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#1260
by
gongora
on 15 Nov, 2017 02:49
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If this type of rule had been in effect during Apollo (and applied to same), NASA would have been forced to attempt an unmanned LM landing before landing it with crew aboard -- even though chances of such an unmanned landing to succeed were considered very slim, and NASA rejected the notion even before the Fire. But, without an unmanned demonstration, you'd be blocked from trying the manned landing...
As well, the Shuttle could never have flown with crew under this rule. It would have required an unmanned orbital flight test, which, the way the Shuttle was designed, was not possible. It was not a spacecraft that could be both launched and landed without crew; the gear could not be deployed except manually. Any automation of gear deployment was deemed so dangerous (in case gear deploy came early) that the system was designed with lockouts; I've read in a number of places that NASA refused to consider automating gear deployment under any circumstances. Meaning that, if you abandoned a Shuttle orbiter with TPS damage (something planned for in post-Columbia thinking), you could try to auto-enter the abandoned orbiter, but under no circumstances could you try to land it -- since you could not extend the gear. If it survived the entry, you still had to ditch it in the ocean somewhere.
So, the question begged is thus -- why can NASA get away with s**t that commercial carriers aren't allowed to? Doesn't that seem somehow illegal to y'all?
Nonsense. The FAA rules require testing before "space flight participants", a.k.a. passengers, are flown. Crew is allowed on the test flights.
It is assumed that NASA has done a large amount of analysis and verification before they fly a new vehicle. The same cannot be assumed of every commercial company that wants to start flying paying passengers.
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#1261
by
the_other_Doug
on 15 Nov, 2017 03:10
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If this type of rule had been in effect during Apollo (and applied to same), NASA would have been forced to attempt an unmanned LM landing before landing it with crew aboard -- even though chances of such an unmanned landing to succeed were considered very slim, and NASA rejected the notion even before the Fire. But, without an unmanned demonstration, you'd be blocked from trying the manned landing...
As well, the Shuttle could never have flown with crew under this rule. It would have required an unmanned orbital flight test, which, the way the Shuttle was designed, was not possible. It was not a spacecraft that could be both launched and landed without crew; the gear could not be deployed except manually. Any automation of gear deployment was deemed so dangerous (in case gear deploy came early) that the system was designed with lockouts; I've read in a number of places that NASA refused to consider automating gear deployment under any circumstances. Meaning that, if you abandoned a Shuttle orbiter with TPS damage (something planned for in post-Columbia thinking), you could try to auto-enter the abandoned orbiter, but under no circumstances could you try to land it -- since you could not extend the gear. If it survived the entry, you still had to ditch it in the ocean somewhere.
So, the question begged is thus -- why can NASA get away with s**t that commercial carriers aren't allowed to? Doesn't that seem somehow illegal to y'all?
Nonsense. The FAA rules require testing before "space flight participants", a.k.a. passengers, are flown. Crew is allowed on the test flights.
It is assumed that NASA has done a large amount of analysis and verification before they fly a new vehicle. The same cannot be assumed of every commercial company that wants to start flying paying passengers.
The quoted sections of the FAA regulations have been interpreted above to mean that you cannot have crew on a flight that has not essentially been performed without *any* crew, though any and all flight regimes that the spacecraft may be asked to encounter with crew aboard. Not just that has not yet been performed without qualified test pilots, or some such. That is where the comparisons to the LM and Shuttle came in -- these were two spacecraft that literally could not be flown through their entire anticipated regimes unmanned.
Your assertion that "crew is allowed on the test flights" is exactly what is being challenged by a majority of the posters above. If nonsense means you don't agree with the majority (not my definition, but...) then you're the one spouting nonsense, not me.
And, I wasn't stating that these FAA rules ought to have been applied during Apollo or Shuttle, just that they seem to be designed to accomplish a very uneven playing field. I will admit, I forgot my smiley when I asked if applying different standards to NASA and to commercial projects is illegal -- I know how governments like to make most things illegal, except when they do them themselves. It's not moral or ethical, but that's life.
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#1262
by
gongora
on 15 Nov, 2017 03:28
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The quoted sections of the FAA regulations have been interpreted above to mean that you cannot have crew on a flight that has not essentially been performed without *any* crew, though any and all flight regimes that the spacecraft may be asked to encounter with crew aboard. Not just that has not yet been performed without qualified test pilots, or some such. That is where the comparisons to the LM and Shuttle came in -- these were two spacecraft that literally could not be flown through their entire anticipated regimes unmanned.
Your assertion that "crew is allowed on the test flights" is exactly what is being challenged by a majority of the posters above. If nonsense means you don't agree with the majority (not my definition, but...) then you're the one spouting nonsense, not me.
The interpretation that crew isn't allowed on a test flight is complete and utter nonsense. Spaceship Two doesn't fly unmanned, Lynx wasn't going to fly unmanned, and if you actually read the words on that site it does not say crew isn't allowed on the test flights, it says passengers aren't allowed on the test flights.
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#1263
by
Negan
on 15 Nov, 2017 04:00
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Ultimately SpaceX and its customers have already determined a test flight is not required. Setting aside what the FAA will do. Why are they wrong?
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#1264
by
woods170
on 15 Nov, 2017 08:33
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Part B is in addition to Part A, not a completely separate set of rules.
The correct answer is in the document itself:
PART 431—LAUNCH AND REENTRY OF A REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV) §431.8 Human space flight.
To obtain a license, an applicant proposing to conduct a reusable launch vehicle mission with flight crew or a space flight participant on board must demonstrate compliance with §§460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51 and 460.53 of this subchapter.
[Doc. No. FAA-2005-23449, 71 FR 75632, Dec. 15, 2006]
PART 435—REENTRY OF A REENTRY VEHICLE OTHER THAN A REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV)§435.8 Human space flight.
An applicant for a license to conduct a reentry with flight crew or a space flight participant on board the vehicle must demonstrate compliance with §§460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, 460.51 and 460.53 of this subchapter.
[Doc. No. FAA-2005-23449, 71 FR 75632, Dec. 15, 2006]
So, regardless of the launcher or reentry vehicle being reusable or not, AND regardless of there being crew or space flight participants, the applicant for a license must demonstrate compliance with:
§460.5 Crew qualifications and training.
(a) Each crew member must—
(1) Complete training on how to carry out his or her role on board or on the ground so that the vehicle will not harm the public; and
(2) Train for his or her role in nominal and non-nominal conditions. The conditions must include—
(i) Abort scenarios; and
(ii) Emergency operations.
(b) Each member of a flight crew must demonstrate an ability to withstand the stresses of space flight, which may include high acceleration or deceleration, microgravity, and vibration, in sufficient condition to safely carry out his or her duties so that the vehicle will not harm the public.
(c) A pilot and a remote operator must—
(1) Possess and carry an FAA pilot certificate with an instrument rating.
(2) Possess aeronautical knowledge, experience, and skills necessary to pilot and control the launch or reentry vehicle that will operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). Aeronautical experience may include hours in flight, ratings, and training.
(3) Receive vehicle and mission-specific training for each phase of flight by using one or more of the following—
(i) A method or device that simulates the flight;
(ii) An aircraft whose characteristics are similar to the vehicle or that has similar phases of flight to the vehicle ;
(iii) Flight testing; or
(iv) An equivalent method of training approved by the FAA through the license or permit process.
(4) Train in procedures that direct the vehicle away from the public in the event the flight crew abandons the vehicle during flight; and
(5) Train for each mode of control or propulsion, including any transition between modes, such that the pilot or remote operator is able to control the vehicle.
(d) A remote operator may demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to paragraph (c)(1) of this section through the license or permit process.
(e) Each crew member with a safety-critical role must possess and carry an FAA second-class airman medical certificate issued in accordance with 14 CFR part 67, no more than 12 months prior to the month of launch and reentry.
§460.7 Operator training of crew.
(a) Implementation of training. An operator must train each member of its crew and define standards for successful completion in accordance with §460.5.
(b) Training device fidelity. An operator must
(1) Ensure that any crew-training device used to meet the training requirements realistically represents the vehicle's configuration and mission, or
(2) Inform the crew member being trained of the differences between the two.
(c) Maintenance of training records. An operator must continually update the crew training to ensure that it incorporates lessons learned from training and operational missions. An operator must—
(1) Track each revision and update in writing; and
(2) Document the completed training for each crew member and maintain the documentation for each active crew member.
(d) Current qualifications and training. An operator must establish a recurrent training schedule and ensure that all crew qualifications and training required by §460.5 are current before launch and reentry.
§460.11 Environmental control and life support systems.
(a) An operator must provide atmospheric conditions adequate to sustain life and consciousness for all inhabited areas within a vehicle. The operator or flight crew must monitor and control the following atmospheric conditions in the inhabited areas or demonstrate through the license or permit process that an alternate means provides an equivalent level of safety—
(1) Composition of the atmosphere, which includes oxygen and carbon dioxide, and any revitalization;
(2) Pressure, temperature and humidity;
(3) Contaminants that include particulates and any harmful or hazardous concentrations of gases, or vapors; and
(4) Ventilation and circulation.
(b) An operator must provide an adequate redundant or secondary oxygen supply for the flight crew.
(c) An operator must
(1) Provide a redundant means of preventing cabin depressurization; or
(2) Prevent incapacitation of any of the flight crew in the event of loss of cabin pressure.
§460.13 Smoke detection and fire suppression.
An operator or crew must have the ability to detect smoke and suppress a cabin fire to prevent incapacitation of the flight crew.
§460.15 Human factors.
An operator must take the precautions necessary to account for human factors that can affect a crew's ability to perform safety-critical roles, including in the following safety critical areas—
(a) Design and layout of displays and controls;
(b) Mission planning, which includes analyzing tasks and allocating functions between humans and equipment;
(c) Restraint or stowage of all individuals and objects in a vehicle; and
(d) Vehicle operation, so that the vehicle will be operated in a manner that flight crew can withstand any physical stress factors, such as acceleration, vibration, and noise.
§460.17 Verification program.
An operator must successfully verify the integrated performance of a vehicle's hardware and any software in an operational flight environment before allowing any space flight participant on board during a flight. Verification must include flight testing.
§460.51 Space flight participant training.
An operator must train each space flight participant before flight on how to respond to emergency situations, including smoke, fire, loss of cabin pressure, and emergency exit.
§460.53 Security.
An operator must implement security requirements to prevent any space flight participant from jeopardizing the safety of the flight crew or the public. A space flight participant may not carry on board any explosives, firearms, knives, or other weapons.
So, three (3) observations:
- Subpart A and Subpart B go together. They are NOT mutually exclusive.
- For the manned circumlunar mission SpaceX must have demonstrated Crew Dragon to comply with $460.17. And that includes flight testing.
- Crew is allowed on test flights. Spaceflight participants are not allowed on test flights.
However: the nature of the referenced flight testing is NOT clear from Chapter C. And that could very well mean that the planned Crew Dragon demo missions for CCP, as well as stand-alone test flights of FH, are sufficient to allow the circumlunar mission without a dedicated test flight of the FH/Crew Dragon combination.
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#1265
by
envy887
on 15 Nov, 2017 13:50
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An operator must successfully verify the integrated performance of a vehicle's hardware and any software in an operational flight environment...
...
...
However: the nature of the referenced flight testing is NOT clear from Chapter C. And that could very well mean that the planned Crew Dragon demo missions for CCP, as well as stand-alone test flights of FH, are sufficient to allow the circumlunar mission without a dedicated test flight of the FH/Crew Dragon combination.
"Integrated performance" reads to me like they have to actually test Dragon 2 on FH. Dragon 2 on F9 is a different integrated vehicle with different hardware and software than FH. Likewise a commsat on FH is a different integrated vehicle than FH with Dragon.
Also the "operational flight environment" for Dragon on a FH launch and in cis-lunar space is significantly different than Dragon on F9 launch or in LEO.
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#1266
by
Negan
on 15 Nov, 2017 14:41
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Also the "operational flight environment" for Dragon on a FH launch and in cis-lunar space is significantly different than Dragon on F9 launch or in LEO.
The operational flight environment in cis-lunar is different, but very well understood. Why is a test flight to cis-lunar the only way to prove a Dragon can operate successfully there?
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#1267
by
gongora
on 15 Nov, 2017 14:47
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Also the "operational flight environment" for Dragon on a FH launch and in cis-lunar space is significantly different than Dragon on F9 launch or in LEO.
The operational flight environment in cis-lunar is different, but very well understood. Why is a test flight to cis-lunar the only way to prove a Dragon can operate successfully there?
It might be nice for Dragon's computers to be tested outside of LEO, even if it doesn't go all the way to the moon.
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#1268
by
Negan
on 15 Nov, 2017 14:58
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Also the "operational flight environment" for Dragon on a FH launch and in cis-lunar space is significantly different than Dragon on F9 launch or in LEO.
The operational flight environment in cis-lunar is different, but very well understood. Why is a test flight to cis-lunar the only way to prove a Dragon can operate successfully there?
It might be nice for Dragon's computers to be tested outside of LEO, even if it doesn't go all the way to the moon.
The computers have been tested to very, very high radiation environments in labs already, plus the many operational flights. Nice sure, but I don't see the need.
http://aviationweek.com/blog/dragons-radiation-tolerant-design
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#1269
by
envy887
on 15 Nov, 2017 15:21
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Also the "operational flight environment" for Dragon on a FH launch and in cis-lunar space is significantly different than Dragon on F9 launch or in LEO.
The operational flight environment in cis-lunar is different, but very well understood. Why is a test flight to cis-lunar the only way to prove a Dragon can operate successfully there?
It might be nice for Dragon's computers to be tested outside of LEO, even if it doesn't go all the way to the moon.
The computers have been tested to very, very high radiation environments in labs already, plus the many operational flights. Nice sure, but I don't see the need.
http://aviationweek.com/blog/dragons-radiation-tolerant-design
Nav, comms, ECLSS endurance, and radiation can be verified in LEO and the lab. IMO the hardest thing to replicate in either ground testing or LEO flight testing is lunar return entry heating, but even that might be possible using a steeper than normal entry trajectory from LEO, perhaps on the Dragon 2 demo flight.
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#1270
by
tvg98
on 15 Nov, 2017 15:37
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Apologies if this has been discussed before, but Elon has said that they would not do a direct entry and would instead do several passes before returning from orbit. However, that would require the trunk to be ejected right? And if so, just how long can Crew Dragon last without it?
PS: Now that I think about it, I may have asked this before.
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#1271
by
ugordan
on 15 Nov, 2017 15:46
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Apologies if this has been discussed before, but Elon has said that they would not do a direct entry and would instead do several passes before returning from orbit. However, that would require the trunk to be ejected right? And if so, just how long can Crew Dragon last without it?
Several passes? Do you mean a skip reentry? Those would take of the same order of magnitude as Dragon takes during launch, after going on internal power and up to solar panel deployment. Minutes, not hours.
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#1272
by
tvg98
on 15 Nov, 2017 15:49
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Apologies if this has been discussed before, but Elon has said that they would not do a direct entry and would instead do several passes before returning from orbit. However, that would require the trunk to be ejected right? And if so, just how long can Crew Dragon last without it?
Several passes? Do you mean a skip reentry? Those would take of the same order of magnitude as Dragon takes during launch, after going on internal power and up to solar panel deployment. Minutes, not hours.
Interesting. This is where Elon spoke about this earlier this year:
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#1273
by
Eerie
on 15 Nov, 2017 15:49
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Is it known if SpaceX is planning to launch an unmanned Circumlunar Mission first?
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#1274
by
llanitedave
on 15 Nov, 2017 15:58
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If this type of rule had been in effect during Apollo (and applied to same), NASA would have been forced to attempt an unmanned LM landing before landing it with crew aboard -- even though chances of such an unmanned landing to succeed were considered very slim, and NASA rejected the notion even before the Fire. But, without an unmanned demonstration, you'd be blocked from trying the manned landing...
As well, the Shuttle could never have flown with crew under this rule. It would have required an unmanned orbital flight test, which, the way the Shuttle was designed, was not possible. It was not a spacecraft that could be both launched and landed without crew; the gear could not be deployed except manually. Any automation of gear deployment was deemed so dangerous (in case gear deploy came early) that the system was designed with lockouts; I've read in a number of places that NASA refused to consider automating gear deployment under any circumstances. Meaning that, if you abandoned a Shuttle orbiter with TPS damage (something planned for in post-Columbia thinking), you could try to auto-enter the abandoned orbiter, but under no circumstances could you try to land it -- since you could not extend the gear. If it survived the entry, you still had to ditch it in the ocean somewhere.
So, the question begged is thus -- why can NASA get away with s**t that commercial carriers aren't allowed to? Doesn't that seem somehow illegal to y'all?
Apollo was 48 years ago. The first space shuttle flight was 36 years ago. If the technology had existed then to have what are essentially off the shelf capabilities today, chances are the rules would have been different. The time constraints are different now, too.
Doing autonomous operations in space is no longer exotic, so it seems like a much more reasonable requirement today than it was then.
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#1275
by
Negan
on 15 Nov, 2017 16:03
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Nav, comms, ECLSS endurance, and radiation can be verified in LEO and the lab. IMO the hardest thing to replicate in either ground testing or LEO flight testing is lunar return entry heating, but even that might be possible using a steeper than normal entry trajectory from LEO, perhaps on the Dragon 2 demo flight.
Both Stardust's and Dragon's heat shields were tested in a lab up to their operational temperatures. I don't see why the same couldn't be done here.
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#1276
by
Negan
on 15 Nov, 2017 17:03
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"Integrated performance" reads to me like they have to actually test Dragon 2 on FH. Dragon 2 on F9 is a different integrated vehicle with different hardware and software than FH. Likewise a commsat on FH is a different integrated vehicle than FH with Dragon.
Isn't the actual integration done with the second stage which
I'm assuming is identical in both F9 and FH?
Edit: I guess there's some speculation of changes to both the FH and Dragon for beyond LEO. Musk has indicated only changes to Dragon 2's communication systems would be needed.
Edit: Also compare this to the crewed EM-2 with a non-flight proven second stage.
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#1277
by
deruch
on 16 Nov, 2017 00:25
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An operator must successfully verify the integrated performance of a vehicle's hardware and any software in an operational flight environment...
...
...
However: the nature of the referenced flight testing is NOT clear from Chapter C. And that could very well mean that the planned Crew Dragon demo missions for CCP, as well as stand-alone test flights of FH, are sufficient to allow the circumlunar mission without a dedicated test flight of the FH/Crew Dragon combination.
"Integrated performance" reads to me like they have to actually test Dragon 2 on FH. Dragon 2 on F9 is a different integrated vehicle with different hardware and software than FH. Likewise a commsat on FH is a different integrated vehicle than FH with Dragon.
Also the "operational flight environment" for Dragon on a FH launch and in cis-lunar space is significantly different than Dragon on F9 launch or in LEO.
To me it sounds like they just mean that component and system level tests are insufficient. If they were just using FH to launch a spec Crewed Dragon capsule to LEO, I would expect their experience with launching them on F9 (as well as non-Dragon launches) and a understanding of FH flight characteristics would be enough. The issues of the changes necessary for BEO operation of Dragon 2 and experience in the cis-lunar environment seem more weighty.
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#1278
by
FutureSpaceTourist
on 16 Nov, 2017 08:21
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#1279
by
jebbo
on 16 Nov, 2017 08:24
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