Lesson Learned #3: Beware the terrestrial competitor who has a scalable business model. Competing with terrestrial businesses from space is fraught with peril. The terrestrial business model is generally scalable. The cell phone company can put in some cell towers, gain some customers (revenue), then put in some more—on a timescale measured in months. The space business (in the mode of Iridium) must get everything fielded before any revenue accrues. The timescale is measured in years.Lesson Learned #4: Be deeply suspicious of your own market analysis. You should start from the premise that all commercial space business models suck (See Lesson Learned #1). I still shake my head at the wild market analyses we used to justify the investment into Atlas V and Delta IV. We were assuming that the worldwide launch market would grow by 4 to 5 times its then size in just a few years. The fact that everyone got it wrong is little consolation. If it seems too good to be true, it probably is. Compounding the problem was that each side assumed they alone would garner the lion’s share of that new market and priced accordingly. Obviously, in the real world, the market will be shared among many competitors, some of whom don’t have to recover investment or make a profit. (See Lesson Learned #2).
What sorts of vehicles were proposed by Boeing and Alliant Techsystems in response to the Air Force's RFP in 1995?
But all of that growth relates to what people can do in space, thanks to cheap launches. None of it is focused on making money by providing cheap launches. Cheap launches becomes the catalyst for the explosion of the space industry. It does not represent the money making mechanism itself. Merely the platform that enables the money making to take place in orbit and beyond.SpaceX themselves admit this. Hence their focus on the satellite constellation. The revenue of which will dwarf the money they can hope to make from launch services.