Not building a Lunokhod-3. Stopping at Luna-24.
If to speak shortly, that a big mistake of the USSR was lack of the correct strategy in space. From the technical point of view, the N1 and the Buran projects were the greatest mistakes. Both programs didn't correspond to requirements and country opportunities. IMHO.
N1 was fine from a conceptual standpoint, but the execution was anything but. Buran was totally pointless except from a Cold War d--- waving stance. "Hey Americans, look we can build a shuttle too!"
First off, decisions without funding aren't decisions, they are opinions, so some of the "decisions" that were pretty bad, like those made by the Powers That Were in 1966 to fly around the Moon in 1967, or in 1968 to land on the Moon the next year weren't really decisions. The reality was that lack of real decision making capability is what killed the Soviets in regards to their "Challenge to Apollo".
And yes, isolating a real decision means that the decision to fly Soyuz-1 was pretty bad, pretty much a Challenger-level screw-up.
The decision to kill Mir in 2001 was pretty bad, although defensible.
Without Korolev, the Soviet program was a chicken running around with its head cut off.
To mirror the thread "worst decision in US space history?" http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=31200.0Curious as to people's thoughts on the decisions on the other side of the iron curtain.
Quote from: Nickolai on 02/25/2013 07:50 pmTo mirror the thread "worst decision in US space history?" http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=31200.0Curious as to people's thoughts on the decisions on the other side of the iron curtain.I'll mirror the same post I used for the American version of this thread:Not joining forces fully with the United States and other spacefaring nations immediately after the Apollo-Soyuz flight in 1975.Think about it:- It could have helped end the Cold War sooner- We could have had an international space station 20 years earlier. No duplication of efforts with Mir, Skylab, the latter Salyuts etc.- The Soviets wouldn't have wasted billions of roubles on a giant spaceplane that they didn't need if they had access to American hardware- The money saved by both nations could have easily been ploughed into an international mission to Mars by now.
Quote from: Nickolai on 02/25/2013 07:50 pmTo mirror the thread "worst decision in US space history?" http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=31200.0Curious as to people's thoughts on the decisions on the other side of the iron curtain.I'll mirror the same post I used for the American version of this thread:Not joining forces fully with the United States and other spacefaring nations immediately after the Apollo-Soyuz flight in 1975.Think about it:- It could have helped end the Cold War sooner
Quote from: savuporo on 02/26/2013 03:26 amNot building a Lunokhod-3. Stopping at Luna-24.I would add not continuing on with their Venus exploration program, they should have stayed focus on Venus rather than the shift back to Mars & its satellites that occurred.
Their real mistake with Mars was wasting most of the 1970s working on unrealistic Mars sample return missions (when not a single one of their missions had succeeded!) and only really looking at realistic missions starting the 1980s, when it was getting late for them to successfully execute a mission before the whole edifice collapsed.
My nomination would actually be a somewhat counter intuitive one, namely aiming to get firsts, especially first satellite and first human into orbit. Doing so kicked off the space race and led to a number of the other problems people here have pointed out, like sloppy, rushed development of, well, everything. I find it hard to believe that the US doing those things first would have triggered the Soviets to play catch-up quite nearly as much as the other way around, in which case both the Soviet and American programs could take a slower, more sustainable development route which would perhaps have ended up in a better place in the long term.
Mir needed to go. It was way past its expiration date and turning into a safety hazard (not to mention the butt of jokes on late-night TV). In a way, the later career of Mir was symbolic of the whole disaster that was Yeltsin-era Russia.