SpaceX F9 : Crew Dragon In-Flight Abort Test : Jan. 19, 2020 : Discussion

[Alexphysics]

Is there any official Spacex information about the ability of the crew to start the abort sequence? Or it is an all-automated system?

I'm not 100% certain, but I'm guessing that is the red-highlighted handle on the control panel.

My recollection from big zoom on the original hi-res of those input panels were that there were some abort scenarios the crew could activate (water deorbit, deorbit now, and something with the parachutes ... perhaps more).  But I'm not readily thinking of any scenario with crew initiated abort during ascent that makes asense.

The handle on the middle of the panel is for the crew to manually trigger the abort system. It was a NASA requirement to have a way for the crew to activate the escape system manually.

can you give a source?

I've seen closer pictures and other ones of the rest of the pannel so I very well know what the buttons on all those panels do and that handle in the middle is precisely there for manual command of an abort during launch. Also, our forum member woods has also their own sources and has explained that on detail in the Dragon 2 discussion thread and matches very well what I've been told and what I've seen.

[Rondaz]

Update: NASA and SpaceX Targeting Sunday, Jan. 19, for In-Flight Abort Test

Danielle Sempsrott Posted on January 18, 2020

NASA and SpaceX now are targeting 8 a.m. EST Sunday, Jan. 19, for launch of the company’s In-Flight Abort Test from Launch Complex 39A in Florida, which will demonstrate Crew Dragon’s ability to safely escape the Falcon 9 rocket in the event of a failure during launch. The abort test has a six-hour launch window.

Teams are standing down from today’s launch attempt due to poor splashdown and recovery weather.

For tomorrow’s launch attempt, meteorologists with the U.S. Air Force 45th Space Wing predict a 60% chance of favorable weather toward the opening of the window with a 40% chance toward the end of the window. The primary concerns for launch day are the thick cloud layer and flight through precipitation rules during the launch window.

The test launch will air on NASA Television and the agency’s website. Here’s the upcoming mission coverage:

Sunday, Jan. 19

7:40 a.m. – NASA TV test coverage begins for the 8 a.m. liftoff
9:30 a.m. – Post-test news conference at Kennedy, with the following representatives:
NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine
SpaceX representative
Kathy Lueders, manager, NASA Commercial Crew Program
Victor Glover, astronaut, NASA Commercial Crew Program
Mike Hopkins, astronaut, NASA Commercial Crew Program

https://blogs.nasa.gov/kennedy/2020/01/18/update-spacex-targeting-sunday-jan-19-for-in-flight-abort-test/

[AC in NC]

Is there any official Spacex information about the ability of the crew to start the abort sequence? Or it is an all-automated system?

I'm not 100% certain, but I'm guessing that is the red-highlighted handle on the control panel.

My recollection from big zoom on the original hi-res of those input panels were that there were some abort scenarios the crew could activate (water deorbit, deorbit now, and something with the parachutes ... perhaps more).  But I'm not readily thinking of any scenario with crew initiated abort during ascent that makes asense.

The handle on the middle of the panel is for the crew to manually trigger the abort system. It was a NASA requirement to have a way for the crew to activate the escape system manually.

   Sadly one day soon I'm going to have to start affirmatively compensating for old age.  Totally missed "handle" and was focused on the buttons with the red-highlighted "ooops shields".

Thanks for the correction and now I remember, of course, that the handle was obviously discussed to exhaustion as per usual.   

[ace5]

Is there any official Spacex information about the ability of the crew to start the abort sequence? Or it is an all-automated system?

I'm not 100% certain, but I'm guessing that is the red-highlighted handle on the control panel.

My recollection from big zoom on the original hi-res of those input panels were that there were some abort scenarios the crew could activate (water deorbit, deorbit now, and something with the parachutes ... perhaps more).  But I'm not readily thinking of any scenario with crew initiated abort during ascent that makes asense.

The handle on the middle of the panel is for the crew to manually trigger the abort system. It was a NASA requirement to have a way for the crew to activate the escape system manually.

can you give a source?

I've seen closer pictures and other ones of the rest of the pannel so I very well know what the buttons on all those panels do and that handle in the middle is precisely there for manual command of an abort during launch. Also, our forum member woods has also their own sources and has explained that on detail in the Dragon 2 discussion thread and matches very well what I've been told and what I've seen.

As far as I understand your statement comes from second-hand info from a source that has "their own sources" . I expected something directly from a certified Spacex source. I'm aware of the T-handle.

(Of course, CCtCAP requirement says: "The integrated space vehicle shall enable the crew to manually override higher level software control/automation (such as automated abort initiation, configuration change, and mode change) during pre-launch operations and ascent when the override of the software system will not directly cause a catastrophic event.")

[Comga]

As far as I understand your statement comes from second-hand info from a source that has "their own sources" . I expected something directly from a certified Spacex source. I'm aware of the T-handle.

(Of course, CCtCAP requirement says: "The integrated space vehicle shall enable the crew to manually override higher level software control/automation (such as automated abort initiation, configuration change, and mode change) during pre-launch operations and ascent when the override of the software system will not directly cause a catastrophic event.")

Looking at that T-handle, it seems to point to "eject" if twisted left OR right.
Wouldn't that make it able to "manually override higher level software" to initiate an abort, but unable to "override ...automated abort initiation"?
IOW, is there an obvious way to use this to prevent an abort that the astronauts determine would be more dangerous than not initiating it?

Imagine if DM-2 were to accidentally launch on the IFA profile and head due east.  It would be arguably safer to get to orbit than to immediately abort into the Atlantic, just as it was judged safer for Starliner to get to orbit than to come down immediately near Australia. 
Could the astronauts command Dragon to "ride it out"?

[EspenU]

Looking at that T-handle, it seems to point to "eject" if twisted left OR right.
Wouldn't that make it able to "manually override higher level software" to initiate an abort, but unable to "override ...automated abort initiation"?
IOW, is there an obvious way to use this to prevent an abort that the astronauts determine would be more dangerous than not initiating it?

An abort initiated by the capsule would fire in way under a second. No human would be able to react quickly enough to stop it.

[Comga]

Looking at that T-handle, it seems to point to "eject" if twisted left OR right.
Wouldn't that make it able to "manually override higher level software" to initiate an abort, but unable to "override ...automated abort initiation"?
IOW, is there an obvious way to use this to prevent an abort that the astronauts determine would be more dangerous than not initiating it?

An abort initiated by the capsule would fire in way under a second. No human would be able to react quickly enough to stop it.

Good point!

[b.lorenz]

Looking at that T-handle, it seems to point to "eject" if twisted left OR right.
Wouldn't that make it able to "manually override higher level software" to initiate an abort, but unable to "override ...automated abort initiation"?
IOW, is there an obvious way to use this to prevent an abort that the astronauts determine would be more dangerous than not initiating it?

An abort initiated by the capsule would fire in way under a second. No human would be able to react quickly enough to stop it.

Good point!

But are there no scenarios when the crew could understand that something is off-nominal before it becomes so bad that the abort triggers? In such a case they might see a point in inhibiting abort.

[SINO4894]

It seems that the height of the waves is decreasing by last 24h. 

[Rondaz]

In-Flight Abort Test Targeted for 10 a.m. EST Launch

James Cawley Posted on January 19, 2020

NASA and SpaceX now are targeting 10 a.m. EST Sunday, Jan. 19, for launch of the company’s In-Flight Abort Test from Launch Complex 39A in Florida, which will demonstrate Crew Dragon’s ability to safely escape the Falcon 9 rocket in the event of a failure during launch. The abort test has a six-hour launch window ending at 2 p.m. this afternoon.

The test launch will air on NASA Television and the agency’s website. Here’s the upcoming mission coverage:

 Sunday, Jan. 19

9:40 a.m. – NASA TV test coverage begins for the 10 a.m. liftoff
11:30 a.m. – Post-test news conference at Kennedy, with the following representatives:
NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine
SpaceX representative
Kathy Lueders, manager, NASA Commercial Crew Program
Victor Glover, astronaut, NASA Commercial Crew Program
Mike Hopkins, astronaut, NASA Commercial Crew Program
The time adjustment for today’s launch attempt, splashdown and recovery of the Crew Dragon spacecraft allows for the best time to perform the abort demonstration based on weather conditions.

The U.S. Air Force 45th Space Wing continues to predict a 60% chance of favorable weather for launch toward the opening of the window with a 40% chance toward the end of the window. The primary concerns for launch day are the thick cloud layer and flight through precipitation rules during the launch window.

https://blogs.nasa.gov/kennedy/2020/01/19/in-flight-abort-test-targeted-for-10-a-m-launch/

[AJW]

For those who have placed cameras around the pad to capture the liftoff, how are the cameras triggered and is there any impact by the delays?

[mtakala24]

For those who have placed cameras around the pad to capture the liftoff, how are the cameras triggered and is there any impact by the delays?

Great article about this here:

https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-vandenberg-photographers-20171229-story.html

[The Roadie]

Sound-activated triggers, and batteries typically last more than 24 hours unattended.

Sent from my SM-N960U using Tapatalk

[mrhuggy]

NSF Wayward Boat is underway. https://www.twitch.tv/dasvaldez

https://twitter.com/julia_bergeron/status/1218897096847306752

[clongton]

I have a Dragon launch trajectory ground track question, not for this abort test, but for a normal Crew Dragon launch.
At what point over the North Atlantic does Dragon actually enter orbit and an abort to the ground is no longer possible? I'm wondering if a launch abort will ALWAYS be into the water or is there a possibility that an abort could actually terminate on land in southern Ireland, England or northern France. If impacting the ground under parachutes, would the impact be survivable for the crew? Alternatively, at what point could the Super Dracos enable an Abort To Orbit?

Mods - wasn't sure where to post this. Feel free to move to a better thread. Please just let me know where.

[RonM]

Looking at that T-handle, it seems to point to "eject" if twisted left OR right.
Wouldn't that make it able to "manually override higher level software" to initiate an abort, but unable to "override ...automated abort initiation"?
IOW, is there an obvious way to use this to prevent an abort that the astronauts determine would be more dangerous than not initiating it?

An abort initiated by the capsule would fire in way under a second. No human would be able to react quickly enough to stop it.

Good point!

But are there no scenarios when the crew could understand that something is off-nominal before it becomes so bad that the abort triggers? In such a case they might see a point in inhibiting abort.

They won't have time to decide. If a delay is added to wait for crew approval then many survivable scenarios become loss of crew.

[Rondaz]

NEW T-0: 10:30 AM EST (15:30 UTC). Winds in the recovery zone.

https://twitter.com/TGMetsFan98/status/1218897074877542400

[DecoLV]

These constraints seem finicky to me. It's the Atlantic Ocean. You are not going to ever get calm winds and calm seas. I have a feeling conditions are not going to get better than they are now.

[Lar]

These constraints seem finicky to me. It's the Atlantic Ocean. You are not going to ever get calm winds and calm seas. I have a feeling conditions are not going to get better than they are now.

I think it is possible that the constraints are tighter for this than a normal launch would be, because there are extra imaging and capture needs than normal. No basis for that speculation though.

[clongton]

But are there no scenarios when the crew could understand that something is off-nominal before it becomes so bad that the abort triggers? In such a case they might see a point in inhibiting abort.

None. The abort decision tree executes so fast that an actual abort would be underway before the crew could detect anything wrong. Their first indication would be noticing that the SDs were firing. That's when they would suddenly realize that an abort was already underway so there must have been something wrong.