Quote from: Jim on 10/27/2012 07:25 pmULA has around 3500 people for two launch sites, 5 pads, 3 launch vehicle families and integration efforts for around 30 different spacecraft.The comment here is that ULA recieves a yearly $650M launch assurance contract that would cover the cost of all of ULA's employees salaries and overhead.
ULA has around 3500 people for two launch sites, 5 pads, 3 launch vehicle families and integration efforts for around 30 different spacecraft.
Which sounds a pretty expensive bill for things the business *should* be doing to improve its products anyway + archiving it just in case.
$650M / 3500 = $185K/yr.Whether they launch or not? And launch costs are added to this?
Isn't this $650M an expensive bill?
Why is it necessary, other than from ULA's parochial viewpoint of profitability, to grant them a monopoly for more than three years?
But seriously, the 3500 employees to keep the hardware in a "useable" state whether or not they launch has got to be an excessive cost. Is it the case that if they do launch something, they must hire additional people, since the 3500 are maintaining this hardware are kept employed full time at that effort?That cannot be.
If this is not a sort of economic blackmail, then what would it be called?
Quote from: JohnFornaro on 10/28/2012 02:58 pmWhat the problem is? Seems like he made an effort to suggest an industry average, already including the costs you mention.The source of my numbers washttp://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes172011.htm#topbut if we go with the cost for the *top* 10% of aerospace engineers $71.06/hr. *doubling* that to account for benefits and support costs gives $142.12. A 40 hr week at that rate gives $295609.6 [edit] per year.so (assuming you're team is *exclusively* composed of aerospace engineers at the top 10% of the industry pay scale on *nothing* but "mission assurance" $100m gets you 338 engineers a year.Caveats. I'm not an American so I cannot confirm that the "fully burdened" cost of an employee is 2x their annual salary. I can't remember where I saw that figure as a rule of thumb and I could be wrong. Increasing the multiplier (the direction I would *expect* it to go) would reduce the number of engineers.but that is still one *hell* of a lot of variance between launches needing *all* this one off attention.
What the problem is? Seems like he made an effort to suggest an industry average, already including the costs you mention.
As to whether [heh] $650m is fair or not it seems the USAF waived its right to detailed cost data at certain stages (GAO 12-822, 11-641, 08-1039) so it's a bit difficult to tell, although this appears to be changing. One of the key drivers of the ULA merger was that Lockheed agreed to drop its lawsuit on how Boeing acquired about 5000 pages of its internal proprietary documentation. DoD had the choice of having its 2 key LV suppliers tear themselves to pieces in the courts or join hands and let bygones be bygones. They chose the latter and got the FTC agree.
What GAO Recommends (September 2008)GAO recommends the Secretary of Defense take actions to: ensure the regular reporting of key information on program status, produce an independent life-cycle cost estimate, and ensure the program’s staffing meets its needs. DOD concurred with the recommendations. ...The EELV program currently faces uncertainties in the reliability of the vehicles used to launch military and other government spacecraft as well as its budget for future years and in the merger of its two principal suppliers. Taken together, these unknowns require careful monitoring and oversight to ensure a fairly long track record of launch successes can continue.
What GAO Recommends (September 2011)Among other things, GAO recommends DOD assess engine costs and mission assurance activities, reassess the length of the proposed block buy, and consider how to address broader launch acquisition and technology development issues.DOD generally concurred with the recommendations. ...What GAO FoundDOD officials believe the launch industrial base is unstable and plan to implement an acquisition strategy they believe will help stabilize it. The leading proposal would commit the government to a block buy of eight common booster cores—the main component of a launch vehicle—each year, for a 5-year term. However, this approach may be based on incomplete information and although DOD is gathering data that it needs as it finalizes the new acquisition strategy, some critical knowledge gaps remain.
What GAO Recommends (08-13-12)GAO is making no new recommendations in this report. DOD reviewed and concurs with this report. ...Ensure launch mission assurance activities are sufficient and not excessive, and identify ways to incentivize the prime contractor to implement efficiencies without affecting mission success as DOD develops a new contracting structure for the EELV programSome action taken; more action needed
But we still don't know if "launch mission assurance activities are sufficient and not excessive", do we? After four years of round the clock work, by one guy: the Program Executive Officer for Space Launch. "More action needed." Sheesh.
Quote from: JohnFornaro on 10/30/2012 01:07 pmBut we still don't know if "launch mission assurance activities are sufficient and not excessive", do we? After four years of round the clock work, by one guy: the Program Executive Officer for Space Launch. "More action needed." Sheesh.He *might* have a few assistants.
After four years of work on launch mission assurance, more action is still needed, and launch mission assurance is by no means guaranteed by the corporation. So far, it appears that that action will cost more than $650M/yr. Since the work is still not complete, and the issuance of a deadline is assiduously avoided by the PEV in question, it is not yet clear how much more money is needed to "incentivize" the private corporation in question.
A suspicious person might get the idea the DoD was not trying very hard to find out exactly how this money is being spent.