The engines of STS-93
Columbia. STS-93 was the last time that these SSME's were flown.
SSME#2019/Powerhead#2020 (19th flight) Engine Position#1 (Center)
SSME#2031/Powerhead#2028 (17th flight) Engine Position#2 (Left)
SSME#2012/Powerhead#2025 (12th flight) Engine Position#3 (Right)
Since all 3 SSME's flown on STS-93 were of Block II design, the SSME Advanced Health Management System(AHMS) was not part of STS-93.
AHMS "Phase In"
•1st Flight - 1 AHMS controller in monitor-only mode, 2 Block II controllers
• Accomplished on STS -116 on 12/9/2006
• 2nd Flight - 1 AHMS controller in redline-active mode, 1 AHMS controller in
monitor-only mode
• Accomplished on STS -117 on 6/8/2007
• 3rd Flight - 3 AHMS controllers in redline-active mode
• Accomplished on STS -118 on 8/8/2007
Pratt & Whitney Overview and Advanced Health Management Program (circa 2006)
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20080023322.pdfFrom Wayne Hale's blog titled "STS-93 We dont need anymore of those"
http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2014/10/26/sts-93-we-dont-need-any-more-of-those/"about a minute after launch, the booster officer and his team recognized the fact that the right engine turbine temperatures and speeds were higher than normal. They correctly identified that this might be due to a nozzle leak, but there was another potential anomaly that also had the same signature. If the oxidizer pump started to lose ‘efficiency’ (blades rubbing, pump clogging, etc.) it would look the same. As the SSME controller commanded mixture ratio changes to keep up with the loss of efficiency on the pump, the turbines would reach their temp limit and the engine would have to throttle down to prevent a shutdown: this was called ‘thrust limiting’. Until the SSME went into thrust limiting, the Booster team could not tell the difference between an oxidizer turbine/pump efficiency loss and a nozzle leak. The instrumentation just wasn’t precise enough to know what was going on. Jon and his team correctly identified that the engine was running off nominally (‘off tags’) but could not quantify it. Later on, when the FDO asked him, the Booster officer had to report that none of the engines were ‘suspect’. All these terms were precisely defined in the flight rules and had specific actions for the flight controllers and crew to take to maximize safety. But this leak was too small for any of that."
My question, would having AHMS installed on STS=93
Columbia helped to make the Booster Officer/Team to diagnose the SSME issues even quicker and/or with more certainty?