Stephen Clark @StephenClark1 7m7 minutes agoBoeing spokesperson: CST-100 pad abort slips to October 2017, uncrewed flight test to December 2017, crewed flight test to February 2018.
Stephen Clark @StephenClark1 6m6 minutes agoCST-100 delays caused by spacecraft mass challenge, aeroacoustic issue with Atlas 5/CST-100 stack, new software requirements levied by NASA.
Wasn't this pretty much expected when the commercial crew funding was cut by Congress a couple of years ago? The original plan to fly unmanned in early 2016 with manned flights happening in late 2016 to early 2017 was said at the time to be out the window due to these funding factors over which neither Boeing nor SpaceX had any control.It was always a matter of just how far to the right the dates were going to end up, not as to whether they would push out to late 2017 through mid 2018, right?
Yes, actual testing of design articles can throw some surprises at you. The models can be wrong or off. But how is it that "suddenly" there are 2 fundamental issues such as these? Have they always known such issues existed but have just now decided they won't be able to mitigate in time? Were they riding their weight margins too close for this Atlas V variant? Did they add weight because of acoustics or did the acoustics issues pop up because they added weight? Or are they unrelated? Did the mitigation design decisions of Centaur/CST/Abort thruster issues lead to increased weight and/or acoustics issues? And the article also mentions a delay because NASA changed some software requirements. Were those changes made program wide or just for Boeing? For what and why? Vehicle diagnosis for human rating/abort? Bill Gerstenmaier always had concerns that so much of Boeing's Actual Development & Testing were in the back-end of the schedule but that they had such superior management, processes and procedures as to help mitigate against their schedule ambitious. Now, a 6 to 8 month delay, in the grand scheme is not a huge deal. But when 2 of the most fundamental things such as weight and acoustics crop up at this stage...well, I hope this isn't something systemic. Because one day Aviation Week reports the Boeing/CST say they are on schedule and all issues are being handled. Then literally the next day we get another article about this delay. I guess we'll see.(And remembering countless LAN parties at the office playing Quake3 Arena, I'm completely up for some Capture The Flag action to see who gets there first.)
If the fired ULA VP is correct about possible heat shield damage during a launch abort that seems to me a huge problem for a high suborbital abort requiring reentry, or an abort to orbit, requiring serious mitigation or a redesign. How far right would adding a launch abort tower, or blast reflectors & blowout panels to the SM, move their schedule? What do they do to the weight issue already in play?
Quote from: docmordrid on 05/13/2016 01:07 amIf the fired ULA VP is correct about possible heat shield damage during a launch abort that seems to me a huge problem for a high suborbital abort requiring reentry, or an abort to orbit, requiring serious mitigation or a redesign. How far right would adding a launch abort tower, or blast reflectors & blowout panels to the SM, move their schedule? What do they do to the weight issue already in play?A related issue is that the Dreamchaser Team analyzed away the need for an in-flight abort demonstration... Is this analysis still valid or was the indicated Centaur risk a discovery in that analysis? Is the in-flight abort demo for Dreamchaser on or off the table?
Quote from: AncientU on 05/13/2016 01:17 pmQuote from: docmordrid on 05/13/2016 01:07 amIf the fired ULA VP is correct about possible heat shield damage during a launch abort that seems to me a huge problem for a high suborbital abort requiring reentry, or an abort to orbit, requiring serious mitigation or a redesign. How far right would adding a launch abort tower, or blast reflectors & blowout panels to the SM, move their schedule? What do they do to the weight issue already in play?A related issue is that the Dreamchaser Team analyzed away the need for an in-flight abort demonstration... Is this analysis still valid or was the indicated Centaur risk a discovery in that analysis? Is the in-flight abort demo for Dreamchaser on or off the table?Is Dreamchaser abort directed back at the second stage as well?
Message from crew Dream Chaser..."Do you miss me now?"
Quote from: Rocket Science on 05/14/2016 01:50 pmMessage from crew Dream Chaser..."Do you miss me now?"Your inference being DC would have been subject to less schedule slips? It's a spaceplane of significant size. It's even more vulnerable. Plus you're making assumptions SNC is dramatically better at being development Gods than Boeing or SpaceX. Any switch to crew DC now and the ComCrew program gets derailed and wastes a lot of money needlessly.DC already has a future. Let it be.
Quote from: The Amazing Catstronaut on 05/14/2016 03:05 pmQuote from: Rocket Science on 05/14/2016 01:50 pmMessage from crew Dream Chaser..."Do you miss me now?"Your inference being DC would have been subject to less schedule slips? It's a spaceplane of significant size. It's even more vulnerable. Plus you're making assumptions SNC is dramatically better at being development Gods than Boeing or SpaceX. Any switch to crew DC now and the ComCrew program gets derailed and wastes a lot of money needlessly.DC already has a future. Let it be.1) No2) Always wanted all three crew vehicles to fly. Because you are relatively new here I guess you didn't know that. Since you are quoting John Lennon today it seems... "Let it be..."
"Let It Be" -- Paul McCartney /pedant
For Starliner, the warnings and reservations on such high use of computer modeling and less flight (none for a CST prior version) experience has come home.
But it is also a testament to Boeing's thoroughness in their analysis that these problems were caught at this early point in the build process. They don't stop analyzing just because the moved into production but they continue their analysis of each and every small change in design and even evaluate and update their models themselves when new environment data suggest the models are in error/"not near perfect and need change".
Quote from: Rocket Science on 05/14/2016 03:59 pmQuote from: The Amazing Catstronaut on 05/14/2016 03:05 pmQuote from: Rocket Science on 05/14/2016 01:50 pmMessage from crew Dream Chaser..."Do you miss me now?"Your inference being DC would have been subject to less schedule slips? It's a spaceplane of significant size. It's even more vulnerable. Plus you're making assumptions SNC is dramatically better at being development Gods than Boeing or SpaceX. Any switch to crew DC now and the ComCrew program gets derailed and wastes a lot of money needlessly.DC already has a future. Let it be.1) No2) Always wanted all three crew vehicles to fly. Because you are relatively new here I guess you didn't know that. Since you are quoting John Lennon today it seems... "Let it be...""Let It Be" -- Paul McCartney /pedant
First crewed Starliner flight delayed to 2018; problems with vehicle weight and Atlas V acoustics.Ars link....
A spokesman for SpaceX told Ars Wednesday night that the company remains on track for crewed missions in 2017.
Quote from: oldAtlas_Eguy on 05/14/2016 03:23 pmFor Starliner, the warnings and reservations on such high use of computer modeling and less flight (none for a CST prior version) experience has come home.Many sounded an alarm on this from the very beginning that going late to metal wasn't going to cut it. And were given the usual assurances that Boeing had it under control, having done so much HSF that they couldn't miss.Well, they missed as predicted on going to metal too late. It was a political decision, and it was flawed.So far not a tremendous deal. Here's the rub - there might be a chain of surprises. Perhaps its bounded.But in terms of the decision vs SNC - SNC was going to metal about as fast as SX. Which likely meant similar issues to SX and not the same as Boeing here. So "no one gets fired for choosing GM or IBM or Boeing" wasn't the "catch all" promised. The huge pile of paper that proves it'll work on time came up short.QuoteBut it is also a testament to Boeing's thoroughness in their analysis that these problems were caught at this early point in the build process. They don't stop analyzing just because the moved into production but they continue their analysis of each and every small change in design and even evaluate and update their models themselves when new environment data suggest the models are in error/"not near perfect and need change".Juries still out on that effectiveness for dependent/consecutive issues. Yes change process is working. If the number of issues doesn't climb as fabrication/assembly rises, they'll likely recover within reasonable time because the close rate will dominate the new issue rate. The virtue of being large here - you can scale to meet the challenge, and bring in the schedule at cost.SX/SNC have a different issue - they don't have as much history so they run the risk of taking too long to close/communicate on such a complex program. Their "undiscovered country" leads to open-ended process.The performance shortfall on the pad abort was an eye-opener. But that's why we do tests.Its also why we go to metal not paper early.
Quote from: Space Ghost 1962 on 05/15/2016 04:48 amQuote from: oldAtlas_Eguy on 05/14/2016 03:23 pmFor Starliner, the warnings and reservations on such high use of computer modeling and less flight (none for a CST prior version) experience has come home.Many sounded an alarm on this from the very beginning that going late to metal wasn't going to cut it. And were given the usual assurances that Boeing had it under control, having done so much HSF that they couldn't miss.Well, they missed as predicted on going to metal too late. It was a political decision, and it was flawed.So far not a tremendous deal. Here's the rub - there might be a chain of surprises. Perhaps its bounded.But in terms of the decision vs SNC - SNC was going to metal about as fast as SX. Which likely meant similar issues to SX and not the same as Boeing here. So "no one gets fired for choosing GM or IBM or Boeing" wasn't the "catch all" promised. The huge pile of paper that proves it'll work on time came up short.QuoteBut it is also a testament to Boeing's thoroughness in their analysis that these problems were caught at this early point in the build process. They don't stop analyzing just because the moved into production but they continue their analysis of each and every small change in design and even evaluate and update their models themselves when new environment data suggest the models are in error/"not near perfect and need change".Juries still out on that effectiveness for dependent/consecutive issues. Yes change process is working. If the number of issues doesn't climb as fabrication/assembly rises, they'll likely recover within reasonable time because the close rate will dominate the new issue rate. The virtue of being large here - you can scale to meet the challenge, and bring in the schedule at cost.SX/SNC have a different issue - they don't have as much history so they run the risk of taking too long to close/communicate on such a complex program. Their "undiscovered country" leads to open-ended process.The performance shortfall on the pad abort was an eye-opener. But that's why we do tests.Its also why we go to metal not paper early.Primary drivers of the latest delay are aero loads and software. What "metal" should Boeing have produced to uncover these issues earlier?
