Commercial Crew - Discussion Thread 1

[tdperk]

Commercial Crew discussion at ASAP meeting...

Still lots of verification work to be finished with both contractors.

SpaceX:
COPV failure investigation still not closed.
There have been unspecified anomalies observed with parachute testing and CRS parachutes.  Don't know how serious or if any design changes would be needed.  Stressed they think this should be resolved before uncrewed flight.

Boeing:
Parachute testing continues, some sort of anomaly on last test.   A couple more tests still to do.
The pyro assemblies for separating crew module from service module have had unexpected fractures in testing, successfully performed their function but created some FOD.
The problem with the launch abort system was described as a harmonic resonance creating a water hammer effect, still working on fixes.

I have a bit more on the SpaceX parachute "anomalies". They are described as "not-previously observed" behaviour.  But the more important thing is that the behaviour was well within the allowed limits of the parachute system.

And then:

That information would be considered proprietary to SpaceX and Boeing, and is unlikely to be publicly released.

Precisely. Yet another example of individuals online thinking they are entitled to data that they aren’t.

The only thing which could possibly save a company which was a CC provider which had a LOC event, is that it was perfectly above board in addressing such concerns.  The idea information relating to such would stay proprietary is ridiculous -- it would no more stay proprietary data than would the increasing severity and likelihood of O-ring failure with decreasing temperature.  And unlike the people who made and went along with the statement, "take off your engineer hat and put on your management hat", they might face actual consequences.

We speak of data which if it exists, is as with that O-ring data then would have before that launch--and as with which no one would quibble now--would justify sneaking onto the pad and taking a sledgehammer to the vehicle prior to launch.  The goal for the LOC rate is 1 in 270.

Claiming such data as would justify ASAP's statements is proprietary is conclusory, and is explicable most easily as a way to shut down public debate and criticism.

The public is footing the bill for ASAP and Commercial Crew both.  "Proprietaryness" of data is no excuse at all for the cards not to be on the table, and them face up.

http://blogs.sciencemag.org/pipeline/archives/2012/02/09/roger_boisjoly_and_the_management_hat

When I am a counselor for the Engineering merit badge, I use hearing "take off your engineer hat and put on your management hat" an example of when it's at least past time to walk off the job and probably find an attorney, if not an attorney general.

What concerns ASAP has which they can not/have not quantified publicly, are nullities for all public purposes, including discussion here.

[A_M_Swallow]

{snip}
The only thing which could possibly save a company which was a CC provider which had a LOC event, is that it was perfectly above board in addressing such concerns.  The idea information relating to such would stay proprietary is ridiculous -- it would no more stay proprietary data than would the increasing severity and likelihood of O-ring failure with decreasing temperature.  And unlike the people who made and went along with the statement, "take off your engineer hat and put on your management hat", they might face actual consequences.

{snip}

Managerially that one was simple to save money you order the Shuttle take off delayed for 1 day to allow the O-rings to warm up.

Cost alternatives:

a. cost of delaying launch for a day or two until the the O-rings return to specification -> fairly low cost.

b. cost of keeping the O-rings warm. Possibly by using hot water bottles attached with sealing wax and string -> low cost.

c. x% of the cost of (buying a new Space Shuttle + rejecting income from launches during the 32-month hiatus + investigation + laying off several thousand people + training their replacements + ...) -> a cost of $billions

The committee chose the high cost option which led to such a disgrace that we are still talking about it today.

[su27k]

I only see people objecting to ASAP being unable to provide any data showing there are any unaddressed concerns RE either load-and-go, COPVs, or D2 parachutes.
...
Where are their numbers?!

That information would be considered proprietary to SpaceX and Boeing, and is unlikely to be publicly released.

ASAP was able to describe Boeing's problems fairly clearly, enough so that a layman would understand the gist. The same is not true for their description of SpaceX's "problems", which is vague and unspecific.

[pathfinder_01]

My guess is that people calling for a rush to flight aren't remembering the brutal lessons taught the last time the U.S. rushed just such a thing.

You knew when you posted that image that you would get pushback...

Yes, it was over the top, and unwarranted. And not relevant AT ALL to the current discussion.

People on this very thread are calling for bypassing the certification process.  Seriously.

I worked with engineers who were in the 34 blockhouse on January 27, 1967.  They would be furious to here such talk.

 - Ed Kyle

The cause wasn't rush. The cause was using pure oxygen in the cabin and we were lucky it had not killed any crews beforehand. The solution was to use oxygen/nitrogen during the launch phase and to design the craft for emergency escape on the pad if need be. Also they never did find what started the fire but simply redesigned the electoral system to get rid of probable causes.

[woods170]

My guess is that people calling for a rush to flight aren't remembering the brutal lessons taught the last time the U.S. rushed just such a thing.

 - Ed Kyle

Rushing to flight and being overly cautious are two very different things. You don't seem to understand that being downright reckless (Apollo 1) and overly cautious (CCP) are the two extreme ends of a very broad bandwidth.

The trick here is to find the golden path in the middle. ASAP is, IMO, not doing that.

[woods170]

What really irked me, with regards to the comments made about the Crew Dragon parachute system, is that ASAP dragged in the Cargo Dragon parachute system. They managed to completely overlook the fact that that particular system has a 100% reliability score (14 for 14 for operational missions, 2 for 2 for demo missions and 10 for 10 for development tests)

Only 26 flights? The Shuttle TPS system worked on 111 flights with 100% success. That doesn't mean you ignore weird events like foam strikes.

No, I think it worked about 50/50 with lots more near misses than LOC -- RE the foam shedding.  The agony of the thing is, foam shedding and foam strikes weren't weird, they were the continuance of the, "normalization of deviance".

Correct, it didn't work with 100% success. On most of those 111 shuttle missions there was substantial damage to the tiles. There was no single shuttle mission that never required any replacement of tiles. In fact, some parts of the shuttle TPS were damaged so often that it was replaced with an extension of the carbon-carbon nosecap. Quite literally, the design was changed to improve resistance to damage in the most affected places.

[LouScheffer]

ASAP is TOO cautious in my opinion. [...]

They also continue making problems of things that have long since been determined to be no problems. For example: at the recent ASAP meeting it was mentioned that Load-N-Go was still considered to be a safety issue. Well, it looks like ASAP didn't get the memo that NASA has approved Load-N-Go for CCP missions, after exhaustive investigation of the proprosed procedure. ASAP still considering Load-N-Go to be a safety issue is also contradictive to their own opening statement, saying that they haven't observed any decision making by NASA that would increase safety risks for CCP.

In my mind, ASAP has crossed the line from constructive criticism to concern trolling.   They also demand things which may or may not even be possible.   For example, they say SpaceX needs a final resolution on root cause of the COPV failure before they can fly.  While this would certainly be desirable, such precision is not always possible.  For example, the Apollo 1 fire never had a root cause firmly established - no ignition source was ever identified, though there were lots of suspects.

Needless to say, all of the stakeholders in the investigation were also in favor of finding a definite root cause.   So ASAP is demanding something that the combination of SpaceX, NASA, USAF, NTSB, and outside experts combined were unable to  determine.  Unless ASAP has some reason to think otherwise, they are just wishing for a pony.     In such a case, the sensible way forward is to fix every source anyone can think of, and test the crap out of the revised design.   That's what Apollo did, what SpaceX appears to be doing, and what ASAP should monitor.

Likewise, their calls for complete understanding before flying make me skeptical.   For example , the rocket flies through the atmosphere, including turbulence, an area where we certainly cannot claim to have complete understanding.  (In fact scientists have never even proved that solutions to the relevant equations even exist, much less behave as desired.)  But our understanding is good enough, a much more sensible criterium.

[FinalFrontier]

ASAP is TOO cautious in my opinion. [...]

They also continue making problems of things that have long since been determined to be no problems. For example: at the recent ASAP meeting it was mentioned that Load-N-Go was still considered to be a safety issue. Well, it looks like ASAP didn't get the memo that NASA has approved Load-N-Go for CCP missions, after exhaustive investigation of the proprosed procedure. ASAP still considering Load-N-Go to be a safety issue is also contradictive to their own opening statement, saying that they haven't observed any decision making by NASA that would increase safety risks for CCP.

In my mind, ASAP has crossed the line from constructive criticism to concern trolling.   They also demand things which may or may not even be possible.   For example, they say SpaceX needs a final resolution on root cause of the COPV failure before they can fly.  While this would certainly be desirable, such precision is not always possible.  For example, the Apollo 1 fire never had a root cause firmly established - no ignition source was ever identified, though there were lots of suspects.

Needless to say, all of the stakeholders in the investigation were also in favor of finding a definite root cause.   So ASAP is demanding something that the combination of SpaceX, NASA, USAF, NTSB, and outside experts combined were unable to  determine.  Unless ASAP has some reason to think otherwise, they are just wishing for a pony.     In such a case, the sensible way forward is to fix every source anyone can think of, and test the crap out of the revised design.   That's what Apollo did, what SpaceX appears to be doing, and what ASAP should monitor.

Likewise, their calls for complete understanding before flying make me skeptical.   For example , the rocket flies through the atmosphere, including turbulence, an area where we certainly cannot claim to have complete understanding.  (In fact scientists have never even proved that solutions to the relevant equations even exist, much less behave as desired.)  But our understanding is good enough, a much more sensible criterium.

I have long since said and felt the same way. ASAP over the years has shown a considerable, and almost at times vitriolic, bias against any system that was not the stick. They spent years declaring that the stick was the safest vehicle ever and no commercial vehicle would ever work, when in fact the opposite was true and the stick was the most dangerous vehicle ever and would never work. They even persisted in doing this after aug com, after the truth was out, right up to CXP cancellation. And then they kept doing it after CXP, continuing to hinder commercial crew and at one point they were hindering SLS as well. ASAP spent a long time campaigning against an inline SDHLV as well. So I have never viewed them as an unbiased safety watchdog, instead they have always come across as a political instrument to me that ignores data and consistently tries to mess up any vehicle development that they don't like. And there are still some people on the ASAP who were absolute religious griffin/stick supporters, so I imagine they are still to this day bitter over CXP and it would not surprise me if some of what we are seeing is related to that.

In short, ASAP veered off of what it was chartered to do, what it was supposed to be, during the CXP era and it has never been put back on the path. It was supposed to be a safety watchdog not a political tool for certain factions/congressional factions, that are still bitter over losing the stick. I have yet to see ASAP say a single positive thing about any vehicle designed since CXP was cancelled.

What concerns ASAP has which they can not/have not quantified publicly, are nullities for all public purposes, including discussion here.

JohnQ public and the Congress are the ones paying for all this. We are also the ones who might lose the space station if it has to deman beause the Soyuz explodes again and these vehicles can't fly. If ASAP cannot quantify the problems publicly and all they have are handwaving then Congress should move them out of the way. Legislatively if necessary, or the POTUS could do the same with executive action. We really shouldn't have to go there but again, if they can't quantify the problem then they are obfuscating for the sake of themselves not to actually better the vehicles. And that is an unacceptable situation especially right now.

[woods170]

In my mind, ASAP has crossed the line from constructive criticism to concern trolling.   They also demand things which may or may not even be possible.   For example, they say SpaceX needs a final resolution on root cause of the COPV failure before they can fly.  While this would certainly be desirable, such precision is not always possible.  For example, the Apollo 1 fire never had a root cause firmly established - no ignition source was ever identified, though there were lots of suspects.

Needless to say, all of the stakeholders in the investigation were also in favor of finding a definite root cause.   So ASAP is demanding something that the combination of SpaceX, NASA, USAF, NTSB, and outside experts combined were unable to  determine.  Unless ASAP has some reason to think otherwise, they are just wishing for a pony.     In such a case, the sensible way forward is to fix every source anyone can think of, and test the crap out of the revised design.   That's what Apollo did, what SpaceX appears to be doing, and what ASAP should monitor.

Likewise, their calls for complete understanding before flying make me skeptical.   For example , the rocket flies through the atmosphere, including turbulence, an area where we certainly cannot claim to have complete understanding.  (In fact scientists have never even proved that solutions to the relevant equations even exist, much less behave as desired.)  But our understanding is good enough, a much more sensible criterium.

Emphasis mine.

That is exactly what SpaceX has been doing for the past 1,5 years, in very close cooperation with NASA (as reported publically by both NASA and SpaceX).

But hell no, that's not enough for ASAP.

IMO, if ASAP had the authority to call the shots after Apollo 1 there never would have been a manned launch of an Apollo spaceship, ever.

[Semmel]

My guess is that people calling for a rush to flight aren't remembering the brutal lessons taught the last time the U.S. rushed just such a thing.

 - Ed Kyle

Rushing to flight and being overly cautious are two very different things. You don't seem to understand that being downright reckless (Apollo 1) and overly cautious (CCP) are the two extreme ends of a very broad bandwidth.

The trick here is to find the golden path in the middle. ASAP is, IMO, not doing that.

I agree. What is missing for the ASAP is a correcting force. They are in a loose-loose situation. If anything goes wrong, everyone is complaining that they didnt do their job properly. If nothing goes wrong, everyone is complaining that they are too strict and unreasonable. Also, since you never know 100% if something works unless you try it, ASAP is against all change since any change has the danger of going bad. There is no force for ASAP to balance their advice. In any engineering problem, the solution is a balance. If it is not, the solution goes to some extreme. For example, say, you want to build a bridge over a river and there are no restrictions, the obvious solution is a solid metal wall with a hole for the water to flow through. It cant break down and it will not kill people. Of course that is not practical. The ASAP is in exactly this type of situation. The way this is structured, they cant make it right and always will tend to the extreme.

[tdperk]

*snip*
I agree. What is missing for the ASAP is a correcting force. They are in a loose-loose situation. If anything goes wrong, everyone is complaining that they didnt do their job properly. If nothing goes wrong, everyone is complaining that they are too strict and unreasonable.
*snip*

The way out of their loose-loose situation for them is for them to show their work.

[Kabloona]

My guess is that people calling for a rush to flight aren't remembering the brutal lessons taught the last time the U.S. rushed just such a thing.

 - Ed Kyle

Rushing to flight and being overly cautious are two very different things. You don't seem to understand that being downright reckless (Apollo 1) and overly cautious (CCP) are the two extreme ends of a very broad bandwidth.

The trick here is to find the golden path in the middle. ASAP is, IMO, not doing that.

I agree. What is missing for the ASAP is a correcting force. They are in a loose-loose situation. If anything goes wrong, everyone is complaining that they didnt do their job properly. If nothing goes wrong, everyone is complaining that they are too strict and unreasonable. Also, since you never know 100% if something works unless you try it, ASAP is against all change since any change has the danger of going bad.

Yes to Semmel's comment, and as a thought experiment, it's worth wondering what ASAP would say/has said about Soyuz RTF so soon after the latest incident:

https://spacenews.com/bridenstine-confident-soyuz-launches-will-resume-on-schedule/

A comment by user perilun after the article is, I think, worth reposting:

Double down! If it has a US failure we would have years of review before another try ... but since it will be the Russian's fault then what the hell ... give it another shot. At least NASA can say that the Russian's "failure" was a great and successful test of their escape system so it does not matter that the Soyuz booster failure rate continues to climb ... just build more and keep trying. I do think they should give the scheduled crew a respectful pass-on-this option and let the risk takers take the next ride. With this quick OK on another Russian attempt we see all the NASA/ASAP hand wringing is not a "safety issue" is a "will-we-get-blamed?" issue with NASA.

Last sentence bolding is mine, as I think it neatly summarizes the question.

It's not entirely fair to compare Soyuz RTF risk assessment with Commercial Crew risk assessment, since Soyuz is such a mature system with a good safety record, and it's reasonable for engineers to have confidence that the separation issue is not a design flaw but perhaps a relatively easily correctable QA issue, for example.

But it does highlight the fundamental issue that, of course, NASA doesn't want to get blamed for a Commercial Crew LOC incident, which would turn into a big political football.

[rayleighscatter]

The trick here is to find the golden path in the middle. ASAP is, IMO, not doing that.

That's not ASAP's job, that's management's.

They also demand things which may or may not even be possible.   

ASAP is advisory (it's right in their name), they can't "demand" anything. 

[woods170]

The trick here is to find the golden path in the middle. ASAP is, IMO, not doing that.

That's not ASAP's job, that's management's.

You parsed my post incorrectly. My point was this: ASAP, as it exists today, is thinking in extremes only and is IMO incapable of understanding that better is the enemy of good enough. That attitude is reflected in the safety advises given by ASAP: safety into the extreme. To the point that ASAP's safety advises are no longer practically applicable.
An advisory panel on safety would be well advised to not only focus on safety, but also on what is practically possible. It is this latter aspect that is quite often missing from ASAP advice.
A fine example is from their most recent meeting, where they discussed the parachute systems used by Boeing and SpaceX for the CCP vehicles. ASAP voiced a demand to not fly any CCP vehicles until recently observed parachute anomalies are solved, even going as far as to suggest that the parachute systems would have to be redesigned.
This demand from ASAP is completely unrealistic. ASAP failed to acknowledge that even operational parachute systems, that have been in use for multiple decades, exhibit anomalous behaviour every now and then. Second: ASAP completely overlooked the fact that most parachute systems contain a very wide performance margin, precisely because it is known that parachute systems sometimes have anomalies. The performance margin is there to compensate for any anomaly. Getting rid of even the last anomaly is simply not practically possible. And that goes for most systems. A good designer acknowledges this and makes d*mn sure the system has margin to compensate. But sadly this notion is lost on ASAP.

They also demand things which may or may not even be possible.   

ASAP is advisory (it's right in their name), they can't "demand" anything.

Emphasis mine.

Per their charter they can indeed NOT demand anything.
But that doesn't stop them from doing it anyway.
Just go listen to the audio recording from their most public meeting.

Also, when ASAP voices their "advice" in strong words (as a demand), NASA often complies with the advice demand.

[tyrred]

Maybe confusing it with Orion?

That was probably it.
My apologies.
Carry on

Overview of performed and planned abort tests, per vehicle:

Orion:
- Pad abort test (PA-1). Was performed on May 6, 2010.
- In-flight abort test (Ascent Abort test - AA-2). Planned for April, 2019

Crew Dragon:
- Pad abort test. Was performed on May 6, 2015. (Exactly 5 years to the day after Orion's PA-1)
- In-flight abort test. Planned for March/April 2019.

CST-100 Starliner
- Pad abort test. Was planned for June/July 2019. However, the vehicle's service module suffered a mishap during a hotfire-test (prior to the actual pad abort test), requiring re-design of abort propellant valves. New planning date TBD.
- No in-flight abort test will be performed for Starliner.

Post Soyuz MS-10, how does it make sense for Starliner not to have an in-flight abort test scheduled?  Is there such confidence in the industry that Starliner's abort capability has already been proven in that part of the flight regime? 

IANARS and must be missing something here, please correct me, but at face value it just doesn't look right. 

Orion, which has no scheduled ISS missions on the books, and Crew Dragon, which is a main contender for ISS crew missions, have both had pad abort tests. 

Crew Dragon test was performed before SpaceX even successfully landed their first booster.

Also, has there been any whisper of movement to the left of the Crew Dragon IFA test?  I can't find the original IFA test schedule, but from SpaceX before their Pad Abort test:

"Pending the outcome of the pad abort test, SpaceX will then conduct an in-flight abort test. With the in-flight abort, we will test the same launch abort system, however this time in mid-flight during an actual launch. Both the pad abort and in-flight abort will be challenging tests, but the data gathered here will be key to helping develop one of the safest, most reliable spacecraft ever flown."

https://www.spacex.com/news/2015/05/04/5-things-know-about-spacexs-pad-abort-test

3 years is an eternity when glued to these forums at NSf 

[Steven Pietrobon]

Post Soyuz MS-10, how does it make sense for Starliner not to have an in-flight abort test scheduled?  Is there such confidence in the industry that Starliner's abort capability has already been proven in that part of the flight regime?

It makes sense if you want to save money and have confidence in your simulations. As has often been proved in the past though, this could end up being a very bad decision. I'm disappointed that NASA did not make this test mandatory for certification. "Test what you fly and fly what you test."

[Jcc]

The SpaceX IFA was moved to be after DM-1.  Probable reason was to make sure it used 100% final configuration.

To make things more interesting, they are also planning to reuse the Dragon 2 from DM-1 with only a few months turnaround. This despite landing in the water, and NASA not certifying (yet) reuse of Dragon 2 for crew missions.

[Steven Pietrobon]

The SpaceX IFA was moved to be after DM-1.  Probable reason was to make sure it used 100% final configuration.

Yes, but it puts the test in the critical path. Any problems that are discovered could significantly delay the first crewed launch of Dragon 2.

[woods170]

Post Soyuz MS-10, how does it make sense for Starliner not to have an in-flight abort test scheduled?  Is there such confidence in the industry that Starliner's abort capability has already been proven in that part of the flight regime?

It makes sense if you want to save money and have confidence in your simulations. As has often been proved in the past though, this could end up being a very bad decision. I'm disappointed that NASA did not make this test mandatory for certification. "Test what you fly and fly what you test."

In fact, NO abort flight tests were mandatory for CCP.


Yes, you read that correctly.


Only computer modeling of the abort capabilities was required (mandatory) by NASA. No abort flight tests required.

The pad-abort test and ascent-abort test for Crew Dragon are voluntary abort flight tests that were added to the CCP contract by SpaceX.

The pad abort test for CST-100 Starliner is a voluntary abort flight test that was added to the CCP contract by Boeing.

[woods170]

The SpaceX IFA was moved to be after DM-1.  Probable reason was to make sure it used 100% final configuration.

To make things more interesting, they are also planning to reuse the Dragon 2 from DM-1 with only a few months turnaround. This despite landing in the water, and NASA not certifying (yet) reuse of Dragon 2 for crew missions.

The Crew Dragon vehicle from DM-1 (which is an unmanned mission) will be reused for the (unmanned) ascent abort test (IFA). There is no need for NASA to certify reuse of Crew Dragon for crew missions because neither mission (DM-1 and IFA) is a crew mission. Certification of Crew Dragon reuse for uncrewed (demo) missions is outside of the scope of the CCP contract.