And this means what? How about posting again without acronyms for us plain folks so we can follow you smart fellows hmmm?
Aren't those engineers at risk of going to jail, for providing technical direction under a FFP contract, on the customer side?
Quote from: oldAtlas_Eguy on 12/11/2019 08:56 pmA clearing up of some fallacies in regard to government contracting.On a cost plus engineers although not supposed to give direct technical direction, they are not prosecuted for such actions since the changes to the contract are primarily a way of documenting the direction with new cost and schedule estimates since there are no negotiations related.On a Firm fixed price engineers go to jail if they give direct technical direction. In order to give technical direction requires a contract change with strong legal consequences. The change orders can be done overnight but usually take 90 days. They involve a request of contractor proposed cost and schedule impacts for the change. Resulting in a miniature evaluation and negotiations process. These change requests can be initiated by the contractor or gov. So FFP are difficult to change unless the contractor agrees and the government agrees with formal legal signatures.So whatever the reason for the contract change the legal recourse for both parties is quite severe if malfeasance is discovered by one or the other regarding the other party.Aren't those engineers at risk of going to jail, for providing technical direction under a FFP contract, on the customer side?However, in the case of Commercial Crew, the contracts seem to have said that the contractors would meet certain requirements that had yet to be finalized. They were willing to take that risk. With or without malfeasance, it seems like Boeing was better able than SpaceX to anticipate the cost of changes and to negotiate better recovery, convincing NASA that certain direction that increased costs went beyond the permitted requirement evolution and thus recover the cost.
A clearing up of some fallacies in regard to government contracting.On a cost plus engineers although not supposed to give direct technical direction, they are not prosecuted for such actions since the changes to the contract are primarily a way of documenting the direction with new cost and schedule estimates since there are no negotiations related.On a Firm fixed price engineers go to jail if they give direct technical direction. In order to give technical direction requires a contract change with strong legal consequences. The change orders can be done overnight but usually take 90 days. They involve a request of contractor proposed cost and schedule impacts for the change. Resulting in a miniature evaluation and negotiations process. These change requests can be initiated by the contractor or gov. So FFP are difficult to change unless the contractor agrees and the government agrees with formal legal signatures.So whatever the reason for the contract change the legal recourse for both parties is quite severe if malfeasance is discovered by one or the other regarding the other party.
I'm all for giving some slack but what database did McDonnell have to draw from when they designed with slide-rules both Mercury and Gemini in those early days of HSF...
Thanks for the honesty, it's appreciated you clear that out. About the "fear": I suspect it has much more to do with the ITAR and proprietary red-taped world the aerospace industry has sadly become in the last few years rather than some "anti-SpaceX conspiracy" (of which this forum is an anti-example).
Quote from: eeergo on 12/11/2019 05:33 pmThanks for the honesty, it's appreciated you clear that out. About the "fear": I suspect it has much more to do with the ITAR and proprietary red-taped world the aerospace industry has sadly become in the last few years rather than some "anti-SpaceX conspiracy" (of which this forum is an anti-example).I'm comfortable with the notion that some people at NASA love SpaceX and some loathe it and some are in between. I'm also comfortable with the notion that if the culture of an organization is a certain way, that it can be career limiting to speak out against that, even when you hear outright falsehoods (but congruent with the culture) uttered. I don't think ITAR is an explanation for all of the difficulties that have been encountered.
Quote from: Lar on 12/13/2019 04:26 pmQuote from: eeergo on 12/11/2019 05:33 pmThanks for the honesty, it's appreciated you clear that out. About the "fear": I suspect it has much more to do with the ITAR and proprietary red-taped world the aerospace industry has sadly become in the last few years rather than some "anti-SpaceX conspiracy" (of which this forum is an anti-example).I'm comfortable with the notion that some people at NASA love SpaceX and some loathe it and some are in between. I'm also comfortable with the notion that if the culture of an organization is a certain way, that it can be career limiting to speak out against that, even when you hear outright falsehoods (but congruent with the culture) uttered. I don't think ITAR is an explanation for all of the difficulties that have been encountered.I had some contact with folks from the Visiting Vehicle staff in Mission Control about five or six years ago, in the early days of CRS. Their attitude was quite negative toward SpaceX - arrogant, hard to work with, taking a lot of risks. Textbook culture clash kind of thing. I've often wondered how those attitudes have evolved since then. I'm sure they felt vindicated by the CRS-7 and Amos-6 failures in 2015 and 2016. I wonder if their opinion of SpaceX has improved since (or other people have rotated into those positions with less animus).
Quote from: billh on 12/13/2019 05:56 pmI had some contact with folks from the Visiting Vehicle staff in Mission Control about five or six years ago, in the early days of CRS. Their attitude was quite negative toward SpaceX - arrogant, hard to work with, taking a lot of risks. Textbook culture clash kind of thing. I've often wondered how those attitudes have evolved since then. I'm sure they felt vindicated by the CRS-7 and Amos-6 failures in 2015 and 2016. I wonder if their opinion of SpaceX has improved since (or other people have rotated into those positions with less animus).Not to get too off-topic, though I believe this is at least tangentially relevant, it might be about the organic vs contractor clash that is prevalent just about everywhere in government, particularly regarding new entrants. I have been a DoD consultant for 16 years and some of the attitudes and behaviors I have personally experienced against me border on abuse and harassment, and there is not a thing I can do. One time I tried to do something and my government customer informed me that my program suddenly ran out of funds. I was out of work for 3 months.I guess my point is that it is not all about SpaceX, it is the overall culture.
I had some contact with folks from the Visiting Vehicle staff in Mission Control about five or six years ago, in the early days of CRS. Their attitude was quite negative toward SpaceX - arrogant, hard to work with, taking a lot of risks. Textbook culture clash kind of thing. I've often wondered how those attitudes have evolved since then. I'm sure they felt vindicated by the CRS-7 and Amos-6 failures in 2015 and 2016. I wonder if their opinion of SpaceX has improved since (or other people have rotated into those positions with less animus).
Quote from: garcianc on 12/13/2019 07:51 pmQuote from: billh on 12/13/2019 05:56 pmI had some contact with folks from the Visiting Vehicle staff in Mission Control about five or six years ago, in the early days of CRS. Their attitude was quite negative toward SpaceX - arrogant, hard to work with, taking a lot of risks. Textbook culture clash kind of thing. I've often wondered how those attitudes have evolved since then. I'm sure they felt vindicated by the CRS-7 and Amos-6 failures in 2015 and 2016. I wonder if their opinion of SpaceX has improved since (or other people have rotated into those positions with less animus).Not to get too off-topic, though I believe this is at least tangentially relevant, it might be about the organic vs contractor clash that is prevalent just about everywhere in government, particularly regarding new entrants. I have been a DoD consultant for 16 years and some of the attitudes and behaviors I have personally experienced against me border on abuse and harassment, and there is not a thing I can do. One time I tried to do something and my government customer informed me that my program suddenly ran out of funds. I was out of work for 3 months.I guess my point is that it is not all about SpaceX, it is the overall culture.In this situation the contrast in attitudes was between working with SpaceX on Dragon (very negative) vs. working with ESA and JAXA on ATV and H-II (very positive). In all cases it was about cooperation with an external organization, but one was commercial and the other two were governmental, and maybe more like NASA in their own culture.
SpaceX, NASA and Boeing have a common problem: Making sure their parachutes workRachael Joy Florida TodayPublished 6:00 AM EST Dec 16, 2019Next year when SpaceX’s Dragon capsule is hurtling toward the Pacific Ocean at 540 miles per hour on its return from the International Space Station, the technology ensuring the astronauts inside land safely is a component it seems we’d have mastered by now: the parachute.
“Parachutes, they look easy but they are definitely not easy,” Elon Musk said in October at a press conference at SpaceX, “We’ve had so many engineers quit over the parachutes.”
QuoteSpaceX, NASA and Boeing have a common problem: Making sure their parachutes workRachael Joy Florida TodayPublished 6:00 AM EST Dec 16, 2019Next year when SpaceX’s Dragon capsule is hurtling toward the Pacific Ocean at 540 miles per hour on its return from the International Space Station, the technology ensuring the astronauts inside land safely is a component it seems we’d have mastered by now: the parachute.https://eu.floridatoday.com/story/tech/science/space/2019/12/16/nasa-spacex-and-boeing-struggle-overcome-parachute-issues/4177914002/
...I wonder if they regret doing this, given Falcon 9's performance it seems Dragon 2 shouldn't need so much weight reduction.
Quote from: su27k on 12/17/2019 01:43 pm...I wonder if they regret doing this, given Falcon 9's performance it seems Dragon 2 shouldn't need so much weight reduction. Well if they weight less then they also probably take up less space, and dragon is definitely volume constrained, so there is a trade there.
Quote from: FutureSpaceTourist on 12/16/2019 01:41 pmhttps://eu.floridatoday.com/story/tech/science/space/2019/12/16/nasa-spacex-and-boeing-struggle-overcome-parachute-issues/4177914002/(Snip)Also interesting that SpaceX's parachute is half the weight of Orion's, I guess they're really pushing the boundaries here. I wonder if they regret doing this, given Falcon 9's performance it seems Dragon 2 shouldn't need so much weight reduction.
https://eu.floridatoday.com/story/tech/science/space/2019/12/16/nasa-spacex-and-boeing-struggle-overcome-parachute-issues/4177914002/
Quote from: su27k on 12/17/2019 01:43 pmQuote from: FutureSpaceTourist on 12/16/2019 01:41 pmhttps://eu.floridatoday.com/story/tech/science/space/2019/12/16/nasa-spacex-and-boeing-struggle-overcome-parachute-issues/4177914002/(Snip)Also interesting that SpaceX's parachute is half the weight of Orion's, I guess they're really pushing the boundaries here. I wonder if they regret doing this, given Falcon 9's performance it seems Dragon 2 shouldn't need so much weight reduction. Orion’s mass is nearly 23 tonsDragon 2 is under 10 tonsIf Dragon’ chutes weigh half as much as Orion’s it’s hardly surprising, or an indication of extreme lightweighting. The volume arguments are persuasive. Edit: That’s dry mass for Dragon 2 and does not include the abort propellant that is being brought down.
Yesterday the team completed the 10th successful multi-chute test in a row of Crew Dragon’s upgraded Mark 3 parachute design – one step closer to safely launching and landing @NASA astronauts
Great news!
Absolutely amazing! A special Congratulations to the @SpaceX parachute team. @AstroBehnken and I can’t thank you all enough for your tireless efforts to get us ready to fly Demo-2.
