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#160 by joek on 07 Feb, 2013 19:16
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Upper-stage engines (along with fairings) seem to be among the most troublesome components of today's launch vehicles. Doesn't pushing Atlas V and Delta IV toward a common upper stage eliminate much assuredness of assured space launch, thereby undermining the whole rationale for keeping two EELVs in the first place?
Yes, but two completely different EELV's was not necessarily forever. Per the DoD in 2006, "for the foreseeable future", "because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience", and "until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle".
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#161 by Lobo on 07 Feb, 2013 22:39
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Upper-stage engines (along with fairings) seem to be among the most troublesome components of today's launch vehicles. Doesn't pushing Atlas V and Delta IV toward a common upper stage eliminate much assuredness of assured space launch, thereby undermining the whole rationale for keeping two EELVs in the first place?
Yes, but two completely different EELV's was not necessarily forever. Per the DoD in 2006, "for the foreseeable future", "because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience", and "until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle".
YEs, Atlas has a great track record. I think they could downsize to just At;as at this point with pretty good confidence. According to Jim, Atlas-55x with a WBC upper stage can do D4H's performance. -
#162 by Lobo on 07 Feb, 2013 23:01
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Think 2005/6, what options did the AF, Lockheed or Boeing have? As independent companies the overhead costs were much higher than ULA. There was no alternative launch offering. So there was a shotgun wedding. Now 8 years later was that the correct decision? ULA has delivered what was intended, reduced cost, assured access to orbit and reliable launch. Even today there is no viable alternative, a lot of hope, but a lot more broken promises.
Well, with the details of the politics and legalities aside (as I don’t understand it enough to know them all), There were some options.
Jim and you both said the overhead of two independent companies would be higher than ULA, and I’ll take you guys at your word. But how much more? Would it be significant, or more of a drop in the bucked of the huge amount that’s spent on the joint ULA anyway. If we are talking a few million more per year to keep them separate, is it worth it to have this separate entity now that can’t be separated now?
If we are talking tens of millions or hundreds of millions per year, that may be another story.
I mean, I really don’t know, but I have to assume there’s a certain amount of extra costs associated with physically merging Boeing and LM operations into a single entity, especially when their parent companies are often competitors with often opposing interests. Even a shotgun wedding is between two people that like each other enough to get knocked up. It takes a pretty big shotgun to force two people that don’t particularly like each other (or hate each other), and who’ve never liked each other, and who don’t really even have anything in common, into a marriage. And it’s probably a pretty ugly process.
How much cheap is that –really- than keeping the two separate, but splitting the contracts for both for a period of time, and then studying an option to downselect to just one? I’m just looking at it form afar, and that wouldn’t seem to be much more expensive than pushing the two together. And now USAF is married to that new entity with both of their LV’s and all of the legacy liabilities brought in from both sides (the same as they’d have been separately I’d think).
But then, they could have downselected to one and kept Titan as a backup standby while the new EELV proves itself. Then fully retire Titan once the chosen EELV hit an acceptable level of reliability. Both designs were known by USAF and were legitimate, and it should be assumed that any problem that did arise would not be catastrophic or program ending. It would be worked through and fixed. Since humans are not at risk on them like they were After Challenger or Columbia, the criteria for fixing a problem would not be as onerous. A backup would really only be needed temporarily. Maybe they could buy some Titan LV’s and store them somewhere in case they were needed, then retired the production. If not needed by the time the EELV proved itself, they could be fitted with payloads and launched (to get them used so not to go to waste), and then the pads and facilities retired. IF needed, then they could be used while the EELV was being fixed. It’s not like –most- USAF/DoD payloads couldn’t have been delayed 6 months or a year while the EELV issue was getting fixed. And if there was a payload that absolutely –couldn’t- wait as a matter of national security, there’d be an inventory of say 5 Titan IV LV’s which could be tapped.
Would that have been more expensive then supporting two full new LV’s, with new pads, and new infrastructure, full staffs, etc? I dunno, but it seems like there could have been options other than this shotgun wedding that married USAF to two redundant EELV’s forever.
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#163 by Jim on 07 Feb, 2013 23:56
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They consolidated from 3 factories into one. They have reduced their staff by %50. It is now irreversible. They aren't going to split back up. They
EELV's didn't just replace Titan IV, it also replaced Atlas II and somewhat Delta II. Titan IV wasn't an option, production was shut down years before the last launch. Hindsight is 20/20, there was suppose to be sufficient commercial market to support both vehicles. -
#164 by kevin-rf on 08 Feb, 2013 02:26
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Hindsight? Down selecting to two instead of one was driven by national security concerns and rationalized with magic of the commercial market. Two EELV's was about assured access to space, preserving two teams capable of producing launch vehicles, and not being held hostage by the commercial markets.
A shame the rationalized economics didn't work out, but neither did it for the shuttle. Hence the willingness to produce two EELV's. -
#165 by Jim on 08 Feb, 2013 03:16
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Also, the DOD only gave each 500 million and the companies contributed 2.5 to 4 billion total.
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#166 by Lobo on 08 Feb, 2013 04:23
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They consolidated from 3 factories into one. They have reduced their staff by %50. It is now irreversible. They aren't going to split back up. They
EELV's didn't just replace Titan IV, it also replaced Atlas II and somewhat Delta II. Titan IV wasn't an option, production was shut down years before the last launch. Hindsight is 20/20, there was suppose to be sufficient commercial market to support both vehicles.
Well that is encouraging.
Thanks for the other additional information too.
I didn't realize Titan IV production had been shut down that early. -
#167 by joek on 08 Feb, 2013 04:36
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Not to turn this into an EELV history thread, but the history (and future) of the EELV program and ULA are inexorably intertwined. The consolidation and rationalization of ULA has essentially followed the plan laid out in 2006--this was not something they made up along the way. As Jim suggested, pulling them apart would be difficult...
Engineering has been consolidated to Denver CO (ex-LM); manufacturing has been consolidated to Decatur AL (ex-Boeing); LV common systems (avionics and upper stage) and processes (payload integration and pad processing) continues. Boeing and LM have little or no Atlas and Delta expertise remaining; that now resides in ULA.Also, the DOD only gave each 500 million and the companies contributed 2.5 to 4 billion total.
No argument that Boeing and LM put significant skin in the game, but should also be noted that concurrently with those $500M awards in 1998 they also received significant delivery contracts (through FY2003): Boeing $1.38B 19 launches; LM $650M 9 launches. That said...Hindsight is 20/20, there was suppose to be sufficient commercial market to support both vehicles.
Bears repeating. Key decisions were made by DOD, Boeing and LM based on (in hindsight) ecstatic forecasts of the time, which projected that the US government would consume only 30% of EELV launches, with commercial the rest. By the time reality arrived--4-5 years after those decisions and 7-8 years prior to ULA's formation--everyone was in deep and there was no time or money for a do-over.
For those wishing to refresh their memory of those euphoric years...
EELV Program — An Acquisition Reform Success Story, Program Management, May-June 1999*
1999 Commercial Space Transportation Forecasts, FAA, May 1999
For a (somewhat) counterpoint and a bit more history, which includes EELV predecessor programs (e.g., why not Titan, Atlas II/III, ...?), see:
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) — Acquisition and Combat Capability, Air Command and Staff College, March 1997
* That optimisim persisted for several years in some quarters; see later version:
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System — The Next Step in Affordable Space Transportation, Program Management, March-April 2002
edit: correct first link for "EELV Program — An Acquisition Reform Success Story".
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#168 by QuantumG on 08 Feb, 2013 05:00
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Hindsight? Down selecting to two instead of one was driven by national security concerns and rationalized with magic of the commercial market. Two EELV's was about assured access to space, preserving two teams capable of producing launch vehicles, and not being held hostage by the commercial markets.
A shame the rationalized economics didn't work out, but neither did it for the shuttle. Hence the willingness to produce two EELV's.
And now similar logic is being used to keep two commercial crew providers in the game.
The only lesson we can learn from history is that the lessons never seem to be learned.
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#169 by joek on 08 Feb, 2013 05:23
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And now similar logic is being used to keep two commercial crew providers in the game.
The only lesson we can learn from history is that the lessons never seem to be learned.
That's a bit harsh; I think we have learned a bit, and commercial crew's approach reflects it. The EELV program and providers were confident there was a commercial market, and thus convinced themselves that the original plan for down-select to one was unnecessary or short-sighted The commercial crew program has made clear that down-select to one provider is very likely. -
#170 by sdsds on 08 Feb, 2013 07:06
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It might be better to phrase the original question, "After May 1, 2017 and if the FTC imposes no ongoing restrictions at that point, what should Boeing and LM do with ULA?"
One possibility is they could continue to direct ULA to work solely on EELV. It seems to me another possibility would be for the two parent companies to agree to use their ULA child as a joint venture more broadly focused on space launch. Would there be anything stopping them from doing that?
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#171 by joek on 08 Feb, 2013 09:43
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It might be better to phrase the original question, "After May 1, 2017 and if the FTC imposes no ongoing restrictions at that point, what should Boeing and LM do with ULA?"
One possibility is they could continue to direct ULA to work solely on EELV. It seems to me another possibility would be for the two parent companies to agree to use their ULA child as a joint venture more broadly focused on space launch. Would there be anything stopping them from doing that?
Good question, but I'd rephrase that as:QuoteIt might be better to phrase the original question, "After May 1, 2017 and if the DoD imposes no ongoing requirements [as the FTC will likely follow DoD's lead as they have in the past] at that point, what should Boeing and LM do with ULA?"
The likely answer is that US policy and DoD will continue to require and direct ULA to continue on their present path, until there are alternative providers that meet DoD's needs, which by DoD's own reckoning probably won't happen until 2018+.
Will the market in 2018+ prevent ULA's parents from taking a more aggressive stance? Doubtful. Will the market in 2018+ motivate ULA's parents to take a more aggressive stance? Hard to tell. IMHO depends entirely on what ULA is able to do to remain competitive 2018+ without significant support from their parents between now and then, which at present doesn't appear to look good. -
#172 by Proponent on 08 Feb, 2013 10:57
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... two completely different EELV's was not necessarily forever. Per the DoD in 2006, "for the foreseeable future", "because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience", and "until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle".
That's interesting. I wonder whether DoD could ever truly "certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle." -
#173 by Rugoz on 08 Feb, 2013 11:33
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Maybe they should just scrap either Atlas or Delta. What the point of having two EELVs with almost the same payload range? Its not like there is a shortage of launchers in the US. Atlas, Delta, Falcon, Nasa stuff...
Um sorry, guess has already been said
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#174 by Ben the Space Brit on 08 Feb, 2013 12:23
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Maybe they should just scrap either Atlas or Delta. What the point of having two EELVs with almost the same payload range? Its not like there is a shortage of launchers in the US. Atlas, Delta, Falcon, Nasa stuff...
Um sorry, guess has already been said
IF, and that's a big 'if', ULA (via its parents or through a modified corporate constitution) can find more customers, then I think there would be a justification to maintain both Delta-IV and Atlas-V. As matters stand, I think the only thing keeping Delta-IV's nose above the water is the fact that DoD seems to prefer the type and Delta-IVH is currently the only operation vehicle of its type available from US launch providers. -
#175 by Xplor on 08 Feb, 2013 12:29
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Not to turn this into an EELV history thread, but the history (and future) of the EELV program and ULA are inexorably intertwined.
Thank you for the excellent history and links -
#176 by Rugoz on 08 Feb, 2013 12:50
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Quote from: Ben the Space Brit
As matters stand, I think the only thing keeping Delta-IV's nose above the water is the fact that DoD seems to prefer the type and Delta-IVH is currently the only operation vehicle of its type available from US launch providers.
Well then scrap Atlas, uses a russian engine anyway. -
#177 by Xplor on 08 Feb, 2013 12:52
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Maybe they should just scrap either Atlas or Delta. What the point of having two EELVs with almost the same payload range? Its not like there is a shortage of launchers in the US. Atlas, Delta, Falcon, Nasa stuff...
Um sorry, guess has already been said
What US rockets other than Atlas V and Delta IV are available to launch medium to large national security paylaods? -
#178 by jongoff on 08 Feb, 2013 13:14
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And now similar logic is being used to keep two commercial crew providers in the game.
The only lesson we can learn from history is that the lessons never seem to be learned.
That's a bit harsh; I think we have learned a bit, and commercial crew's approach reflects it. The EELV program and providers were confident there was a commercial market, and thus convinced themselves that the original plan for down-select to one was unnecessary or short-sighted The commercial crew program has made clear that down-select to one provider is very likely.
Or it could just be that in life, there are multiple competing lessons to be learned. For instance, the interested reader could probably find a case or two where going to just one provider didn't end up being the financial panacea that naive analysis would suggest. I think the problem is that at the demand rate of government launch, and with the demand of government customers of very high reliability, that you're never going to see cheap launch without there also being a large amount of commercial demand going along with it. Regardless of whether there is one provider, two or three.
Personally, I think that even if the EELVs had been downselected to one (which with the early wins Boeing had, it likely would've been Delta IV), that we wouldn't actually be in much better of a position as far as launch prices are concerned.
~Jon -
#179 by Proponent on 08 Feb, 2013 13:31
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Maybe they should just scrap either Atlas or Delta. What the point of having two EELVs with almost the same payload range? Its not like there is a shortage of launchers in the US. Atlas, Delta, Falcon, Nasa stuff...
Well, officially the idea is that DoD needs both Atlas and Delta, because 1) if one is grounded, the other is still available to launch most of DoD's payloads, and 2) Falcon isn't sufficiently reliable for DoD's purposes. Given the increasing commonality between the Atlas and Delta, however, there is actually a lot of assuredness of launch capability to be had in an independent vehicle, even if it hasn't demonstrated terribly high reliability.
Consider two scenarios for DoD's assured access to space. The first is reliance on Atlas V and Delta IV, with their high demonstrated reliabilities and increasing commonality. The other is reliance on just one of those two and on a new vehicle, e.g., Falcon 9, whose demonstrated reliability is, say 90% (Falcon certainly isn't there yet; let's imagine we're further down the road and it has demonstrated that). Let e be the probability of either EELV failing (e.g., 1%), and let f be the fraction of such failures which are common to both EELVs (e.g., 30%). Then the probability of a common failure is fe, and the probability of either EELV suffering an intrinsic failure unrelated to the other is (1 - f)e. Now, there are two ways the EELV system can fail: either a common failure occurs, or both EELVs suffer intrinsic failures. The combined probability of these events is
E = fe + [(1 - f)e]2 .
Now suppose the fleet consists of a single EELV and a new independent vehicle of lower demonstrated reliability, such as the Falcon. Let the probability of failure of the new vehicle be n. The probability that this mixed fleet fails is simply
M = en .
Attached is a plot of E and M for p=1%, n=10% and a range of values of f. The fraction of common EELV failures, f, need not be very high before a relatively unreliable vehicle provides better back-up than a second EELV. This suggests discontinuing one of the EELVs in the relatively near future if SpaceX is even modestly successful.
