Quote from: Lars_J on 03/15/2011 03:34 pm... Which we still need to send, since we are essentially "buying" two Soyuz per year for crew escape capability for the non-russian crew.I guess you just don't get it. Not sure how I could have been much more clear. Oh well.
... Which we still need to send, since we are essentially "buying" two Soyuz per year for crew escape capability for the non-russian crew.
Quote from: OV-106 on 03/16/2011 10:01 pmQuote from: Lars_J on 03/15/2011 03:34 pm... Which we still need to send, since we are essentially "buying" two Soyuz per year for crew escape capability for the non-russian crew.I guess you just don't get it. Not sure how I could have been much more clear. Oh well. I'm intrigued, was the original plan to keep a permanent shuttle on ISS and relieve it with another one? Can the ISS dock two shuttles? How would crew rotation have been implemented then?
Quote from: mlorrey on 03/16/2011 09:57 pmQuote from: MP99 on 03/15/2011 07:59 amBut that doesn't cover the on-orbit and reentry phases, where Shuttle is way more mature then any new system.cheers, MartinI LOL'd so hard at this statement. Since when is the shuttle TPS "more mature" than a capsule?You seem to have quite the misunderstanding of orbiter TPS and want to blame it as the root of everything, even when the statement you responded to didn't even mention TPS.
Quote from: MP99 on 03/15/2011 07:59 amBut that doesn't cover the on-orbit and reentry phases, where Shuttle is way more mature then any new system.cheers, MartinI LOL'd so hard at this statement. Since when is the shuttle TPS "more mature" than a capsule?
But that doesn't cover the on-orbit and reentry phases, where Shuttle is way more mature then any new system.cheers, Martin
Shuttle has quite a lot of room for improvement.PICA is better than the Carbon-Carbon matrix.
PICA is ablative, which doesn't work so well for a shuttle-type vehicle.
Quote from: Lars_J on 03/16/2011 11:10 pmPICA is ablative, which doesn't work so well for a shuttle-type vehicle.PICA-x is capable of dozens, if not hundreds of reuses. That should be enough to do the job.
Having ablative material smeared over a large part of the fuselage is not great for a vehicle that hopes to be reusable with minimal work.
Quote from: Lars_J on 03/16/2011 11:19 pmHaving ablative material smeared over a large part of the fuselage is not great for a vehicle that hopes to be reusable with minimal work. But the the opposite of minimal work is needed for the Shuttle TPS.
Quote from: OV-106 on 03/16/2011 10:03 pmQuote from: mlorrey on 03/16/2011 09:57 pmQuote from: MP99 on 03/15/2011 07:59 amBut that doesn't cover the on-orbit and reentry phases, where Shuttle is way more mature then any new system.cheers, MartinI LOL'd so hard at this statement. Since when is the shuttle TPS "more mature" than a capsule?You seem to have quite the misunderstanding of orbiter TPS and want to blame it as the root of everything, even when the statement you responded to didn't even mention TPS. I am quite familliar with the Orbiter TPS. Its immaturity and stillborn status (i.e. the decision to cut the tile size rather than investing in resolving cracking issues early on) is, along with the segmented SRB design, and the decision to cease painting and sealing the tank foam, the three main design flaws in the launch system that contribute to its uneconomic operation and its high risk rating.Shuttle has always been an experimental vehicle pressed into operational service by egotism. It is not by any means "mature". A mature technology by definition is one which is maximised for economic operation, inherently safe to operate, capable of frequent operation without major overhauls or complete rebuilds between each use.
1. I am quite familliar with the Orbiter TPS. Its immaturity and stillborn status (i.e. the decision to cut the tile size rather than investing in resolving cracking issues early on) is, 2. along with the segmented SRB design,3. and the decision to cease painting and sealing the tank foam, the three main design flaws in the launch system that contribute to its uneconomic operation and its high risk rating.
Quote from: mlorrey on 03/16/2011 11:22 pm1. I am quite familliar with the Orbiter TPS. Its immaturity and stillborn status (i.e. the decision to cut the tile size rather than investing in resolving cracking issues early on) is, 2. along with the segmented SRB design,3. and the decision to cease painting and sealing the tank foam, the three main design flaws in the launch system that contribute to its uneconomic operation and its high risk rating.You are working with old and out dated data, in addition to error fulled conclusions from lack of knowledge.1. Far from it. The TPS work between missions is down by more than a magnitude and is a minor portion of the flight turnaround work2. Monolithic solids were not viable4. Painting the tank would not prevent foam loss
1. As of 2001, NASA was reporting that 75% of all maintenance man hours between flights involved TPS maintenance. Unless there has been an unreported miracle or two since then, my point stands. As of 2004, MMH per flight totalled 44,000+, which, while reduced from that typical of the 1990's, was still more than ten times greater rate on average, in MMH/FH than any other reusable aerospace vehicle.1. a. Granted, in the old days, the TPS workers would spit in the tile adhesive so it would not dry as fast (the batches of glue would harden by the time you applied 2 or 3 tiles), a practice that was undocumented and put to an end when NASA officials found out about it, but it also meant that the adhesive was weaker and thus tiles were more prone to fall off in flight.1.b As for your claim that MMH has gone down, I just saw a press release on STS-131 claiming that United Space Alliance puts 750,000 MMH into the flow for each shuttle turnaround, which is actually almost ten times more maintenance time than NASA claimed when they did the work themselves. The PR may be wrong, but getting recent maintenance data is neigh on impossible for the public these days, compared to the past.2. Monolothic solids were viable and tested on two occasions, and were also cheaper and manufactured in Florida. The ATK segmented design only won due to congressional influence, as it was heavily criticized at the time for the risks inherent with segementing.3. Simple experiment any inaccurate can perform: i. throw a sponge into a tank of water, see it soak up water and sink. ii. paint a sponge. let it dry, throw it in the tank, see it float high in the water.Painting the tank foam would limit the ability of air to ingress into the foam when air already in the foam is being frozen by the chilling of fuelling of the tanks. This would limit ice formation. It would not eliminate ice formation, but it would limit the mass of ice formed.
Quote from: Joris on 03/16/2011 11:11 pmQuote from: Lars_J on 03/16/2011 11:10 pmPICA is ablative, which doesn't work so well for a shuttle-type vehicle.PICA-x is capable of dozens, if not hundreds of reuses. That should be enough to do the job.Having ablative material smeared over a large part of the fuselage is not great for a vehicle that hopes to be reusable with minimal work. For a winged vehicle with a large surface area this is even more true.Dragon re-use (if it happens) will probably involve re-applying the outer sidewall insulation. The heat shield could be reused, but expect it will not be. It makes more sense for SpaceX to reduce excess margin by thinning the heat shield, to allow more payload. Want to fly it again? - Put a new heat shield on it.Different protective materials are useful for different purposes.