Insurance rates for different launch providers

[FutureSpaceTourist]

Will insurance force Russia’s Proton rocket out of the commercial satellite business?

by Peter B. de Selding | Oct 18, 2017

https://www.spaceintelreport.com/will-insurance-force-russias-proton-rocket-commercial-satellite-business/

Article says that insurance premiums for Proton launches are about 12% of the insured value, as opposed to 3-4% for Ariane 5 and 4-5% for the Falcon 9. Thought this interesting too:

But the low insurance rates for Ariane 5 and Falcon 9 mean total premium revenue for 2016 was insufficient to cover a single major launch failure, and 2017 looks no better.

[Rebel44]

Will insurance force Russia’s Proton rocket out of the commercial satellite business?

by Peter B. de Selding | Oct 18, 2017

Thought this interesting too:

But the low insurance rates for Ariane 5 and Falcon 9 mean total premium revenue for 2016 was insufficient to cover a single major launch failure, and 2017 looks no better.

Its just simple math - with known flight rates and these insurance premiums, its clear that insurance companies expect to cover less than 1 major launch failure per year for either Ariane 5 or Falcon 9 - we will see if that turns out to be true or not.

[john smith 19]

Its just simple math - with known flight rates and these insurance premiums, its clear that insurance companies expect to cover less than 1 major launch failure per year for either Ariane 5 or Falcon 9 - we will see if that turns out to be true or not.

It's interesting that how launch rate balances out launch failure.  Get that up (and make them successful) and insurers get enough in the kitty and a good enough track record to lower the rates.

Atlas V should have fairly low rates as well, given it's success rate is about 2nd only to Ariane 5. The interesting question is how reusability should affect rates for SX.

My instinct is the Russians will have to set up an insurance subsidiary. It's the only way they can lower their prices enough to get the launch rate up to encourage the rest of the insurance market to lower there premiums back to a competitive level.

[LouScheffer]

Article says that insurance premiums for Proton launches are about 12% of the insured value, as opposed to 3-4% for Ariane 5 and 4-5% for the Falcon 9. Thought this interesting too:

But the low insurance rates for Ariane 5 and Falcon 9 mean total premium revenue for 2016 was insufficient to cover a single major launch failure, and 2017 looks no better.

But why should premiums for a year cover a launch failure?  Ariane 5 has not failed for about 15 years.   Therefore a break-even premiums for year  would only cover 1/15 of a launch failure.  As of now, the insurance companies have collected 80 straight premiums for Ariane, without a single payout.  At 4%, that's about 3.2 payloads worth in the bank, not including what they've earned by investing the money over that time.  They could afford to lose one or two payloads and still be solidly in the black.  If anything, insurance for Ariane seems way more expensive than the statistics dictate.

[abaddon]

But why should premiums for a year cover a launch failure?  Ariane 5 has not failed for about 15 years.   Therefore a break-even premiums for year  would only cover 1/15 of a launch failure.  As of now, the insurance companies have collected 80 straight premiums for Ariane, without a single payout.  At 4%, that's about 3.2 payloads worth in the bank, not including what they've earned by investing the money over that time.  They could afford to lose one or two payloads and still be solidly in the black.  If anything, insurance for Ariane seems way more expensive than the statistics dictate.

I believe the insurance talked about here is for launch and first year on-orbit.

No idea if that changes the numbers.

[ringsider]

Article says that insurance premiums for Proton launches are about 12% of the insured value, as opposed to 3-4% for Ariane 5 and 4-5% for the Falcon 9. Thought this interesting too:

But the low insurance rates for Ariane 5 and Falcon 9 mean total premium revenue for 2016 was insufficient to cover a single major launch failure, and 2017 looks no better.

But why should premiums for a year cover a launch failure?  Ariane 5 has not failed for about 15 years.   Therefore a break-even premiums for year  would only cover 1/15 of a launch failure.  As of now, the insurance companies have collected 80 straight premiums for Ariane, without a single payout.  At 4%, that's about 3.2 payloads worth in the bank, not including what they've earned by investing the money over that time.  They could afford to lose one or two payloads and still be solidly in the black.  If anything, insurance for Ariane seems way more expensive than the statistics dictate.

The probability of each failure event is independent from the history. It's more like long term roulette. You put 3 tokens on a single number - the premium - and spin the wheel. 35/36 times you - the launch operator - lose your bet and the house sweeps it. But at any time the house - the insurer - can lose 105 tokens. The premiums are set against that long run expectation as even if the house doesn't lose for 80 turns (240 tokens), it could lose 105 on the next one and then again on the very next one. After which, as a good insurance underwriter, they would of course decline further insurance and sit on a 30 token long run profit...

And of course there are costs. They need to run the underwriting operation, do the sales work, reserve the funds, pay legal fees, be ready to defend paying a claim etc.

[Mader Levap]

Interesting, there were claims that Ariane 5 and F9 have same insurance rates. They have not, but I agree they are still strangely very close values considering their launch success to failure ratio.

This kind of thing causes me to treat not very seriously claims like "insurance of used core is practically same as new, so they must have same chance of blowing up!".

[LouScheffer]

The probability of each failure event is independent from the history. It's more like long term roulette. You put 3 tokens on a single number - the premium - and spin the wheel. 35/36 times you - the launch operator - lose your bet and the house sweeps it. But at any time the house - the insurer - can lose 105 tokens. The premiums are set against that long run expectation as even if the house doesn't lose for 80 turns (240 tokens), it could lose 105 on the next one and then again on the very next one. After which, as a good insurance underwriter, they would of course decline further insurance and sit on a 30 token long run profit...

And of course there are costs. They need to run the underwriting operation, do the sales work, reserve the funds, pay legal fees, be ready to defend paying a claim etc.

But the costs are more than offset by the investment income.  If they invest their 3 tokens gained per launch over the 15 years in a 6% investment, at the end of 80 launches they have not 240 tokens but more than 360.  So it would take at least 4 failures before they lose money.   Considering that Ariane has been OK 80 times in a row, and that any failure would be thoroughly investigated, that's a pretty safe bet.  They've made hundreds of millions on Ariane so far.

[su27k]

Interesting, there were claims that Ariane 5 and F9 have same insurance rates. They have not, but I agree they are still strangely very close values considering their launch success to failure ratio.

Not strange at all:
Ariane 5: 4/95 = 4.2%
Falcon 9: 2/43 = 4.6%

[woods170]

Interesting, there were claims that Ariane 5 and F9 have same insurance rates. They have not, but I agree they are still strangely very close values considering their launch success to failure ratio.

Not strange at all:
Ariane 5: 4/95 = 4.2%
Falcon 9: 2/43 = 4.6%

Indeed. People seem to forget that Ariane 5 suffered two (2) complete failures (Ariane 501 and 517) as well as two (2) partial failures (Ariane 502 and 510). The two partial failures left several payloads in unusable orbits and resulted in insurance companies paying for the "lost" payloads (A payload does not have to be destroyed in a catastrophic launch mishap to be a total loss. Ending up in a useless orbit is every bit as much a total loss).


Additionally, for Proton:

Past 20 years of service: 13/162 = 8,0%
Past 10 years of service: 10/85 = 11,8%

So, the failure rate of Proton shot up in the last 10 years. A failure rate of nearly 12% in the last decade fits nicely with current insurance rate (12%) for Proton.

[savuporo]

Article says that insurance premiums for Proton launches are about 12% of the insured value, as opposed to 3-4% for Ariane 5 and 4-5% for the Falcon 9. Thought this interesting too:

I want to see the insurance bill for JWST

[woods170]

Article says that insurance premiums for Proton launches are about 12% of the insured value, as opposed to 3-4% for Ariane 5 and 4-5% for the Falcon 9. Thought this interesting too:

I want to see the insurance bill for JWST

You won't see that bill, for one very good reason:

JWST is a US government payload (NASA being a US government agency). Government payloads are NOT insured. Governments usually self-insure.
Exactly the same applies to the ESA owned payloads on JWST.

[LouScheffer]

Interesting, there were claims that Ariane 5 and F9 have same insurance rates. They have not, but I agree they are still strangely very close values considering their launch success to failure ratio.

Not strange at all:
Ariane 5: 4/95 = 4.2%
Falcon 9: 2/43 = 4.6%

I suspect the insurance companies use less naive statistics. For Ariane, if the failure rate was uniform, then the odds of 4 failures in the first 15 would be (4/95)^4 x (91/95)^11 * (15 choose 4) = 0.0026.  The odds of 80 straight successes thereafter is (91/95)^80 = 0.032.  The odds that both are true (4 failures in the first 15, followed by 80 successes) is 0.000083.

The natural conclusion (which coincides with common sense, and experience with other rocket families) is that, most likely,  Ariane was less reliable than 4% in the early days, and is more reliable lately, as problems are understood and fixed.  How much better cannot be determined from the data alone, and depends a lot on your model, and how certain you need the results to be, but a crude estimate is that you need 99% reliability to have a 50% chance of getting through 80 launches without a failure.  Of course it is possible that the failure rate is still 4%, and they have just gotten lucky the last 80 launches, but that's not the way to bet.

[savuporo]

Governments usually self-insure.

In case of ~10 billion dollar space telescope that takes 20 years to build, this term doesn't actually mean anything in practice, does it ? It's not like there is any feasible recovery of the potential loss here.

[TrevorMonty]

Governments usually self-insure.

In case of ~10 billion dollar space telescope that takes 20 years to build, this term doesn't actually mean anything in practice, does it ? It's not like there is any feasible recovery of the potential loss here.

If worst happen a replacement JWST wouldn't cost anywhere near $10B. Most of that money was spent on solving engineering problems not the actual build.

[envy887]

Interesting, there were claims that Ariane 5 and F9 have same insurance rates. They have not, but I agree they are still strangely very close values considering their launch success to failure ratio.

Not strange at all:
Ariane 5: 4/95 = 4.2%
Falcon 9: 2/43 = 4.6%

I suspect the insurance companies use less naive statistics. For Ariane, if the failure rate was uniform, then the odds of 4 failures in the first 15 would be (4/95)^4 x (91/95)^11 * (15 choose 4) = 0.0026.  The odds of 80 straight successes thereafter is (91/95)^80 = 0.032.  The odds that both are true (4 failures in the first 15, followed by 80 successes) is 0.000083.

The natural conclusion (which coincides with common sense, and experience with other rocket families) is that, most likely,  Ariane was less reliable than 4% in the early days, and is more reliable lately, as problems are understood and fixed.  How much better cannot be determined from the data alone, and depends a lot on your model, and how certain you need the results to be, but a crude estimate is that you need 99% reliability to have a 50% chance of getting through 80 launches without a failure.  Of course it is possible that the failure rate is still 4%, and they have just gotten lucky the last 80 launches, but that's not the way to bet.

While the insurance underwriters undoubtedly us a more complex model, you don't need elaborate statistics to derive expected failure rates remarkably similar to the insurance rates for the currently operational variants. Using a simple first level Bayesian estimate of (successes+1)/(attempts+2) yields expected launch failure rates of 3% of Ariane 5 ECA (64/66), and 4% for Falcon 9 v1.2 (25/26).

Ariane 5 ECA doesn't fly enough to ensure statistical confidence that its probable failure rate is truly the 1.6% that its record shows. And insurers likely weight successful flights from 10 or more years ago lower than recent flights, as they should (and do) lower the weighting of failures from the same time frame. It's plausible that variance in manufacturing and operation of the vehicle could change enough over those time frames to change the failure rate substantially (as indeed did happen with Proton).

[Zed_Noir]

The insurance rate for the Falcon 9 is 4-5% of the standard launch cost of $62M, that works out to about $2.5M to $3.1M.

Compare that to the insurance rate for the Ariane 5 of 3-4% of the $178M laumch cost  stated in a recent GAO report. Which works out to $5.3M to $7.1M.

That means it should be cheaper for insurance with a Falcon 9 even with a dual manifested Ariane 5 for GTO comsats.

[david1971]

The insurance rate for the Falcon 9 is 4-5% of the standard launch cost of $62M, that works out to about $2.5M to $3.1M.

Compare that to the insurance rate for the Ariane 5 of 3-4% of the $178M laumch cost  stated in a recent GAO report. Which works out to $5.3M to $7.1M.

That means it should be cheaper for insurance with a Falcon 9 even with a dual manifested Ariane 5 for GTO comsats.

Aren't those percentages of the value of the payload, not the launch cost?  Because it's the payload that really needs to be replaced, I'm assuming you would get a free reflight.

[woods170]

Governments usually self-insure.

In case of ~10 billion dollar space telescope that takes 20 years to build, this term doesn't actually mean anything in practice, does it ? It's not like there is any feasible recovery of the potential loss here.

No, you don't understand. For governments, there is no need to recover their investment in (the unlikely) case their investment (JWST) is lost. Governments are not commercial companies. The rules of the game are quite different for governments.

[IRobot]

Governments usually self-insure.

In case of ~10 billion dollar space telescope that takes 20 years to build, this term doesn't actually mean anything in practice, does it ? It's not like there is any feasible recovery of the potential loss here.

If worst happen a replacement JWST wouldn't cost anywhere near $10B. Most of that money was spent on solving engineering problems not the actual build.

Unsure how the program is managed, but if I were in charge, a 2nd complete telescope would be ordered as spare. Or at least the critical parts, one-offs, that are hard to remake, like custom sensors, optics, electronics, etc.

[john smith 19]

Indeed. People seem to forget that Ariane 5 suffered two (2) complete failures (Ariane 501 and 517) as well as two (2) partial failures (Ariane 502 and 510). The two partial failures left several payloads in unusable orbits and resulted in insurance companies paying for the "lost" payloads (A payload does not have to be destroyed in a catastrophic launch mishap to be a total loss. Ending up in a useless orbit is every bit as much a total loss).


Additionally, for Proton:

Past 20 years of service: 13/162 = 8,0%
Past 10 years of service: 10/85 = 11,8%

So, the failure rate of Proton shot up in the last 10 years. A failure rate of nearly 12% in the last decade fits nicely with current insurance rate (12%) for Proton.

Some interesting numbers, but there are also some unmentioned assumptions in them.

I think the key one is the extent to which Ariane 5 and F9 change over time.

AIUI Arianespace is basically a sales and services operation. It does no development work. So the A5 design will have been changed on the results of the MIB investigations for those 4 events but is otherwise pretty stable.

OTOH F9 has been continually changed since first launch. Merlin thrust levels have gone through what 4 levels? Engine mounts shifted to Octaweb and IIRC at least one tank stretch.

These are only the visible changes.  I can't imagine how many versions the flight control software has gone through.

The point is every change is a possibility for failure and every so often SX has gotten it wrong as AMOS 6 demonstrated. 

On that basis Ariane 5 has clocked up 78 successful flights with (AFAIK) the same configuration, for a failure rate < 1 in 78 IE < 1.28%

F9 has clocked up 23 launches of F9/FT or 2 of the F9/FT/Blk4 version (according to Wiki).
Or 15 since AMOS 6 (whatever version). So is that  a failure rate <4.34%, <6.66% or 50%  all flown ?
And this disregards which of those boosters has already been flight proven.

I'm not saying either approach is good or bad. I'm saying the insurance rates don't seem to match the actual risk profiles of the companies involved.

IOW are insurers discounting the effect of reusability?  Are they under weighting the frequent changes? Or are Arianespace being over charged (until they have another flight failure)?

[john smith 19]

Unsure how the program is managed, but if I were in charge, a 2nd complete telescope would be ordered as spare. Or at least the critical parts, one-offs, that are hard to remake, like custom sensors, optics, electronics, etc.

There are precedents. The book on NASA computers said the 2nd Voyager was quite a bit cheaper than the first.

That said some stuff is so eyewateringly expensive you really want to think hard about wheather you need a spare (Beryllium is much lighter and stiffer than Aluminum.  IIRC anything Beryllium is about 200x the cost of something in Aluminum). 

[woods170]

Indeed. People seem to forget that Ariane 5 suffered two (2) complete failures (Ariane 501 and 517) as well as two (2) partial failures (Ariane 502 and 510). The two partial failures left several payloads in unusable orbits and resulted in insurance companies paying for the "lost" payloads (A payload does not have to be destroyed in a catastrophic launch mishap to be a total loss. Ending up in a useless orbit is every bit as much a total loss).


Additionally, for Proton:

Past 20 years of service: 13/162 = 8,0%
Past 10 years of service: 10/85 = 11,8%

So, the failure rate of Proton shot up in the last 10 years. A failure rate of nearly 12% in the last decade fits nicely with current insurance rate (12%) for Proton.

Some interesting numbers, but there are also some unmentioned assumptions in them.

I think the key one is the extent to which Ariane 5 and F9 change over time.

AIUI Arianespace is basically a sales and services operation. It does no development work. So the A5 design will have been changed on the results of the MIB investigations for those 4 events but is otherwise pretty stable.

OTOH F9 has been continually changed since first launch. Merlin thrust levels have gone through what 4 levels? Engine mounts shifted to Octaweb and IIRC at least one tank stretch.

These are only the visible changes.  I can't imagine how many versions the flight control software has gone through.

The point is every change is a possibility for failure and every so often SX has gotten it wrong as AMOS 6 demonstrated. 

On that basis Ariane 5 has clocked up 78 successful flights with (AFAIK) the same configuration, for a failure rate < 1 in 78 IE < 1.28%

F9 has clocked up 23 launches of F9/FT or 2 of the F9/FT/Blk4 version (according to Wiki).
Or 15 since AMOS 6 (whatever version). So is that  a failure rate <4.34%, <6.66% or 50%  all flown ?
And this disregards which of those boosters has already been flight proven.

I'm not saying either approach is good or bad. I'm saying the insurance rates don't seem to match the actual risk profiles of the companies involved.

IOW are insurers discounting the effect of reusability?  Are they under weighting the frequent changes? Or are Arianespace being over charged (until they have another flight failure)?

Ariane 5 has changed more over the years than you indicate:
- Two different versions of the core stage main engine (Vulcain 1 and Vulcain 2)
- Continuous improvements made to the core stage main engines.
- Two different versions of the core stage (EPC H158 and EPC H173)
- Two different versions of the solid rocket boosters (EAP 238 and EAP 241).
- Two completely different upper stages. (EPS and ESC-A)
- Two different versions of one of the upper stage types. (EPS L9.7 and EPS L10)
- Multiple changes in core stage tank insulation
- Multiple changes to avionics hardware (replacement of obsolete and out-of-production with newly developed)
- Switch from fairing with acoustics dampening to one without
- Multiple improvements and changes in production of tankage and other structures.
- Smaller changes to hundreds of other details over the Ariane 5 life-span.

Don't assume a current Ariane 5 ECA to be identical to one from 10 years ago. There are lots of (albeit small) changes.

[Rik ISS-fan]

In my opinion the difference in insurance rate between Ariane 5 and Falcon 9 is very small.
Ariane 5 ECA hasn't had a failure or partial failure for about 15 years. [https://csglaunches.eu/] only the first ECA failed.  There have been four improvements to A5 ECA, they are developed under the LEAP program.
They first do ground test (for example ARTA6, last year) and than a test launch at discounted cost (institutional launch).

With SpaceX it is not known what they have changed to the launcher or launch procedure.
Using Super Cryo with composite wrapped GHe tanks is looking for trouble. Let's try filling the He later and faster => Kaboom. A failure mode that was totally to be expected. I hope this has changed at SpaceX.

[john smith 19]

Ariane 5 has changed more over the years than you indicate:
- Two different versions of the core stage main engine (Vulcain 1 and Vulcain 2)
- Continuous improvements made to the core stage main engines.
- Two different versions of the core stage (EPC H158 and EPC H173)
- Two different versions of the solid rocket boosters (EAP 238 and EAP 241).
- Two completely different upper stages. (EPS and ESC-A)
- Two different versions of one of the upper stage types. (EPS L9.7 and EPS L10)
- Multiple changes in core stage tank insulation
- Multiple changes to avionics hardware (replacement of obsolete and out-of-production with newly developed)
- Switch from fairing with acoustics dampening to one without
- Multiple improvements and changes in production of tankage and other structures.
- Smaller changes to hundreds of other details over the Ariane 5 life-span.

Don't assume a current Ariane 5 ECA to be identical to one from 10 years ago. There are lots of (albeit small) changes.

TBH I was aware of the Vulcain upgrade but had forgotten it. 

I was unaware of most of the rest of those changes. Thank you for listing them. 

So the other question would seem to be have these changes been an ongoing thing (with nearly every launch being just a little bit different from every other) or were most of them done following a failure, or partial failure?

I guess what I'm saying is that the scale of changes still seems smaller than that of F9 and their success record is still definitely better, so (in the context of this thread) is SX getting a very good deal on its insurance, or is Arianespace getting rather a bad deal on its launches?

Somehow the facts don't quite add up. 

[john smith 19]

In my opinion the difference in insurance rate between Ariane 5 and Falcon 9 is very small.

Yes it does, which doesn't seem a true reflection of A5 unbroken launch success record (78) versus F9 (15 since AMOS 6).

With SpaceX it is not known what they have changed to the launcher or launch procedure.

True, although presumably the insurance companies who take the contract have somewhat greater insight than we do.

Using Super Cryo with composite wrapped GHe tanks is looking for trouble. Let's try filling the He later and faster => Kaboom. A failure mode that was totally to be expected. I hope this has changed at SpaceX.

That's a bit harsh.  If it really was that predictable they'd have know it was not worth doing in the first place. 

OTOH doing with the payload on the top was an unnecessary risk. I doubt SX will be doing that again when they have any ConOps tweaks planned.

[kenny008]

Ariane 5 has changed more over the years than you indicate:
- Two different versions of the core stage main engine (Vulcain 1 and Vulcain 2)
- Continuous improvements made to the core stage main engines.
- Two different versions of the core stage (EPC H158 and EPC H173)
- Two different versions of the solid rocket boosters (EAP 238 and EAP 241).
- Two completely different upper stages. (EPS and ESC-A)
- Two different versions of one of the upper stage types. (EPS L9.7 and EPS L10)
- Multiple changes in core stage tank insulation
- Multiple changes to avionics hardware (replacement of obsolete and out-of-production with newly developed)
- Switch from fairing with acoustics dampening to one without
- Multiple improvements and changes in production of tankage and other structures.
- Smaller changes to hundreds of other details over the Ariane 5 life-span.

Don't assume a current Ariane 5 ECA to be identical to one from 10 years ago. There are lots of (albeit small) changes.

TBH I was aware of the Vulcain upgrade but had forgotten it. 

I was unaware of most of the rest of those changes.

So the other question would seem to be have these changes been an ongoing thing (with nearly every launch being just a little bit different from every other) or were most of them done following a failure, or partial failure?

I guess what I'm saying is that the scale of changes still seems smaller than that of F9 and their success record is still definitely better, so (in the context of this thread) is SX getting a very good deal on its insurance, or is Arianespace getting rather a bad deal on its launches?

Somehow the facts don't quite add up. 

I would imagine that the insurance premiums at some point asymptotically reach some number, and I would also assume that this number is not zero.  As you get more and more flights, I would not expect that the rates will continue to go down to zero.  Therefore, as both launchers continue to fly, both of their rates should become pretty much the same.  When does this happen?  Have Ariane rates pretty much bottomed out, and F9 are just about there?

I'm also not sure what the real question is.  Are we looking for evidence that insurance companies have made some backroom decision to cut SX a deal and potentially lose money on future launch failures?  I don't think I can see the motivation for insurance companies to keep the rates for any particular launcher artificially low.

[abaddon]

I'm not saying either approach is good or bad. I'm saying the insurance rates don't seem to match the actual risk profiles of the companies involved.

The simple answer is they are professionals who have a better understanding of the actual risk profiles than you (or I) do.

It's easy to forget, but SES has a team embedded with SpaceX sitting right there.  NASA and the USAF have very deep insight as well.  They all know way more than we do, to base their assessments on.

[Lars-J]

I was unaware of most of the rest of those changes.

So the other question would seem to be have these changes been an ongoing thing (with nearly every launch being just a little bit different from every other) or were most of them done following a failure, or partial failure?

JS19, All rockets go through a lot of changes. ULA does the same thing with the Atlas V. I doubt there has been many Atlas V cores that have been identical in every aspect - if any.

SpaceX is more open about its changes, and they are sometimes more visible. And there is also certain group of actors that do their best to highlight SpaceX changes and downplay changes to their own vehicles.

[john smith 19]

It's easy to forget, but SES has a team embedded with SpaceX sitting right there.  NASA and the USAF have very deep insight as well.  They all know way more than we do, to base their assessments on.

How is that relevant exactly? It's the insurance companies that set the rates on payloads. Do they have a team "embedded" with SX, or any LV supplier? that would be more relevant to this discussion.

JS19, All rockets go through a lot of changes. ULA does the same thing with the Atlas V. I doubt there has been many Atlas V cores that have been identical in every aspect - if any.

I never doubted it.   

Except some do seem to go a lot longer than others before one of their vehicles goes bang. Russians, for example seemed to manage 100s of launches without a RUD.

SpaceX is more open about its changes, and they are sometimes more visible. And there is also certain group of actors that do their best to highlight SpaceX changes and downplay changes to their own vehicles.

No doubt. However the simple numbers suggest something is wrong in the market. 

I would imagine that the insurance premiums at some point asymptotically reach some number, and I would also assume that this number is not zero.  As you get more and more flights, I would not expect that the rates will continue to go down to zero.  Therefore, as both launchers continue to fly, both of their rates should become pretty much the same.  When does this happen?  Have Ariane rates pretty much bottomed out, and F9 are just about there?

I'm also not sure what the real question is.  Are we looking for evidence that insurance companies have made some backroom decision to cut SX a deal and potentially lose money on future launch failures?  I don't think I can see the motivation for insurance companies to keep the rates for any particular launcher artificially low.

So let's see an ELV with 92 flights, the last 78 successful, has about the same insurance rate as one which has flown 43 times, the last 15 successful.

My point is either SX has had a remarkably fast drop in rates (to 4% after 15 launches since RTF), given the last claim by a payload operator was only 15 launches ago, or the insurance industry has been very slow to recognize any  benefit to SX in having a flight proven booster (which is known to work and whose resistance to flight wear has actually been measured after flight, and which incorporates 9 of the 10 engines and 1/2 the stages of the whole vehicle)

As SOP for SX launches is to move to "flight proven" boosters shouldn't those rates go down, as every launch (from the same set of hardware) cease to be "unique" IE expendable,  but one of a series, whose performance can be judged against its performance during previous launches with the same hardware?

It's an anomaly, but I cannot say which direction the anomaly is.

It's not a question, it's an observation.

The "question" your looking for is "why" ?

[LouScheffer]

But why should premiums for a year cover a launch failure?  Ariane 5 has not failed for about 15 years.   Therefore a break-even premiums for year  would only cover 1/15 of a launch failure.  As of now, the insurance companies have collected 80 straight premiums for Ariane, without a single payout.  At 4%, that's about 3.2 payloads worth in the bank, not including what they've earned by investing the money over that time.  They could afford to lose one or two payloads and still be solidly in the black.  If anything, insurance for Ariane seems way more expensive than the statistics dictate.

I believe the insurance talked about here is for launch and first year on-orbit.

No idea if that changes the numbers.

This appears to be the case, and changes the numbers by a lot, and then they make much more sense.  From Falling Satellite Insurance Premiums Put Market at Risk of Major Upheaval, at least in 2012, the payouts from satellites failing in the first year were more than the risk of launch failure.

So if the insurer needs 2% to cover satellite failures, then the total for Ariane might be something like 3.5%, so 1.5% for launch, representing a 1/66 odds of failure.   For SpaceX, perhaps 5%, so 3% for launch, for a perceived failure rate of 1 in 33.   For Proton, perhaps 2% satellite + 8% launch (1 in 12 fails) for 10% total.

So adding a few percent for satellite failure makes the premiums line up with the observed failure rates much better.

[Mike Jones]

Insurance rate do not directly follow statistical success rates but they reflect the level of trust from insurance and reinsurance companies (mainly western entities whose employees read the same enthusiastic press articles about the future of space enabled by reusability). SpaceX benefits from the great hype (well deserved overall) around their company and new space in general to have similar insurance rate than Arianespace or ULA despite 2 major failures in 2 years.

[Rik ISS-fan]

Ariane 5 has changed more over the years than you indicate:
- Two different versions of the core stage main engine (Vulcain 1 and Vulcain 2)
- Two different versions of the core stage (EPC H158 and EPC H173)
- Two different versions of the solid rocket boosters (EAP 238 and EAP 241).

These were changes applied at P2

- Two different versions of one of the upper stage types. (EPS L9.7 and EPS L10) Difference G and GS/ES

- Continuous improvements made to the core stage main engines.
- Multiple changes in core stage tank insulation
- Multiple changes to avionics hardware (replacement of obsolete and out-of-production with newly developed)
- Switch from fairing with acoustics dampening to one without
- Multiple improvements and changes in production of tankage and other structures.
- Smaller changes to hundreds of other details over the Ariane 5 life-span.

These are implemented at block upgrades. And as I write in my reply this is tested before implementation in scope of LEAP. Most are applied because the materials are no longer allowed or are no longer available.

Using Super Cryo with composite wrapped GHe tanks is looking for trouble. Let's try filling the He later and faster => Kaboom. A failure mode that was totally to be expected. I hope this has changed at SpaceX.

That's a bit harsh.  If it really was that predictable they'd have know it was not worth doing in the first place. 

OTOH doing with the payload on the top was an unnecessary risk. I doubt SX will be doing that again when they have any ConOps tweaks planned.

The first thing teachers told me about epoxy / polymers is that they are permeable, so LOx gets into it.
So my oppinion is that this was totally to be expected. Very bad risk judgment from SpaceX, or ...

[john smith 19]

Ariane 5 has changed more over the years than you indicate:
- Two different versions of the core stage main engine (Vulcain 1 and Vulcain 2)
- Two different versions of the core stage (EPC H158 and EPC H173)
- Two different versions of the solid rocket boosters (EAP 238 and EAP 241).

These were changes applied at P2

- Two different versions of one of the upper stage types. (EPS L9.7 and EPS L10) Difference G and GS/ES

- Continuous improvements made to the core stage main engines.
- Multiple changes in core stage tank insulation
- Multiple changes to avionics hardware (replacement of obsolete and out-of-production with newly developed)
- Switch from fairing with acoustics dampening to one without
- Multiple improvements and changes in production of tankage and other structures.
- Smaller changes to hundreds of other details over the Ariane 5 life-span.

These are implemented at block upgrades. And as I write in my reply this is tested before implementation in scope of LEAP. Most are applied because the materials are no longer allowed or are no longer available.

So you're saying that while A5 has had fairly extensive changes they were done en-mass as a block upgrade, and the design cut over to the new version after that? IOW although there were many individual changes because they were done all at once there is actually only 1 or 2 "change events" ?

Using Super Cryo with composite wrapped GHe tanks is looking for trouble. Let's try filling the He later and faster => Kaboom. A failure mode that was totally to be expected. I hope this has changed at SpaceX.

That's a bit harsh.  If it really was that predictable they'd have know it was not worth doing in the first place. 

OTOH doing with the payload on the top was an unnecessary risk. I doubt SX will be doing that again when they have any ConOps tweaks planned.

The first thing teachers told me about epoxy / polymers is that they are permeable, so LOx gets into it.
So my oppinion is that this was totally to be expected. Very bad risk judgment from SpaceX, or ...

One option would be they didn't have  your teachers.   

More seriously one thing I've noticed about aerospace engineering is there is a lot of "lore" about what you can and can't do.

A lot of this evolved during the crash R&D programmes of the lat 50's post Sputnik, when the US was desperate to get something off the ground. If something proved (or in fact even looked) problematical then it was a case of "here be monsters."

Hence the pervasive belief that it is impossible to cool a combustion chamber with LOX (despite nearly all rockets that don't use LOX as an oxidizer doing so) and in fact NASA testing such a 40 000lb engine (including a deliberate leak inside the chamber itself) in the early 90's.

So any "rules of thumb" should be treated with extreme caution and tested.  BTW HMX (who's company also tested LOX cooling) pointed out that composite LOX tanks have also been constructed decades ago.

Obviously SX thought the reward outweighed the risk. In the short term it did not. In the long run they may have been able to find something that has improved their ConOps and/or their costs.

[ZachF]

But why should premiums for a year cover a launch failure?  Ariane 5 has not failed for about 15 years.   Therefore a break-even premiums for year  would only cover 1/15 of a launch failure.  As of now, the insurance companies have collected 80 straight premiums for Ariane, without a single payout.  At 4%, that's about 3.2 payloads worth in the bank, not including what they've earned by investing the money over that time.  They could afford to lose one or two payloads and still be solidly in the black.  If anything, insurance for Ariane seems way more expensive than the statistics dictate.

I believe the insurance talked about here is for launch and first year on-orbit.

No idea if that changes the numbers.

This appears to be the case, and changes the numbers by a lot, and then they make much more sense.  From Falling Satellite Insurance Premiums Put Market at Risk of Major Upheaval, at least in 2012, the payouts from satellites failing in the first year were more than the risk of launch failure.

So if the insurer needs 2% to cover satellite failures, then the total for Ariane might be something like 3.5%, so 1.5% for launch, representing a 1/66 odds of failure.   For SpaceX, perhaps 5%, so 3% for launch, for a perceived failure rate of 1 in 33.   For Proton, perhaps 2% satellite + 8% launch (1 in 12 fails) for 10% total.

So adding a few percent for satellite failure makes the premiums line up with the observed failure rates much better.

This seems the most likely scenario.

Would also be interesting to see if there is any difference in insurance rates between satellite manufacturers as well.

[Rik ISS-fan]

These are implemented at block upgrades. And as I wrote in my reply, this is tested before implementation in scope of LEAP. Most are applied because the materials are no longer allowed or are no longer available.

So you're saying that while A5 has had fairly extensive changes they were done en-mass as a block upgrade, and the design cut over to the new version after that? IOW although there were many individual changes because they were done all at once there is actually only 1 or 2 "change events" ?

Yes.
I think they are now at version 10 or 11. (G, G+, GS, ES [3x], ECA{4|5x}. It's unfortunate that ESA removed the pages about the G, G+ and GS versions.
They build the launchers in blocks of the same configuration, although there are several performance options.
Arianespace announced that they are going to move away from block orders. But I think that they will implement the changes late. They are really conservative. If I'm not mistaken the Vulcain 2.1 has been performing bench tests from 2014. Possibly they will implement it in the PC batch, but Ariane 6 could also be the first use.
The difference between Vulcain 2 and Vulcain 2.1 is the production method for the nozzle.
(and a lot of other tweeks most likely)
In my oppinion the move form A5 ECA to A6 is roughly the same as the move from A5 G to ECA.

If I'm not mistaken SpaceX is at least at version 7 of Falcon 9. (F9; F9 v1.1; F9 FT (five versions)).

[ChrisWilson68]

If I'm not mistaken SpaceX is at least at version 7 of Falcon 9. (F9; F9 v1.1; F9 FT (five versions)).

I believe you are mistaken.  When they say "Falcon 9 Block 5", the reason it's a 5 is that the first Falcon 9 corresponds to block 1, v1.1 corresponds to block 2, and full thrust corresponds to block 3.

Of course, there are more minor changes than the block numbering implies, but by that count the number of versions is far more than seven.

[whatever11235]

If I'm not mistaken SpaceX is at least at version 7 of Falcon 9. (F9; F9 v1.1; F9 FT (five versions)).

I believe you are mistaken.  When they say "Falcon 9 Block 5", the reason it's a 5 is that the first Falcon 9 corresponds to block 1, v1.1 corresponds to block 2, and full thrust corresponds to block 3.

Of course, there are more minor changes than the block numbering implies, but by that count the number of versions is far more than seven.

I wish spacex would adopt semantic versioning (http://semver.org/) for its vehicles. This "1.1" mixed with "block 3/4/5 system" is very confusing.

[ChrisWilson68]

The first thing teachers told me about epoxy / polymers is that they are permeable, so LOx gets into it.
So my oppinion is that this was totally to be expected. Very bad risk judgment from SpaceX, or ...

SpaceX has been using COPV helium tanks inside LOX tanks since day one, so this kind of simplistic "epoxy and LOX don't mix" argument is just silly.  SpaceX certainly knew about the issues, and thought they had ways to safely handle all of them.

For the most part, SpaceX has been very successful doing what you deride.  Even with sub-cooled LOX, after they discovered the specific circumstances that led to that one failure, they were able to change their procedures and make it work.  All the launches since then have successfully used sub-cooled LOX with those same COPV helium tanks.

[woods170]

These are implemented at block upgrades. And as I wrote in my reply, this is tested before implementation in scope of LEAP. Most are applied because the materials are no longer allowed or are no longer available.

So you're saying that while A5 has had fairly extensive changes they were done en-mass as a block upgrade, and the design cut over to the new version after that? IOW although there were many individual changes because they were done all at once there is actually only 1 or 2 "change events" ?

Yes.
I think they are now at version 10 or 11. (G, G+, GS, ES [3x], ECA{4|5x}. It's unfortunate that ESA removed the pages about the G, G+ and GS versions.
They build the launchers in blocks of the same configuration, although there are several performance options.
Arianespace announced that they are going to move away from block orders. But I think that they will implement the changes late. They are really conservative. If I'm not mistaken the Vulcain 2.1 has been performing bench tests from 2014. Possibly they will implement it in the PC batch, but Ariane 6 could also be the first use.
The difference between Vulcain 2 and Vulcain 2.1 is the production method for the nozzle.
(and a lot of other tweeks most likely)
In my oppinion the move form A5 ECA to A6 is roughly the same as the move from A5 G to ECA.

It is in fact much more substantial than you assume:
- New tankage manufacturing methods to substantially lower production costs.
- Different length of tankage compared to A5.
- New fairing manufacturing method to substantially lower production costs.
- Increased fairing length (optional).
- Completely new thrust-frame for core stage engine.
- Completely new forward thrust-take-out skirt.
- Completely new solid rocket boosters, based on Vega-C first stage. Composite casing in stead of steel casing.
- Compared to the ESC-A upper stage of A5 the upper stage of A6 is completely new, with a new engine, new thrust-frame, new tankage, new avionics and new insulation.  Compared to that the ESC-A upper stage of A5 was really just a mash-up of the Ariane 4 upper stage using the original A4 thrust-frame and LOX tank combined with a new LH2 tank.
- Vulcain 2.1 engine features radically re-designed nozzle extension as well as re-designed turbines and increased chamber pressure.
- Completely new launchpad and associated infrastructure.

[john smith 19]

It is in fact much more substantial than you assume:
- New tankage manufacturing methods to substantially lower production costs.
- Different length of tankage compared to A5.
- New fairing manufacturing method to substantially lower production costs.
- Increased fairing length (optional).
- Completely new thrust-frame for core stage engine.
- Completely new forward thrust-take-out skirt.
- Completely new solid rocket boosters, based on Vega-C first stage. Composite casing in stead of steel casing.
- Compared to the ESC-A upper stage of A5 the upper stage of A6 is completely new, with a new engine, new thrust-frame, new tankage, new avionics and new insulation.  Compared to that the ESC-A upper stage of A5 was really just a mash-up of the Ariane 4 upper stage using the original A4 thrust-frame and LOX tank combined with a new LH2 tank.
- Vulcain 2.1 engine features radically re-designed nozzle extension as well as re-designed turbines and increased chamber pressure.
- Completely new launchpad and associated infrastructure.

The shift in mfg methods is quite a big change, but I think the shift to composite SRB casings is even bigger. BTW Isn't the standard for the A6 US going to be the Vinci engine?

On that basis the A5/A6 shift is more like that between Atlas 3 (pressure stabilized steel) to Atlas V (Aluminum with machined in stiffners).

That I would expect to raise insurance rates, pending a track record being established.

The puzzle is still why A5's rate is so close to F9, or vice versa. 

[woods170]

It is in fact much more substantial than you assume:
- New tankage manufacturing methods to substantially lower production costs.
- Different length of tankage compared to A5.
- New fairing manufacturing method to substantially lower production costs.
- Increased fairing length (optional).
- Completely new thrust-frame for core stage engine.
- Completely new forward thrust-take-out skirt.
- Completely new solid rocket boosters, based on Vega-C first stage. Composite casing in stead of steel casing.
- Compared to the ESC-A upper stage of A5 the upper stage of A6 is completely new, with a new engine, new thrust-frame, new tankage, new avionics and new insulation.  Compared to that the ESC-A upper stage of A5 was really just a mash-up of the Ariane 4 upper stage using the original A4 thrust-frame and LOX tank combined with a new LH2 tank.
- Vulcain 2.1 engine features radically re-designed nozzle extension as well as re-designed turbines and increased chamber pressure.
- Completely new launchpad and associated infrastructure.

The shift in mfg methods is quite a big change, but I think the shift to composite SRB casings is even bigger. BTW Isn't the standard for the A6 US going to be the Vinci engine?

On that basis the A5/A6 shift is more like that between Atlas 3 (pressure stabilized steel) to Atlas V (Aluminum with machined in stiffners).

That I would expect to raise insurance rates, pending a track record being established.

The puzzle is still why A5's rate is so close to F9, or vice versa. 

Exactly. Ariane 5 to Ariane 6 is much more like Atlas III to Atlas V than Ariane 5G to Ariane 5 ECA.
The new engine for the new upper stage of Ariane 6 is indeed the Vinci engine. It is "new" because it has never been used before on any other launcher, despite having been in development since 1998.
Yes, you read that correctly: Vinci has been in development for the better part of 2 decades.

[john smith 19]

Exactly. Ariane 5 to Ariane 6 is much more like Atlas III to Atlas V than Ariane 5G to Ariane 5 ECA.
The new engine for the new upper stage of Ariane 6 is indeed the Vinci engine. It is "new" because it has never been used before on any other launcher, despite having been in development since 1998.
Yes, you read that correctly: Vinci has been in development for the better part of 2 decades.

I'd query the development part. My sense is that going to Vinci means basically a whole new US and that's been bound up with the whole upgrade/replace discussion for A5, part of which seems to be about how the design is funded and built and dates from when A6 was going to be a much different beast (single, not dual main payload).  My feeling was that a re-startable LH2 US was exactly what A5 needed to support multiple comm sats to widely different locations in GEO, but the other issue was comm sat grown meant it could no longer accommodate 2 top weight comm sats together. IOW it was overdue a payload upgrade.

WRT to this thread title the question is how that affects insurance rates, on payloads, and I'd guess it will raise them

[abaddon]

The puzzle is still why A5's rate is so close to F9, or vice versa. 

We already have a reasonable answer to that question: https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=44012.msg1740502#msg1740502:

So adding a few percent for satellite failure makes the premiums line up with the observed failure rates much better.

[Ragmar]

Interesting article. Do we think there's any possibility we'll see a greater movement towards self-insurance among launch companies? Given that more and more new launch ventures are backed by super-wealthy individuals, is it possible companies will start moving towards self-insurance as a way to avoid higher rates? Do we know if any launch companies are doing that already?

[Sam Ho]

Except some do seem to go a lot longer than others before one of their vehicles goes bang. Russians, for example seemed to manage 100s of launches without a RUD.

As noted in the article that started this thread, insurance rates for Proton are 3x those for Ariane, and at risk of driving Proton out of the commercial market.  No-one has "100s of launches" without a failure.  Soyuz had about 150 launches without a failure in the 1980s.  Delta 2 had about 100 successes in a row.

[john smith 19]

Except some do seem to go a lot longer than others before one of their vehicles goes bang. Russians, for example seemed to manage 100s of launches without a RUD.

As noted in the article that started this thread, insurance rates for Proton are 3x those for Ariane, and at risk of driving Proton out of the commercial market.  No-one has "100s of launches" without a failure.  Soyuz had about 150 launches without a failure in the 1980s.  Delta 2 had about 100 successes in a row.

At the risk of being pedantic 150 is "multiple 100s"

[Nomadd]

 There's pretty huge error in the way most people are figuring premiums. The insurance companies aren't shooting for a 10% profit margin. Their aim is to have claim payouts no more than 50% of premiums. It's why many deep pocket companies are self insured.

[Tywin]

Swiss Re leave the market...

Jan Schmidt, the head of Swiss Re’s space underwriting division, said in an email obtained by SpaceNews that the decision to “cease Space underwriting with immediate effect” was driven by “bad results of recent years and unsustainable premium rates.”

https://spacenews.com/space-insurer-swiss-re-leaves-market/

What this means for space sector?

[Asteroza]

Swiss Re leave the market...

What this means for space sector?

I would imagine with the increasing reuse footprint of SpaceX, there might be a shift where expendables might expect a raise in premiums, at least in the short term as the number of insurance providers is reduced. If Musk gets Starship to orbit, it will be interesting which insurance provider moves first to lower premiums for riding on Falcon9/Starship as that will signal a downward spiral on premiums for Starship riders. With higher expendable premiums, that means there will be a preference for expendable launchers that are in volume manufacturing, favoring RocketLabs with their expected monthly cadence. For smallsat launchers, if you are not in nearly monthly launch cadence before Starship goes commercial, you better be state backed and consign yourself to being beholden to government launches, and kiss that sweet startup IPO goodbye...

[Tywin]

Swiss Re leave the market...

What this means for space sector?

I would imagine with the increasing reuse footprint of SpaceX, there might be a shift where expendables might expect a raise in premiums, at least in the short term as the number of insurance providers is reduced. If Musk gets Starship to orbit, it will be interesting which insurance provider moves first to lower premiums for riding on Falcon9/Starship as that will signal a downward spiral on premiums for Starship riders. With higher expendable premiums, that means there will be a preference for expendable launchers that are in volume manufacturing, favoring RocketLabs with their expected monthly cadence. For smallsat launchers, if you are not in nearly monthly launch cadence before Starship goes commercial, you better be state backed and consign yourself to being beholden to government launches, and kiss that sweet startup IPO goodbye...

Yeaah look like will increase significatively...

The insurance loss for the rocket and satellite represents the largest recorded loss in the space market, satellite analysis firm Seradata said.

“Insurance rates for both launch and in-orbit have been at historically low levels and ... need to increase significantly.”

https://in.reuters.com/article/space-insurance/space-insurance-costs-to-rocket-after-satellite-crash-idINKCN1UQ2FH?il=0

[Blackjax]

I've been giving some thought to the updated SpaceX rideshare program and while there was a lot of discussion about how SpaceX was undercutting the price of existing and proposed small launchers, I didn't see anything about the insurance aspect of things which would be part of the total cost picture for prospective customers. 

Does anyone know what the likely rates are for an operational but relatively inexperienced launcher like RocketLabs? 

What about new entrants with no history like Virgin or Firefly?

One of the harsh aspects of this move by SpaceX could be that it makes it really difficult for them to win enough payloads to establish a clear flight history and get competitive insurance rates in a reasonable timeframe.  When SpaceX was trying to break into the launch industry as the new kid on the block, they had the benefit of being the low cost option, contributing to their ability to win enough payloads to establish a flight history.  If the rideshare program didn't fly very often and if something like Momentous didn't exist to get your rideshare payload to a specific orbit, the small launchers might win on flexiility rather than cost but as things stand one has to wonder how they will manage to fly often enough to prove themselves.

[gongora]

I don't think insurance rates will make any difference at all for the rideshare market.

[Blackjax]

I don't think insurance rates will make any difference at all for the rideshare market.

I'm curious about your reasoning for this.

[gongora]

I just can't really imagine the difference in insurance rates between launching on Electron and F9 being large enough to really make a difference when choosing a rideshare provider.  Electron's flight history is just as good as SpaceX's, although shorter.  Using a third-party tug adds more uncertainty to a mission, which if you're insuring delivery to final orbit would have to be taken into account.

[Blackjax]

Using a third-party tug adds more uncertainty to a mission, which if you're insuring delivery to final orbit would have to be taken into account.

That's another question I'd be interested in learning more about.  Is there any information out there on the impact to rates for using a service like this irrespective of the launcher?

[gongora]

https://spacenews.com/space-insurance-rates-increasing-as-insurers-review-their-place-in-the-market/

Rora said that while rate are increasing, he did not expect a return to the high rates of the early 2000s. “Even if there is a sharp increase today, the levels we will see are similar to those around 2009 and 2010,” he said, when launch plus one-year insurance rates were about 10%.

[PatMick]

Interesting topic. I'd also like to know if it's possible that corporations will begin to move towards self-insurance as a means to avoid higher rates? Do we know if Space-X or any other corps are doing this?

[Asteroza]

Using a third-party tug adds more uncertainty to a mission, which if you're insuring delivery to final orbit would have to be taken into account.

That's another question I'd be interested in learning more about.  Is there any information out there on the impact to rates for using a service like this irrespective of the launcher?

Since we haven't really had a fully independent tug that can ride on anybody's rocket before, there's not much precedence. The closest would be solid rocket SRM kick stages, which appear to be manufactured is certain families of sizes (or just a fixed set of sizes). The Star series SRM's would a be start point comparison perhaps? There are upper stages that are not entirely one-rocket designs, such as russian heritage Fregat and Breeze stages, but those are big stages and not really small tugs per se.

[su27k]

Space insurers just might book 2020 as a gross profit, but with the lowest premium volume in 20+ years

You know it’s a struggling business when its first gross profit in three years, likely to end up a net loss, is based on the lowest annual revenue in at least two decades.

That’s where the world’s space insurers found themselves at the end of 2020. And 2021 began inauspiciously when Sirius XM Holdings filed a $225 million claim for the total loss of its Sirius XM-7 satellite

[M.E.T.]

Space insurers just might book 2020 as a gross profit, but with the lowest premium volume in 20+ years

You know it’s a struggling business when its first gross profit in three years, likely to end up a net loss, is based on the lowest annual revenue in at least two decades.

That’s where the world’s space insurers found themselves at the end of 2020. And 2021 began inauspiciously when Sirius XM Holdings filed a $225 million claim for the total loss of its Sirius XM-7 satellite

Well, it doesn’t help when the bulk of commercial launches are Starlink sats, which I’m guessing SpaceX self insures (though I may be totally wrong on that).