1. ...No one is going to pay for a launch without a payload on an existing launcher no matter what the tanks are made of. There is no engineering reason to do such a launch
1. Why did Delta IV Heavy launch without a commercial payload?
1. Wrong again. Delta IV Heavy Demo launch was for design validation and not manufacturing validation. Big difference.
2. ...
3. ...
My original posts had enough clarity,
I'll let you slap whatever validation label on it you want so you can say you were right and I was wrong. Somebody paid for a launch without a payload on an existing rocket. There were some engineering reasons for doing so, and there were issues of programmatic risk.
We seem to look at OCC and say, “hey, they’ve carved out a niche market and are doing well in it, that’s good business!”. But we look at ULA doing the same thing and view it as onerous and inefficient. (Of course, some of that might have to do with it being our tax dollars paying for ULA’s operation. And if it were government departments buying these expensive, unique choppers, we might start asking why they can’t go with standard bikes instead? Heheheh)
I cut most of this post away because I think it's a pretty good analysis/summation, so thanks, Lobo!!!
I left this paragraph to comment on it... I have the ability to buy an OCC bike, or not. So I get to choose how the money's spent, and if I want to spend it on custom stuff, bully for me. It's my money.
That's not the case with ULA, (not that they're the only outfit this is true of... ) and that galls me.
So I think the ire should be more directed at USAF/DoD that they aren't doing a better job of requiring the best value for their dollars, and doing their best to structure their needs so they can use as much "industry standard" as possible.
National Security and the Commercial Space Sector, CSIS, July 2010
What I have not seen here is any attempt to estimate where the launch market is going. Only by doing this can you try to figure out what changes they need to make.
Based on several articles and papers I guess that the average commercial satellite will grow from 5MT now to about 6.5 MT in the 2030s both to GTO. ACES would be more then enough to meet this increase.
What I have not seen here is any attempt to estimate where the launch market is going. Only by doing this can you try to figure out what changes they need to make.
Based on several articles and papers I guess that the average commercial satellite will grow from 5MT now to about 6.5 MT in the 2030s both to GTO. ACES would be more then enough to meet this increase.
Could you provide references to those forecasts?. My previous numbers--which was an attempt to address the question you raise--are based on FAA and OECD projections, which don't go out to 2030. Based on those...
While GSO satellite mass in the heavier classes has shown historical growth, the forecast for the heaviest (>5400kg) is flat or declining through 2021. If anything, advances in satellite propulsion appear to argue against ever-increasing LV capabilities (and expense). Unless there's another compelling reason for ACES--Atlas V 421+ can put ~6500kg in GTO today--I don't see how ACES would make much difference in ULA's commercial competitiveness?
Unless there's another compelling reason for ACES--Atlas V 421+ can put ~6500kg in GTO today--I don't see how ACES would make much difference in ULA's commercial competitiveness?
While GSO satellite mass in the heavier classes has shown historical growth, the forecast for the heaviest (>5400kg) is flat or declining through 2021. If anything, advances in satellite propulsion appear to argue against ever-increasing LV capabilities (and expense). Unless there's another compelling reason for ACES--Atlas V 421+ can put ~6500kg in GTO today--I don't see how ACES would make much difference in ULA's commercial competitiveness?
While GSO satellite mass in the heavier classes has shown historical growth, the forecast for the heaviest (>5400kg) is flat or declining through 2021. If anything, advances in satellite propulsion appear to argue against ever-increasing LV capabilities (and expense). Unless there's another compelling reason for ACES--Atlas V 421+ can put ~6500kg in GTO today--I don't see how ACES would make much difference in ULA's commercial competitiveness?I believe ACES would do a few things.
...
AV Week (1-8 April 2013) in an article "Boost to the Future" says that the Air Force is doing a block buy of at least 36 ULA cores, to last through 2016. In 2015 the 2017 launches will be competed, provided at least one competitor is certified. If not, ULA will get an order for another 14 cores, and USAF will compete again a year later, and so on until at least one competitor is certified. The Air Force has "high confidence" of at least one competitor will be certified by 2015.
The ULA CEO, Gass, says that the proposed contract to the government will reduce the price by $7 billion over individual buys. Even if he was talking about all 50 cores, that's *reducing* the price by $7B/50 = $140 million *per core*. Either that's a phenomenal percentage reduction, or they'll still have an interesting time competing with SpaceX at $56 million per Falcon 9 (in quantity one). Granted that Falcon 9, v 1.1, is not yet proven/certified and that SpaceX prices may increase with experience, I'd still be very worried if I was ULA.
Can't happen until common avionics and common propellants/core.
At its core, ULA is simply a business designed to make money for parent companies LM & Boeing. It also serves those parent companies by creating jobs for political goodwill and anything to do with the space program has the benefit of generating good publicity.
So this question really boils down to this: At what point does Space-X threaten that income stream?
After 12 years of development work, Space-X are now beginning to threaten ULA's dominance in the US marketplace. They clearly have a competing product that has already proven to be reliable and cost competitive. They also have solid plans to provide larger capacity at even better prices in the relatively near future and those plans do appear to hold water.
Space-X's recent actions are also now taking the fight into both the public and political domain.
I can't see any way for ULA to get the prices of the current Delta-IV or Atlas-V down to the levels Space-X are clearly aiming for, so there comes a point where their only realistic chance of competing with this new paradigm is to design a new vehicle that targets a competitive price point.
Whether such a new vehicle would be able to generate sufficient profit to satisfy the parent companies is open to debate. Personally, I don't think so. Perhaps the political and publicity might be sufficient to keep them interested, despite significantly reduced profits, but I doubt it.
I therefore suspect the most profitable route for Boeing and LM, will be to sell ULA within the next few years, for as much as they can get.
The logical purchaser would be Aerojet, but frankly, they would be better off repeating Space-X's approach and building an optimized operation specifically built for their needs, instead of inheriting a less optimised operation like ULA. It would take Aerojet longer to build their own, but it would also cost them a lot less in both the short- and long-term.
Who else could buy ULA? ATK? Dynetics?
-MG.
I can't see any way for ULA to get the prices of the current Delta-IV or Atlas-V down to the levels Space-X are clearly aiming for, so there comes a point where their only realistic chance of competing with this new paradigm is to design a new vehicle that targets a competitive price point.