Commercial Crew - Discussion Thread 1

[Rondaz]

Commercial Crew Teams Practice Triage and Medical Evacuation

Anna Heiney Posted on October 25, 2018
Commercial Crew Program, Kennedy

NASA and the Department of Defense Human Space Flight Support (HSFS) Office have a long history in preparing for human spaceflight missions. As NASA’s Commercial Crew Program prepares to begin launching astronauts once again from American soil, it is vital teams prepare for launch day operations, including possible but unlikely emergency scenarios, and simulations are key to getting teams as ready as possible.

Today, teams from NASA, HSFS and SpaceX are conducting a joint medical triage and medical evacuation (medevac) training exercise at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida. This is the second of two emergency medical services simulations to be performed before commercial crew flight tests, which are scheduled for 2019. The first exercise was conducted at Space Launch Complex 41 and integrated teams from NASA, Boeing and United Launch Alliance.

“In the business of human spaceflight, we go to great lengths to design away or to control all the known hazards,” said Steve Payne, NASA Simulation Test Director and CCP Launch Integrator. “However, when the unexpected happens, we must be ready to respond. We develop and practice our procedures to handle the worst possible scenarios on launch day, but we hope we never have to use them. NASA is working closely with both our commercial partners and the Department of Defense to do everything possible to keep our flight crews and ground teams safe.”

For today’s exercise, teams are practicing a worst-case scenario, pad emergency and subsequent hypergolic fuel leak. Starting at the base of the egress system at Launch Complex 39A, volunteer ground crews are evacuating the pad perimeter using three Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAP, vehicles. Three helicopters, emergency services, and the triage team are meeting the evacuated crews at triage site 8, between Launch Pads 39A and B.

As part of this exercise, evacuated personnel are undergoing a toxic vapor check. Kennedy Fire/Rescue teams are treating the crews as if contamination were detected and are performing decontamination measures. Following the medical evaluations, the simulated patients are being stabilized and prepared for transport. Selected patients are being evacuated to several area hospitals in order to validate all emergency procedures.

This simulation is a recent example of how safety is being built into systems, processes and procedures. These simulations are designed to exercise various components of emergency procedures, as well as triage and medevac response during the unlikely event of an emergency during launch operations. It is standard practice to conduct these exercises, and was regularly done during the Space Shuttle Program.

[IntoTheVoid]

Full commercial crew (latest round up) update article.

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2018/10/commercial-crew-training-prepares-flight-hardware/ - By Thomas Burghardt

https://twitter.com/NASASpaceflight/status/1056924799447064578

[Coastal Ron]

Thought I'd point out that with the release of the onboard video of the recent Soyuz failure, that it kind of reinforces what Elon Musk said about failure modes in rockets - that stage separation was one of those frequent failure modes, and that was why their design goals were to reduce the number of stage separation events.

Of course something else to point out is that the Soyuz escape system worked as designed, which should make NASA happy that both Boeing and SpaceX have abort capabilities from the launch pad to orbit - the Shuttle era of no reliable abort modes will truly be behind us.

Accepting risk as part of traveling to space is important, not only for the travelers but also for the transportation owners and funders. And while there are many reasons to not like what Russia does these days, they don't take long to do their investigations and implement fixes - which is something I hope we'll be able to do if we have a Commercial Crew launch failure. Because you can't have transportation redundancy if you only have one provider flying...

[FinalFrontier]

Thought I'd point out that with the release of the onboard video of the recent Soyuz failure, that it kind of reinforces what Elon Musk said about failure modes in rockets - that stage separation was one of those frequent failure modes, and that was why their design goals were to reduce the number of stage separation events.

Of course something else to point out is that the Soyuz escape system worked as designed, which should make NASA happy that both Boeing and SpaceX have abort capabilities from the launch pad to orbit - the Shuttle era of no reliable abort modes will truly be behind us.

Accepting risk as part of traveling to space is important, not only for the travelers but also for the transportation owners and funders. And while there are many reasons to not like what Russia does these days, they don't take long to do their investigations and implement fixes - which is something I hope we'll be able to do if we have a Commercial Crew launch failure. Because you can't have transportation redundancy if you only have one provider flying...

Let's hope for two things, one that Soyuz has no more issues. And two that there are no further delay's to commercial crew. Fly already, let's see if these things work or not.

[SciNews]

Commercial Crew Astronauts train in centrifuge

[Roy_H]

Of course something else to point out is that the Soyuz escape system worked as designed, which should make NASA happy that both Boeing and SpaceX have abort capabilities from the launch pad to orbit - the Shuttle era of no reliable abort modes will truly be behind us.

Not if Musk has his way with the BFS. Passengers on airlines don't wear parachutes either. At some point abort modes become more complicated than they are worth. Both Shuttle disasters were  a result of over-eager managers who refused to listen to the recommendations of engineers.

[docmordrid]

Of course something else to point out is that the Soyuz escape system worked as designed, which should make NASA happy that both Boeing and SpaceX have abort capabilities from the launch pad to orbit - the Shuttle era of no reliable abort modes will truly be behind us.

Not if Musk has his way with the BFS.
>

SpaceX hasn't discussed abort modes. All we have is WAGs.

[gongora]

BFS abort modes are offtopic for this thread.

[gongora]

Boeing

MOD 72: The purpose of this modification is to change the maximum number of Post Mission Certifications (PCMs) that can be granted Authority to Proceed (ATP) prior to completion of the ISS Design Certification Review (ISS DCR) from two (2) to three (3). The contract value remains unchanged.

MOD 4: The purpose of this bilateral modification is to provide Authority to Proceed (ATP) for PCM-3 and provide incremental funding.
1. The task order is updated to identify the PCM-3 launch date, milestone review dates, docking date and landing date.
2. Incremental funding in the amount of $42,087,614 is added, increasing the funding amount from $0 to $42,087,614.

SpaceX

MOD 53:
1. The purpose of this modification is to change the maximum number of PCMs that can be granted Authority to Proceed (ATP) prior to completion of the ISS Design Certification Review (ISS DCR) from two (2) to three (3).

MOD 3:  The purpose of this modification is to provide Authority to Proceed (ATP) for Post Certification Mission (PCM) 3 and provide incremental funding. [$36.7M]

I guess someone wanted more money upfront?

[woods170]

Boeing

MOD 72: The purpose of this modification is to change the maximum number of Post Mission Certifications (PCMs) that can be granted Authority to Proceed (ATP) prior to completion of the ISS Design Certification Review (ISS DCR) from two (2) to three (3). The contract value remains unchanged.

MOD 4: The purpose of this bilateral modification is to provide Authority to Proceed (ATP) for PCM-3 and provide incremental funding.
1. The task order is updated to identify the PCM-3 launch date, milestone review dates, docking date and landing date.
2. Incremental funding in the amount of $42,087,614 is added, increasing the funding amount from $0 to $42,087,614.

SpaceX

MOD 53:
1. The purpose of this modification is to change the maximum number of PCMs that can be granted Authority to Proceed (ATP) prior to completion of the ISS Design Certification Review (ISS DCR) from two (2) to three (3).

MOD 3:  The purpose of this modification is to provide Authority to Proceed (ATP) for Post Certification Mission (PCM) 3 and provide incremental funding. [$36.7M]

I guess someone wanted more money upfront?

That is an incorrect guess. What this means is that both Boeing and SpaceX have been asked by NASA to start working on their respectieve PCM-3 missions.

[Rebel44]

https://twitter.com/wapodavenport/status/1064956505047355392

https://twitter.com/SciGuySpace/status/1064957134536888321

https://twitter.com/SciGuySpace/status/1064962639430864898

[kevinof]

What has Elon Musk smoking pot got to do with the safety of commercial crew? What a joke. Nasa you lose my respect with every wrong step you take.

[matthewkantar]

Wasting the work hours of hundreds or even thousands of engineers and technicians with stressful interviews while they are doing the work of returning the United States to space travel is completely idiotic.

Anyone who doesn't think these interviews will be stressful is delusional.

[QuantumG]

Witch hunt, ass covering, dirty tricks. Pick your poison.

[AnalogMan]

We have a dedicated thread to discuss the safety review:

NASA to launch safety review of SpaceX and Boeing after video of Elon Musk...
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=46837.0

[Rondaz]

NASA’s Commercial Crew Program Target Test Flight Dates

Marie Lewis Posted on November 21, 2018

The next generation of American spacecraft and rockets that will launch astronauts to the International Space Station are nearing the final stages of development and evaluation. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program will return human spaceflight launches to U.S. soil, providing safe, reliable and cost-effective access to low-Earth orbit on systems that meet our safety and mission requirements.

To meet NASA’s requirements, the commercial providers must demonstrate that their systems are ready to begin regular flights to the space station. Two of those demonstrations are uncrewed flight tests, known as Orbital Flight Test for Boeing, and Demo-1 for SpaceX. After the uncrewed flight tests, both companies will carry out spacecraft abort tests to demonstrate their crew escape capability during an actual on-pad, or ascent emergency. The final test flights for each company will be crew flight tests to the space station prior to being certified by NASA for crew rotation missions. The following target dates reflect the current schedule as of Tuesday, Nov. 20.

Test Flight Planning Dates:
Boeing Orbital Flight Test (uncrewed): March 2019
Boeing Pad Abort Test: Between OFT and CFT
Boeing Crew Flight Test (crewed): August 2019
SpaceX Demo-1 (uncrewed): January 7, 2019
SpaceX In-Flight Abort Test: Between Demo-1 and Demo-2
SpaceX Demo-2 (crewed): June 2019

SpaceX also completed a pad abort test in 2015. Following the test flights, NASA will review the performance data and resolve issues as necessary to certify the systems for operational missions.  Boeing, SpaceX and the Commercial Crew Program are actively working to be ready for the operational missions; however, as with all human spaceflight development, learning from each test and adjusting as necessary to reduce risk to the crew may override planning dates.

Anticipated Readiness Dates for Operational Missions:
First operational mission: August 2019
Second operational mission: December 2019

https://blogs.nasa.gov/commercialcrew/2018/11/21/nasas-commercial-crew-program-target-test-flight-dates-5/

[JonathanD]

I would be surprised if they didn't put a full crew on DM-2 if all goes well with DM-1 and inflight abort.

[Comga]

And we were under six weeks to launch.....

NASA’s Commercial Crew Program Target Test Flight Dates

Marie Lewis Posted on November 21, 2018

(snip)
Test Flight Planning Dates:
Boeing Orbital Flight Test (uncrewed): March 2019
Boeing Pad Abort Test: Between OFT and CFT
Boeing Crew Flight Test (crewed): August 2019
SpaceX Demo-1 (uncrewed): January 7, 2019
SpaceX In-Flight Abort Test: Between Demo-1 and Demo-2
SpaceX Demo-2 (crewed): June 2019
(snip)
First operational mission: August 2019
Second operational mission: December 2019

And now we have Bridenstine throwing major shade on the schedule only 8 days later:

Bridenstine says that "there is a very low probability" that DM-1 occurs in January.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/11/29/nasa-program-send-astronauts-space-station-facing-more-delays/2143813002/

So what changed in the last week?
We have known for some tme that the parachute reef cutters are coming from a new supplier without flight heritage.
This does put some finite added risk into the DM-1 flight.
The parachute system is significantly modified from the 3 chute Cargo Dragon version which has something like 16 for 16 successes.  However it has been tested ~10 times, although I don't know how many included the new reef cutter.

Why, again, did NASA insist of adding a 4th parachute?
And won't NASA let SpaceX assume the risk of a parachute failure on DM-1, at the potential cost of having to do it again, as they continue their certification for DM-2?

Does anyone else remember and feel like Charlie Brown truing to kick the football.?
Imagine Bridenstine in the role of Lucy.....

[TripleSeven]

And we were under six weeks to launch.....

NASA’s Commercial Crew Program Target Test Flight Dates

Marie Lewis Posted on November 21, 2018

(snip)
Test Flight Planning Dates:
Boeing Orbital Flight Test (uncrewed): March 2019
Boeing Pad Abort Test: Between OFT and CFT
Boeing Crew Flight Test (crewed): August 2019
SpaceX Demo-1 (uncrewed): January 7, 2019
SpaceX In-Flight Abort Test: Between Demo-1 and Demo-2
SpaceX Demo-2 (crewed): June 2019
(snip)
First operational mission: August 2019
Second operational mission: December 2019

And now we have Bridenstine throwing major shade on the schedule only 8 days later:

Bridenstine says that "there is a very low probability" that DM-1 occurs in January.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/11/29/nasa-program-send-astronauts-space-station-facing-more-delays/2143813002/

So what changed in the last week?
We have known for some tme that the parachute reef cutters are coming from a new supplier without flight heritage.
This does put some finite added risk into the DM-1 flight.
The parachute system is significantly modified from the 3 chute Cargo Dragon version which has something like 16 for 16 successes.  However it has been tested ~10 times, although I don't know how many included the new reef cutter.

Why, again, did NASA insist of adding a 4th parachute?
And won't NASA let SpaceX assume the risk of a parachute failure on DM-1, at the potential cost of having to do it again, as they continue their certification for DM-2?

Does anyone else remember and feel like Charlie Brown truing to kick the football.?
Imagine Bridenstine in the role of Lucy.....

do you grasp the cost of failure in a political sense?

[woods170]

And we were under six weeks to launch.....

NASA’s Commercial Crew Program Target Test Flight Dates

Marie Lewis Posted on November 21, 2018

(snip)
Test Flight Planning Dates:
Boeing Orbital Flight Test (uncrewed): March 2019
Boeing Pad Abort Test: Between OFT and CFT
Boeing Crew Flight Test (crewed): August 2019
SpaceX Demo-1 (uncrewed): January 7, 2019
SpaceX In-Flight Abort Test: Between Demo-1 and Demo-2
SpaceX Demo-2 (crewed): June 2019
(snip)
First operational mission: August 2019
Second operational mission: December 2019

And now we have Bridenstine throwing major shade on the schedule only 8 days later:

Bridenstine says that "there is a very low probability" that DM-1 occurs in January.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/11/29/nasa-program-send-astronauts-space-station-facing-more-delays/2143813002/

So what changed in the last week?
We have known for some tme that the parachute reef cutters are coming from a new supplier without flight heritage.
This does put some finite added risk into the DM-1 flight.
The parachute system is significantly modified from the 3 chute Cargo Dragon version which has something like 16 for 16 successes.  However it has been tested ~10 times, although I don't know how many included the new reef cutter.

Why, again, did NASA insist of adding a 4th parachute?
And won't NASA let SpaceX assume the risk of a parachute failure on DM-1, at the potential cost of having to do it again, as they continue their certification for DM-2?

Does anyone else remember and feel like Charlie Brown truing to kick the football.?
Imagine Bridenstine in the role of Lucy.....

do you grasp the cost of failure in a political sense?

Do you grasp the cost of losing a crew on Soyuz in a political sense?