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#1020
by
Propforce
on 20 Jun, 2007 00:40
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bombay - 19/6/2007 5:29 PM
Jim - 19/6/2007 10:03 AM
it is total BS to blame this on the formation of ULA.
4. RL-10 problems are not ULA
Assuming the RL-10 engine was the issue with the Centaur mishap, this is example of a potentially troubling source of a single-point failure that could ground both the Delta and Atlas fleets.
I understand that there are different variants of the engine, regardless, they represent a common component in both systems that could hinder the U.S. nat'l policy of assuring access to space.
Couple this with the cracked Delta IV pad and you're left with zero launch capability.
It would appear the recent Atlas NRO launch will have a similar failure investigation as Delta III. First there will be some investigation on [i[whose fault[/i] is it, e.g., did the problem occurred on the 2nd stage itself, or did the problem lies on the RL-10 engine? Unless there's a strong evidence point one way or the other, there will be some finger pointings from both sides.
In either case, both Atlas and Delta were grounded until the investigation & follow-up actions were completed. If indeed this NRO launch "anomaly" does point to the RL-10 engine, this could ground the fleet for 12 ~ 18 months.
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#1021
by
bombay
on 20 Jun, 2007 01:09
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Propforce - 19/6/2007 7:40 PM
bombay - 19/6/2007 5:29 PM
Jim - 19/6/2007 10:03 AM
it is total BS to blame this on the formation of ULA.
4. RL-10 problems are not ULA
Assuming the RL-10 engine was the issue with the Centaur mishap, this is example of a potentially troubling source of a single-point failure that could ground both the Delta and Atlas fleets.
I understand that there are different variants of the engine, regardless, they represent a common component in both systems that could hinder the U.S. nat'l policy of assuring access to space.
Couple this with the cracked Delta IV pad and you're left with zero launch capability.
It would appear the recent Atlas NRO launch will have a similar failure investigation as Delta III. First there will be some investigation on [i[whose fault[/i] is it, e.g., did the problem occurred on the 2nd stage itself, or did the problem lies on the RL-10 engine? Unless there's a strong evidence point one way or the other, there will be some finger pointings from both sides.
In either case, both Atlas and Delta were grounded until the investigation & follow-up actions were completed. If indeed this NRO launch "anomaly" does point to the RL-10 engine, this could ground the fleet for 12 ~ 18 months.
The Delta III flight that you're referring to failed in May 1999. The Maiden flight of Atlas III was delayed from Feb. 2000 to May 2000. So a one year grounding of the fleets is a distinct possibility depending on the actual cause.
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#1022
by
yinzer
on 20 Jun, 2007 01:38
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bombay - 19/6/2007 6:09 PM
Propforce - 19/6/2007 7:40 PM
It would appear the recent Atlas NRO launch will have a similar failure investigation as Delta III. First there will be some investigation on [i[whose fault[/i] is it, e.g., did the problem occurred on the 2nd stage itself, or did the problem lies on the RL-10 engine? Unless there's a strong evidence point one way or the other, there will be some finger pointings from both sides.
In either case, both Atlas and Delta were grounded until the investigation & follow-up actions were completed. If indeed this NRO launch "anomaly" does point to the RL-10 engine, this could ground the fleet for 12 ~ 18 months.
The Delta III flight that you're referring to failed in May 1999. The Maiden flight of Atlas III was delayed from Feb. 2000 to May 2000. So a one year grounding of the fleets is a distinct possibility depending on the actual cause.
Nice try. The Delta III failure grounded the Atlas fleet from June, when the inaugural Atlas III was expected to fly, until September, when an Atlas IIAS launched EchoStar 5. Three months.
It took time for Lockheed to line up a customer for the inaugural Atlas III flight after Loral jumped ship, but there was no further readiness impact from the RL10, as can be seen by the five other Atlas IIA family flights between September 1999 and May 2000.
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#1023
by
Propforce
on 20 Jun, 2007 01:55
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yinzer - 19/6/2007 6:38 PM
Nice try. The Delta III failure grounded the Atlas fleet from June, when the inaugural Atlas III was expected to fly, until September, when an Atlas IIAS launched EchoStar 5. Three months.
IIRC, there were some finger pointings between the vehicle guy (Delta III) and the engine guy (RL-10). Boeing, the vehicle guy, claimed the failure was due to a "breach" to the RL-10 combustion chamber, e.g., it came apart, during the 2nd burn, while P&W kept insisting on the engine cut-off was due to vehicle faults. I don't know what was the final official findings.
It was apparent that P&W performed additional analysis/ testing and convinced Lockheed & Air Force that the engine on the Atlas III was good enough to fly. The problem was unique to the B2 variant so Atlas III was cleared to flight.
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#1024
by
WHAP
on 20 Jun, 2007 02:23
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For those of you who have discussed the savings ULA is supposed to provide, this weekend's Denver Post had a interview with the ULA CEO.
http://www.denverpost.com/aerospace/ci_6155029The relevant paragraph:
"Q: How long do you think it will take for the U.S. government to realize the $150 million in expected savings from the rocket joint venture?
A: They start showing the actual budget savings in 2011. We are guaranteeing the savings in the form of a 2-for-1 guarantee, that for every dollar we spend in consolidation costs to form this company, we have to deliver $2 in savings. We've already spent quite a bit of money. We have to deliver the savings if we want to get reimbursed."
I'm not actually sure how to read it. ULA is going to incur consolidation costs, and those will be reimbursed by the government. In 2011, ULA will start showing a savings for operations (consolidation
should be done by then) over the original plan for the separate companies. ULA has to show double the the savings of the consolidation costs in order to be reimbursed by the government for those costs. I'm sure there are a lot of ways to make this work...
It's interesting that the question said "$150 million in savings", not $150 million
per year in savings.
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#1025
by
yinzer
on 20 Jun, 2007 02:42
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Propforce - 19/6/2007 6:55 PM
yinzer - 19/6/2007 6:38 PM
Nice try. The Delta III failure grounded the Atlas fleet from June, when the inaugural Atlas III was expected to fly, until September, when an Atlas IIAS launched EchoStar 5. Three months.
IIRC, there were some finger pointings between the vehicle guy (Delta III) and the engine guy (RL-10). Boeing, the vehicle guy, claimed the failure was due to a "breach" to the RL-10 combustion chamber, e.g., it came apart, during the 2nd burn, while P&W kept insisting on the engine cut-off was due to vehicle faults. I don't know what was the final official findings.
It was apparent that P&W performed additional analysis/ testing and convinced Lockheed & Air Force that the engine on the Atlas III was good enough to fly. The problem was unique to the B2 variant so Atlas III was cleared to flight.
Manufacturing flaw in the RL10 - incorrect brazing of stiffener rings on the main combustion chamber. They went back through X-Rays taken during the manufacture and found proof.
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#1026
by
Propforce
on 20 Jun, 2007 03:02
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yinzer - 19/6/2007 7:42 PM
Manufacturing flaw in the RL10 - incorrect brazing of stiffener rings on the main combustion chamber. They went back through X-Rays taken during the manufacture and found proof.
Good link!
It sure is better to reference a document than relying on one's memory!
Apparently the failure investigation was concluded in September 1999, the same time Atlas III was cleared for launch.
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#1027
by
bombay
on 20 Jun, 2007 03:04
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WHAP - 19/6/2007 9:23 PM
For those of you who have discussed the savings ULA is supposed to provide, this weekend's Denver Post had a interview with the ULA CEO.
http://www.denverpost.com/aerospace/ci_6155029
The relevant paragraph:
"Q: How long do you think it will take for the U.S. government to realize the $150 million in expected savings from the rocket joint venture?
A: They start showing the actual budget savings in 2011. We are guaranteeing the savings in the form of a 2-for-1 guarantee, that for every dollar we spend in consolidation costs to form this company, we have to deliver $2 in savings. We've already spent quite a bit of money. We have to deliver the savings if we want to get reimbursed."
I'm not actually sure how to read it. ULA is going to incur consolidation costs, and those will be reimbursed by the government. In 2011, ULA will start showing a savings for operations (consolidation should be done by then) over the original plan for the separate companies. ULA has to show double the the savings of the consolidation costs in order to be reimbursed by the government for those costs. I'm sure there are a lot of ways to make this work...
It's interesting that the question said "$150 million in savings", not $150 million per year in savings.
ULA is getting reimbursed for what? They're the ones that should be doing the reimbursing.
Supposedly the gov't is paying the transitions costs for the first three years (Nat'l Sec. Space Launch Report). After three years, the gov't is supposed to realize $100M-$150M per year from the joint venture, which would go towards paying back the upfront transition costs that the gov't provided.
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#1028
by
Gov't Seagull
on 20 Jun, 2007 22:25
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Propforce - 19/6/2007 5:53 PM
In reality, an engine company is like a wife once you married her. Your vehicle is designed around its capabilities and limitations. There's not much you can do to "manage" the engine company especially, in this case, they are the only game in town and they know it all too well. You will pay and pay even if the issues are in-house with P&W as you are deeply dependent on them. Both Atlas & Delta have continue to buy RL-10s coming off production lines, eventhough they were not launching many birds, in order to keep the RL-10 people employed and the production line open. That decision went above head of both launch houses and straight to the Air Force.
Much of what you are saying is true. The AF must keep PWR in profitable business, and ultimately pays for any problems, even if they are PWR's fault. That being the case, I modestly propose that the AF just buy PWR outright. It'd only cost about the same as one big NRO bird, and it would solve a lot of problems at one fell swoop. The idea that PWR is a free-market company engaged in open competition with other players is a charade and everyone knows it. Even if the AF is willing to go Russian, PWR gets a slice (RD-180). They should just buy out PWR, declare it the "Rocketdyne National Propulsion Laboratory", and contract with United Technologies to manage it.
Obviously, certain political realities would have to be overcome in order to do this. A National Lab is prohibited by law from making campaign contributions, so key Congressmen would have to be persuaded to give up their piece of the action.
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#1029
by
Dexter
on 21 Jun, 2007 04:24
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Jim - 19/6/2007 10:03 AM
Dexter - 18/6/2007 11:13 PM
This change over in talent seems to be having an effect on ULA wth all the problems to date
1. Cracked Delta 4 pad
2. Delta 2 pad crane breaks down - who is doing maintenance?
3. Damaged solar array on DAWN spacecraft.
4. Atlas V fails to put NRO satellites in correct orbit.
it is total BS to blame this on the formation of ULA.
1. The cracked pad is completely independent of this
2. A separate USAF contractor performs maintenance on the D-II pads
3. Not a Delta II tech but a spacecraft tech (even if it were, it is not due to ULA, since the same techs are there)
4. RL-10 problems are not ULA
In your denial that this is not ULA related, how do you account for the fact that there are 707 (now 731) openings for positions in the newly formed ULA??
How can a company that is justifying savings by manpower reductions be in need of so many new job requisitions??
How is this different from the Titan failures of the mid 1990s that were attributed to a loss of key technical personell???
Inquiring minds want to know!
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#1030
by
WHAP
on 22 Jun, 2007 02:07
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Which Titan failures were attributed to loss of key technical personnel?
I'm with Jim on this (mostly):
1. The pad issue was not that long after ULA formation. Certainly there have been folks leaving the Delta program since ULA was announced, but the launch folks have probably not seen nearly the attrition that the HB folks have.
2. Poor oversight by the AF, maybe, but not ULA.
3. Maybe poor oversight by ULA, but probably not. Most times the launch vehicle folks don't come near the spacecraft (except maybe encapsulation and lift), and are certainly not involved directly with spacecraft processing.
4. I disagree with Jim that RL10 problems are not ULA. But until someone provides the cause of the problem, it would be hard to say the ULA formation was to blame. If it was RL10 related, that may be even harder because that engine was probably built long before ULA.
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#1031
by
bombay
on 22 Jun, 2007 04:27
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WHAP - 21/6/2007 9:07 PM
Which Titan failures were attributed to loss of key technical personnel?
August 1998, a Titan IVA carrying a $1B NRO satellite exploded after liftoff.
April 1999, a Titan IVB failed to place a $632M satellite in the desired orbit.
April 1999, a Titan IVB placed the most expensive unmanned satellite ($1.23B) in space launch history in a useless orbit.
The internal review noted numerous discrepancies, but the following shortfalls were consistently identified throughout: 1) emphasis on cost cutting measures; 2) loss of experienced personnel; 3) inadequate manufacturing process controls; and 4) inefficient oversight on quality assurance.
It was further concluded that the emphasis on cost cutting measures influenced the other three findings, particularly in the loss of key personnel.
All of this, I think, sounds eerily familiar with the ULA current state of affairs.
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#1032
by
Antares
on 22 Jun, 2007 04:51
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I really don't understand this ULA witchhunt, especially given that the effects of it have been mild so far. The only noticeable effects have been poor morale and HB attrition. Neither of those have contributed to any of these problems. Well, poor morale could be a distraction for cracked pad, but that's a big stretch.
Bombay, I'll put the question to you that I put to Dexter: what feasible alternate state would you rather see? Without ULA, one of these rockets would have left the business. If the nation is willing to put all of its launch eggs in one basket and have even fewer cost controls, that's a viable solution. But no one in SMC, SpaceCom or DoD in their right mind would do that.
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#1033
by
jimvela
on 22 Jun, 2007 05:23
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Antares - 21/6/2007 10:51 PM
Bombay, I'll put the question to you that I put to Dexter: what feasible alternate state would you rather see? Without ULA, one of these rockets would have left the business. If the nation is willing to put all of its launch eggs in one basket and have even fewer cost controls, that's a viable solution. But no one in SMC, SpaceCom or DoD in their right mind would do that.
*Cough* SpaceX *Cough*
I agree there's a bit of a witch hunt going on, but disagree that if one or the other launch vehicle went away that there'd be no other providers.
I'd rather see nimble startups taking swings at all types of business, if for no other reason than to keep existing competitors actually being competitive.
The verdict is still out in my opinion because if ULA succeeds in lowering overall costs for whatever EELVs survive then it will turn out to be a good thing for all.
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#1034
by
Dexter
on 22 Jun, 2007 06:01
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Antares - 21/6/2007 11:51 PM
I really don't understand this ULA witchhunt, especially given that the effects of it have been mild so far. The only noticeable effects have been poor morale and HB attrition. Neither of those have contributed to any of these problems. Well, poor morale could be a distraction for cracked pad, but that's a big stretch.
Bombay, I'll put the question to you that I put to Dexter: what feasible alternate state would you rather see? Without ULA, one of these rockets would have left the business. If the nation is willing to put all of its launch eggs in one basket and have even fewer cost controls, that's a viable solution. But no one in SMC, SpaceCom or DoD in their right mind would do that.
Let me reiterate what I have been saying all along.
Option 1 - Downselect one programs.
Option 2 - Keep both programs.
Option 3 - Form ULA.
Option 1 and 2 keep programs intact. Option 3 damages Delta engineering expertise and Atlas manufacturing expertise. How can option 3 have been the best option?
And now we hear that ULA is considering killing Delta 2. In light of recent developments, how can this be part of an "assured access to space" strategy?
As stated by jimvela, SpaceX is a lean upstart that should be given every opportunity to demonstrate EELV capabilty to create true competition.
To put it in layman's terms, SpaceX is like Southwest airline. Lockheed/ Boeing/ULA is like Pan AM/TWA/Eastern airlines.
Anatres, since you have challenged us with what the alternatives are, let me challenge you to answer why ULA has job postings for 731 employees, how this affects the expertise within the company, and how ULA will prevent this exodus of expertise from manifesting itself as additonal "incidents/anomalies"
?
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#1035
by
MKremer
on 22 Jun, 2007 06:20
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Other than existing contract flight hardware for the next few years, Delta II is already a cancelled program, isn't it?
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#1036
by
Jim
on 22 Jun, 2007 11:23
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Dexter - 22/6/2007 2:01 AM
. Lockheed/ Boeing/ULA is like Pan AM/TWA/Eastern airlines.
Wrong, more like Delta and United airlines
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#1037
by
Antares
on 22 Jun, 2007 13:08
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SpaceX: where does one draw the line between a viable company that still hasn't flown yet and Joe's Rocket Shop that never will? Federal Acquisition Regs require an unassailable rationale to justify spending money on one company over the others. The "Me Toos" will come out of the woodwork if the case is not a dead lock cinch. This is even a problem when deciding which companies a government agency might visit.
Delta II: ULA is not killing it. The market is.
ULA vacancies: The better engineering culture is winning. Anything more I might say would require a couple of pages to properly explain or else it would be unfair to the good ones at ULA-Delta. Everyone has known about the loss of talent problem since ULA was announced in May 2005. That's more than enough time to manage the transition. If I were ULA-Atlas, I'd be salivating at the chance to learn another rocket, especially my main competitor. At this point, the sooner Delta moves, the sooner the Atlas folks can start learning it. In actuality, many of the Delta IV designers left the company before ULA was just a gleam in Chicago's eye.
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#1038
by
jimvela
on 22 Jun, 2007 14:01
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Antares - 22/6/2007 7:08 AM
SpaceX: where does one draw the line between a viable company that still hasn't flown yet and Joe's Rocket Shop that never will?
When they actually fly? SpaceX hasn't sucessfully put a customer payload into orbit yet, but they have actually gotten two launch vehicles off of the ground, and one actually into space.
Aside from that, they have credible facilities, credible workforce, credible designs, and credible processes.
SpaceX is not an example of an inviable company, they're an example of a potentially viable startup in a very high risk endeavor. What happens next for them depends entirely on how they manage to perform. That's exactly what an entrepreneur would want to have in their startup.
A better example would be Armadillo Aerospace, whom looks for all the world to be doing amazing work on a shoestring, but *at the moment* is not a credible launch provider for anything other than suborbital work and prize competitions. If they can secure funding and start demonstrating launch platforms that can credibly and reliably exhibit orbital capabilities then they too could fall into that category if for no other reason than actually flying hardware. They probably will be a factor in suborbital space tourism, but I'm not sure that any of them will be getting rich from that market.
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#1039
by
McDew
on 22 Jun, 2007 16:49
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MKremer - 22/6/2007 2:20 AM
Other than existing contract flight hardware for the next few years, Delta II is already a cancelled program, isn't it?
Far from it, another block buy of Delta II’s is almost guaranteed. All NASA needs to do is just dust off the sole source justification they used for the Pack 19 award and change the date.
Key words: “High Value” + “Cat 3” + “Medium Class” + “Wait and See poses unacceptable risks” = Sole Source Award per FAR 16.505(b)(2)
It sure is better to reference a document than relying on one's memory! 