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#660 by bombay on 25 Jan, 2007 00:46
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Jim - 24/1/2007 9:36 AM
And who are those many people outside of San Diego that know the ins-and-outs of building a Centaur tank? I'm curious to know!
The Centaur design was completed over 40 years ago, tank builders have come and gone, the ins and outs are known by many people.... And not all the people are going to leave.
No one else except ULA -
#661 by bombay on 25 Jan, 2007 00:58
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Jim - 24/1/2007 6:13 AM
Yeap, it's no big deal to bond on the insulating material to the bulkhead on the inside of the tank just like it was no big deal to bond on the fixed foam to the outside of the Shuttle external tank. What's a few lives lost here and there.
Structually stable common bulkheads are no big deal. Cryogenics and structually stable common bulkhead are no big deal, just add bond on insulation (See Saturn stages S-IV, S-IVB, and S-II). These were not Centaurs, there is a world of difference. The Centaur is a ballon tank, with a double common bulkhead which have a vacuum between them. That is what no one else can do.
Actually I don't have confidence in MSFC, but the US contractor will be holding MSFC's hand though the whole process. It won't be pretty.
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#662 by quark on 25 Jan, 2007 02:35
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Dexter - 24/1/2007 7:59 AM
Just to paraphrase what was in this article, it mentioned that 1000 people in ULA were to be headquartered in Denver with 500 at a site yet to be opened.
Why would someone differentiate between Denver and a site yet to be opened if that site was not in Denver?
Would not the logical strategy for moving ULA engineering closer to Decatur be kept hidden until after the HB transfers are completed? (Much in the same way as ULA was announced and all the affected employees were kept from transferring out)
And how much of the $80M Alabama incentive package is at risk by not meeting the desired employment targets?
My experience tells me that folks at the top are bottom line thinkers and $80M is not to be sneezed at.
The additional site is also in Denver, a leased facility because all 1500 people won't fit on the current LM site. Nothing to do with Alabama. -
#663 by Dexter on 25 Jan, 2007 03:46
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Jim - 24/1/2007 9:15 AM
Here is your site yet to be opened.
"Facilities Update: Last Friday the ULA Board of Directors gave the go-ahead for lease of the building at 9100 East Mineral Circle in southeast Denver (which is not Denver but Centennial). The 160,000-square-foot building has room for about 680 people. Detailed occupancy planning is under way for the building, which will begin as early as the second quarter."
Like I said, the LM building in huntsville can't be for ULA
1. It is in Huntsville, which is too far away from being "colocated" with the plant in Decaut
2. it is still LM's. and therefore not ULA, which is separate. ULA now has to buy services from LM and Boeing. No more freebies
3. The building is for NMD. That is where the big money in in HuntsvilleLooking at Google Earth, Centennial appears to be much closer to Denver than Waterton. So is Waterton part of Denver now?
I find it interesting that Tacoma can be the same as Seattle but Centennial is diffrent than Denver.
Reviewing this thread, I recall that one of the items that held back the formation of ULA was the 50-50 contribution between Lockheed and Boeing.
Boeing contibutes 5 launch pads, two product lines, and a state of the art factory in Decatur.
Lockheed contributes one product line (with Russian engines), two launch pads, and a leased facility that apperently is now not in Denver in addition to the dropped law suit.
In all the responses to my "BS" theory, there is a failure to address the $80M incentive package from Alabama that was expecting a workforce of 3,000. The state definitely learned a lesson from the Mercedes deal and was quoted as saying that they would not negotiate for anything that they could not get back. That sounds like penalty clauses to me.
Why would ULA risk losing $80M if they could show in good faith that they relocated jobs to Alabama. And what jobs would be left to relocate with all the manufacturing already there at 750?
So when you reply to this post in an attempt to refute it, please address the following:
50-50 contribution
$80M incentive package
3,000 versus 750.
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#664 by Dexter on 25 Jan, 2007 04:05
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Jim - 24/1/2007 9:36 AM
QuoteDexter - 24/1/2007 9:49 AM
QuoteJim - 24/1/2007 6:13 AM
Structually stable common bulkheads are no big deal. Cryogenics and structually stable common bulkhead are no big deal, just add bond on insulation (See Saturn stages S-IV, S-IVB, and S-II). These were not Centaurs, there is a world of difference. The Centaur is a ballon tank, with a double common bulkhead which have a vacuum between them. That is what no one else can do.
Actually I don't have confidence in MSFC, but the US contractor will be holding MSFC's hand though the whole process. It won't be pretty.In your own words, you state what I have been saying all along.
Bringing this thread back on topic, ULA will put at great risk, this unique capability because all the experienced technical people will be gone.
No, I didn't say that. I was talking about a new design.
The Centaur design was completed over 40 years ago, tank builders have come and gone, the ins and outs are known by many people.... And not all the people are going to leave.
No one else except ULAWhat you said is "That is what no one else can do." This is present tense and implies something that is being done today.
I don't understand what you mean by "No one else except ULA"
Don't worry about MSFC, they are the big picture people who don't have to stare a computer screens all day. That's what contractors are for.
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#665 by Jim on 25 Jan, 2007 11:13
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bombay - 24/1/2007 8:58 PM
Yeap, it's no big deal to bond on the insulating material to the bulkhead on the inside of the tank just like it was no big deal to bond on the fixed foam to the outside of the Shuttle external tank.
11 Saturn V's, 6 Saturn I's and 9 Saturn IB's using 60's materials technology proves it is no big deal. Bonding fixed foam on the outside on ELV's is no big deal either.
There is nothing wrong with the foam on the ET, it is the tiles that are the problem. -
#666 by Jim on 25 Jan, 2007 11:24
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Dexter - 24/1/2007 11:46 PM
50-50 contribution
$80M incentive package
3,000 versus 750.
One Atlas EELV program and One Delta EELV program. Looks 50-50 to me. Boeing threw in Delta II. Boeing and LM agreed to the formation of the company. It seems they are ok with it. I just you have to take that up with them. LM is not providing a leased facility, ULA is getting it. there are 2 Delta IV pads. NASA owns the west coast one and USAF owns the east coast ones.
I am sure that there are escape clauses for ULA -
#667 by spacedreams on 25 Jan, 2007 16:34
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No it's not true. Rocket tank designers and stress analysts don't simply pack up there pencil and paper and move on to another program to design something else upon completion of the initial design phase.
Actually, that is exactly what does happen. There are two distinct phases to a "design" prject. The first stage starts with the blank sheet and goes through somewhere around CDR and first machining. The second phase is more production oriented (manufacturing, functional modifications, upgrades, etc ...) and actually making things work and that goes on until the last vehicle is launched. Most of the designers (not all) usually tend to settle into either one phase or the other and are employed accordingly.
The way it works is that the program will staff up at the beginning of the program with a combination of experienced guys coming over from other "winding down" programs, contractors ("job shoppers") and new hires. Toward the end of the first stage the company will start laying off the shoppers and a few of the experienced guys will start sniffing around for newer programs. Eventually somebody will get taken on to one of these new programs and then as the old program initial phase winds down they will pull all their buddies over to the brandnew program where they also meet up with their shopper buddies from the old job and the cycle continues. In the meantime, the old program will start pulling in other guys that have more production type experience from programs who are really becoming extinct. It doesn't all happen at once, more of a slow transition cycle but you end up working with many of the same people on several different projects.
The guys that are more likely to see a program through both stages are either new hires, upward mobile types, or older guys just looking to settle down. The new guys don't really know what they like yet so they tend to want to see at least one project through just to figure that out. They usually don't have as strong of connections to get on with the new projects right away unless their really good either. Then the upward mobile types usually find that there is more opportunity to climb the ladder as the phases transitions so they take advantage and stay. Then you have the older guys, "grey beards", who are looking at their retirement benefits, don't want to start over again with a new company, don't want to change their commute, can't take advantage of a salary increase because they are alreacy at the upper range, and just want to be an expert on something. They will stay on a project until there is no more work to do. And when that time comes, there is usually somebody who just finished their CDR who is looking for people to take it into production.
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#668 by Propforce on 25 Jan, 2007 20:23
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Spacedreams makes a good point, but the reality comes down to the chart below.
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#669 by bombay on 25 Jan, 2007 23:18
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Jim - 25/1/2007 6:13 AM
Why are you trying to mislead?Quotebombay - 24/1/2007 8:58 PM
Yeap, it's no big deal to bond on the insulating material to the bulkhead on the inside of the tank just like it was no big deal to bond on the fixed foam to the outside of the Shuttle external tank.
11 Saturn V's, 6 Saturn I's and 9 Saturn IB's using 60's materials technology proves it is no big deal. Bonding fixed foam on the outside on ELV's is no big deal either.
There is nothing wrong with the foam on the ET, it is the tiles that are the problem.
The Columbia disaster was caused by a chunk of sprayed-on foam insulation on the external tank detaching and striking the edge of the wing. The impact then destroyed several thermal tiles, which then allowed heated gas to enter and destroy the wing structure. The root cause was the bonded on foam detaching, not the tiles.
26 Saturn flights doesn't prove that it's no big deal. It took over 100 shuttle flights to determine that there was a big deal with the sprayed-on foam. And after 2.5 yrs of trying to fix the problem, foam fell off on the Discovery return to flight in 2005. As I recollect, 270 successes will result in success with 90% confidence.
So as the MSFC engineers look for that fail safe mechanism to ensure FOD doesn't enter into the Ares I upperstage propellant system, the answer is right across the street with the Centaur methodolgy and it's 300 or 400 successes. -
#670 by Jim on 25 Jan, 2007 23:36
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bombay - 25/1/2007 7:18 PM
Why are you trying to mislead?
.
The Columbia accident was cause by a inherent design flaw. Using a fragile TPS and placing it next to a known debris shedding structure was the flaw. And it is not just bonded on foam. All launch vehicles shed debris, especially ones using SOFI. The shuttle problem was known after the first few flights and was ignored. Because the foam is the issue and it can't be fixed, the shuttle program is crutching the system by performing inflight inspections and terminating the program in 15 flights.
There was never an issue with the insulation on interior of the Saturns. It is not even related to SOFI or BOFI
Only 150 or so Centaurs.
not across the street. It is in Denver
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#671 by bombay on 26 Jan, 2007 00:04
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Jim - 25/1/2007 6:36 PM
Having no issue on only 26 flights does not mean that there was no detachment of insulation from the bulkhead into the tank. All FOD will not shutdown an engine, but it potentially could. To think that a bonded, nonhomogeneous condition between insulation mat'l and aluminum while subjected to membrane and mechanical loading at -423 degrees poses no risk of detachment, is an illusion.
There was never an issue with the insulation on interior of the Saturns. It is not even related to SOFI or BOFI
Only 150 or so Centaurs.
not across the street. It is in Denver
The Centaur could fly 1000 times and FOD contamination from the common bulkhead will NEVER be an issue because of the unique design.
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#672 by Jim on 26 Jan, 2007 00:10
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bombay - 25/1/2007 8:04 PM
The Centaur could fly 1000 times and FOD contamination from the common bulkhead will NEVER be an issue because of the unique design.
But depressurization and ice ingestion happened multiple times. So you trade one risk for another
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#673 by Gus on 26 Jan, 2007 04:04
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Jim - 24/1/2007 7:15 AM
Here is your site yet to be opened.
"Facilities Update: Last Friday the ULA Board of Directors gave the go-ahead for lease of the building at 9100 East Mineral Circle in southeast Denver (which is not Denver but Centennial). The 160,000-square-foot building has room for about 680 people. Detailed occupancy planning is under way for the building, which will begin as early as the second quarter."
I have seen this quote but not in the public domain. This is from an internal ULA status report to all ULA employees from Michael Gass and Dan Collins. I did not know NASA was on distribution.
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#674 by Gus on 26 Jan, 2007 04:48
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Propforce - 25/1/2007 1:23 PM
Spacedreams makes a good point, but the reality comes down to the chart below.
Nice Chart Propforce. The only thing I disagree with is the good buddies staying through the end of the program. That is usually the professionals who do that as the good buddies have moved on to the next project. The good buddies usually are associated with suspect academic credentials and are not capable of seeing a project through to the end except on the coat-tails of the more capable professionals. -
#675 by Gus on 26 Jan, 2007 05:23
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Jim - 25/1/2007 5:10 PM
Quotebombay - 25/1/2007 8:04 PM
The Centaur could fly 1000 times and FOD contamination from the common bulkhead will NEVER be an issue because of the unique design.
But depressurization and ice ingestion happened multiple times. So you trade one risk for another
The last time ice ingestion ocurred was 1993 on AC101. The cause was a tygon tube that slipped off the sense port. The design is much more robust now.
Depressurization is something even the structurally stable designs have to contend with. They are not structurally stable under flight loads and thus have to carry a pressurization system just like a balloon design. The risk is the same for both.
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#676 by Propforce on 26 Jan, 2007 06:46
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Jim - 25/1/2007 4:36 PM
Quotebombay - 25/1/2007 7:18 PM
Why are you trying to mislead?
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The Columbia accident was cause by a inherent design flaw.
Wrong. The Columbia TRAGEDY was due to a seris of HUMAN ERRORS including NASA mismanagement.
One of the causes was due to the inexperienced thermal analysts Boeing has at Houston and, because Boeing had cut the fundings of its Shuttle support budget in HB (where the experienced guys are at who did not move to Houston), their inability to assess the severity of damage caused their failure to warn their appropriate NASA counter-part in a timely fashion. Afterward, Boeing quickly reinstated its funding to the HB shuttle guys in order to avoid any further embarrassment to the company. This was known to the NASA inner circle.
Shortly afterward, then-shuttle program manager Ron Dittmore became the president of ATK and ex-ATK guy Scott Horowitz became the Deputy Adminstrator under Griffin for Space Exploration, and the next centerpiece of NASA space access (ESAS) builds around the ATK SRB. But that's another story altogether.
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#677 by Propforce on 26 Jan, 2007 07:03
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Gus - 25/1/2007 10:23 PM
QuoteJim - 25/1/2007 5:10 PM
Quotebombay - 25/1/2007 8:04 PM
The Centaur could fly 1000 times and FOD contamination from the common bulkhead will NEVER be an issue because of the unique design.
But depressurization and ice ingestion happened multiple times. So you trade one risk for another
The last time ice ingestion ocurred was 1993 on AC101. The cause was a tygon tube that slipped off the sense port. The design is much more robust now.
Depressurization is something even the structurally stable designs have to contend with. They are not structurally stable under flight loads and thus have to carry a pressurization system just like a balloon design. The risk is the same for both.
FOD contamination is something that ALL launch vehicles have to watchout for, not just unique to the common bulkhead tank design. It starts with design but key prevention is during manufacturing and assembly of EACH individual flight hardware. For Delta, there are processes in place at Decatur to check & re-check cleanliness & contaminations. At launch site, the ground system is designed in place to prevent FOD during propellant loadings.
During boost phase, the Delta US tank pressures are "locked" so I guess you can call it "pressure-stabilized" as the ambient pressure drops rapidly. In the last few minutes of CBC boost phase, the tanks are vented and re-pressurized as the RL-10 undergoes the chilldown during flight and the upper stage prepares for separation.
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#678 by Propforce on 26 Jan, 2007 07:07
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Gus - 25/1/2007 9:48 PM
QuotePropforce - 25/1/2007 1:23 PM
Spacedreams makes a good point, but the reality comes down to the chart below.
Nice Chart Propforce. The only thing I disagree with is the good buddies staying through the end of the program. That is usually the professionals who do that as the good buddies have moved on to the next project. The good buddies usually are associated with suspect academic credentials and are not capable of seeing a project through to the end except on the coat-tails of the more capable professionals.
You make a good point as good buddies usually scatter looking for the next project to latch onto and leave the professional to clean up the mess they caused.
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#679 by vda on 26 Jan, 2007 10:11
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> Wrong. The Columbia TRAGEDY was due to a seris of HUMAN ERRORS including NASA mismanagement.
NASA knew that foam is shedding but did nothing. This is exactly what Feynman was talking about in his famous Appendix F to Roger's Commission report - if something doesn't work to design specs - find out why, and fix it. Nature cannot be fooled. But managers again forgot about it. Too many manages which do not listen to techies. When techies say you "this goddamn thing can fail! We need to fix it!" you'd better listen to that, _especially_ if you are a manager and do not know anything about the matter.
NASA got it wrong _twice_ and I do not beieve things have improved enough. For example, SRB people again are high in the chain of command, as you correctly noticed.
