USAF Certification a possible hindrance to future F9 Development?

[Wigles]

Noting the significant amount of effort that goes into military certification (having been involved in military aircraft certification), this could this lead to either a stagnation of F9 development, or a fork in design's.

Aircraft modifications need to be assessed for their impact on the certification basis, and similarly I expect that modifications which SpaceX may wish to put on F9 in the future could require a costly and lengthy re-certification process. Now minor modifications will probably only require notification to the USAF and an internal assessment of the impact, but for majors there could be a multi-month delay while the modification is individually certified.

This could lead to either a stangation in overall F9 development (acknowledging that maintaining USAF certification would decrease risk & insurance costs for commercial customers) or a fork where the certified rocket doesn't get as rapidly updated as the commercial launcher.

Thoughts?

edit: made the subject less definitive, added word 'possible'.

[Llian Rhydderch]

Noting the significant amount of effort that goes into military certification (having been involved in military aircraft certification), this could this lead to either a stagnation of F9 development, or a fork in design's.

Aircraft modifications need to be assessed for their impact on the certification basis, and similarly I expect that modifications which SpaceX may wish to put on F9 in the future could require a costly and lengthy re-certification process. Now minor modifications will probably only require notification to the USAF and an internal assessment of the impact, but for majors there could be a multi-month delay while the modification is individually certified.

This could lead to either a stangation in overall F9 development (acknowledging that maintaining USAF certification would decrease risk & insurance costs for commercial customers) or a fork where the certified rocket doesn't get as rapidly updated as the commercial launcher.

Thoughts?

It has been argued by many that SpaceX needs to go after every segment of the mid-size to heavy launch market in order to have the sort of volume and launch rate needed to support their low-cost objectives in general and their reusable launch vehicle objectives in particular.  I tend to agree with this.

But your point is a good one.  All actions have a cost, and the cost of SpaceX pursuing US government military "certification" will certainly preclude a number of other courses of action, such as making iterative incremental changes to the design between successive launches for the US military without the Air Force certification bureaucracy getting in their shorts on design, and process, and sufficient verification and validation testing, and sometimes, resolving political issues with important generals and Congressfolk or the Administration.

My sense is that with the largely monopsonistic market that has existed in space launch for decades (for many reasons—reasons that are probably off topic here) with the small exception of the commercial geosynchronous commsat market, SpaceX has to endeavor to sell to that monopsony buyer:  the US government.  And it needs to do so in both the civilian and military sides of the US government space launch purchasing programs, NASA and USAF.

I look at this cost a couple of ways: 

1) it may be advisable^[1] to halt the innovation on the F9 launch system once the USG certifies the F9 for its use.  Move the innovation to other SpaceX launch systems that are not yet tied down by the government process:  FH initially and the MCT launch vehicle.  (It can be argued that by SpaceX modifying the F9 v1.0 design to the F9 v1.1 design, they have got 95%+ of what they want in the rocket, and that little additional innovation is needed in that particular design—so perhaps the cost is not high.  But I can see arguments on the other side of that too—the cost of impeding innovation is larger than is easily seen.)

2) alternatively, SpaceX could fork the design as you pointed out, and lock down a version/model of the F9 for the USG military launches, while allowing some innovation on the other model.  This is contrary to SpaceX design philosophy to this point, and would add significant costs to manufacturing, procurement, launch ops, etc.  But there is no getting around that this alternative is one way of dealing with the cost of the government additional regulation for military launches.

But yes, either way, selling to the military segment of the US launch market does incur costs.

Cheers,
  Llian


[1]—i.e., economically advisable from the point of view of the company.  What potentially deleterious effect this has on F9 technology innovation for the "progress of space launch" to the rest of us would remain, however, an unintended consequence of the regulatory aspects of the USG/USAF processes.  While unfortunate, it won't be the first time a government regulatory process has hampered innovation.

[rst]

This could lead to either a stangation in overall F9 development (acknowledging that maintaining USAF certification would decrease risk & insurance costs for commercial customers) or a fork where the certified rocket doesn't get as rapidly updated as the commercial launcher.

Thoughts?

Question:  we know the certification requirements for the original EELV program were rather less stringent than what's being required of SpaceX to compete for contracts -- in particular, the original EELVs were not required to have three successful launches in the same configuration before a DOD mission.  (The second launch of Delta IV Heavy was an NRO payload, after a first launch with premature engine shutdowns.)

So, is it possible that the DOD will loosen up on the requirements for a commercial launcher once one variant has achieved certification by the full three-launch-and-design-review criteria?

[hrissan]

Elon referred to certification as a "paper excersize".

Is it magic? If you fill lots of forms, the flying machine will not break?

Nowadays in the foreign trade "certification" means "trade war, but without violating WTO rules". Producer from the country A is requested to get certification in country B to sell things there. Producer spends lots of money and year or two, and close to the end the certification requirements change or another different certification is devised.

So is Air Force certification the form of "trade war"? Why the insurance does not work? They have unique birds, so what? They may lose any of them, so should have Plan B anyway.

[Jim]

Question:  we know the certification requirements for the original EELV program were rather less stringent than what's being required of SpaceX to compete for contracts -- in particular, the original EELVs were not required to have three successful launches in the same configuration before a DOD mission.  (The second launch of Delta IV Heavy was an NRO payload, after a first launch with premature engine shutdowns.)

So, is it possible that the DOD will loosen up on the requirements for a commercial launcher once one variant has achieved certification by the full three-launch-and-design-review criteria?

Incorrect, the original EELV's were develop to USAF specs and paid for by the USAF.  The USAF then participated in the development.   

Certification is for vehicles that were not developed by the USAF.
NASA does its a cert for vehicles that were not developed by the it.  Atlas V went through the NASA cert process.

[Kabloona]

Elon referred to certification as a "paper excersize".

Is it magic? If you fill lots of forms, the flying machine will not break?

Nowadays in the foreign trade "certification" means "trade war, but without violating WTO rules". Producer from the country A is requested to get certification in country B to sell things there. Producer spends lots of money and year or two, and close to the end the certification requirements change or another different certification is devised.

So is Air Force certification the form of "trade war"? Why the insurance does not work? They have unique birds, so what? They may lose any of them, so should have Plan B anyway.

No, it's not a form of "trade war." The DoD payloads are extremely expensive and the Air Force is paranoid about losing a $1 billion payload. So they are doing everything they can think of to ensure the launch vehicles they purchase for those missions are reliable. The "certification" process is simply the Air Force going over the design with a fine toothed comb to decide whether it will meet their stringent requirements that they expect will result in high reliability.

As for insurance, the US Government does not buy insurance. They self-insure, which means they just swallow the cost of a lost payload and move on. So if they do lose one, they do have a "Plan B," which is to build another.

[AncientU]

This could lead to either a stangation in overall F9 development (acknowledging that maintaining USAF certification would decrease risk & insurance costs for commercial customers) or a fork where the certified rocket doesn't get as rapidly updated as the commercial launcher.

Thoughts?

Working from the assumption that DoD certification/USG launches are a means to an end, not the end in itself (i.e., a source of revenue, not a Corporate goal):
1) the revenue stream is obviously the largest in the space launch world, so setting up a separate unit to deal with the certification process paperwork and an ongoing stream of change (continuous improvement) documentation after certification, should be relatively easy to fund from this source;
2) there could be significant launch reliability lessons learned by SpaceX as a result of an end-to-end scrub of current design and operations (I would hope) -- this could help long term with hardware and operations reliability;
3) a downside risk could be letting full documentation of the  F9 v1.1 recipe out of Hawthorne -- no patents is SpaceX policy to avoid this -- but we can hope the certification process isn't 'leaky.'

Overall, I don't think stagnation need be too high of risk. The clash of cultures will be very much in the forefront, though.

[Jim]

But your point is a good one.  All actions have a cost, and the cost of SpaceX pursuing US government military "certification" will certainly preclude a number of other courses of action, such as making iterative incremental changes to the design between successive launches for the US military without the Air Force certification bureaucracy getting in their shorts on design, and process, and sufficient verification and validation testing, and sometimes, resolving political issues with important generals and Congressfolk or the Administration.

This is already happening with NASA. F9 is being certified by NASA and any changes have to be vetted by NASA

1) it may be advisable^[1] to halt the innovation on the F9 launch system once the USG certifies the F9 for its use.  Move the innovation to other SpaceX launch systems that are not yet tied down by the government process:  FH initially and the MCT launch vehicle. 

FH is the main vehicle to go after the military market since the F9 captures very few of the missions

While unfortunate, it won't be the first time a government regulatory process has hampered innovation.

Certification is not part of a regulatory process.  It is a procurement process.

[Jim]

3) a downside risk could be letting full documentation of the  F9 v1.1 recipe out of Hawthorne -- no patents is SpaceX policy to avoid this -- but we can hope the certification process isn't 'leaky.'

There is no risk.
a. there isn't anything really advanced
b.  It is ITAR information, and use USG can guard it
c.  It is propriety information, and  USG guards just like the other vehicles' information.

[Lar]

3) a downside risk could be letting full documentation of the  F9 v1.1 recipe out of Hawthorne -- no patents is SpaceX policy to avoid this -- but we can hope the certification process isn't 'leaky.'

If there are 100 people working on something, chances are there will be some minor leakage (at least on the level of people telling their wives little tidbits) unless it's been classified.  That is in no way intended as a slight against the USAF (especially not on Memorial Day!!!), it's just human nature.

While unfortunate, it won't be the first time a government regulatory process has hampered innovation.

Certification is not part of a regulatory process.  It is a procurement process.

Semantics. It's a government process. It would not be the first time a government process hampered ___X___  (where X is any number of desirable things)

[Jim]

Semantics. It's a government process. It would not be the first time a government process hampered ___X___  (where X is any number of desirable things)

Wrong, it is not semantics.  Nobody is forcing SX.   SX does not have to be certified and it doesn't have to fly USAF missions.

[Lar]

Semantics. It's a government process. It would not be the first time a government process hampered ___X___  (where X is any number of desirable things)

Wrong, it is not semantics.  Nobody is forcing SX.   SX does not have to be certified and it doesn't have to fly USAF missions.

True, but not relevant to my point which is simply " It would not be the first time a government process hampered ___X___  (where X is any number of desirable things)"  In this case, X is "save money for the taxpayer" and if the certification process adds needless cost ... QED

(I am sure that you are about to reply that not one cent of cost added is "needless"... save it ... that assertion will never fly)

[ncb1397]

3) a downside risk could be letting full documentation of the  F9 v1.1 recipe out of Hawthorne -- no patents is SpaceX policy to avoid this -- but we can hope the certification process isn't 'leaky.'

There is no risk.
a. there isn't anything really advanced
b.  It is ITAR information, and use USG can guard it
c.  It is propriety information, and  USG guards just like the other vehicles' information.

a.) If there was anything SpaceX wanted to keep secret, you wouldn't necessarily know about it. Their engine seems to be really inexpensive with modern manufacturing techniques(mainly CNC) given that you can do 10 of them on a 56 million dollar mission. Tom Mueller famously built a medium sized engine in his garage before working on Merlin. IMO the engine details would be potentially a place where a competitor would want to replicate technology in order to potentially realize any cost savings and gain competitive advantage. Merlin has also gone through multiple design iterations over many many years which, if you wanted to gain the ability, design information would allow for skipping intermediate steps and going directly to the end-point.

c.)USG doesn't gaurd against USAF personnnel going to work for AJR and taking their brain with lots of information with them. Turn-over at SpaceX is one avenue of SpaceX trade secrets leaking. Design information residing at the Air force as well is simply another avenue that runs in parallel.

[Jim]

a.) If there was anything SpaceX wanted to keep secret, you wouldn't necessarily know about it. Their engine seems to be really inexpensive with modern manufacturing techniques(mainly CNC) given that you can do 10 of them on a 56 million dollar mission. Tom Mueller famously built a medium sized engine in his garage before working on Merlin. IMO the engine details would be potentially a place where a competitor would want to replicate technology in order to potentially realize any cost savings and gain competitive advantage. Merlin has also gone through multiple design iterations over many many years which, if you wanted to gain the ability, design information would allow for skipping intermediate steps and going directly to the end-point.

c.)USG doesn't gaurd against USAF personnnel going to work for AJR and taking their brain with lots of information with them. Turn-over at SpaceX is one avenue of SpaceX trade secrets leaking. Design information residing at the Air force as well is simply another avenue that runs in parallel.

a.  Not true.  If SX wants to be certified, there will be no stone left unturned

c.  Yes, it does.  And it is more than USAF, it is Aerospace Corp and the many support contractors, who have to sign disclosure statements.

And the USAF isn't all the issue, Falcon 9 has been going under NASA cert since the Jason-3 contract award.  NASA and it's contractors have been looking at F9 a lot longer.

Edit/Lar: fixed misattribution

[AncientU]

2) there could be significant launch reliability lessons learned by SpaceX as a result of an end-to-end scrub of current design and operations (I would hope) -- this could help long term with hardware and operations reliability;

On this point, does anyone know if the certification process is designed as a co-operative effort -- maybe like the NASA-SpaceX relationship where (I believe) that SpaceX is gaining from NASA's expertise while the SpaceX systems are being 'vetted' -- or as an adversarial or neutral process?  Co-operative would certainly open possibilities for improved systems and launch flow, while adversarial/neutral would be opportunity lost.

[ncb1397]

a.) If there was anything SpaceX wanted to keep secret, you wouldn't necessarily know about it. Their engine seems to be really inexpensive with modern manufacturing techniques(mainly CNC) given that you can do 10 of them on a 56 million dollar mission. Tom Mueller famously built a medium sized engine in his garage before working on Merlin. IMO the engine details would be potentially a place where a competitor would want to replicate technology in order to potentially realize any cost savings and gain competitive advantage. Merlin has also gone through multiple design iterations over many many years which, if you wanted to gain the ability, design information would allow for skipping intermediate steps and going directly to the end-point.

c.)USG doesn't gaurd against USAF personnnel going to work for AJR and taking their brain with lots of information with them. Turn-over at SpaceX is one avenue of SpaceX trade secrets leaking. Design information residing at the Air force as well is simply another avenue that runs in parallel.

a.  Not true.  If SX wants to be certified, there will be no stone left unturned

c.  Yes, it does.  And it is more than USAF, it is Aerospace Corp and the many support contractors, who have to sign disclosure statements.

And the USAF isn't all the issue, Falcon 9 has been going under NASA cert since the Jason-3 contract award.  NASA and it's contractors have been looking at F9 a lot longer.

a.) I meant you or I personally won't know because we aren't reviewing the design. Or if you do have access to the design, the fact that you state there is nothing "advanced"(like this is some sort of desireable goal) just illustrates how information leaks. I think a simple engine that works would be more desireable than a complex engine as they both do the same thing. Note that the chinese use a locally copied version of the AK-47 called the Type 56 Assault Rifle and not an M-16 derived design.

c.) NDAs don't stop former USAF employees working for SpaceX competitors from using information personally retained during certification in their internal calculus.

[Llian Rhydderch]

Semantics. It's a government process. It would not be the first time a government process hampered ___X___  (where X is any number of desirable things)

Wrong, it is not semantics.  Nobody is forcing SX.   SX does not have to be certified and it doesn't have to fly USAF missions.

Wrong.  The government has the monopsopy on the military market.  So it is a state regulated market.  Noone can enter the market unless the comply with the (wise or unwise, good or bad, ...) regulatory process to compete in that market. 

That was my point.

And those regulations will tend to both slow innovation, and increase cost to anyone who wants to sell into that market.

[oldAtlas_Eguy]

Yes, the process has a tendancy to freeze vehicle configuration if your only market was the government. But SpaceX has other non-government customers that new configurations can fly and be used to then certify them to the governemnt.  Eventually the certification process will be just a paper exercise without meaning as vehicle inovation increases basic reliabilty way beyond that being sought by the AF.

Other pradigram inovations in operations may also greatly change the landscape.  Use of an on-orbit final checkout and repair facility in LEO and possibly even in GEO will make the "shippment" of payloads in common containers to orbit the way its done.  No more launch services just shippment contracts.

An aside its not the AF personnel doing the certification engineering review but Aerospace Corporation.  I found that Aerospace Corporation was very resistive to anything not done before as a official stance but individuals inside AC were vere progressive but they work in a represive corporate culture environment.

The really sad part is that inovative engineering, processes, and manufacturing have only experts inside the entity that is doing the new.  AC is giving "expert" opinions to the AF about these for which it has only a novice level of understanding.

[Coastal Ron]

a.) If there was anything SpaceX wanted to keep secret, you wouldn't necessarily know about it. Their engine seems to be really inexpensive with modern manufacturing techniques(mainly CNC)...

Just wanted to point out that CNC has been around for decades (1st generation CNC used paper tape), so advocating that it is "modern" is a misnomer.  Even friction-stir welding (FSW) is no longer "new", just yet another manufacturing technique that is now proven and well understood.

For the Merlin I would say that it is a number of factors that contribute to the overall cost advantage it brings.  The first is the design (i.e. pintle type), including it's size and lack of overall complexity when compared to much larger engines.  That then requires parts that are smaller in size and easier to manufacture in-house with affordable machinery.  SpaceX is supposedly also using 3-D manufactured parts, which again would only be possible for smaller designs at this point.

So overall it's really because SpaceX decided to use a cluster of smaller engines, instead of one large engine, that drove their ability to reduce the $/lb of thrust per launcher.

And not much of that is a secret.  Merlin type pintle engines were perfected decades ago, and SpaceX has not likely created any new manufacturing techniques.

Likely the only way someone can duplicate what SpaceX is doing is to essentially start from scratch, which means building a new Falcon 9 class rocket - and everyone else in the world has already locked in their design choices for their current generation of launchers, so until someone decides to build a brand new rocket we are unlikely to see someone else try to duplicate what SpaceX has done.

My $0.02

[rcoppola]

The certification process may not halt further innovations or iterative improvements. Post certification, the AF will have an intimate understanding of every aspect from design, production and operations. And in so having, they will be in an ideal position to understand and approve further system improvements or ask that the improvements be flown on another non-AF mission first to validate.

Now, the real concern becomes, if SpaceX will need to lock down the current Falcon 9v1.1 while rolling in enhancements to another line used to support fully commercial launches.

I am fully aware and in agreement with many of the concerns posted, however, the AF is not a typical USG, civil service bureaucracy. Many of these people have state-of-the-art training and are wickedly smart. We may be very surprised how the introduction of SpaceX into this process will begin to alter both themselves and the AF into an amazing partnership where each learns from the other. It's going to take some time for this to happen.

It's all about risk tolerance, of which the AF has little wrt their payloads and I don't blame them one bit. Personally, I think a mash-up of SpaceX and the AF will be great. They can both learn something from the other and they will.

[savuporo]

2) alternatively, SpaceX could fork the design as you pointed out, and lock down a version/model of the F9 for the USG military launches, while allowing some innovation on the other model.  ....

I'd just like to point out that this will have very far reaching effects, including factory equipment, ground systems and potentially pads. Can get super expensive.

[Hauerg]

Isn't the AF used to "superexpensive"?
 

[Lar]

The point of having SpaceX compete is to lower costs to the taxpayer. So "superexpensive" isn't good. If SpaceX has to fork that would be bad, IMHO. It's not exactly the same as forking a software project, which is bad enough, it's far worse.

[RocketGoBoom]

Likely the only way someone can duplicate what SpaceX is doing is to essentially start from scratch, which means building a new Falcon 9 class rocket - and everyone else in the world has already locked in their design choices for their current generation of launchers, so until someone decides to build a brand new rocket we are unlikely to see someone else try to duplicate what SpaceX has done.

My $0.02

Excellent point. Real innovation is going to come from new players. I don't expect Ariane, ULA, Orbital Sciences or the Russians to be drivers of innovation on the same level as SpaceX. I have worked in large corporations and I really don't see an established corporate culture ever doing what SpaceX is doing. They are often too conservative to take that type of "bet the company" risk.

It will take another billionaire who is willing to self fund a new company in the early stages for us to see this again.

As to how this all plays into F9 development and USAF certification, I think SpaceX will rise or fall based on their results. If a new improvement in their commercial version of the F9R is working consistently, then after a certain number of launches there needs to be a process where the USAF just accepts it as valid for USG launches also. Not a full blown recertification...

The USAF won't be the first customer to fly a used 1st stage. But I bet it will happen within 5 years of a commercial customer doing it.

[Jcc]

Two points: as I understand it, Atlas V and Delta IV have not been frozen in time since the first EELV launch, they have been incrementally improved, and furthermore there are a number of configurations of each with SRBs, DIVH. Possibly the latest improvements are related to human rating the Atlas V, and installing a common avionics package between the two launchers.

At the same time, I think SpaceX is about ready to keep the F9 design more or less static. They still have some bugs to work out (what's with the He pressurization system?), and according to them, the hardware for reusability is in place, they mainly need to refine the software. So, being locked into to a more gradual upgrade pace for F9, would be the best thing that can happen to them.

[Jim]

On this point, does anyone know if the certification process is designed as a co-operative effort -- maybe like the NASA-SpaceX relationship where (I believe) that SpaceX is gaining from NASA's expertise while the SpaceX systems are being 'vetted' -- or as an adversarial or neutral process?  Co-operative would certainly open possibilities for improved systems and launch flow, while adversarial/neutral would be opportunity lost.

It is neutral like NASA's. 

[savuporo]

Two points: as I understand it, Atlas V and Delta IV have not been frozen in time since the first EELV launch, they have been incrementally improved..

And as has been pointed out multiple times, each and every change undergoes a continuous review by the customer, effectively constituting a "continuous certification" process or delta certification or whatever - incurring overhead.

[Jim]

Wrong.  The government has the monopsopy on the military market.  So it is a state regulated market.  Noone can enter the market unless the comply with the (wise or unwise, good or bad, ...) regulatory process to compete in that market. 

That was my point.

And those regulations will tend to both slow innovation, and increase cost to anyone who wants to sell into that market.

Wrong again.  It is a vendor qualification program and not a regulatory process. 

[Jim]

I am fully aware and in agreement with many of the concerns posted, however, the AF is not a typical USG, civil service bureaucracy. Many of these people have state-of-the-art training and are wickedly smart. We may be very surprised how the introduction of SpaceX into this process will begin to alter both themselves and the AF into an amazing partnership where each learns from the other. It's going to take some time for this to happen.

Wrong, the USAF is young officers who rely on the Aerospace Corp and other contractors for advice.  There is no "state-of-the-art training" when it comes to space systems, OJT is where everything is learned.

[john smith 19]

Wrong, it is not semantics.  Nobody is forcing SX.   SX does not have to be certified and it doesn't have to fly USAF missions.

Insofar as it regulates who is allowed access to a government controlled market (which is AFAIK the biggest one in Spacex's home country) I'd call it a "regulation".

If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck....

[Jim]

Wrong, it is not semantics.  Nobody is forcing SX.   SX does not have to be certified and it doesn't have to fly USAF missions.

Insofar as it regulates who is allowed access to a government controlled market (which is AFAIK the biggest one in Spacex's home country) I'd call it a "regulation".

If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck....

Looks like vendor qual to me.  No different than any other time the military uses an alternative source.

[john smith 19]

Yes, the process has a tendancy to freeze vehicle configuration if your only market was the government. But SpaceX has other non-government customers that new configurations can fly and be used to then certify them to the governemnt.  Eventually the certification process will be just a paper exercise without meaning as vehicle inovation increases basic reliabilty way beyond that being sought by the AF.

I was wondering at this strategy. Incremental changes on every commercial launch (within reason) then once a bunch of changes have been proved out do a "block upgrade" to the DoD version, all at once.

[savuporo]

I was wondering at this strategy. Incremental changes on every commercial launch (within reason) then once a bunch of changes have been proved out do a "block upgrade" to the DoD version, all at once.

The problem with this approach is, that the entire process above all needs dedicated personnel to spend their working hours on it ( that's obviously where the cost comes from ).
You don't hire a bunch of people to deal with this process, have them work for couple of months and then twiddle their thumbs until there is a next round coming up.

[john smith 19]

Just wanted to point out that CNC has been around for decades (1st generation CNC used paper tape), so advocating that it is "modern" is a misnomer.  Even friction-stir welding (FSW) is no longer "new", just yet another manufacturing technique that is now proven and well understood.

True. In fact IIRC explosive forming was considered for the tank ends of either the Saturn 1c or the Saturn V.

But LV mfg is a very conservative process. I think FSW will be the SoA approach for future LV's.

[R7]

Incremental changes on every commercial launch (within reason) then once a bunch of changes have been proved out do a "block upgrade" to the DoD version, all at once.

Who says the commercial customers (and their insurers) like being paying crash test dummies on every flight? Why wouldn't they opt for certified, stable and proven version too?

[Jim]

I think FSW will be the SoA approach for future LV's.

Already is for US vehicles.  Delta IV first used it. 

[Jim]

Who says the commercial customers (and their insurers) like being paying crash test dummies on every flight? Why wouldn't they opt for certified, stable and proven version too?

They paid for insurance.

[Jcc]

Two points: as I understand it, Atlas V and Delta IV have not been frozen in time since the first EELV launch, they have been incrementally improved..

And as has been pointed out multiple times, each and every change undergoes a continuous review by the customer, effectively constituting a "continuous certification" process or delta certification or whatever - incurring overhead.

Sure, it incurs overhead, but probably the cost for SpaceX to do it is less than for some other companies. At least, that is what we are led to believe. Besides, having a thorough review of the systems for certification will probably enhance their reliability. I am sure that NASA reviews helped them a great deal to build a launcher with zero primary mission failures after losing 3 out of 4 F1s.

[Jim]

I am sure that NASA reviews helped them a great deal to build a launcher with zero primary mission failures after losing 3 out of 4 F1s.

Not really.   NASA doesn't tell them how to design or fix their vehicles.  NASA just needs to know how the vehicle works.

[Jcc]

I am sure that NASA reviews helped them a great deal to build a launcher with zero primary mission failures after losing 3 out of 4 F1s.

Not really.   NASA doesn't tell them how to design or fix their vehicles.  NASA just needs to know how the vehicle works.

Yes, but in the process of describing how it works, with the level of detail that NASA required of them, it would have helped them think through the details better. I think I remember Gwynn Shotwell saying something to that effect.

[Lar]

Yes, but in the process of describing how it works, with the level of detail that NASA required of them, it would have helped them think through the details better. I think I remember Gwynn Shotwell saying something to that effect.

^this

The best way to understand something is to try to explain it.
The best way to learn something is to try to teach it.

In the software world, explaining how your code works (in a formal code review before it gets promoted) often uncovers some very subtle bugs. So ya, I would expect there is some benefit from the process. As long as it's not adversarial and not overly bureaucratic.

[savuporo]

In the software world, explaining how your code works (in a formal code review before it gets promoted) often uncovers some very subtle bugs. So ya, I would expect there is some benefit from the process. As long as it's not adversarial and not overly bureaucratic.

There are almost always benefits, i have been on both sides of various hardware cert programs ( not aerospace ) including helping creating one - yes it always adds extra costs and can get bureaucratic, but it also does help both sides.
Certifications can take multiple forms - compliance, quality, safety etc and sometimes they are separate tracks, sometimes bundled programs. Mass volume product certification programs are usually simple pass/fail and whoever does the certification tends to be pretty rigid - you either pass or fail, and that's the end of it until you come back with fixes.
If you are talking "certification" where you have a very few products ever being certified, the programs tend to be much more flexible and cert criteria often evolves in lockstep with the products themselves - so both sides benefit.

[Llian Rhydderch]

2) alternatively, SpaceX could fork the design as you pointed out, and lock down a version/model of the F9 for the USG military launches, while allowing some innovation on the other model.  ....

I'd just like to point out that this will have very far reaching effects, including factory equipment, ground systems and potentially pads. Can get super expensive.

Agreed.  That was the "cost" of this option that I spoke about.  So while their are high costs of less innovation and certification costs to stay with the business-as-usual military procurement model, and slow down the movement of technology innovation into non-government market launches, there are, as you note, also high costs of maintaining two processes in production capital equipment and ground systems/pad and the people who run them if SpaceX were to fork the design and maintain an older technology (but ostensibly more stable) military model launcher separate from the an iteratively improving launcher SpaceX is innovating on for non-military launches.

[RocketmanUS]

I am sure that NASA reviews helped them a great deal to build a launcher with zero primary mission failures after losing 3 out of 4 F1s.

Not really.   NASA doesn't tell them how to design or fix their vehicles.  NASA just needs to know how the vehicle works.

What do you mean, how it works?
How the engine works or how it performs?
Rocket vibrations, sound, thermal, ect. ?
Does this include details of every aspect of the vehicle or just how the payload will ride to orbit?

I know the specs for a truck and how the driver and payload will ride on it but don't know how the truck works ( for example ).


Fork production-
Stop an evolution of the F9 and certify it for USAF and have a production line for it.
For other customers have a second line that continues to evolve.
At some point certify a new version of the F9 that has evolved for USAF ( such as full RLV, not just 1st stage  for example ). I would expect the evolution line to be the less production line ( experimental ) and the USAF version to be the work horse for most customer flights.

[AncientU]

Fork production-
Stop an evolution of the F9 and certify it for USAF and have a production line for it.
For other customers have a second line that continues to evolve.
At some point certify a new version of the F9 that has evolved for USAF ( such as full RLV, not just 1st stage  for example ). I would expect the evolution line to be the less production line ( experimental ) and the USAF version to be the work horse for most customer flights.

Don't think this is best path.
1) increases costs, probably lot more than keeping running certification on upgrades
2) upgrades, if/when needed, must be flown on USAF launches to keep reliability improving

If F9/FH are going to fly crew safely, they will be reliable enough for USAF.  Systems that are developed for USAF-specific payloads can be custom built and certified to USAF needs.

[oldAtlas_Eguy]

After thinking about it: the certification process for changes/alterations/upgrades to the LV is written into the Launch Services contract as directions/clauses and data deliverables.  So Some of the price increase for AF launches is the costing for these items over the duration between the contract signing and the actual launch.

This I saw as boilerplate clause and datadeliverables even back in 1980 for Atlas E/F contracts.

The certification process never stops. It is just much more low key than the original certifcation prior to the first contract award.

[R7]

Why wouldn't they [commercial customers] opt for certified, stable and proven version too?

They paid for insurance.

Surely insurance fees would be higher for first flights of any new mods than frozen design with longer flight history?

I'm assuming here that flight on frozen design would not cost substantially more (shouldn't a longer production run do the reverse) for commercial customers than flight on latest mod. Elon's "it's been a paper exercise" comment seems to suggest that they are already building the vehicles in ways compliant with certification.

[john smith 19]

Surely insurance fees would be higher for first flights of any new mods than frozen design with longer flight history?

Not necessarily. Keep in mind how those Spacex tests have been done. They are done after stage or payload separation.

I'm assuming here that flight on frozen design would not cost substantially more (shouldn't a longer production run do the reverse) for commercial customers than flight on latest mod. Elon's "it's been a paper exercise" comment seems to suggest that they are already building the vehicles in ways compliant with certification.

It's the "opportunity cost" of not being able to conduct live flight tests and feeding those improvements (or the fact some changes don't work

AFAIK F9 was designed from day 1 to be EELV compliant. Certification if really for the USAF to confirm  that it has been designed to do that. 

[Jcc]

So what major changes does F9v1.1 need, now that it has legs? I suppose making the second stage reusable, if ever. They would probably need to recertify for that. They certainly will not convert to methane engines, change the core diameter or any other disruptive change. No point in it.

[TrevorMonty]

So what major changes does F9v1.1 need, now that it has legs? I suppose making the second stage reusable, if ever. They would probably need to recertify for that. They certainly will not convert to methane engines, change the core diameter or any other disruptive change. No point in it.

I think there will be two 2nd stage versions, an expendable ( current version) plus a new reusable. That being case they can use current ( certified)  expendable for DOD missions.

[beancounter]

I don't think that Elon wants two streams for the F9.  He's pushing for self-certification which is what he currently has for his commercial launches I think!?
Cheers.

[Lar]

I don't think that Elon wants two streams for the F9.  He's pushing for self-certification which is what he currently has for his commercial launches I think!?
Cheers.

Wait, is he *actually* pushing for self certification, or is that just what his critics are claiming he is wanting?

[Joffan]

I don't think that Elon wants two streams for the F9.  He's pushing for self-certification which is what he currently has for his commercial launches I think!?
Cheers.

Wait, is he *actually* pushing for self certification, or is that just what his critics are claiming he is wanting?

The latter. The phrase was used by an anonymous critic of SpaceX, in the Aviation Week article that Chris rightly decided he didn't wish to host debate on.

[john smith 19]

The latter. The phrase was used by an anonymous critic of SpaceX, in the Aviation Week article that Chris rightly decided he didn't wish to host debate on.

Good point.

AFAIK Spacex are well into the EELV certification. They seem to be happy to do it. If they were really serious about not doing it I don't think they would have got this far without a much louder level of protest.

Speaking to the thread's title. Yes I think it will. How big a hindrance will depend on the USAF's attitude and willingness to update their certification as Space identify improvements and put them into F9 or F9R and the USAF is left behind.

[Wigles]

The latter. The phrase was used by an anonymous critic of SpaceX, in the Aviation Week article that Chris rightly decided he didn't wish to host debate on.

Good point.

AFAIK Spacex are well into the EELV certification. They seem to be happy to do it. If they were really serious about not doing it I don't think they would have got this far without a much louder level of protest.

Of course they are "happy" to do it, not getting EELV certification excludes themselves from what could be potentially 70-80% of the launches which SpaceX may be in a position to compete for (depending on outcome of block buy challenge).

I don't think that Elon wants two streams for the F9.  He's pushing for self-certification which is what he currently has for his commercial launches I think!?
Cheers.

Wait, is he *actually* pushing for self certification, or is that just what his critics are claiming he is wanting?

I agree with beancounter, I don't believe that he would want to have 2 versions. By putting all the major design changes in place now for the certification flights (eg legs) even if he is not using them currently (eg legs) means that the delta-certification requirement is much lower as there will be less design evolution.

Also, I didn't mean to imply that the certification or requirement for re-certification for changes would imply a design freeze. What I mean is that the timeline to incorporate a change will be increased as the certification assessment will have to happen after the design is complete but prior to flight on a revenue launch. This increased cost to incorporate modifications could tip the scales on borderline cost-benefit analysis which on average would lead to less incremental development and larger "block" upgrades.

As a bonus. If the FH core and boosters remain largely similar to the certified FH 1st stage, it makes FH certification much easier.

[Jim]

As a bonus. If the FH core and boosters remain largely similar to the certified FH 1st stage, it makes FH certification much easier.

The boosters aren't

[Jim]

Certification is not just of the hardware but of the integration processes.
Also, there are changes to the vehicle going on all the time.

[Wigles]

As a bonus. If the FH core and boosters remain largely similar to the certified FH 1st stage, it makes FH certification much easier.

The boosters aren't

They arent 100% the same but subsystems would be very similar, eg the engines are the same, the octoweb engine assembly would be 99% the same (except for crossfeed) the construction and testing and QA processes are the same, the internal piping would be largely similar.

Major differences would be the length, load paths, vibration & fatigue assessments, etc. still a body of work to do but less than starting from scratch.

[Jim]

As a bonus. If the FH core and boosters remain largely similar to the certified FH 1st stage, it makes FH certification much easier.

The boosters aren't

They arent 100% the same but subsystems would be very similar, eg the engines are the same, the octoweb engine assembly would be 99% the same (except for crossfeed) the construction and testing and QA processes are the same, the internal piping would be largely similar.

Major differences would be the length, load paths, vibration & fatigue assessments, etc. still a body of work to do but less than starting from scratch.

which I would say excludes the term " largely similar ".  That is why NASA and USAF treat the vehicle as a separate one for cert purposes.

[Owlon]

which I would say excludes the term " largely similar ".  That is why NASA and USAF treat the vehicle as a separate one for cert purposes.

We're just arguing semantics here. Many people would acknowledge those differences and still call them largely similar, I'm sure, but we call all definitely agree they're not identical to the core and that FH will need a not insignificant amount of work to be certified.

[Wigles]

As a bonus. If the FH core and boosters remain largely similar to the certified FH 1st stage, it makes FH certification much easier.

The boosters aren't

They arent 100% the same but subsystems would be very similar, eg the engines are the same, the octoweb engine assembly would be 99% the same (except for crossfeed) the construction and testing and QA processes are the same, the internal piping would be largely similar.

Major differences would be the length, load paths, vibration & fatigue assessments, etc. still a body of work to do but less than starting from scratch.

which I would say excludes the term " largely similar ".  That is why NASA and USAF treat the vehicle as a separate one for cert purposes.

"Largely" was a deliberately loose term. As I said in the OP, I am not familiar with space launcher certification, but I am familiar with USAF and USN military aircraft certification and in that case we leverage off previous certifications as much as possible. If an element of the certification can be demonstrated through "recognition of prior acceptance" then that is the most efficient way to move forward because you dont need to do a first principles assessment and can usually avoid further testing. Only a CRE (Configuration, Role & Environment) assessment is required to determine if the original assessment remains valid.

Seperate vehicles can still have interelated certifications. As an example each new variant of the 737 is a supplimentary type certificate on top of the basic 737 certification, even the 2012 180 seat 737 Max is an STC to the original 80 seat 737 Type Certificate.

For military derivatives of commercial aircraft, we don't re-certify the parts of the aircraft which are not affected by the modification.

Certificaiton of the F9 seems to require 3x flights in a "stable" configuration + 100 people over more than 12 months worth of assessment. I bet FH will only require a single flight and much less time to certify.

[Jim]

I bet FH will only require a single flight and much less time to certify.

It will require 3

[Jim]

Certification is not just of the hardware but of the integration processes.
Also, there are changes to the vehicle going on all the time.

Jim;
A)Based upon your experience with aircraft, would USAF approval of launch vehicle specific EELV Engineering Change Requests and Engineering Change Orders (ECR/ECO) slow development, or does it have a QA benefit in adding a means of identifying systemic negative potentials for proposed changes?
B) Does the USAF external design review and approval process highlight areas for possible improvement in dependent systems?

My experience isn't with aircraft but with launch vehicles and I have been involved with cert before.    A baseline vehicle is established and certified and the changes are individually looked at.   I will look at trigger thresholds.

Here is it.  Any component or subsystem that undergoes a change in qualification status or is a first flight item or first use.

[Prober]

Certification is not just of the hardware but of the integration processes.
Also, there are changes to the vehicle going on all the time.

Changes in suppliers
Going from standard aerospace suppliers to SpaceX internal manufacture

[Jim]

Changes in suppliers
Going from standard aerospace suppliers to SpaceX internal manufacture

That isn't applicable, since Spacex has been doing that from Day 1 for the whole vehicle, hence there is no change in vendor.

[newpylong]

If they want to be certified they can stop complaining about how the process is long winded, expensive, and unnecessary and either let it occur or not go after the launches, simple.

[AncientU]

If they want to be certified they can stop complaining about how the process is long winded, expensive, and unnecessary and either let it occur or not go after the launches, simple.

Right.  No one should ever question a review process that costs more than the rocket being examined... especially if it has been long-established and proven.  No one should be so bold as to 'suggest' that this process is less-than-perfect.

[john smith 19]

Seperate vehicles can still have interelated certifications. As an example each new variant of the 737 is a supplimentary type certificate on top of the basic 737 certification, even the 2012 180 seat 737 Max is an STC to the original 80 seat 737 Type Certificate.

I find that pretty amazing given the hoops Spacex are being made to jump through. 

For military derivatives of commercial aircraft, we don't re-certify the parts of the aircraft which are not affected by the modification.

Certificaiton of the F9 seems to require 3x flights in a "stable" configuration + 100 people over more than 12 months worth of assessment. I bet FH will only require a single flight and much less time to certify.

I bet FH will only require a single flight and much less time to certify.

It will require 3

This is very intriguing. The deep way aircraft and LV certification differ and any intuition you may have with aircraft simply does not apply for USAF LV rules.   

I still find it pretty amazing also that an Atlas V can have 0-5 SRB's strapped around it (and 1 or 2 RL 10's on the Centaur) but only one configuration needs to be analyzed because "The USAF were deeply involved in the design and funding."

It also seems the USAF don't recognize the idea of "grandfathering" provisions (for LV's) where an existing section's performance is taken as read. This is somewhat ironic given an Atlas V is just like an Atlas III except for the tank construction materials and tank design, and the engine. IOW it's a totally different vehicle with a similar name yet somehow is expected to have the same reliability from day 1. 

I agree FH booster stages will be different from F9 booster stages but I suspect (unlike Boeing) Spacex will make all F9 booster, FH core and FH booster stages as nearly identical as possible, with most changes localized to the top end of the stage so they only "customize" the stage to F9, FH core or FH booster at the last possible moment.

Wheather that buys them an easier certification process only time will tell. 

[Will]

If they want to be certified they can stop complaining about how the process is long winded, expensive, and unnecessary and either let it occur or not go after the launches, simple.

Right.  No one should ever question a review process that costs more than the rocket being examined... especially if it has been long-established and proven.  No one should be so bold as to 'suggest' that this process is less-than-perfect.

The price of the rocket is much less relevant than the cost of the intended payloads. And four flights of the current Falcon version is not actually a lot if you want to fly very valuable payloads.

[Jim]

I find that pretty amazing given the hoops Spacex are being made to jump through. 

What hoops?  Most of the work is on the USAF side

[Jim]

I agree FH booster stages will be different from F9 booster stages but I suspect (unlike Boeing) Spacex will make all F9 booster, FH core and FH booster stages as nearly identical as possible, with most changes localized to the top end of the stage so they only "customize" the stage to F9, FH core or FH booster at the last possible moment.

Can't if all the TSM's or equivalents are one side of the erector, the side boosters will be mirror images

[Jim]

I still find it pretty amazing also that an Atlas V can have 0-5 SRB's strapped around it (and 1 or 2 RL 10's on the Centaur) but only one configuration needs to be analyzed because "The USAF were deeply involved in the design and funding."

The USAF was involved in the launch vehicle system development.  There was it said that they focused on one configuration?

Anyways, read NASA's
 Launch Services Risk Mitigation Policy for NASA-Owned and/or NASA-Sponsored Payloads/Missions - NPD 8610.7D

This is what NASA's take is on vehicle configurations.

 "A "common launch vehicle configuration" is a unique combination of core propulsive stages, excluding strap-on rocket motors and stages utilized explicitly for orbit escape or trim"

[Jim]

It also seems the USAF don't recognize the idea of "grandfathering" provisions (for LV's) where an existing section's performance is taken as read. This is somewhat ironic given an Atlas V is just like an Atlas III except for the tank construction materials and tank design, and the engine. IOW it's a totally different vehicle with a similar name yet somehow is expected to have the same reliability from day 1. 

The USAF never bought an Atlas III. 

[Jim]

People don't understand.  It is not just the vehicle that is being certified but the organization and its processes.

[john smith 19]

People don't understand.  It is not just the vehicle that is being certified but the organization and its processes.

So it's like a USAF specific version of ISO 9001 but for LV mfg and launch services provision?

Which Spacex is certified to already.

[OnWithTheShow]

The USAF was involved in the launch vehicle system development.  There was it said that they focused on one configuration?

You said it yourself in the "Elon wants to self certify" thread....

not required, the USAF paid for and participated in the development of the Atlas V and Delta IV, hence no need for certification.   

When it comes to certification, only the common core matters.  The number of strap on SRM's, third stages or PLF sizes does not play into it.

So only two variants of Atlas V were needed to be certified by NASA, the 4XX and 5XX series.  This is due to the encapsulation of the Centaur by the 5m fairing which induces different load paths.

[Jim]

You said it yourself in the "Elon wants to self certify" thread....

I said that what NASA did.

[Joffan]

People don't understand.  It is not just the vehicle that is being certified but the organization and its processes.

...which is reasonable enough. So presumably when the Falcon Heavy goes for certification, the process will be easier and quicker because SpaceX is already (at that point) a certified organization. How much might that affect the effort/cost of certification?

[john smith 19]

And again, stop with the nonsense, it is not regulatory.  It is a vendor qualification process.  SX can launch all the rockets it wants without going through this process

The supply of LV's and launch services to the USG for NSS missions is a highly regulated market (by the customer in this case) and any entry to this market requires supplier "certification."

IOW "Vendor qualification" is both a "vendor qualification" and a regulatory hurdle, because no customer outside the USG requires it. They just look at the price and the track record.

You seem to have trouble accepting this.

[Lar]

"You're wrong"
"no YOU are wrong"
"no you"

BORING, peeps. Lots of posts got circular filed just now, and not even by me.

[arachnitect]

IOW "Vendor qualification" is both a "vendor qualification" and a regulatory hurdle, because no customer outside the USG requires it. They just look at the price and the track record.

You seem to have trouble accepting this.

Non government customers aren't required to take the lowest bid.

If someone who has never been up a ladder gave you a great price on a new roof you'd tell them to take a hike.

To avoid the same problem the government has to have written down somewhere "prospective contractors must provide proof of previous satisfactory roofing experience, defined as the following... (etc etc)."

You can argue about the specifics of vendor qual (in this case LV certification) but there's a reason it exists and it's not going away. It's more stringent in fields like launch services because no one is going to put up a performance bond for a $2B rocket and payload.

[Vultur]

So what major changes does F9v1.1 need, now that it has legs? I suppose making the second stage reusable, if ever. They would probably need to recertify for that. They certainly will not convert to methane engines, change the core diameter or any other disruptive change. No point in it.

Second stage, yes... but that may be several changes as they try to make it work.

[john smith 19]

Non government customers aren't required to take the lowest bid.

True, but they probably will if the supplier has a reasonable track record.

If someone who has never been up a ladder gave you a great price on a new roof you'd tell them to take a hike.

To avoid the same problem the government has to have written down somewhere "prospective contractors must provide proof of previous satisfactory roofing experience, defined as the following... (etc etc)."

Except that's not all that "vendor qualification" is for the USG, is it? Going with your roofing contractor analogy you wouldn't just visit previous customers. You'd check who they bought their materials from, who trained them, who their staff were trained by etc.

You can argue about the specifics of vendor qual (in this case LV certification) but there's a reason it exists and it's not going away. It's more stringent in fields like launch services because no one is going to put up a performance bond for a $2B rocket and payload.

And yet there is a launch vehicle insurance market. It's just the USG chooses not to use it. Ariane 5 has delivered as good a track record at much less cost without any of its major customers (except CNES payloads) having any deep insight into how it was designed or built.

What fascinates me is that F9 has passed NASA's human rating. Given the exceptionally high value placed on human life in the US I find if astonishing that is still not enough. 

[Llian Rhydderch]

And yet there is a launch vehicle insurance market. It's just the USG chooses not to use it. Ariane 5 has delivered as good a track record at much less cost without any of its major customers (except CNES payloads) having any deep insight into how it was designed or built.

What fascinates me is that F9 has passed NASA's human rating. Given the exceptionally high value placed on human life in the US I find if astonishing that is still not enough. 

Cost is definitely increased by these regulatory certification requirements, while innovation of new ways of doing things will be slowed by the ongoing/continued need to certify with USAF each innovation/change in the design of the launch vehicle.

Indeed, that is an odd outcome...; until you think about the political economic implications of the thing.  It works very well for a goodly number of the individuals who are the economic decision makers in these matters.  For them the incentives can be quite reversed from the incentives for the taxpaying public. 

The higher cost is not a bug, it is a feature for the execs at any government contractor doing business-as-usual through standard USG procurement practices; and it is a feature to the companies hired to do the multi-million dollar certification exercise; and as we've discussed many times on these fora, it is a feature to various political actors who endavors to bring jobs and companies to their districts states and then use that as part of their claim as to why they ought to be reelected.  And although the engineers working at the the BAU contractors may not benefit as much, and indeed by harmed by the relatively slower pace of technology innovation, the higher costs processes may also be seen as a boon to the large number of personnel who are involved to provide many of the data/paperwork to support the extensive certification project. 

So not nearly as astonishing when you look at the various roles played by folks involved in the process, and the costs and benefits to them rather than merely looking at the program as a whole.

[Jim]

What fascinates me is that F9 has passed NASA's human rating.

Incorrect.  NASA has not performed such a certification.  That is only a SX claim

[Jim]

The higher cost is not a bug, it is a feature for the execs at any government contractor doing business-as-usual through standard USG procurement practices; and it is a feature to the companies hired to do the multi-million dollar certification exercise; and as we've discussed many times on these fora, it is a feature to various political actors who endavors to bring jobs and companies to their districts states and then use that as part of their claim as to why they ought to be reelected. 

Nonsense, there is no local politics involved with LV cert.

[Jim]

Cost is definitely increased by these regulatory certification requirements, while innovation of new ways of doing things will be slowed by the ongoing/continued need to certify with USAF each innovation/change in the design of the launch vehicle.

Indeed, that is an odd outcome...; until you think about the political economic implications of the thing.  It works very well for a goodly number of the individuals who are the economic decision makers in these matters.  For them the incentives can be quite reversed from the incentives for the taxpaying public. 

The higher cost is not a bug, it is a feature for the execs at any government contractor doing business-as-usual through standard USG procurement practices; and it is a feature to the companies hired to do the multi-million dollar certification exercise; and as we've discussed many times on these fora, it is a feature to various political actors who endavors to bring jobs and companies to their districts states and then use that as part of their claim as to why they ought to be reelected.  And although the engineers working at the the BAU contractors may not benefit as much, and indeed by harmed by the relatively slower pace of technology innovation, the higher costs processes may also be seen as a boon to the large number of personnel who are involved to provide many of the data/paperwork to support the extensive certification project. 

So not nearly as astonishing when you look at the various roles played by folks involved in the process, and the costs and benefits to them rather than merely looking at the program as a whole.

Completely unsubstantiated.  You have no insight to make such claims.  100% opinion and no facts

[Jim]

Ariane 5 has delivered as good a track record at much less cost without any of its major customers (except CNES payloads) having any deep insight into how it was designed or built.

Not true.  Ariane is subsidized and so the "less costs' is unquantified.

[kirghizstan]

What fascinates me is that F9 has passed NASA's human rating.

Incorrect.  NASA has not performed such a certification.  That is only a SX claim

Has SpaceX claimed that?  I do not remember them saying they passed NASA's human rating.

[Jim]

Has SpaceX claimed that?  I do not remember them saying they passed NASA's human rating.

The claim is that they designed to the NASA standards

[neoforce]

Has SpaceX claimed that?  I do not remember them saying they passed NASA's human rating.

The claim is that they designed to the NASA standards

kirghizstan and Jim are both correct.  I don't think spacex has ever said they "passed" NASA's human rating, but they talk all the time that they are designing to do so.  Many examples of that, some posted here:

From http://www.spacex.com/falcon9:

Falcon 9, along with the Dragon spacecraft, was designed from the outset to deliver humans into space and under an agreement with NASA, SpaceX is actively working toward that goal.

from http://www.spacex.com/falcon-heavy

Falcon Heavy was designed from the outset to carry humans into space and restores the possibility of flying missions with crew to the Moon or Mars.

from http://shitelonsays.com/transcript/singapore-satellite-industry-forum-2013-opening-keynote-gwynne-shotwell-2013-06-23:

We do wanna turn the Dragon capsule into a crew rated capsule.

from http://shitelonsays.com/transcript/spacex-next-falcon-heavy-press-conference-2011-04-05

the Falcon Heavy is also designed to meet the NASA human rating standards.

[oldAtlas_Eguy]

Basicly the fact that there are no proposed F9 changes for it to meet the CC requirements means that its design was to Human flight or better safety standards.  But these standards are saftey not mission assurance.

Note is that Atlas V does not meet these safety requiremnts and the avionics had to be upgraded including new additional engine monitoring, engine controlers, and software to meet the saftey requirements.  The F9 already had the monitoring, redundant engine controlers (single failure operate dual failure safe), and software to implement the engine out capability.  All of which is needed for a human flight.  Only some possible software additions for performing abort notifications or additional engine status info to the spacecraft.

[savuporo]

Basicly the fact that there are no proposed F9 changes for it to meet the CC requirements means that its design was to Human flight or better safety standards.  But these standards are saftey not mission assurance.

I think one small point of confusion is that there is some sort of linear measurement of launch vehicle "safety standards" here, where one goal post is "human rated".

I am quite certain that USAF certification is worrying about multiple things that NASA or human flights will never consider, and i will toss a completely fringe scenarios like resistance to EMP attacks, nuclear power sources or technology proliferation in case of crashes etc.

Quite simply, "if its good enough for humans, its good enough for multibillion dollar secret military project" does not necessarily always hold true, and design margins have very little to do with it.

[baldusi]

I remember an ULA official explaining that a crew mission required different trajectory and anomaly handling than a defense mission. In the later case, the software has to try to reach orbit while not endangering anybody. In the crewed case, it has to assure the safety of the crew (while not endangering the surface dwellers).

[Llian Rhydderch]

Cost is definitely increased by these regulatory certification requirements, while innovation of new ways of doing things will be slowed by the ongoing/continued need to certify with USAF each innovation/change in the design of the launch vehicle.

Indeed, that is an odd outcome...; until you think about the political economic implications of the thing.  It works very well for a goodly number of the individuals who are the economic decision makers in these matters.  For them the incentives can be quite reversed from the incentives for the taxpaying public. 

The higher cost is not a bug, it is a feature for the execs at any government contractor doing business-as-usual through standard USG procurement practices; and it is a feature to the companies hired to do the multi-million dollar certification exercise; and as we've discussed many times on these fora, it is a feature to various political actors who endavors to bring jobs and companies to their districts states and then use that as part of their claim as to why they ought to be reelected.  And although the engineers working at the the BAU contractors may not benefit as much, and indeed by harmed by the relatively slower pace of technology innovation, the higher costs processes may also be seen as a boon to the large number of personnel who are involved to provide many of the data/paperwork to support the extensive certification project. 

So not nearly as astonishing when you look at the various roles played by folks involved in the process, and the costs and benefits to them rather than merely looking at the program as a whole.

Completely unsubstantiated.  You have no insight to make such claims.  100% opinion and no facts

It's rather standard political economy, and evaluated extensively in Public Choice Theory. 

But I don't think there's any changing your views.   

So let's just stay pleasant, and agree to disagree.

[newpylong]

If they want to be certified they can stop complaining about how the process is long winded, expensive, and unnecessary and either let it occur or not go after the launches, simple.

Right.  No one should ever question a review process that costs more than the rocket being examined... especially if it has been long-established and proven.  No one should be so bold as to 'suggest' that this process is less-than-perfect.

Correct. You don't question a potential customer's certification process. You put up or shut up.

[QuantumG]

If they want to be certified they can stop complaining about how the process is long winded, expensive, and unnecessary and either let it occur or not go after the launches, simple.

Right.  No one should ever question a review process that costs more than the rocket being examined... especially if it has been long-established and proven.  No one should be so bold as to 'suggest' that this process is less-than-perfect.

Correct. You don't question a potential customer's certification process. You put up or shut up.

Ya do when your competitor's cronies are setting the certification process to be an endless activity.

[Darkseraph]

3) a downside risk could be letting full documentation of the  F9 v1.1 recipe out of Hawthorne -- no patents is SpaceX policy to avoid this -- but we can hope the certification process isn't 'leaky.'

I have never bought that "Space X has a secret sauce that goes into it vehicles that the Chinese will steal" line. My completely paranoid hunch is that they don't file patents because they're infringing against other US aerospace companies and don't want to get the sued, or made pay royalties.

[savuporo]

My completely paranoid hunch is that they don't file patents because they're infringing against other US aerospace companies and don't want to get the sued, or made pay royalties.

That is tinfoil hat zone, as there are two different government organizations reviewing a lot of what they are doing, with employees that would be somewhat aware of critical IP that other companies are holding. Its not like in propulsion there are gazillion different other innovators around to copy from - there is pretty much only AJR left.

[Darkseraph]

My completely paranoid hunch is that they don't file patents because they're infringing against other US aerospace companies and don't want to get the sued, or made pay royalties.

That is tinfoil hat zone, as there are two different government organizations reviewing a lot of what they are doing, with employees that would be somewhat aware of critical IP that other companies are holding. Its not like in propulsion there are gazillion different other innovators around to copy from - there is pretty much only AJR left.

Yes its completely off the wall suspicion. But I find the idea that they have a secret sauce in their craft equally off the wall. Smartphone manufacturers all produce in China and are not afraid to apply for patents in case of the unscrupulous Chineze!!! Space X is great at PR though, there's nothing they wouldn't spin to look good. On their brochures, they claimed that the Falcon 1 having only one main engine was good for reliability and that the Falcon 9 having 9 engines was good for reliability (engine out)!

[Llian Rhydderch]

If they want to be certified they can stop complaining about how the process is long winded, expensive, and unnecessary and either let it occur or not go after the launches, simple.

Right.  No one should ever question a review process that costs more than the rocket being examined... especially if it has been long-established and proven.  No one should be so bold as to 'suggest' that this process is less-than-perfect.

Correct. You don't question a potential customer's certification process. You put up or shut up.

Thank you!  You just provided a beautiful example of the gross distortion in any market by the existence of a monopsony buyer.

When there is only one buyer that has significant market power, as the US government does in the space "market", you darn well better question the actions of that monopsonist.

Moreover, in the US, as tattered as our Constitutional Federal Republic is with its government of (supposedly) limited powers, there remains some kernal of an idea that we still have, or should have, a government of the people, for the people, by the people.  Therefore, it is of course right that the government be questioned.

And especially so when our "captalism" has devolved into a form of state capitalism rather than market capitalism.

The USG is, shall we say, a very unusual customer.

So I say, Questions all around.  Here, here.   

[Darkseraph]

If they want to be certified they can stop complaining about how the process is long winded, expensive, and unnecessary and either let it occur or not go after the launches, simple.

Right.  No one should ever question a review process that costs more than the rocket being examined... especially if it has been long-established and proven.  No one should be so bold as to 'suggest' that this process is less-than-perfect.

Correct. You don't question a potential customer's certification process. You put up or shut up.

Thank you!  You just provided a beautiful example of the gross distortion in any market by the existence of a monopsony buyer.

When there is only one buyer that has significant market power, as the US government does in the space "market", you darn well better question the actions of that monopsonist.

Moreover, in the US, as tattered as our Constitutional Federal Republic is with its government of (supposedly) limited powers, there remains some kernal of an idea that we still have, or should have, a government of the people, for the people, by the people.  Therefore, it is of course right that the government be questioned.

And especially so when our "captalism" has devolved into a form of state capitalism rather than market capitalism.

The USG is, shall we say, a very unusual customer.

So I say, Questions all around.  Here, here.   

Not sure why you would say that capitalism has "devolved" into state capitalism, as if its some lower form. That's actually an improvement if you're interested in space access. In a pure market environment, Space X would probably not exist, or not for very long. Musk won't even IPO the company in the next 10 years because markets are anathema to his goals. Space exploration hasn't been held back because the government is the only customer, its been held back by no one being able to make a business case that closes outside of government contracts and communication satellites. There's the old saying "How do you become a millionaire at space.?...start of as a Billionaire!" I'm generally glad the government funds this stuff with all its own imperfections, because the alternative is zero.

[Llian Rhydderch]

If they want to be certified they can stop complaining about how the process is long winded, expensive, and unnecessary and either let it occur or not go after the launches, simple.

Right.  No one should ever question a review process that costs more than the rocket being examined... especially if it has been long-established and proven.  No one should be so bold as to 'suggest' that this process is less-than-perfect.

Correct. You don't question a potential customer's certification process. You put up or shut up.

Thank you!  You just provided a beautiful example of the gross distortion in any market by the existence of a monopsony buyer.

When there is only one buyer that has significant market power, as the US government does in the space "market", you darn well better question the actions of that monopsonist.

Moreover, in the US, as tattered as our Constitutional Federal Republic is with its government of (supposedly) limited powers, there remains some kernal of an idea that we still have, or should have, a government of the people, for the people, by the people.  Therefore, it is of course right that the government be questioned.

And especially so when our "captalism" has devolved into a form of state capitalism rather than market capitalism.

The USG is, shall we say, a very unusual customer.

So I say, Questions all around.  Here, here.   

Not sure why you would say that capitalism has "devolved" into state capitalism, as if its some lower form. That's actually an improvement if you're interested in space access. In a pure market environment, Space X would probably not exist, or not for very long. Musk won't even IPO the company in the next 10 years because markets are anathema to his goals. Space exploration hasn't been held back because the government is the only customer, its been held back by no one being able to make a business case that closes outside of government contracts and communication satellites. There's the old saying "How do you become a millionaire at space.?...start of as a Billionaire!" I'm generally glad the government funds this stuff with all its own imperfections, because the alternative is zero.

Agree with you on Musk and taking SpaceX public on the stock market.

But don't confuse the "stock market", with market relations and the market process more generally.  Musk has ownership of whatever part of SpaceX he owns (a majority, I believe).  His choice to retain that ownership, and act with the ordinary property rights this affords him, is absolutely a sterling example of market process in action:  he has no doubt looked at the expected benefit, and the expected cost (including likely redirection of company focus on strategic objectives he thinks important, increased focus on short term results and less on long term results, etc.), and made a determination not to exchange his property right in SpaceX under the rules of the game of a public IPO under US law.  That is a market choice, and part of the working out of a market process.

Whether the little bit of private market action that is happening in NewSpace today is sufficient, and can continue long enough to make a difference, is an open question.  I hope it does.  Some have different views.

But I certainly can see a huge difference in the kinds of technological innovation made under (largely) private market relations vs. those that are made (and frequently, not made) under state control, whether the state is run by a monarch, an autocrat, or a democratic majoritarian political regime.  I believe that the empirical evidence is that we see much more innovation under private market relations--where property rights, the rule of law, freedom to contract, freedom of new entrants to enter the market, freedom to leave the market, and a few other key institutions are in place--will tend to significantly outperform the state capitalism model.

So relative to the OP topic, the growth or extension of excessive regulatory control by the state over launches will tend to reduce innovation and increase costs on F9 innovation by SpaceX.  That's the principal argument I've been making. 

[Lar]

Debates about capitalism, the stock market, patents, etc are off topic. No more.

[john smith 19]

On their brochures, they claimed that the Falcon 1 having only one main engine was good for reliability

That's exactly the argument made for the EELV designs. Which were not meant to be human rated

and that the Falcon 9 having 9 engines was good for reliability (engine out)!

And that's the argument that's made for crew rated vehicles.

Reliability statistics say more parts --> more parts to fail --> less reliable.

But smart engineers know 2 things. 1) Bigger engines have much worse combustion instability problems 2)All parts are not  equally prone to failure.

The math says the one big perfect engine is better than the 7 dwarfs.

Except the math does not take into account the consequence of failure.
1 engine fails on 1 engine LV --> Loss of Mission
1 engine fails on multiple copies of same engine --> Possible continuance of mission.

That qualification on engine type is because an engine failure on Shuttle takeoff (especially the SRB's) and certainly within the first 2 minutes would have been a LOC.

I know what I'd prefer to be on.

In respect to the thread title it'd be interesting to see given that the USAF was intimately involved with the EELV designs if they'd allow a 9 engine 1st stage or rule "It's too risky. Our statistics estimate one of your engines would fail on nearly every flight" when F9 was being designed. 

[Jim]

That's exactly the argument made for the EELV designs. Which were not meant to be human rated

But smart engineers know 2 things. 1) Bigger engines have much worse combustion instability problems 2)All parts are not  equally prone to failure.

The math says the one big perfect engine is better than the 7 dwarfs.

Except the math does not take into account the consequence of failure.
1 engine fails on 1 engine LV --> Loss of Mission
1 engine fails on multiple copies of same engine --> Possible continuance of mission.

A lot is wrong here

a.  Not originally designed to be is not the same as meant to be.  There is nothing that says EELV's can't be human rated.

b.  Smart engineers know that bigger does not equate to large.  Large engines have combustion instability problems.  EELV engines are not large nor do they have combustion instability issues.

c.  But more of the same parts are have more chances to fail

d.  The multi engine scheme is just a marketing ploy.  More than a 2/3's of a Falcon 9 flight time has the same consequence from a engine failure as the EELV's.  It uses a single engine (which is also significantly different than the first stage engines) for second stage flight.   Find the time that a first stage engine on a US vehicle (other than SpaceX) cause a LOM.  It will be in the 90's and an Atlas with a bad set screw.  You have to go further to find an engine that let go.

[llanitedave]

Wow, Jim!  That was positively loquacious!

And I agree with the argument.

[john smith 19]

A lot is wrong here

a.  Not originally designed to be is not the same as meant to be.  There is nothing that says EELV's can't be human rated.

AFAIK "Can be man rated in later versions" was not a design criteria of the EELV programme. It happens that crew rating the Atlas V and the RD180 were not particularly difficult. IIRC the big item was adding a 2nd hydraulics system. If space had been tighter on the engine layout that could have gotten very tricky to do.

b.  Smart engineers know that bigger does not equate to large.  Large engines have combustion instability problems.  EELV engines are not large nor do they have combustion instability issues.

I'm not sure the theory on CI is still good enough to guarantee that in the design phase. I'd say bigger chamber and nozzle --> more resonance modes to excite --> probability of triggering a CI goes up.

That said IIRC the scarfed bell nozzles on the Shuttle also suffered from CI. Prior to that it was believed that CI in such small engines was simply impossible.

IOW smaller chambers improve the odds of not encountering CI in development, but they do not guarantee it. 

c.  But more of the same parts are have more chances to fail

Which was my question about if the USAF had the sort of insight into the F9 development that they had to Delta IV and Atlas V would they have allowed it?

d.  The multi engine scheme is just a marketing ploy.  More than a 2/3's of a Falcon 9 flight time has the same consequence from a engine failure as the EELV's. 

An argument that could be made of the Saturn V. Engine out helped save the crew of Apollo 13.

It uses a single engine (which is also significantly different than the first stage engines) for second stage flight.   

I'm a fan of engine clusters but recalling cases of asymmetric start on a Centaur when the thrust imbalance broke up the stage I'm not sure anything less than 5 engines is viable. I'll also note that a Merlin 1d Vac is (AFAIK) still about 90% of a Merlin 1d. An RL10 (or two) is not an RD180 or even close to an RS68.

Find the time that a first stage engine on a US vehicle (other than SpaceX) cause a LOM.  It will be in the 90's and an Atlas with a bad set screw.  You have to go further to find an engine that let go.

I presume you're talking about the Orbital secondary payload on the maiden F9 2.0 flight?

AFAIK no one held a gun to Orbcomm's management to force them to fly on the F9.

They could of course have flown as a primary on the Pegasus XL. How much is an XL these days?

Or waited for an EELV ride.

Or maybe an Ariane 5 ride.

But they didn't. 

I'll hazard a guess that price played a big part in their decision, as I would guess it does for nearly every secondary payload. 

IOW they took a calculated (well I presume someone did a PRA  ) risk based on cost Vs benefit. On the day it didn't go their way.

They're not the first (and I doubt they will be the last) secondary payload that did not achieve their full goals. 

AFAIK most that fail don't have insurance to begin with (or a PR department to express their annoyance) so they just have to go back to the lab and build another. 

BTW Did Orbcomm build a new one with the insurance money? they certainly talked like it was a total failure and they'd need to build another one to get the test data.

[HappyMartian]

That's exactly the argument made for the EELV designs. Which were not meant to be human rated

But smart engineers know 2 things. 1) Bigger engines have much worse combustion instability problems 2)All parts are not  equally prone to failure.

The math says the one big perfect engine is better than the 7 dwarfs.

Except the math does not take into account the consequence of failure.
1 engine fails on 1 engine LV --> Loss of Mission
1 engine fails on multiple copies of same engine --> Possible continuance of mission.

A lot is wrong here

a.  Not originally designed to be is not the same as meant to be.  There is nothing that says EELV's can't be human rated.

b.  Smart engineers know that bigger does not equate to large.  Large engines have combustion instability problems.  EELV engines are not large nor do they have combustion instability issues.

c.  But more of the same parts are have more chances to fail

d.  The multi engine scheme is just a marketing ploy.  More than a 2/3's of a Falcon 9 flight time has the same consequence from a engine failure as the EELV's.  It uses a single engine (which is also significantly different than the first stage engines) for second stage flight.   Find the time that a first stage engine on a US vehicle (other than SpaceX) cause a LOM.  It will be in the 90's and an Atlas with a bad set screw.  You have to go further to find an engine that let go.

With an engine failure on the first stage Loss of Mission may be a given, however one advantage of multiple engines on a first stage on a crewed mission might be that you don't have to immediately fire up the second stage or the high g abort rockets. Instead, you could decide to just 'go long' by continuing to burn the remaining first stage engines.

Again, to 'go even longer', you might also continue to refrain from using the abort system option and after the first stage burns through all of its propellant, you could decide to burn some or all of the propellant in the second stage. With enough delta-v capability, a flightpath diversion and more optimal ocean recovery site may be a possible option.

Obviously you might no longer need or want to accelerate or gain altitude, but by carefully deciding to 'go long' you might get a bit closer to a ship with a known location, an island, better recovery weather conditions, daylight, or a continent with significant ocean search and rescue capabilities.

Where the crew or a heavy robotic satellite or nuclear powered rover 'comes down' after a first stage engine failure may have different safety or political consequences. Being able to 'go long', despite a Loss of Mission, by continuing the first stage's powered flight with a reduced number of engines may sometimes be useful in launches from different sites around the world. 


Edited.

[watermod]

d.  The multi engine scheme is just a marketing ploy.  More than a 2/3's of a Falcon 9 flight time has the same consequence from a engine failure as the EELV's.

All this reminds me of the failure statistical analysis equations as they applied to electronics evolution.
It boiled down to an individual PHYSICAL parts count. 

A tube had more parts than a transistor.  The transistor was essentially one part on a single piece of  semiconductor so it's part count was pretty close to 1.  The tube was in single or low double digits  but that's already worse in the statistics.

Then industry went to the IC chip resulting in a many device design having a parts count of essentially 1 wafer die for the failure statistic (if one left out the manufacturing failures).   This resulted in the current state with hundreds of millions of devices on a die having a failure statistic of near 1. 

Now the multi-engine bit of the Falcon 9s is multiple devices so simple statistical failure analysis suggests a higher system failure rate - however - this ignores strategy.

The Falcon 9 has another strategy borrowed from the electronics and computer fields.  That is fault tolerance.   This strategy had to be used in the computer field in its early days when the mean time to failure of a tube or other part was on the order of five minutes.  Computers were slower than 4-banger calculators then so the average program could expect several hardware failures while running.
There were two solutions - 1 the 3 device  vote and the other constant saving of state to some medium.   
The latter has no analogue in rocketry but the former does.  Nine engines with sensors where it is unlikely that a problem with one will infect the others (the shielding between the engines) improves the system failure statistics provided that the system function doesn't require all the engines.  One would need to have access to the actual equations defining that system to see by how much it actually improves the system as a whole.   (where the system as a whole == the rocket mission)

As to the first strategy that is why I asked some questions in other discussions about rockets engines on a chip by the MIT guys and some of the electric/magnetic propulsion schemes.   From a failure standpoint a surface of rocket propulsion would be the equivalent of a dense IC in the computer world with the failure equation dropping to near 1.   But, that is not what SpaceX implemented.

[Lourens]

Lots of talk about what the statistics would say, but very little actual statistics in this thread. Let's fix that.

I can't do an entire F9 rocket, for lack of information, because it's way too much work, and because I'm not an actual rocket reliability statistician. But I think I know enough statistics to do some calculations on 1 engine vs. 9 engines, so that's what I'll do. I'll ignore any potential issues not related to the engines, and I'll ignore any information (on production processes, tests, etc.) except the engines' success rate in actual launches. We'll compare an F9 first stage with 9 Merlin 1D engines to a hypothetical Falcon 1e first stage with 1 Merlin 1D engine. A comparison with a single engine with equal thrust to 9 Merlin 1Ds would be interesting, but we don't have such an engine or reliability statistics on it, so we'll go with F9 vs. F1e.

Some assumptions:

* The Merlin 1C, 1D and the Merlin 1C and 1D Vacuum as used on the F9 are similar enough to be grouped together for the purpose of computing reliability statistics.
* The F9 can tolerate exactly 1 engine failure anywhere in flight
* The F9 engines are isolated enough that a failure of 1 won't affect the others

So far there have been 10 Falcon 9 flights, with 99 out of 100 Merlin 1D engines running successfully, and 1 failing in flight. That gives a (maximum likelihood) estimate of the success probability of a Merlin 1D of 99%. I'll get back to that figure later, but let's start with that.

The probability of success of the Falcon 1e first stage is thus 99%. For Falcon 9, success is if 9 engines work, or exactly 8 engines work. The probability of all 9 engines working is

0.99^9 = 0.91352

and that would be the success rate if Falcon 9 didn't have engine out capability. But it does, so we have to add the probability of exactly 8 engines working. This is

9 * 0.99^8 * 0.01 = 0.083047

We multiply by 9 because we don't specify which engine fails, so there are really 9 scenario's each with the same probability: engine 1 failing, engine 2 failing, and so on.

The total probability of success for the F9 first stage is the sum of those, which equals 0.99656 which is slightly better than the 0.99 of the Falcon 1e. So 9 engines wins!


That's not the whole story though, since that 99% is only a best guess given the data. The actual probability of success may be lower, and we may just have been lucky. Or the other way around. We have to take that into account, otherwise we would conclude for example that because the Merlin Vacuum ran successfully for 10 out of 10 launches, it cannot fail in the future, and that's of course silly. We can do this by calculating a confidence interval. From the 99 out of 100 recorded successes of the Merlin in general, we can say with 95% confidence that the actual probability of success is at least 0.96159 (single-tailed 95% Jeffreys interval, for those computing along).

So we can be 95% sure (not 100% because we have limited information) that the probability of a Falcon 1e first stage launching successfully is at least 96.159% (not 100% because the Merlin 1D is not perfect).

For the Falcon 9 with single engine out capability, we can be 95% sure that it has at least a probability of 95.562% of launching successfully.

This is actually a pretty interesting result, since we see now that the F9 has a lower success probability than the F1e, whereas at 99% single-engine success rate it had a higher success probability. Whether 1 or 9 engines is better depends on the reliability of those engines!

This means that SpaceX can have their cake and eat it, too, marketing-wise. For the original F1, with Merlin in the development stage and still relatively unreliable, a single engine has a bigger chance of success, even with engine out capability on the multi-engine vehicle. For the current F9 and the more developed Merlin 1D, based on the 99 out of 100 success count, we can be about 91% sure that the 9-engine configuration is more reliable than a single (Merlin 1D) engine one.


To get somewhat back on topic, I have a question. I've seen requirements for a small number of consecutive successes for Falcon 9 to be allowed to fly certain payloads. I don't remember the exact number, but it was too low to give any kind of confidence on its own. So I assume that the reliability assessment is mostly based on knowledge of the manufacturing and QA processes in production. Are these numbers combined with the flight data in a Bayesian manner? Or are they simply separate requirements with separate associated calculations? Does the stage have to be recertified if its manufacturing process doesn't change, but it has failed in flight after being certified?

[macpacheco]

Incremental changes on every commercial launch (within reason) then once a bunch of changes have been proved out do a "block upgrade" to the DoD version, all at once.

Who says the commercial customers (and their insurers) like being paying crash test dummies on every flight? Why wouldn't they opt for certified, stable and proven version too?

This would make sense if your payload is worth a billion dollars or so.
But if your payload costs just a few times the price of the launch, and SpaceX reputation is near spotless, customers are willing to accept the risk for the reduced launch costs.
I recall reading that a few of current/recent SpaceX customers state the launch price they got from SpaceX made the satellite operation a radically better deal than using other typical launch providers.
For instance, I think GPS satellite launches shouldn't require this certification, the payloads are cheap enough and built in production runs of 8 or more birds usually per model.

[Coastal Ron]

Incremental changes on every commercial launch (within reason) then once a bunch of changes have been proved out do a "block upgrade" to the DoD version, all at once.

Who says the commercial customers (and their insurers) like being paying crash test dummies on every flight? Why wouldn't they opt for certified, stable and proven version too?

This would make sense if your payload is worth a billion dollars or so.
But if your payload costs just a few times the price of the launch, and SpaceX reputation is near spotless, customers are willing to accept the risk for the reduced launch costs.

Launch customers have a vested interest in lowering launch costs, so risking a launch or two makes business sense.  That applies to both commercial and government.

I recall reading that a few of current/recent SpaceX customers state the launch price they got from SpaceX made the satellite operation a radically better deal than using other typical launch providers.

Most likely that's true for both Orbcomm and Iridium.