SpaceX Dragon 2 Updates and Discussion - Thread 3

[HalcyonRift]

Well, some NASA folks, being pro Boeing, may have waited to "spring" the new requirements on SpaceX as late as possible and in an attempt to penalize SpaceX by causing the highest cost to meet the new requirements.

I continually get the impression that NASA and Congress are continuing to stack the deck hoping SpaceX will just fail and "go away"

Artemis contractors need to be extremely wary that NASA doesn't use the same tactics against less popular bidders (i.e., not Boeing, not LockheedMartin)
 

[yg1968]

[...] In other words: NASA proclaiming that the CCP contractors are delayed "due to working thru technical issues" is only HALF THE STORY.
Good thing that Gwynne called this out, albeit it slightly veiled, in recent interviews.

SpaceX is not alone in this however. Boeing has had its fair share of requirement changes, and resulting delays, as well.

That's exactly what Wayne Hale predicted in this 2017 post:

https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=35717.msg1743925#msg1743925

My worry:  both providers are getting ready to have their Design Certification Review - that is the point at which the NASA independent technical authorities will give them approval or send them back to the showers for additional work.  If NASA has not changed, you can expect significant delay for the providers to have to do much more work (tests, analysis, maybe even redesign).  Watch what happens over the next couple of months.

[clongton]

Well, some NASA folks, being pro Boeing, may have waited to "spring" the new requirements on SpaceX as late as possible and in an attempt to penalize SpaceX by causing the highest cost to meet the new requirements.

I love a good conspiracy theory as much as the next guy but that's a bit over the top, don't you think?

[su27k]

All I can say is that this should be a cautionary tale for the contractors bidding on human-rated systems for the Artemis program...

In particular, the HLS procurement -- firm fixed price for a new human lunar lander?  I expect that to go well...

Firm fixed price can work if it's a true partnership like Space Act Agreement where NASA cannot dictate unilateral changes, the problem with Commercial Crew is that it's using FAR in the CCtCAP phase.

[wannamoonbase]

This is a prime example of how SpaceX has been having trouble to satisfy NASA's changing wishes. When SpaceX was awarded the CCtCAP contract NASA retained the right to change requirements, pretty much at will.

NASA got a REALLY good deal with CCtCAP: Firmed Fixed Price yet able to change requirements late into the game.

My background is in the defense world, but I'm sure it's the same as NASA since we had similar issues with branches of the military.

Usually though changes are covered with an Engineering Change Order (ECO), which can provide schedule and cost changes. It would be interesting to see how these NASA changes were communicated and interpreted by the NASA contracting office and the SpaceX program office.

And sure, the front line NASA and SpaceX personnel are going to be heads down trying to get Commercial Crew operational as quickly and safely as possible, but when it comes to money that is usually a discussion that is held by management on both sides - and usually something that neither side wants to make public.

And some of those requirement changes have come to bite SpaceX pretty hard. One famous example is the switch to water landings which indirectly has resulted into the current extended (and costly) parachute testing campaign.

Another one is presented here: change the angle of the seats. And thus making it impossible to fly seven folks. Which in turn makes the vehicle unattractive for purely tourist flights.

The thermal "issues" that DM-1 had was also the result from a NASA requirement change.

Maybe everyone had a false sense of hope after the successful Commercial Cargo program? That Public/Private Partnerships would truly result in a better outcome, even when human-rated vehicles were involved?

All I can say is that this should be a cautionary tale for the contractors bidding on human-rated systems for the Artemis program...

I agree that NASA changes have caused delays.  But I can cut them some slack since no one has built a US manned vehicle for nearly 2 generations.

Now there are 3 in work and nearly ready.

As for lunar vehicles, SpaceX has most of the components to build one now.  Super Dracos, navigation, life support, docking etc.  It's a gross generalization, but change the configuration of the pressure hull and you're almost ready to go.

[Rocket Science]

This is a prime example of how SpaceX has been having trouble to satisfy NASA's changing wishes. When SpaceX was awarded the CCtCAP contract NASA retained the right to change requirements, pretty much at will.

NASA got a REALLY good deal with CCtCAP: Firmed Fixed Price yet able to change requirements late into the game.

My background is in the defense world, but I'm sure it's the same as NASA since we had similar issues with branches of the military.

Usually though changes are covered with an Engineering Change Order (ECO), which can provide schedule and cost changes. It would be interesting to see how these NASA changes were communicated and interpreted by the NASA contracting office and the SpaceX program office.

And sure, the front line NASA and SpaceX personnel are going to be heads down trying to get Commercial Crew operational as quickly and safely as possible, but when it comes to money that is usually a discussion that is held by management on both sides - and usually something that neither side wants to make public.

And some of those requirement changes have come to bite SpaceX pretty hard. One famous example is the switch to water landings which indirectly has resulted into the current extended (and costly) parachute testing campaign.

Another one is presented here: change the angle of the seats. And thus making it impossible to fly seven folks. Which in turn makes the vehicle unattractive for purely tourist flights.

The thermal "issues" that DM-1 had was also the result from a NASA requirement change.

Maybe everyone had a false sense of hope after the successful Commercial Cargo program? That Public/Private Partnerships would truly result in a better outcome, even when human-rated vehicles were involved?

All I can say is that this should be a cautionary tale for the contractors bidding on human-rated systems for the Artemis program...

I agree that NASA changes have caused delays.  But I can cut them some slack since no one has built a US manned vehicle for nearly 2 generations.

Now there are 3 in work and nearly ready.

As for lunar vehicles, SpaceX has most of the components to build one now.  Super Dracos, navigation, life support, docking etc.  It's a gross generalization, but change the configuration of the pressure hull and you're almost ready to go.

I'm all for giving some slack but what database did McDonnell have to draw from when they designed with slide-rules both Mercury and Gemini in those early days of HSF...

[woods170]

[...] In other words: NASA proclaiming that the CCP contractors are delayed "due to working thru technical issues" is only HALF THE STORY.
Good thing that Gwynne called this out, albeit it slightly veiled, in recent interviews.

SpaceX is not alone in this however. Boeing has had its fair share of requirement changes, and resulting delays, as well.

That's exactly what Wayne Hale predicted in this 2017 post:

https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=35717.msg1743925#msg1743925

My worry:  both providers are getting ready to have their Design Certification Review - that is the point at which the NASA independent technical authorities will give them approval or send them back to the showers for additional work.  If NASA has not changed, you can expect significant delay for the providers to have to do much more work (tests, analysis, maybe even redesign).  Watch what happens over the next couple of months.

Yes, the scenario as pictured by Wayne Hale has played out to the fullest.
It was to be expected that Wayne would have a good idea on what would happen. He has been a direct witness to how NASA works for ages. He also knew that since his departure NASA has not changed all that much. So, his prediction was pretty much a safe bet.

[woods170]

Could it just be the analysis showed good margins for uncrewed flights, but a more refined one, based on a longer empirical flight history of almost 20 missions which was not available before, done ex-profeso for the crewed variant, showed such problems? No need to invoke NASA's "undecisiveness", IMO. Also, it's unclear why you mention "issues" (between quotes) when we're talking about attitude control engines physically breaking on orbit.

Emphasis mine.

That didn't actually happen on any of the CRS missions. Scenario was developed as a result of extreme limits testing.

You people should realize that, besides on-orbit performance of the Draco's, SpaceX is also required to do a ship-load of testing on the thruster quads. Everything from nominal situations to extreme situations. Some of the results of the extreme situations worried NASA because it could potentially lead to a thruster coming apart. Which is what was referred to prior to DM-1 flying.

you are actually wrong. Well not really, actually right. "It's complicated".
Gestenmaier and Lueders were referring to the thruster failure in real CRS mission CRS-2 on her approach to ISS (the failure resulted in 1 day delay to the arrival to the ISS). As expected it was over dramatized in all major newslets so it's not that difficult to find details. So yes, the failure was real. It happened in 2013.
If I recall the issue was identified in the frozen "propellant" slag. SpaceX has solved the risk by the monitoring temperature levels of the propellant plumbing. Absence of the further issues would suppose the problem being solved. Khhm. Apparently according to NASA it isn't.

Just like it is the case with the cracks, COPV, "chilling", parachutes  etc. NASA likes to return and to iterate obsolete problems add nausea even if their questions don't really relate to the new devices.(as it is the case with cracks, COPV and even parachutes).

Emphasis mine.

Minor nit: the CRS-2 problem was actually a stuck valve. The subcontractor who built them had changed its manufacturing procedures which resulted in slightly out-of-spec dimensional tolerances on the built valves. When the spacecraft went into orbit the slightly out-of-spec dimensions of the valve components caused it to get stuck.
SpaceX applied repeated Helium-hammering to force the valve open. That was successful and the CRS-2 mission proceeded normally.

The helium-hammering did not break anything on the valve. After this incident SpaceX brought manufacturing of those valves in-house to guarantee that no such incident could ever happen again.

[scr00chy]

So when NASA changes the originally agreed-upon requirements, there is no additional payment for the extra work to the contractor? Why would anyone agree to that?

[woods170]

So when NASA changes the originally agreed-upon requirements, there is no additional payment for the extra work to the contractor? Why would anyone agree to that?

Because, during contract negotiations, NASA informed the then would-be contractors that there were almost certainly going to be requirment changes. Both contractors considered a certain number of requirement changes and calculated those into the price-tag they offered for their contracts.

Unfortunately, there were many more requirement changes than either contractor had anticipated. And that's when Fixed Firm Price begins to hurt. Particularly SpaceX which offered significantly lower than Boeing.

Only when NASA asks performance that is above and beyond the scope of the contract (such as flying Starliner's CFT mission as a long-duration mission) will there be additional payments. Such as the $287 million which Boeing recently got on top of the $4.2 billion they are already getting for CCtCAP.

[Coastal Ron]

Maybe everyone had a false sense of hope after the successful Commercial Cargo program? That Public/Private Partnerships would truly result in a better outcome, even when human-rated vehicles were involved?

All I can say is that this should be a cautionary tale for the contractors bidding on human-rated systems for the Artemis program...

I agree that NASA changes have caused delays.  But I can cut them some slack since no one has built a US manned vehicle for nearly 2 generations.

There are two issues that affect Boeing and SpaceX:

1. NASA making changes that end up making the Commercial Crew vehicles less "commercial", such as the change in seating for Dragron.

2. NOT PAYING FOR MANDATED CHANGES. This is really the most egregious, since EVERYONE knew going in that there were going to be changes, since these were new transportation systems. So it's not that no one knew there wouldn't be changes, no one knew that NASA wouldn't be paying for the significant ones.

[dondar]

We all know too that you don't need to *actually* have an "engine-breaking-apart-on-orbit" type of situation in order to do something about it, especially moving onward to crewed flights with the same type of engines but different, probably more demanding flight profiles.

I'm sure you'd agree margins are everything, and from the gathered information thus far it doesn't seem it was an "issue", but rather an *issue*. DM-1 was waived just because it could afford to avoid the thermally-worrying scenarios, as it was stated also in that briefing - not because the situation was deemed to be too academic to actually matter.

In a previous post you seem to imply those new margins are too conservative and NASA is hairsplitting - which cannot be excluded. But it's also true that from your post we'd just have to believe in "some folks at SpaceX"'s judgement (i.e. part of the interested party... what about "the other folks at SpaceX", or "folks at NASA"? how many are there of each subgroup? whose opinion is more valid/who did the most in-depth analysis?).

It's obvious NASA changed its requirements when D2 was deep into its development process, or otherwise it wouldn't have impacted its timeline. Whether the change was arbitrary, exaggerated, imposed with ill intention... is the real question. A scenario in which good margins were seen for uncrewed flights, but more refined analyses based on a longer empirical flight history of ~20 missions not available before, done ex-profeso for the crewed variant, showed problems - is more plausible IMO.

the change was during building process. in 2017. They have tested Crew Dragon in the conditions in which Dragon 1 failed. Dracos being of exactly the same design invariably failed and NASA started hair splitting. I repeat that the the initial failure was in 2013 and relevant Dragon 2 design features were reviewed and approved after a number of times. The test which broke thruster was made in the conditions beyond initial design requirements. AS it is mentioned by  woodz

I know Woods is an ESA insider with many contacts also elsewhere -many times correct, sometimes not entirely-, but even he is not providing such a level of certainty and detail.

I cannot gather from your posting history - do you know for a fact the redesign of the Dracos required by NASA is based entirely on the 2013 issues, and furthermore it was not acted upon by NASA until 2017?

I can not really say immediately if the changes came in 2017 or 2018. I am sure they can be traced.  I know that the changes came after real life tests. It can be 2017 for components tests. But final thermal integral&components tests under NASA control were in 2018. So most probably the design changes came also in the second middle of 2018. The changes are not yet finalized btw.
I do not have SpaceX or ESA contacts, a couple of my ex-colleagues are working with/in NASA. And they are very disgruntled by all this anti-SpaceX nonsense. And they are literally scared to say anything even remotely controversial in  the modern "politically active" atmosphere.

[dondar]

Could it just be the analysis showed good margins for uncrewed flights, but a more refined one, based on a longer empirical flight history of almost 20 missions which was not available before, done ex-profeso for the crewed variant, showed such problems? No need to invoke NASA's "undecisiveness", IMO. Also, it's unclear why you mention "issues" (between quotes) when we're talking about attitude control engines physically breaking on orbit.

Emphasis mine.

That didn't actually happen on any of the CRS missions. Scenario was developed as a result of extreme limits testing.

You people should realize that, besides on-orbit performance of the Draco's, SpaceX is also required to do a ship-load of testing on the thruster quads. Everything from nominal situations to extreme situations. Some of the results of the extreme situations worried NASA because it could potentially lead to a thruster coming apart. Which is what was referred to prior to DM-1 flying.

you are actually wrong. Well not really, actually right. "It's complicated".
Gestenmaier and Lueders were referring to the thruster failure in real CRS mission CRS-2 on her approach to ISS (the failure resulted in 1 day delay to the arrival to the ISS). As expected it was over dramatized in all major newslets so it's not that difficult to find details. So yes, the failure was real. It happened in 2013.
If I recall the issue was identified in the frozen "propellant" slag. SpaceX has solved the risk by the monitoring temperature levels of the propellant plumbing. Absence of the further issues would suppose the problem being solved. Khhm. Apparently according to NASA it isn't.

Just like it is the case with the cracks, COPV, "chilling", parachutes  etc. NASA likes to return and to iterate obsolete problems add nausea even if their questions don't really relate to the new devices.(as it is the case with cracks, COPV and even parachutes).

Emphasis mine.

Minor nit: the CRS-2 problem was actually a stuck valve. The subcontractor who built them had changed its manufacturing procedures which resulted in slightly out-of-spec dimensional tolerances on the built valves. When the spacecraft went into orbit the slightly out-of-spec dimensions of the valve components caused it to get stuck.
SpaceX applied repeated Helium-hammering to force the valve open. That was successful and the CRS-2 mission proceeded normally.

The helium-hammering did not break anything on the valve. After this incident SpaceX brought manufacturing of those valves in-house to guarantee that no such incident could ever happen again.

I was told that the tests which tried  to replicate this failure led to the Draco partial disassembly ("the first one"). Was I told wrong?
Thanks for correcting.

[Comga]

(Snip)
I do not have SpaceX or ESA contacts, a couple of my ex-colleagues are working with/in NASA. And they are very disgruntled by all this anti-SpaceX nonsense. And they are literally scared to say anything even remotely controversial in  the modern "politically active" atmosphere.

Can you be more specific?
Are your ex-colleagues scared of criticizing SpaceX of “anti-SpaceX nonsense” from some NASA factions?

[eeergo]

I can not really say immediately if the changes came in 2017 or 2018. I am sure they can be traced.  I know that the changes came after real life tests. It can be 2017 for components tests. But final thermal integral&components tests under NASA control were in 2018. So most probably the design changes came also in the second middle of 2018. The changes are not yet finalized btw.

In other words, the fact that the CRS-2 incident was the cause for the redesign, which you repeated twice as if certain, is not actually a fact, but your interpretation based on incomplete public info which objectively doesn't point that way. So is the implication NASA sat on it for 4-5 years to force a redesign when it would be inconvenient for SpaceX. When the design changes came, in absolute terms, is irrelevant to your prior point.

Is your claim that changes aren't yet finalized (where, are we still just talking about Dracos?) also another interpretation, with the crewed DM-2 so close to launch?

It'd be helpful if interpretations and guesses were flagged as such rather than writing such authoritative statements.

I do not have SpaceX or ESA contacts, a couple of my ex-colleagues are working with/in NASA. And they are very disgruntled by all this anti-SpaceX nonsense. And they are literally scared to say anything even remotely controversial in  the modern "politically active" atmosphere.

Thanks for the honesty, it's appreciated you clear that out. About the "fear": I suspect it has much more to do with the ITAR and proprietary red-taped world the aerospace industry has sadly become in the last few years rather than some "anti-SpaceX conspiracy" (of which this forum is an anti-example).

[oldAtlas_Eguy]

A clearing up of some fallacies  in regard to government contracting.

On a cost plus engineers although not supposed to give direct technical direction, they are not prosecuted for such actions since the changes to the contract are primarily a way of documenting the direction with new cost and schedule estimates since there are no negotiations related.

On a Firm fixed price engineers go to jail if they give direct technical direction.  In order to give technical direction requires a contract change with strong legal consequences. The change orders can be done overnight but usually take 90 days. They involve a request of contractor proposed cost and schedule impacts for the change. Resulting in a miniature evaluation and negotiations process. These change requests can be initiated by the contractor or gov.

So FFP are difficult to change unless the contractor agrees and the government agrees with formal legal signatures.

So whatever the reason for the contract change the legal recourse for both parties is quite severe if malfeasance is discovered by one or the other regarding the other party.

[joek]

A clearing up of some fallacies  in regard to government contracting.
...

Thanks for that, although should qualify the first statement "On a cost plus engineers although not supposed to give direct technical direction, they are not prosecuted for such actions..." with "while they may not be sanctioned[1] for providing direct technical direction, they are specifically prohibited from providing such; if such is discovered, the parties involved may be subject to sanctions, although that appears to be rare".  Case in point: EELV development (the cost+ parts); there is an old thread which discusses the specifics which I cannot locate at the moment.


[1] Sanctioned meaning everything from administrative disciplinary action to prosecution of statutory or criminal violations.

[joek]

Firm fixed price can work if it's a true partnership like Space Act Agreement where NASA cannot dictate unilateral changes, the problem with Commercial Crew is that it's using FAR in the CCtCAP phase.

FAR is not the issue; the issue is how it is used; specifically, that it is being used to include DDT&E[1], rather that being used strictly for procurement of extant products-services.  In any case FFP (FAR) and SAA are very different; the prior is used when there is an acquisition of products-services; the latter cannot be used for such.

[1] In that you are partially correct as CCtCap includes both DDT&E as well as procurement of extant products-services.

[Grandpa to Two]

Firm fixed price can work if it's a true partnership like Space Act Agreement where NASA cannot dictate unilateral changes, the problem with Commercial Crew is that it's using FAR in the CCtCAP phase.

FAR is not the issue; the issue is how it is used; specifically, that it is being used to include DDT&E[1], rather that being used strictly for procurement of extant products-services.  In any case FFP (FAR) and SAA are very different; the prior is used when there is an acquisition of products-services; the latter cannot be used for such.

[1] In that you are partially correct as CCtCap includes both DDT&E as well as procurement of extant products-services.

And this means what? How about posting again without acronyms for us plain folks so we can follow you smart fellows hmmm?

[Comga]

A clearing up of some fallacies  in regard to government contracting.

On a cost plus engineers although not supposed to give direct technical direction, they are not prosecuted for such actions since the changes to the contract are primarily a way of documenting the direction with new cost and schedule estimates since there are no negotiations related.

On a Firm fixed price engineers go to jail if they give direct technical direction.  In order to give technical direction requires a contract change with strong legal consequences. The change orders can be done overnight but usually take 90 days. They involve a request of contractor proposed cost and schedule impacts for the change. Resulting in a miniature evaluation and negotiations process. These change requests can be initiated by the contractor or gov.

So FFP are difficult to change unless the contractor agrees and the government agrees with formal legal signatures.

So whatever the reason for the contract change the legal recourse for both parties is quite severe if malfeasance is discovered by one or the other regarding the other party.

Aren't those engineers at risk of going to jail, for providing technical direction under a FFP contract, on the customer side?

However, in the case of Commercial Crew, the contracts seem to have said that the contractors would meet certain requirements that had yet to be finalized.  They were willing to take that risk.   With or without malfeasance, it seems like Boeing was better able than SpaceX to anticipate the cost of changes and to negotiate better recovery, convincing NASA that certain direction that increased costs went beyond the permitted requirement evolution and thus recover the cost.