has to choose between moving black-box testing in-house, or say trimming 600 million from the Boeing contact and bidding the testing out to a separate company. Competitors might even consider spinning off a team and bidding on it. Would an independent test company skip something as fundamental as a full integration test? Somehow I don't think so since their contract would specify these tests were completed in order to meet payment milestones. Having a testing organization that is motivated to push the testing boundaries, not just the main path, is also likely to find problems that were overlooked. This same testbed could then be used to test DC, and any other craft that might dock with the ISS.
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#1316
by
davispw
on 06 Mar, 2020 04:14
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To those saying “that’s what the flight test is for” are missing the point of end-to-end integrated software testing.
If the only time you test end-to-end is OFT1, then your software must be done, final, finished. Never to change again. But that’s not reality.
Test runs should be cheap (marginal cost) and infinitely repeatable. That requires investment in automation and test beds that can be used over and over.
If you’re stuck in an old-school mindset where each test run is manual, hard, expensive, and takes up resources so you’re not testing something else, and OFT1 is the only complete test...then agile, iterative companies will eat your lunch.
Which is exactly what’s happening here.
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#1317
by
Comga
on 06 Mar, 2020 05:06
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To those saying “that’s what the flight test is for” are missing the point of end-to-end integrated software testing.
If the only time you test end-to-end is OFT1, then your software must be done, final, finished. Never to change again. But that’s not reality.
Test runs should be cheap (marginal cost) and infinitely repeatable. That requires investment in automation and test beds that can be used over and over.
If you’re stuck in an old-school mindset where each test run is manual, hard, expensive, and takes up resources so you’re not testing something else, and OFT1 is the only complete test...then agile, iterative companies will eat your lunch.
Which is exactly what’s happening here.
That's a good, well considered point.
An excellent first post
Welcome to the forum!
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#1318
by
john smith 19
on 06 Mar, 2020 07:29
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To those saying “that’s what the flight test is for” are missing the point of end-to-end integrated software testing.
If the only time you test end-to-end is OFT1, then your software must be done, final, finished. Never to change again. But that’s not reality.
Test runs should be cheap (marginal cost) and infinitely repeatable. That requires investment in automation and test beds that can be used over and over.
If you’re stuck in an old-school mindset where each test run is manual, hard, expensive, and takes up resources so you’re not testing something else, and OFT1 is the only complete test...then agile, iterative companies will eat your lunch.
Which is exactly what’s happening here.
Welcome to the site.
BTW this is not a new phenomenon.
The SSME programme kept running out of engines. They destroyed 13 powerheads during the development process due to various failures they were not able to detect and shut down the engine fast enough.
Note the software
logic was fine between the 2 different systems, it was their configuration that differed. Bit 1 might have been the upper quadrant clockwise thruster on one system, but the lower quadrant counter clockwise thruster on the other. In principle the new HW should have cloned the old HW configuration, but it didn't, because (it seems) no picked up there were 2 separate systems.

So it's not just the program logic, it's all the
peripheral data that has to be tracked as well.
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#1319
by
Brian45
on 06 Mar, 2020 12:52
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I read this morning that the Cygnus Cargo Ship has had it's mission extended by a month for additional "testing time" of a commercial experiment. "A payload from Lynk, a Virginia-based company working on technology for satellites to enable direct communications with mobile phones." Lynch's chief executive described the technology as "our third ‘cell tower in space’ ". Could this have had any bearing on the claim of cell phone interference with CST?
My source for this was
https://spacenews.com/cygnus-mission-extended-for-tests-of-communications-payload/