and I suspect would not happen unless the spectre of SpaceX was not upon themIt has be happening all along.
and I suspect would not happen unless the spectre of SpaceX was not upon themIt has be happening all along.I agree that continual process improvement is always there, but I don't think this a "natural" path for ULA. I think their natural bias is "do everything possible to ensure a successful launch, even if it's expensive". This makes sense for their current market, very expensive payloads, and has resulted in extremely reliable launchers. But I suspect that in the absence of SpaceX, if someone inside suggested "Let's skip the WDR; it will save time and money and not hurt the reliability", it would have been turned down. The burden of proof would be on the proposer, to *prove* beyond a shadow of a doubt that reliability would not be compromised. The management mindset would be "why save a little time and money if it has even a small chance of hurting our major selling point, reliability?"
Also, deleting WDR is an old idea and was looked at for heritage Atlas and may have been incorporated (don't remember)
1. I agree it's an old idea - that's exactly my point. If there has long been this cost saving on the table, and it does not hurt reliability, then why did they not try it until now, just as competition is appearing on the horizon? It's possible that this is coincidence, and they would have tried this anyway in the absence of SpaceX.
2. In the absence of SpaceX, what's the number of launches gained/lost by reducing the cost by a few million dollars?
this could be writing on the wall as to which one survives...
2. In the absence of SpaceX, what's the number of launches gained/lost by reducing the cost by a few million dollars? [ It's zero... ]
2. It isn't money saved but time. Saving 5 days per launch with 6-8 launches per year equates to almost another launch
Also, deleting WDR is an old idea and was looked at for heritage Atlas and may have been incorporated (don't remember)I agree it's an old idea - that's exactly my point. If there has long been this cost saving on the table, and it does not hurt reliability, then why did they not try it until now, just as competition is appearing on the horizon? It's possible that this is coincidence, and they would have tried this anyway in the absence of SpaceX. But my experience with bureaucracies managing complex and risky projects is that they seldom make big work-flow changes unless forced by the competition. Otherwise the risk is not worth the small cost savings, particularly if the customer has no other option.
This is entirely rational on the part of the ULA managers. In the absence of SpaceX, what's the number of launches gained/lost by reducing the cost by a few million dollars? It's precisely zero, so why change? But with SpaceX in the game, there's a chance (not yet proven) that they will be cheaper and reliable enough, and some customers might switch. So now cost savings have a positive value, and are being pursued.
Are there more payloads ready, so they could launch more if they could cycle faster? My impression was that they were already launching almost all payloads soon after they were ready.
Now, ULA didn't really chose to do that, they were sort of pushed into forming and inherrited the liabilities and assets of Boeing and LM. But at this point right now, it seems like they woudl be looking at streamlining down to one common booster and upper stage, and try to get it's costs down and it's flight rate up.
More like three bricks (Boeing, LM, US gov) looking for a life raft. Also, since ULA is still a Boeing+LM joint venture, ULA's business model is dependent Boeing and LM. While much of what you've said about ULA's business might make sense if ULA was independent, it's going to work only if it also makes sense for Boeing and LM individually.
What an equitable arrangement between the parties might look like--and which would allow ULA to proceed on the path you suggest--is very difficult to say, as there is little visibility into ULA and their arrangements or commitments with Boeing and LM. In any case, the business issues appear to dwarf the technical issues.
Given that much of the discussion seems to focus on Atlas/LM being the preferred heir apparent (?)... maybe Boeing might let loose of ULA some time in the not-so-distant future? Of note, the original Boeing-ULA 2006 Delta Inventory Supply Agreement required payment of $60M/core or $1.86B to Boeing for 31 Delta IV CCB's prior to 31-Mar-2021.
(Which, if I read that correctly, requires payment of $1.86B regardless of how may Delta IV cores ULA uses/launches on or before 31-Mar-2021. Which could be read as demand for a royalty payment of $60M/core, or as a demand that Boeing be compensed for $1.86B for their investment in Delta IV. That the contract verbiage caps the payment at 31 cores or $1.86B suggests the latter?)
At last count, ULA is at ~24 Delta IV cores (Oct 2012), with a projected additional ~11 through 2015, so maybe Boeing will have their guaranteed pound of flesh and would be willing to let loose of ULA by 2016 (which also happens to be when the consent decree is up for review).
If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?
this could be writing on the wall as to which one survives...Yes, it certainly does seem to indicate which one will get be used for most launches. But what are you predicting for the payloads that require DIV-H? Certainly one possibility is, "NRO will have no more of those." But absent any inside knowledge that's difficult to believe.
The Committee also questions the cost of maintaining a Delta-IV Heavy lift capability. Barring a coherent strategy to evolve the Delta-IV Heavy to meet NASA requirements, there are very few requirements for this system. Therefore, the Committee wishes to understand the potential savings of doing away with a Delta-IV Heavy launch capability. Consistent with language in the classified annex accompanying this bill, the Committee requests that the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office certify expected cost savings to the EELV Launch Capability contract under three scenarios relating to the Delta-IV Heavy: (1) removing launch requirements from Cape Canaveral, (2) removing launch requirements from Vandenberg AFB, and (3) removing all launch requirements.
If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?In this scenerio, it might even help ULA if Falcon-Heavy succeeds. Then they could simply drop the Delta line completely, and concentrate on Atlas. The savings from just one line of rockets might well overwhelm the loss of a few heavy missions.
If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?In this scenerio, it might even help ULA if Falcon-Heavy succeeds. Then they could simply drop the Delta line completely, and concentrate on Atlas. The savings from just one line of rockets might well overwhelm the loss of a few heavy missions.
this could be writing on the wall as to which one survives...Yes, it certainly does seem to indicate which one will get be used for most launches. But what are you predicting for the payloads that require DIV-H? Certainly one possibility is, "NRO will have no more of those." But absent any inside knowledge that's difficult to believe.
No inside knowledge, but the evolution of the questions being asked, from "What are the payloads?" to more recently "How much do we save if we get rid of it?" is suggestive; from Senate Report 112-043 ...QuoteThe Committee also questions the cost of maintaining a Delta-IV Heavy lift capability. Barring a coherent strategy to evolve the Delta-IV Heavy to meet NASA requirements, there are very few requirements for this system. Therefore, the Committee wishes to understand the potential savings of doing away with a Delta-IV Heavy launch capability. Consistent with language in the classified annex accompanying this bill, the Committee requests that the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office certify expected cost savings to the EELV Launch Capability contract under three scenarios relating to the Delta-IV Heavy: (1) removing launch requirements from Cape Canaveral, (2) removing launch requirements from Vandenberg AFB, and (3) removing all launch requirements.
If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?In this scenerio, it might even help ULA if Falcon-Heavy succeeds. Then they could simply drop the Delta line completely, and concentrate on Atlas. The savings from just one line of rockets might well overwhelm the loss of a few heavy missions.
Are there a systemic cost issues that preclude Delta IV from being competitive with Atlas V for similar mission classes at similar flight rates--and thus would substantively argue for Atlas V over Delta IV as the heir apparent?
Finally although the Delta CBC acronym uses "common" just like the Atlas CCB acronym, Delta cores for different vehicle configurations have not all the been the same. Again this is said to have been due to RS-68 underperformance, and will be somewhat rectified as RS-68A rolls out. Still there will be at least four core variants required to keep both medium and heavy vehicles flying.
If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?In this scenerio, it might even help ULA if Falcon-Heavy succeeds. Then they could simply drop the Delta line completely, and concentrate on Atlas. The savings from just one line of rockets might well overwhelm the loss of a few heavy missions.