Proton-M Failure Reaction and Discussion Thread - July 2, 2013

[ugordan]

I seem to remember similar claims for previous failures as well, that it was ground controllers who issued commands when, as it later turned out, it was the vehicle itself.

[renclod]

 (as many have noted, TVC was clearly functioning, and engines were running).

The strong roll suggests at least one engine hard-over failed TVC , IMO.

edit: by my count, toward the end the roll was at least 50 rpm.

[Kabloona]

Was this intended to fly on a 35° azimuth to a 64·8° inclination orbit?

See last para:

http://www.russianspaceweb.com/proton_glonass49.html

[Stan Black]

What impressed me is how intact the Proton remained? I wonder if the newer phase II or III would have structurally failed sooner?

[simonbp]

 (as many have noted, TVC was clearly functioning, and engines were running).

The strong roll suggests at least one engine hard-over failed TVC , IMO.

In the handheld video, you can see the rocket pitching first one direction and then the other. So, I would speculate that the rocket was a little bit off on liftoff, the TVC overcorrected, and then overcorrected the overcorrection, and got in a positive feedback loop. It's a classic result of a miscalibrated PID loop...

[Kabloona]

 (as many have noted, TVC was clearly functioning, and engines were running).

The strong roll suggests at least one engine hard-over failed TVC , IMO.

In the handheld video, you can see the rocket pitching first one direction and then the other. So, I would speculate that the rocket was a little bit off on liftoff, the TVC overcorrected, and then overcorrected the overcorrection, and got in a positive feedback loop. It's a classic result of a miscalibrated PID loop...

The change in pitch direction can also be explained more simply by the fact that the vehicle was rolling. One engine TVC stuck hard over would result in the observed attitude "wobble" as the roll changed the effective direction of the stuck engine thrust vector.

[renclod]

 It's a classic result of a miscalibrated PID loop...

The strong roll fouled the controller, IMO.

edit: I understand pilot induced oscillation but the roll went faster and faster until the very end.

[Antares]

Does anyone have a good link for the "Bizer" mentioned up the thread?

[Kabloona]

 It's a classic result of a miscalibrated PID loop...

The strong roll fouled the controller, IMO.

edit: I understand pilot induced oscillation but the roll went faster and faster until the very end.

Agreed, and the accelerating roll is a other data point in favor of an engine TVC stuck hard over.

[Kabloona]

Does anyone have a good link for the "Bizer" mentioned up the thread?

I think he means this:

http://www.hazard.maks.net/blog/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=45&blogId=1

Edit: a search on NSF for "biser" will give more results

[edkyle99]

I'm shaking my head right now, having just come from the comments page of the Independent, the paper I read the most.  Over half the comments so far have claimed that this is US sabotage in revenge for the Edward Snowden affair.  This is the sort of hyper-political shallow mindset that makes me despair sometimes.

The late Kurt Cobain sang a terrific, pertinent phrase.
"Just because you're paranoid, don't mean they're not after you".

 - Ed Kyle

[AJA]

Not only do we need raw sensor input data from those that provide onboard computers with the inertial information, we also need forensic analysis of any remnants of these instrumented areas (to rule out an instrumentation failure); as well as general forensic analysis of program code, and quality control review before we can be quite certain of the cause. Still so many possibilities.

Yes, obviously there was an off nominal thrust input, but assuming it was due to a faultily programmed controller, or a hard-over causing gyroscopic cross coupling is jumping the gun. I think Chris mentioned high winds near liftoff just after the thing went down in the live thread too. Split second wind-shears at the wrong time have brought aircraft down before. Also, I still don't think there was something externally notable at T+4s.. couldn't a supposed errant 'plume' just be a "pad reflection" of exhaust far downstream from the nozzle? Looking at the nozzles itself, there doesn't seem to be anything pointing in a different direction. The right nozzle (camera frame) at launch lacking in colour could be a lighting trick depending on direction of illumination/ others being contrasted against pad shadow? It's shortly after this that there's that left-leaning and pitching.. but that could be an attempt at correcting an out-of-limit external instability too (rather than a faulty rocket...although I admit this is a lot more likely). And we can't rule out other parts of the rockets as of now either

Some interesting background material. Apparently this will be good for the local scrap metal salvagers, but bad for the cattle.

http://www.thelivingmoon.com/41pegasus/02files/Space_Debris_04.html

Thanks for this.  I've often wondered about how people living underneath the flight path dealt with the hazards of the discarded stages.  Incredible and intolerable.

The stuff probably causes similar damage when it falls into the sea. There isn't even any plausible deniability of toxicity to the environment - because extensive care is taken when we fuel the birds. It's just irresponsible to think of the oceans as infinite diluant tanks, and treat land separately. We ought to mandate that all launches have recovery crews on standby - for land AND sea. In Kazakhstan's case, those scrap dealers are doing it already. Why shouldn't the regulators require the launch operators to train them and give them decontamination gear, before allowing them use of the spaceport?

[plutogno]

What impressed me is how intact the Proton remained

actually, Proton made something of a low speed loop, so aerodynamical bending loads must not have been as severe as, for ex, the first Ariane 5. Ariane 5 broke up some 40 seconds after launch at near supersonic speed

[baldusi]

I would think it might have had something to do with the fact that this was a Phase I with RD-276 engines. Sort of custom retrofit which, might have botched something.

[Kabloona]

I would think it might have had something to do with the fact that this was a Phase I with RD-276 engines. Sort of custom retrofit which, might have botched something.

Speaking of changes from Proton K to Proton M, the Khrunichev website has this unfortunate bit of irony re Proton M:

"Another advantage will be drastically reduced drop fields, an extremely important issue now that the Stage 1 drop fields are located in the Republic of Kazakhstan and are leased by Russia . A reduction in the size of drop fields will be achieved through controlled landing of Stage 1 onto a limited area.
 
In addition to reduced rent payments the smaller drop fields will alleviate Stage 1 debris recovery. Moreover, the stage will reach the ground virtually clean since the Proton M Stage 1 engine timeline will ensure complete depletion of propellants. Thus the new Russian launcher will be much more environment-friendly."

(edit for typo)

[ChileVerde]

I am going to go out on a limb here and say they meant to type "toxic" fuel from the rocket.

That's a fair possibility. "Nuclear" (yaderny) and "poisonous" (yadovity) aren't that dissimilar in Russian and a naive journalist in a hurry might have mixed them up.

[Stan Black]

I would think it might have had something to do with the fact that this was a Phase I with RD-276 engines. Sort of custom retrofit which, might have botched something.

 For SES-1 and IS-16 the evidence points to the RD-276 operating at the lower thrust of the RD-275.

 Another point is that for both RD-275 on Proton-M (where they operate at higher thrust than Proton-K) and RD-276 they only go to full thrust six seconds after lift-off.

http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=17568.msg626318#msg626318
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=17568.msg776061#msg776061

[sdsds]

The Flight Termination System operates by detecting an unrecoverable anomaly, and then causing an immediate shut down of all engines. There is no "flyaway" mode.

(With respect for your intimate familiarity with Russian systems: ) What enables you to state that with such certainty? Written documentation? An unequivocal statement from an engineer familiar with Proton FTS? Have you reviewed the FTS code and verified that no "flyaway" logic exists?

I ask because in both this and the recent Sealaunch failure there is the appearance of the vehicle "attempting" to put distance between itself and the pad, during an albeit-brief period of horizontal flight. Is that just getting lucky, or is there a flight control mode that facilitates that?

Obviously this notion that the vehicle has a mind of its own and is trying to get away from the pad is prima facie wrong. But could there be something else in the control logic that leads these vehicles to display this behavior as a side-effect of the designer's intent?

P.S.: Do you know is Proton-M's system Bizer-3 or Bizer-6, or something else? Is the programming language really something called "DRAGON"? (I fear google-translate now.)
http://old.computerra.ru/readitorial/418507/

[smoliarm]

Maybe I was overreacting.

As an Australian I thought it was my right to be pushy about environmentalism.

Cleanup will, or should, be an issue.  The following page discusses hydrazine cleanup at Rocky Mountain Arsenal.
http://www.rma.army.mil/cleanup/facts/hydrazin.html

It says that "Hydrazine and UDMH are unstable in the natural environment and rapidly decompose when exposed to the atmosphere".

So far so good.  The stuff dissipates and what is left mixes with water.  It can be washed into a catch basin.

But then it says that "[a] decomposition product of UDMH is NDMA, a suspected human carcinogen".  The trace NDMA remnants forced RMA cleanup to resort to treating the waste water used to rinse the site previously.  They used a special incinerator to do the job.

 - Ed Kyle

>>It says that "Hydrazine and UDMH are unstable in the natural environment and
>>rapidly decompose when exposed to the atmosphere".

Unfortunately, this is not that simple.
UDMH is indeed unstable and decomposes rapidly -- IF there are three factors present: oxygen, water, and sunlight (UV). Otherwise, if ANY of these three is absent, UDMH is pretty stable. Also, low temperature makes dilute aqueous solution of UDMH stable even in the presence of UV.
In ice, snow, or in frozen soil UDMH is chemically stable.

Environmental examples:

In the neutral soil, starting with 4” depth, UDMH concentration droped only about 60% in 7 months (Yaroslavl’ spill incident, soil samples were taken in February, next day after the spill, and in September 1988).

Another case -- Plesetsk, “Kosmos-3M” explosion on launch table in June 1973.
In 1997, Dr. L.A.Fedorov reported significant content of UDMH for this site in deep soil samples and in ground water. The concentrations were 50 – 200 times above the DL, and this was 24 years after the explosion.

The last one – “Nedelin catastrophe”, P-16 explosion in Oct. 1960 on Turatam Site 41 /1.
Boris Chertok in the second volume of his memoirs, when he tells his reconstruction of the tragedy, he mentions that this particular launch table, 41 /1, was not used for the next two P-16 launches.
So, it was under repair for almost a year. Why it took so long? My guess -- it was due to UDMH decontamination trouble. UMDH goes into concrete quite well (micro-fractures), and it is quite stable there. And what is worse, common chemical decontamination treatment -- Ca(ClO)2 suspension – is ineffective in this particular case, because it prefers to react with concrete components.


>>Cleanup will, or should, be an issue.
It will be a major one, I’m afraid.

[R7]

Is the programming language really something called "DRAGON"? (I fear google-translate now.)
http://old.computerra.ru/readitorial/418507/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DRAKON