CCDev to CCiCAP to CCtCAP Discussion Thread

[yg1968]

Here is a good summary of the CCtCap awards:
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2605/1

[baldusi]

So I guess now you divide up the astronaut class, group A for Dragon and group B for CST. Since each capsule layout and interface will be different.

The example, I suppose, would be how NASA astronauts trained for launching on both Shuttle and Soyuz.  Won't they also be passengers, not pilots?

 - Ed Kyle

But you have to train for contingency situations, evacuation, loss of pressure, aborts, etc. And if I'm guessing it right, training and qualification will be done by the contractors (i.e. Boeing and SpaceX). Probably NASA will want as much commonality as possible. But my guess is that it will be one of the lessons learned from this program. In the end, Boeing and SpaceX will have to coordinate a lot to simplify things for NASA.
But I wonder if the chance of qualifying CST-100 on Falcon 9 won't help a bit here. Or may be the FAA might step in. But I don't expect this until 2018/9 at the earliest.

[Nindalf]

But you have to train for contingency situations, evacuation, loss of pressure, aborts, etc.

Seems like diminishing returns to me.

Progressively improving and testing the capsule and launch vehicle: increasing crew survivability from 50% (if you take your first whack at it, and stick people in, totally untested) to 90% to 99% to 99.9% to 99.99% (extensive launch history) etc.

Progressively improving and training on emergency procedures: increasing crew survivability from 99% (stick blindfolded human cargo in the capsule, without telling them they're going to space), to 99.1% ("You can use the seat cushions as a floatation device." flight attendant speech), to 99.11% to 99.111% to 99.1111% (he train from child) etc.  And as the vehicle is improved, those benefits are going down from 0.1...% to 0.01...% to 0.001...%

Back in the Mercury/Gemini/Apollo days, human skill was important because they had such limited control systems, and there was even some hardware that was accessible and meaningfully field-repairable/modifiable.  Now, in a modern spacecraft, if something goes wrong, and there isn't a programmed response, and ground control doesn't take care of it, it's terribly unlikely that it will be anything that the so-called "crew" can do anything about.

I think in this generation, the realistically useful vehicle-specific "crew" training is going to amount to:
In the CST-100: knowing for each individual button, why you should never press it.
In the Dragon V2: knowing how to delete any U2 albums that are automatically uploaded.

[R7]

Back in the Mercury/Gemini/Apollo days, human skill was important because they had such limited control systems, and there was even some hardware that was accessible and meaningfully field-repairable/modifiable.  Now, in a modern spacecraft, if something goes wrong, and there isn't a programmed response, and ground control doesn't take care of it, it's terribly unlikely that it will be anything that the so-called "crew" can do anything about.

Why are you assuming crew of modern spacecrafts cannot access hardware and field-repair/mod it? Volvo didn't win CCtCAP contract...

[arachnitect]

But you have to train for contingency situations, evacuation, loss of pressure, aborts, etc.

Seems like diminishing returns to me.

Progressively improving and testing the capsule and launch vehicle: increasing crew survivability from 50% (if you take your first whack at it, and stick people in, totally untested) to 90% to 99% to 99.9% to 99.99% (extensive launch history) etc.

Progressively improving and training on emergency procedures: increasing crew survivability from 99% (stick blindfolded human cargo in the capsule, without telling them they're going to space), to 99.1% ("You can use the seat cushions as a floatation device." flight attendant speech), to 99.11% to 99.111% to 99.1111% (he train from child) etc.  And as the vehicle is improved, those benefits are going down from 0.1...% to 0.01...% to 0.001...%

Back in the Mercury/Gemini/Apollo days, human skill was important because they had such limited control systems, and there was even some hardware that was accessible and meaningfully field-repairable/modifiable.  Now, in a modern spacecraft, if something goes wrong, and there isn't a programmed response, and ground control doesn't take care of it, it's terribly unlikely that it will be anything that the so-called "crew" can do anything about.

I think in this generation, the realistically useful vehicle-specific "crew" training is going to amount to:
In the CST-100: knowing for each individual button, why you should never press it.
In the Dragon V2: knowing how to delete any U2 albums that are automatically uploaded.

Water egress. Loss of cabin pressure. Loss of communications. Fire in cabin.

Survivable to trained crew, deadly to untrained individuals.

[Rocket Science]

But you have to train for contingency situations, evacuation, loss of pressure, aborts, etc.

Seems like diminishing returns to me.

Progressively improving and testing the capsule and launch vehicle: increasing crew survivability from 50% (if you take your first whack at it, and stick people in, totally untested) to 90% to 99% to 99.9% to 99.99% (extensive launch history) etc.

Progressively improving and training on emergency procedures: increasing crew survivability from 99% (stick blindfolded human cargo in the capsule, without telling them they're going to space), to 99.1% ("You can use the seat cushions as a floatation device." flight attendant speech), to 99.11% to 99.111% to 99.1111% (he train from child) etc.  And as the vehicle is improved, those benefits are going down from 0.1...% to 0.01...% to 0.001...%

Back in the Mercury/Gemini/Apollo days, human skill was important because they had such limited control systems, and there was even some hardware that was accessible and meaningfully field-repairable/modifiable.  Now, in a modern spacecraft, if something goes wrong, and there isn't a programmed response, and ground control doesn't take care of it, it's terribly unlikely that it will be anything that the so-called "crew" can do anything about.

I think in this generation, the realistically useful vehicle-specific "crew" training is going to amount to:
In the CST-100: knowing for each individual button, why you should never press it.
In the Dragon V2: knowing how to delete any U2 albums that are automatically uploaded.

Water egress. Loss of cabin pressure. Loss of communications. Fire in cabin.

Survivable to trained crew, deadly to untrained individuals.

What would Sandra Bullock do...?

[R7]

What would Sandra Bullock do...?

Study Shenzhou buttons too 

[arachnitect]

What would Sandra Bullock do...?

Study Shenzhou buttons too 

Exit via correct hatch.

[Nindalf]

Why are you assuming crew of modern spacecrafts cannot access hardware and field-repair/mod it? Volvo didn't win CCtCAP contract...

I said meaningfully field-repairable/modifiable, as opposed to it technically being possible, but not being necessary or helpful in any plausible scenario.

1. Water egress.
2. Loss of cabin pressure.
3. Loss of communications.
4. Fire in cabin.

1: If you land in the water, or otherwise in a hostile and remote environment, the safest thing is probably to just stay in the capsule until it gets retrieved.
2 and 4: You're in a suit.  Stay in the suit, stay in your chair.  Let automated systems and ground control detect and put the fire out / pick and execute the fastest reasonably-safe way to get you somewhere you're not dependent on the suit for survival.
3: It's probably a lot safer to make a plan in advance for what to do if communications are lost at any time, and to load that plan into the computer to be automatically executed, than for the human beings in the vehicle to start making those decisions on the fly.

As the vehicle gets more reliable and capable of dealing with contingencies on its own, options for crew action increasingly become failure modes rather than recovery modes.

You have to let your imagination go pretty wild to come up with a scenario where the right answer is, "Train the crew to deal with this." instead of "Design the system to deal with or avoid this, while the passengers stay in their chairs."

What would Sandra Bullock do...?

Probably show off legs a 50-year-old woman has no business having, to attract a space station with a spare lifeboat from an alternate reality into fire-extinguisher range.

This is not a trainable skill.

[R7]

Why are you assuming crew of modern spacecrafts cannot access hardware and field-repair/mod it? Volvo didn't win CCtCAP contract...

I said meaningfully field-repairable/modifiable, as opposed to it technically being possible, but not being necessary or helpful in any plausible scenario.

The question remains; why do you think meaningful field-repairs/mods are no longer possible?

[ChrisWilson68]

1. Water egress.
2. Loss of cabin pressure.
3. Loss of communications.
4. Fire in cabin.

1: If you land in the water, or otherwise in a hostile and remote environment, the safest thing is probably to just stay in the capsule until it gets retrieved.
2 and 4: You're in a suit.  Stay in the suit, stay in your chair.  Let automated systems and ground control detect and put the fire out / pick and execute the fastest reasonably-safe way to get you somewhere you're not dependent on the suit for survival.

Right, you've landed in the water and the vehicle is slowly filling and sinking.  Rather than getting out and living, you're going to stay in and drown.

Same with a fire on landing.  Or, say there's a fire in the vehicle in orbit.  A trained crewmember could pick up a fire extinguisher and put it out.  Or simply put something on it to smother the fire.  Or notice it's an electrical fire and yank the wires.  None of which an automated system could realistically be expected to do.  But instead you'd have the crew sit and die.

Same goes for loss of cabin pressure.  A trained crew member might be able to find the leak and plug it.  Instead, by your rules, they'll just sit by and do nothing.

[baldusi]

Not to mention that Soyuz-13 crew died because an oxygen valve was difficult to access and they had no training on how to do it. even the latest F-22 fatality had this problem. If that poster thinks that training is unnecessary, he shouldn't be close to any dangerous activity (that means no driving, btw).

[TomH]

Won't they also be passengers, not pilots?

Chimps flew on Mercury before humans, no piloting skills required. Gemini required some skills, particularly by Neil when the docked Gemini/Agena went wild (only one of several times Mr. Cool displayed his flying skills). Lunar Apollo missions required piloting skills, particularly by Neil again, though Jim Lovell did some fancy fly by the seat of the pants to get home on 13. STS had pilots and mission specialists. DC would have been pilotable. In capsules to LEO, most maneuvering is automated, not really designed for great amounts of piloting compared to other craft.

[Nindalf]

Right, you've landed in the water and the vehicle is slowly filling and sinking.  Rather than getting out and living, you're going to stay in and drown.

Same with a fire on landing.  Or, say there's a fire in the vehicle in orbit.  A trained crewmember could pick up a fire extinguisher and put it out.  Or simply put something on it to smother the fire.  Or notice it's an electrical fire and yank the wires.  None of which an automated system could realistically be expected to do.  But instead you'd have the crew sit and die.

Same goes for loss of cabin pressure.  A trained crew member might be able to find the leak and plug it.  Instead, by your rules, they'll just sit by and do nothing.

If you've landed in water, the crew compartment is taking on water, and the vehicle is sinking, that means you've suffered at least three separate major system failures (the launch or targetted reentry failed, the main pressure vessel has lost integrity, the air bags have failed).  But somehow, the crew is still alive and concious, it's only taking on water slowly, so they still have time to climb out and swim for it.

You're talking about a vanishingly thin slice of probability between this action being unnecessary, and everyone dying with no chance to act.  And if you happen to hit that slice, being trained to deal with it would still not produce a very high probability of survival.

What if the vehicle crash lands in a swamp, cracks open, and there are alligators?  It could happen!  Shouldn't the crew all be trained in alligator wrestling?

As for fire, an automated system could realistically be expected to flood the crew compartment with inert gas, if fire breaks out.  They have suits to survive an inert-gas environment.  And you really think a modern high-reliability electrical system can't be expected to detect and terminate its own shorts?  A crew that would start yanking out wiring in a moment of fear and confusion is a much bigger threat than the actual potential for an electrical fire.

If there is a loss of cabin pressure, the suits should provide life support for long enough to either reach the destination or execute an emergency reentry, if either are still possible after the incident that causes it.  It's pretty outlandish to imagine that if there is a breach, it will be crew-patchable.  We're not talking about a bicycle tire.  How many such crew-patchable breaches have occurred in space capsules in the past?

As I previously described it, it's not that trained crew action can't prevent loss of life in possible scenarios, it's that these scenarios are improbable, and will be made more and more improbable by improving vehicle reliability.

You could require every commercial airline passenger to do a wilderness survival course, and every stewardess to be able to pilot a plane, but it would be more than a little silly, and grossly uneconomical.  If someone has any real purpose for being in space, there are better ways to spend their time, and all the other resources involved, than extensively training them to deal with that minority of vehicle failures which could be made survivable by crew action, where passive passengers would die.

The age of the astronaut as test pilot ended no later than the 1980s.  On these short, routine flights between LEO and an orbital station, on this newest generation of heavily-computerized vehicle, the astronaut will be something closer to a man who rides an elevator, albeit one that gives a rough ride and has an uncommonly high risk of having the cable snap.

Not to mention that Soyuz-13 crew died because an oxygen valve was difficult to access and they had no training on how to do it. even the latest F-22 fatality had this problem. If that poster thinks that training is unnecessary, he shouldn't be close to any dangerous activity (that means no driving, btw).

It was Soyuz-11 (all the way back in 1971), and the crew died because cabin pressure was lost unexpectedly due to mechanical failure during reentry and they had no suits.  It is grossly implausible that any training would have enabled them to detect and repair the defect in time.

The F-22 fatality was because the aircraft was designed to depend on the pilot to engage the emergency oxygen supply, even though it was an automatic system that shut down the primary oxygen supply, under circumstances in which the pilot was likely to be fully occupied with other immediate tasks.  If anything, this incident highlights the inexcusable stupidity of relying on crew unnecessarily.

In both cases, the problem was fixed by correcting these design defects, not by some insane doubling down on crew responsibility.

If you say I should be being prevented from driving, then I say rather you should require a 6-week emergency procedures course on any particular model of elevator you wish to ride in.  Neither the Dragon V2 nor the CST-100 will need a pilot, nor any other crew.

[bad_astra]

So I guess now you divide up the astronaut class, group A for Dragon and group B for CST. Since each capsule layout and interface will be different.

They're not VFR kids getting their first time in a Piper. They can figure out two capsule systems.

[Bennett]

Oh yeah, no worries there, just thinking difference between the shuttle days and now. With all three shuttles having the same layout (like here: http://scarborough.photoshelter.com/gallery/OV-105/G0000uyj7eRjdZsQ) verse two different capsule layouts and flight softwares. With the shuttle you could train and cross train the entire astronaut corps with the layout and little quirks each bird had. So now, do you cross train them, or split them up and say for your astronaut flying career you will be trained on the Dragon and the others will trained on the CST?

It will be interesting to see how this plays out.

So I guess now you divide up the astronaut class, group A for Dragon and group B for CST. Since each capsule layout and interface will be different.

They're not VFR kids getting their first time in a Piper. They can figure out two capsule systems.

[Galactic Penguin SST]

Also remember that according to current plans, one of the four on board the Dragon/CST-100 will always be a Russian. 

[A_M_Swallow]

{snip}
If you've landed in water, the crew compartment is taking on water, and the vehicle is sinking, that means you've suffered at least three separate major system failures (the launch or targetted reentry failed, the main pressure vessel has lost integrity, the air bags have failed).  But somehow, the crew is still alive and concious, it's only taking on water slowly, so they still have time to climb out and swim for it.

Space craft are short of oxygen.  After landing they have to open the hatch to let air in.  Water can come in through the same hole.  The crew will have to bail the water out.

[john smith 19]

If you say I should be being prevented from driving, then I say rather you should require a 6-week emergency procedures course on any particular model of elevator you wish to ride in.  Neither the Dragon V2 nor the CST-100 will need a pilot, nor any other crew.

A similar argument could be made for airliners.

However I don't think the passengers are quite ready for that.

The rather obvious solution (given this is the "commercial crew" programme) is the pilots are provided by the respective companies. They train in the core astronaut competencies but basically their mission is get the vehicle from pad to station, station to ground and protect the space flight participants from hurting themselves.

That means they are then free for their respective companies to fly other missions for other customers.

While (from what we know of them) both Dragon 2.0 and CTS-100 will be quite different there are limits to how different these vehicles can be. Both are designed to meet NASA standards for ergonomics so stuff like key spacing, lettering etc is likely to be pretty similar. I think their are also higher level standards on standard placement of various controls, but I'm less sure about that.

Likewise they fly roughly the same trajectory.

So while "flying" a capsule is a very different proposition from flying the Shuttle once you've got the outline of one transferring to the other should be (fairly) straight forward, although I personally suspect they will retain "Dragon" pilots and "CTS-100" pilots.

Time will tell which group has the spiffier patches however. 

In short 
[EDIT Neither vehicle may need a pilot in normal operation.

But they will have one. ]

[Steven Pietrobon]

Even at the full $108 million/seat, since this is money that's being spent in America, it's probably a better deal for American government than spending $80 million in Russia, just by counting the consequent immediate increase in tax revenue (income and sales taxes, as people take their salaries and profits home to spend, giving other people salaries and profits to spend, etc.).

Don't forget that NASA is paying for redundant access, so you also need to include the price for CST-100 as well. This means that if NASA only flies six missions at four crew per mission from 2017 to 2019 (using a normal six month rotation), that works out to ($2600+$4200)/(6x4) = $283M per seat, which is 3.5 times the cost of using Soyuz.