Commercial Crew - Discussion Thread 1

[gongora]

I randomly ran across this in a search and I'm too lazy to look back through the site to see if it's been posted before, so sorry in advance if it's a duplicate.

[Feb. 2017] Astronauts Train With Air Force Survival School Instructors

[gongora]

This is for SpaceX:

MOD 77: The purpose of this bilateral modification is to permit acceptance and partial payment for 66% ($60M) of SubCLIN 001A milestone 01A Design Certification Review (DCR) based on the Contracting Officer's unilateral assessment of the work completed. At the time payment, 66% of the associated performance-based financing payments for SubCLIN 001A will be liquidated. The following changes are made:

1. The following criteria is added to the OCR Acceptance Criteria in Attachment J-03, Appendix A:

"(g) Open items shall be completed in accordance with the burn down plan and incremental certification commitments added to the Milestone Review Plan (MRP), established in December 2018. The OCR milestone will remain open until the work identified in the burn down plan and MRP is completed."
2. As consideration for the changes described above, the Contractor shall provide early delivery of the OCR milestone data items and allow NASA access to the Validation Propulsion Module (VPM) Test Article for any IV&V at NASA's request for up to four months after completion of the testing complete milestone.

[Lar]

Can someone translate that? What's a Validation Propulsion Module, and what is IV&V?

[Alpha Control]

Can someone translate that? What's a Validation Propulsion Module, and what is IV&V?

I'll take a stab at the 2nd part.  I think IV&V is Independent verification & validation.

[Steven Pietrobon]

Can someone translate that? What's a Validation Propulsion Module, and what is IV&V?

The Validation Propulsion Module might be a qualification model for SuperDraco.

[woods170]

Can someone translate that? What's a Validation Propulsion Module, and what is IV&V?

The Validation Propulsion Module might be a qualification model for SuperDraco.

The Validation Propulsion Module is a high-fidelity (flight-like) qualification module (single quadrant) of the Crew Dragon propulsion system. It contains both a full-set of Super Draco's as well as the associated Draco thrusters.

Two small images of the Validation Propulsion Module (both showing hotfire of the Super Dracos) were in the recent NAC HEO slides:

[woods170]

This is for SpaceX:

MOD 77: The purpose of this bilateral modification is to permit acceptance and partial payment for 66% ($60M) of SubCLIN 001A milestone 01A Design Certification Review (DCR) based on the Contracting Officer's unilateral assessment of the work completed. At the time payment, 66% of the associated performance-based financing payments for SubCLIN 001A will be liquidated. The following changes are made:

1. The following criteria is added to the OCR Acceptance Criteria in Attachment J-03, Appendix A:

"(g) Open items shall be completed in accordance with the burn down plan and incremental certification commitments added to the Milestone Review Plan (MRP), established in December 2018. The OCR milestone will remain open until the work identified in the burn down plan and MRP is completed."
2. As consideration for the changes described above, the Contractor shall provide early delivery of the OCR milestone data items and allow NASA access to the Validation Propulsion Module (VPM) Test Article for any IV&V at NASA's request for up to four months after completion of the testing complete milestone.

This is a fine example of how CCtCAP having become very burdensome on both CCP contractors.

Their contracts are firm fixed price, but with a major caveat: NASA retained to right to ADD requirements and acceptance criteria even after contract signing. The above is a fine example of this. NASA has used this right to a much greater extent than both contractors had previously anticipated.

[Semmel]

I'm that source. A fourth chute was added to the Crew Dragon design because propulsive landing went out the window. The road to that decision and its consequences are all explained in these posts:

https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=41018.msg1854726#msg1854726
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=45594.msg1854724#msg1854724
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=41016.msg1838743#msg1838743
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=33596.msg1717648#msg1717648

I take it from your sources that NASA didn’t trust SpaceX’ knife edge entry, though that was used successfully on every human capsule spaceflight in history? The agency required more redundancy, though Orion is in fact heavier, from much faster re-entry speeds? If so, it appears a single chute failier would not impact the human crew in the slightest and and dual failier might result in a higher than expected but not catastrophic crew injury. Am I intimating correctly?

On a four chute system for Crew Dragon a single chute failure will not impact the human crew in the slightest. A dual chute failure is perfectly survivable with only non life-threatening injuries expected.


So, single fault redundant for no impact to the crew whatsoever.
Dual fault redundant for non-catastrophic damage to the crew.


If three of the four chutes fail, the crew is dead. And so will be the capsule.

Woods, thanks. I red all the posts you linked, but.. how the hell did you find that? Do you keep a private database for links on the topic?

Another question, if D2 were to approach the ground too fast for survival, for instance if it is hanging on 1 chute or if even none at all.. what argument is there to not use the superdracos to cushion the impact?  I understand that in a reentry scenario, the tanks are still full or are they vented prior to reentry?

Even if D2 would not have perfect attitude control, could not target a spot or would not be able to prevent tip-over and thrust into the ground in all cases.. if the astronauts are dead anyway, why not run the engines and attempt to safe them regardless? You cannot lose more than you already lost in this scenario. This of course cannot be a thing the system should rely on or should be designed for. Just.. run the engines instead of doing nothing.

[Lar]

This is for SpaceX:

MOD 77: The purpose of this bilateral modification is to permit acceptance and partial payment for 66% ($60M) of SubCLIN 001A milestone 01A Design Certification Review (DCR) based on the Contracting Officer's unilateral assessment of the work completed. At the time payment, 66% of the associated performance-based financing payments for SubCLIN 001A will be liquidated. The following changes are made:

1. The following criteria is added to the OCR Acceptance Criteria in Attachment J-03, Appendix A:

"(g) Open items shall be completed in accordance with the burn down plan and incremental certification commitments added to the Milestone Review Plan (MRP), established in December 2018. The OCR milestone will remain open until the work identified in the burn down plan and MRP is completed."
2. As consideration for the changes described above, the Contractor shall provide early delivery of the OCR milestone data items and allow NASA access to the Validation Propulsion Module (VPM) Test Article for any IV&V at NASA's request for up to four months after completion of the testing complete milestone.

This is a fine example of how CCtCAP having become very burdensome on both CCP contractors.

Their contracts are firm fixed price, but with a major caveat: NASA retained to right to ADD requirements and acceptance criteria even after contract signing. The above is a fine example of this. NASA has used this right to a much greater extent than both contractors had previously anticipated.

How much negotiating power does each side have? Can NASA say "these are the requirements, X is what we will pay, you have no choice"? Can the contractor say "for those requirements, the price is Y, not X and if you don't pay Y, we won't do it"?

I have commercial experience and in that realm it's a negotiation. The scope change and the price are both negotiable.

[woods170]

This is for SpaceX:

MOD 77: The purpose of this bilateral modification is to permit acceptance and partial payment for 66% ($60M) of SubCLIN 001A milestone 01A Design Certification Review (DCR) based on the Contracting Officer's unilateral assessment of the work completed. At the time payment, 66% of the associated performance-based financing payments for SubCLIN 001A will be liquidated. The following changes are made:

1. The following criteria is added to the OCR Acceptance Criteria in Attachment J-03, Appendix A:

"(g) Open items shall be completed in accordance with the burn down plan and incremental certification commitments added to the Milestone Review Plan (MRP), established in December 2018. The OCR milestone will remain open until the work identified in the burn down plan and MRP is completed."
2. As consideration for the changes described above, the Contractor shall provide early delivery of the OCR milestone data items and allow NASA access to the Validation Propulsion Module (VPM) Test Article for any IV&V at NASA's request for up to four months after completion of the testing complete milestone.

This is a fine example of how CCtCAP having become very burdensome on both CCP contractors.

Their contracts are firm fixed price, but with a major caveat: NASA retained to right to ADD requirements and acceptance criteria even after contract signing. The above is a fine example of this. NASA has used this right to a much greater extent than both contractors had previously anticipated.

How much negotiating power does each side have? Can NASA say "these are the requirements, X is what we will pay, you have no choice"? Can the contractor say "for those requirements, the price is Y, not X and if you don't pay Y, we won't do it"?

I have commercial experience and in that realm it's a negotiation. The scope change and the price are both negotiable.

Added requirements and cert criteria that clearly go outside the defined scope of the contract are extra work and require additional payment to the contractors.

However, the Prop Validation Module was a milestone in the original CCtCAP contract. NASA added additional requirements for this milestone, without making extra funding available. The reasoning is simple: NASA needs more insight into the test results to be able to determine if the milestone has been met to full satisfaction. Such extra work is within the scope of the contract and does not see any additional payments to SpaceX. But it does add extra effort for both SpaceX and NASA.

Both CCP contractors were fully aware that NASA retained the right to add additional requirments and criteria, within the scope of the contract.
What both CCP contractors failed to properly estimate is the extent of NASA exercising this right.

[woods170]

I'm that source. A fourth chute was added to the Crew Dragon design because propulsive landing went out the window. The road to that decision and its consequences are all explained in these posts:

https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=41018.msg1854726#msg1854726
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=45594.msg1854724#msg1854724
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=41016.msg1838743#msg1838743
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=33596.msg1717648#msg1717648

I take it from your sources that NASA didn’t trust SpaceX’ knife edge entry, though that was used successfully on every human capsule spaceflight in history? The agency required more redundancy, though Orion is in fact heavier, from much faster re-entry speeds? If so, it appears a single chute failier would not impact the human crew in the slightest and and dual failier might result in a higher than expected but not catastrophic crew injury. Am I intimating correctly?

On a four chute system for Crew Dragon a single chute failure will not impact the human crew in the slightest. A dual chute failure is perfectly survivable with only non life-threatening injuries expected.


So, single fault redundant for no impact to the crew whatsoever.
Dual fault redundant for non-catastrophic damage to the crew.


If three of the four chutes fail, the crew is dead. And so will be the capsule.

Woods, thanks. I red all the posts you linked, but.. how the hell did you find that? Do you keep a private database for links on the topic?

Another question, if D2 were to approach the ground too fast for survival, for instance if it is hanging on 1 chute or if even none at all.. what argument is there to not use the superdracos to cushion the impact?  I understand that in a reentry scenario, the tanks are still full or are they vented prior to reentry?

Even if D2 would not have perfect attitude control, could not target a spot or would not be able to prevent tip-over and thrust into the ground in all cases.. if the astronauts are dead anyway, why not run the engines and attempt to safe them regardless? You cannot lose more than you already lost in this scenario. This of course cannot be a thing the system should rely on or should be designed for. Just.. run the engines instead of doing nothing.

In such a scenario the SuperDracos are there, but the crew does not have a capability to manually activate them. Whether or not your scenario has been added to the on-board software, such that the on-board computer can activate the SuperDracos to safe the landing, is unknown to me.

The easier solution is making sure that the parachute system is so robust that a one-chute scenario never happens. And that is exactly what NASA and SpaceX are doing right now.

[JonathanD]

The easier solution is making sure that the parachute system is so robust that a one-chute scenario never happens. And that is exactly what NASA and SpaceX are doing right now.

Still...after CRS-7 they learned it's a good idea to have software in place for unlikely scenarios.  We've seen a successful hover test after all...it's a tantalizingly close emergency option.  And what a shame to not be able to use if if God forbid the scenario ever arises.

[vt_hokie]

Still...after CRS-7 they learned it's a good idea to have software in place for unlikely scenarios.  We've seen a successful hover test after all...it's a tantalizingly close emergency option.  And what a shame to not be able to use if if God forbid the scenario ever arises.

My thought as well - unless it was found to be dynamically unstable and uncontrollable, the capability is inherent to the design with the integrated Super Dracos.  Why not include a Hail Mary option in the control system as a last ditch resort?

[gongora]

Do we really need to rehash propulsive landing in two threads at the same time?  Maybe we could just keep it in the Dragon 2 thread since that's where it cropped up again first?

[Semmel]

Do we really need to rehash propulsive landing in two threads at the same time?  Maybe we could just keep it in the Dragon 2 thread since that's where it cropped up again first?

You are correct, I didnt intent to discuss the merits or history of propulsive landing. My question was narrowly focussed on the above described scenario and Woods answered it as best he could. There is no need to discuss this any further.

[yg1968]

This has been mentioned already by a number of NSF Forum members but here is an article on it:

NASA Astronauts Will Still Ride Russian Rockets After US Craft Arrive

https://www.space.com/42781-nasa-astronauts-will-ride-soyuz-spacecraft.html

"Bill Gerstenmaier and senior NASA leadership have stated their intention to have U.S. crewmembers on Soyuz vehicles after 2019 and [to have] Russians on U.S. crew vehicles," Stephanie Schierholz, who works in public affairs at NASA Headquarters in Washington, told Space.com.

[Comga]

Do we really need to rehash propulsive landing in two threads at the same time?  Maybe we could just keep it in the Dragon 2 thread since that's where it cropped up again first?

No news here
Except that a previous Space.com article from last month said the opposite: “NASA astronaut among the last to launch from baikonur cosmodrome”

The FPIPs we used to see always had cosmonauts on American Commercial Crew spacecraft and American or partner astronauts on Soyuz as far ahead as the planning went. I thought these were direct exchanges, one for one trades with no money or credit being exchanged.

[gongora]

SpaceX CCP contract mod (Dec. 21, 2018):

MOD 55: The purpose of this modification is to add the requirement to integrate the Hatch Handle Tool for each crewed mission (Referenced in Performance Work Statement (PWS) paragraphs 2.3.6 and 4.1.5) and add the Hatch Handle Tool (J-07 item #19), Half Cargo Transfer Bags (BHSEALS Table J-07-2 item #8.4) and NDE Test Specimens (Test and Return Table J-07- 4 item #2) as Government Furnished Property.  As a result, Attachment J-03 PWS pages 30, 54 and 54.1 and  Attachment J-07 page 3, 5 and 7 are replaced.

Some Boeing contract mods:

NNK17MA39T
MOD 4: (Dec. 2018) This bilateral modification is issued to extend the period of performance for Task 1, Parachute Compartment Development Test Vehicle (PCDTV) Lease, from 12/14/18 to 3/31/19. The task order value remains unchanged.
   
80KSC018F0280 (Aug. 2018)
For this task order, the contractor shall conduct a test to assess the impacts of the new NASA Docking System shock requirements on the CST-100.

[IntoTheVoid]

This is probably better here, than the DM-1 mission thread. (Unlike many, the article isn't just a rehash of the video. I thought both were worthwhile.)

New verge article and video with lots of good camera angles of the SpaceX crew simulator along with astronaut interviews. https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/15/18182243/spacex-nasa-astronauts-human-crew-commercial-space-iss-tourism-bob-behnken-doug-hurley

[Scylla]

A description/comparison of Starliner, Dragon 2, Soyuz and Shuttle.

How SpaceX and Boeing will get Astronauts to the ISS
Everyday Astronaut