"....requirements are to standards/laws/regulations"
Quote from: yg1968 on 12/09/2014 04:33 pmQuote from: funkyjive on 12/09/2014 02:55 amQuote from: Kabloona on 12/08/2014 07:48 pmThe only thing that could have gone wrong was pilot error, and this was apparently a rare case of a well-trained, experienced test pilot doing one thing wrong at the worst possible time, something that can never be fully designed out of a system.A computer would fully eliminate that possibility.He discusses why that option was rejected here:Quote from: Marc J. Zeitlin-Have automation question pilot decision.You know that I am usually on your side with respect to automation capabilities. In this case, the design philosophy of the aircraft (given that it would NOT be able to have hundreds of very incremental test flights during which the automation systems would be wrung out, as these systems WILL have bugs/errors in them) was to have everything possible be manual, non-boosted and non-automated. We made concessions in certain areas where it was not possible to manually control things (pitch control while supersonic, for instance), but in general, the philosophy was to rely on the pilots and intensive simulation of every failure mode we could think of given the very small number of flights that could be flown, given the cost of flying a glide flight, much less a powered flight.“Are you sure you want to destroy the plane by deploying at this time?” We have multiple sensors that all agree he’s making big mistake...Again, if it would be possible, as in the development of a Gulfstream bizjet, to have zillions of incremental test flights, we might have gone that route. But our judgement was that we would be more successful relying on pilots and extremely intensive training, as Scaled had been successful over its 30 year history without a fatality in a test flight.https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!msg/cozy_builders/YOnxrd26tXc/3OmYdxvqF_AJThe post above is right on topic for this thread. My own view is that VG may have to partially automate the unlocking mechanism in order for people to have confidence in their spacecraft in the future. If they suggest that no fix is necessary, people will be worried about the same accident happening again.
Quote from: funkyjive on 12/09/2014 02:55 amQuote from: Kabloona on 12/08/2014 07:48 pmThe only thing that could have gone wrong was pilot error, and this was apparently a rare case of a well-trained, experienced test pilot doing one thing wrong at the worst possible time, something that can never be fully designed out of a system.A computer would fully eliminate that possibility.He discusses why that option was rejected here:Quote from: Marc J. Zeitlin-Have automation question pilot decision.You know that I am usually on your side with respect to automation capabilities. In this case, the design philosophy of the aircraft (given that it would NOT be able to have hundreds of very incremental test flights during which the automation systems would be wrung out, as these systems WILL have bugs/errors in them) was to have everything possible be manual, non-boosted and non-automated. We made concessions in certain areas where it was not possible to manually control things (pitch control while supersonic, for instance), but in general, the philosophy was to rely on the pilots and intensive simulation of every failure mode we could think of given the very small number of flights that could be flown, given the cost of flying a glide flight, much less a powered flight.“Are you sure you want to destroy the plane by deploying at this time?” We have multiple sensors that all agree he’s making big mistake...Again, if it would be possible, as in the development of a Gulfstream bizjet, to have zillions of incremental test flights, we might have gone that route. But our judgement was that we would be more successful relying on pilots and extremely intensive training, as Scaled had been successful over its 30 year history without a fatality in a test flight.https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!msg/cozy_builders/YOnxrd26tXc/3OmYdxvqF_AJ
Quote from: Kabloona on 12/08/2014 07:48 pmThe only thing that could have gone wrong was pilot error, and this was apparently a rare case of a well-trained, experienced test pilot doing one thing wrong at the worst possible time, something that can never be fully designed out of a system.A computer would fully eliminate that possibility.
The only thing that could have gone wrong was pilot error, and this was apparently a rare case of a well-trained, experienced test pilot doing one thing wrong at the worst possible time, something that can never be fully designed out of a system.
-Have automation question pilot decision.You know that I am usually on your side with respect to automation capabilities. In this case, the design philosophy of the aircraft (given that it would NOT be able to have hundreds of very incremental test flights during which the automation systems would be wrung out, as these systems WILL have bugs/errors in them) was to have everything possible be manual, non-boosted and non-automated. We made concessions in certain areas where it was not possible to manually control things (pitch control while supersonic, for instance), but in general, the philosophy was to rely on the pilots and intensive simulation of every failure mode we could think of given the very small number of flights that could be flown, given the cost of flying a glide flight, much less a powered flight.“Are you sure you want to destroy the plane by deploying at this time?” We have multiple sensors that all agree he’s making big mistake...Again, if it would be possible, as in the development of a Gulfstream bizjet, to have zillions of incremental test flights, we might have gone that route. But our judgement was that we would be more successful relying on pilots and extremely intensive training, as Scaled had been successful over its 30 year history without a fatality in a test flight.
