ATK/EADS: Liberty Launch Vehicle Update Thread

[FinalFrontier]

In order to make a business case for their advanced SLS booster submission, they need the extra flight rate from Liberty to help compete with the liquid offerings.

If NASA adopts the advanced SRB's for SLS, I would not be suprised if Liberty gets a close variant upgrade of the same.  I suspect both are joined at the hip, one profiting off of the existance of the other.

Not really no, because the taxpayer is essentially going to be subsidizing both until I see commercial payloads for Liberty.

Little if any cost sharing because nothing else uses giant 5 segment SRMs.

[spectre9]

This is why ATK will be forced to compete from now on.

They've done the industry a big favour by showing how to get a sweet deal on a locked in NASA contract.

Now there's a crowd scrambling for such deals ATK can't just spin some stuff about "black zones" and expect people to still respect them.

[PahTo]

Not sure if this thread shouldn't be named "Challenging ATK/Liberty", but in keeping with what the name is...
From a Europena perspective--ff the EPS core for Arianne 5 works better on the top of a 5 seg SRB, why even continue flying two variants (original and new Liberty)?
Conversely, if the existing vehicle with CNES SRBs works better (and clearly works well) and is more cost effective, why spend the money chasing Liberty?
I think the post about a new EADS plant in Alabama is pertinent!

[edkyle99]

Not sure if this thread shouldn't be named "Challenging ATK/Liberty", but in keeping with what the name is...
From a Europena perspective--ff the EPS core for Arianne 5 works better on the top of a 5 seg SRB, why even continue flying two variants (original and new Liberty)?
Conversely, if the existing vehicle with CNES SRBs works better (and clearly works well) and is more cost effective, why spend the money chasing Liberty?
I think the post about a new EADS plant in Alabama is pertinent!

I think that the answer is simple.  Liberty won't work better than Ariane 5 ECA, at least not for the most common Arianespace mission from Kourou.  Ariane 5 ECA can lift close to 10 tonnes to a GTO only 1,500 m/s from GEO.  Liberty, if topped with a third stage, would only lift perhaps 8.8 tonnes to a GTO that probably would be 1,800 m/s from GEO.

Liberty is a LEO launch vehicle, meant for crewed missions, from Kennedy Space Center, which has the SRB infrastructure that would not easily translate to Kourou, and which has infrastructure that could not easily adapt Ariane 5's boosters.

While I'm typing, I have to say that I don't understand all of the derision against ATK when it comes to Liberty.  This is as much, if not more, an EADS launch vehicle topped by a Lockheed Martin spacecraft.  ATK is only providing a solid booster first stage, which is likely a minority cost fraction of the total launcher, along with a composite spacecraft shell (again minority cost element) that Lockheed Martin would fill up with avionics, propulsion, etc., to turn into a spacecraft.

So, if you hate Liberty, why only speak ill of ATK?  EADS and Lockheed Martin are up to their elbows in this as well. 

 - Ed Kyle       

[Go4TLI]

The reason to speak ill of ATK is because people believe they need a villain. The uninformed masses think they understand everything about anything and will therefore hold up SpaceX as this ideal (and reality suggests that nothing is as ever as good as it seems) while ATK is the antithesis only playing along to get more money at higher cost from the government (claims along those lines have been arm waved around here for years now)

[Chris Bergin]

This an update thread, and one that allows for technical debate about the updates. We do see some of what people above mentioned and I find it dirty. So it's not a pantomime, deal with the vehicle.

I'll look into an opinion thread, but it'll be objective one and not a sandpit for "OMG! 51L, Ares 1!" stuff Leave it with me for an opinion thread (I saved the short one, but it was to loaded).

I always ask people to be civil, but people will rightly get upset about Challenger being mentioned. Let's keep the bar high here.

So to be clear, the above posts are the cut off point. Everyone's got it out of their system, I hope, and now this is UPDATES only. Don't ignore this.

[wolfpack]

Is there (or will there be) a requirement to demonstrate the LAS using the actual 5-seg booster? I recall reading there was some disagreement in the launch abort analyses done by NASA and the USAF.

[Ben the Space Brit]

Is there (or will there be) a requirement to demonstrate the LAS using the actual 5-seg booster? I recall reading there was some disagreement in the launch abort analyses done by NASA and the USAF.

If there isn't there should be.  For the record, I consider that a successful test aerial abort at max-Q and at staging to be a necessary safety certification requirement for any commercial crew launch system.

[Go4TLI]

Why?  A LAS is an emergency system when one has absolutely no other choice. A LAS does in no way guarantee crew safety and there are many other dangers throughout the rest of the mission life cycle where there is no escape system at all if something were to go wrong

[Ben the Space Brit]

Why?  A LAS is an emergency system when one has absolutely no other choice. A LAS does in no way guarantee crew safety and there are many other dangers throughout the rest of the mission life cycle where there is no escape system at all if something were to go wrong

Because, if NASA is going to be paying for these services, it is reasonable for them to require that the safety systems will work during the flight phases during which it is supposed to work.  There are few guarantees in life but a working LAS increases survival probability from 'zero' to 'possible'.  Finding out only if and when it was needed whether it works is far too late and the Powers That Be would rightly tear NASA to shreds for not having even attempted to have a degree of assurance of system functionality before hand.

[zerm]

Is there (or will there be) a requirement to demonstrate the LAS using the actual 5-seg booster? I recall reading there was some disagreement in the launch abort analyses done by NASA and the USAF.

If there isn't there should be.  For the record, I consider that a successful test aerial abort at max-Q and at staging to be a necessary safety certification requirement for any commercial crew launch system.

Not to go way OT here, but I've recently asked the same question about SpaceX and the Dragon as well as the other new crew vehicles- and gotten no real good answer. I'm wondering if we're looking at a new standard where computer modeling and other sorts of data will be replacing actual Max-Q abort testing?

[jacqmans]

News Release Issued: July 2, 2012 12:33 PM EDT

ATK Announces Independent Assessment Team for Liberty
Team Established to Advise Development of Commercial Human Certification Plan
SALT LAKE CITY, July 2, 2012 /PRNewswire/ -- ATK (NYSE: ATK) and the Liberty program announced an independent assessment team and their first tasking to advise the company on development of its commercial human certification plan for the Liberty system, which includes the launch vehicle, upper stage, abort system, composite spacecraft, ground and mission operations, crew and passenger training and a test flight crew.

The FAA is authorized by Congress to regulate commercial human spaceflight. Over the next few years, the FAA will use a phased approach to regulating the crew and passenger safety of the emerging commercial human spaceflight industry. In the meantime, and in the absence of specific government human certification standards, the developers themselves must look to NASA and International Partner human spaceflight best practices and lessons learned to develop their own design and operations criteria. Developing the Liberty-specific commercial human certification plan early in the program ensures the system will be designed from the outset to ensure flight crew and passenger safety. 

Liberty's independent assessment team is led by Bryan O'Connor with team members Ken Bowersox, Kevin Leclaire and Alain Souchier. This team brings former space shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) commanders together with experts in NASA Safety and Mission Assurance, commercial space business and cryogenic engine development.

"As we build Liberty using streamlined and affordable commercial approaches, we intend to maintain a steady emphasis on crew safety, which is why we brought together top talent for the Liberty independent assessment team," said Kent Rominger, ATK vice president and program manager for Liberty. "We have one of the best teams whose background and expertise will ensure Liberty is safe and reliable for our commercial customers."

Leading the Liberty independent assessment team, O'Connor brings a strong background in flight test, program management, safety and mission assurance (SM&A). As a former two-time shuttle astronaut and United States Marine Corps test pilot he has served in various high-profile positions over his career including assistant program manager for the Marine AV-8 Harrier and NASA Space Shuttle Programs, NASA's first chairman of the Space Flight Safety Panel that was established to support return-to-flight design re-certification. During O'Connor's tenure at NASA Headquarters he served as director of the Space Station Redesign Team, Space Shuttle Program director, and later as the chief of Safety and Mission Assurance where he was responsible for the safety, reliability, maintainability and quality assurance of all NASA programs.

"I am looking forward to working with ATK on their commercial human certification plan for Liberty," said O'Connor. "It is extremely important to get this plan right. Fortunately, they have a head start because all of Liberty's subsystems were originally designed to be human-rated."

Bowersox is also a former navy test pilot and shuttle astronaut with four shuttle missions and one ISS mission, which included Russia Soyuz training and a return via the Soyuz capsule. He served as the Expedition-6 crew commander for over five months aboard the International Space Station. During his tenure at NASA he held a variety of assignments, notably chief of the Astronaut Office Safety Branch and chairman of the Spaceflight Safety Panel. Bowersox will oversee crew training and the commercial human certification plan for the Liberty program.

Leclaire brings extensive experience in starting and developing space-related companies. He has provided management consulting services to clients involved in the space, satellite and technology sectors and was previously a senior associate at the preeminent venture capital firm that focused on space-related companies. Leclaire will oversee the business aspects of the Liberty program with a focus on ensuring a solid business case without compromising crew safety.

Souchier was the program manager for the design of the stage propulsion systems on the Ariane 5 central core, the technical manager over the engineering department that developed the Vulcain Ariane 5 cryogenic engine and the stage associated propulsion systems, and Snecma's future programs director. During his 30-year career, he has been honored with a bronze and silver medal from the French space agency (CNET). Souchier will ensure all aspects of the Vulcain 2 engine upgrades for air start will be effectively implemented. 

About Liberty

Liberty is a complete commercial crew transportation system that includes a composite spacecraft, abort system, launch vehicle and ground and mission operations, which were all designed from inception to meet NASA's human-rating requirements. ATK is the prime with Astrium and Lockheed Martin serving as major subcomponent providers. Additional subcontractors for Liberty include Safran/Snecma; Moog Inc., Honeywell, Astrotech Space Operations (ASTC), Aerojet, Reynolds, Smith and Hills, Dynamic Concepts, Inc. and Hamilton Sundstrand.

The Liberty system team is located across 10 states including Alabama, California, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Texas, Utah and Virginia. The commercial program will sustain thousands of jobs as well as bring approximately 600 new jobs across the country. Unmanned test flights of Liberty are scheduled for 2014 and 2015, followed by the first human flights in 2015 with the Liberty flight crew.

More information on the Liberty system can be found at www.libertyspace.us

[Go4TLI]

Why?  A LAS is an emergency system when one has absolutely no other choice. A LAS does in no way guarantee crew safety and there are many other dangers throughout the rest of the mission life cycle where there is no escape system at all if something were to go wrong

Because, if NASA is going to be paying for these services, it is reasonable for them to require that the safety systems will work during the flight phases during which it is supposed to work.  There are few guarantees in life but a working LAS increases survival probability from 'zero' to 'possible'.  Finding out only if and when it was needed whether it works is far too late and the Powers That Be would rightly tear NASA to shreds for not having even attempted to have a degree of assurance of system functionality before hand.

So what you are proposing is:

1.  NASA develop a set of requirements for design and test
2.  NASA to have insight and oversight into all test phases to verify the design
3.  Based on 1 and 2 NASA then certifies the design if finds the data acceptable. 
4.  If not, additional tests and/or requirements
5.  Perform steps 2-4 again as necessary.

Is that accurate?

While only the LAS?  What about crit 1/1 components (which a LAS certainly will have in it but from a system perspective it is a mitigation to a potential crit 1/1 failure)

Now we're even further down the slippery slope and this entire effort is already pretty close to business as usual already

[Ben the Space Brit]

[Now we're even further down the slippery slope and this entire effort is already pretty close to business as usual already

So... You are suggesting that NASA enforce minimum safety standards and tests for a product that they will use for the ULTIMATE criticality-1 component, people, is inefficient, unnecessary and would ultimately be pointless? Remind me never to fly on something you designed, ever.


[edit]
Seriously, what did you think that the COTS flights were for? To ensure that the product NASA was buying met certain standards.  This must necessary apply even more to a crewed spacecraft.

[wolfpack]

Why?  A LAS is an emergency system when one has absolutely no other choice. A LAS does in no way guarantee crew safety and there are many other dangers throughout the rest of the mission life cycle where there is no escape system at all if something were to go wrong

My question was specific (and pardon me if my recollection is flawed) to the USAF concern that a range safety destruct of the solid propellant booster could eject burning propellant into the descent path of the crew module. Ares-I disagreed.

Since that particular question has been asked, should it not be answered?

Dragon, CST-100 and Dream Chaser are all separate issues. No government agency (as far as I am aware) has specifically challenged their launch abort systems (which arguably don't even really exist at the moment). So we can leave them out of this thread.

[Go4TLI]

[Now we're even further down the slippery slope and this entire effort is already pretty close to business as usual already

So... You are suggesting that NASA enforce minimum safety standards and tests for a product that they will use for the ULTIMATE criticality-1 component, people, is inefficient, unnecessary and would ultimately be pointless? Remind me never to fly on something you designed, ever.


[edit]
Seriously, what did you think that the COTS flights were for? To ensure that the product NASA was buying met certain standards.  This must necessary apply even more to a crewed spacecraft.

It seems some people think a LAS is the ultimate safety feature and with it nothing can go wrong and the crew will always be safe during launch. A LAS is not a guarantee of anything

What I have been trying to convey is exactly that and launch is only one phase of the overall mission cycle. There are many other things that could potentially go wrong and endanger the crew. So given that truth why focus only so intently on LAS testing?  What about the others that are a function of design?

[Ben the Space Brit]

What I have been trying to convey is exactly that and launch is only one phase of the overall mission cycle. There are many other things that could potentially go wrong and endanger the crew. So given that truth why focus only so intently on LAS testing?  What about the others that are a function of design?

What I'm saying is that those other things are not relevant in the terms of this discussion.  I am discussing ONLY whether the LAS should be tested before allowing crewed flights (and saying yes).  Other aspects of safety should be tested in whatever way is best for those features.  For example, ascent flight dynamics being within human-survivable limits can be tested by flying instrumented crash-test dummies in a remote-controlled capsule.  I'd want them along for the aerial aborts too.

I'm not suggesting that the LAS is a panacea, only that it must be verified as workable and viable in practical tests.  And, yes, if those tests show that a pre-booster burn-out abort is a zero-survivable scenario because no LAS whose operation is survivable in its own right (sustained acceleration or other flight dynamics above human-survivable limits) could get the capsule out of the booster-destruct 'death zone', then I would consider that to be a major black mark on the launcher's record, certainly sufficient to rule out its certification for crewed flight.


[edit]
Fixed typos

[Skyrocket]

ATK has just released some images of their capsule with an extended cargo capacity.

It can carry a small, MPLM derived pressurized module ("Liberty Logistics Module" or LLM) between the capsule and the service module. The LLM will have a common berthing mechanism and will be capable of transporting up to 5,100 pounds of pressurized cargo to the ISS.

[zt]

In that picture, what is connected to the zenith location of Harmony (Node 2)?

[Ben the Space Brit]

In that picture, what is connected to the zenith location of Harmony (Node 2)?

I'm guessing but I think that's the Centrifuge Accommodation Module (CAM).  Obviously ATK don't have access to as up-to-date ISS models as SpaceX!