I often wonder if the Shuttle would have actually have been economical if not for the two DoD requirements that were never used (cross range for single orbit and payload bay length).
I often wonder if the Shuttle would have actually have been economical if not for the two DoD requirements that were never used (cross range for single orbit and payload bay length).
Both requirements were used frequently. Crossrange was never used "for single orbit" but it was used for nominal entry to increase deorbit opportunities, and for TAL site availability.

Both requirements were used frequently. Crossrange was never used "for single orbit" but it was used for nominal entry to increase deorbit opportunities, and for TAL site availability.
That was a case of using what they already had, though, wasn't it? The initial requirement was all Air Force, so far as I understand it, and then once they had it anyway, NASA looked at other things they could so with the capability. Please correct me if I'm wrong.
Both requirements were used frequently. Crossrange was never used "for single orbit" but it was used for nominal entry to increase deorbit opportunities, and for TAL site availability.
That was a case of using what they already had, though, wasn't it? The initial requirement was all Air Force, so far as I understand it, and then once they had it anyway, NASA looked at other things they could so with the capability. Please correct me if I'm wrong.
No, NASA agreed it had similar requirement.
I suppose my question could be rephrased more succinctly as "What's so great about Vandenberg" that NASA felt they needed to build the Shuttle as they did rather than get them to shift to some other launchpad for military-related missions to polar orbit.
To be precise, what made them decide this way in 1972 or so? Any knowledge gained after that time is unfair 20/20 hindsight
I suppose my question could be rephrased more succinctly as "What's so great about Vandenberg" that NASA felt they needed to build the Shuttle as they did rather than get them to shift to some other launchpad for military-related missions to polar orbit.
To be precise, what made them decide this way in 1972 or so? Any knowledge gained after that time is unfair 20/20 hindsight
The final shuttle configuration chosen drove the need to use VAFB for the same reasons that existing launch vehicles used VAFB, no overflight of land during launch.
Both requirements were used frequently. Crossrange was never used "for single orbit" but it was used for nominal entry to increase deorbit opportunities, and for TAL site availability.
That was a case of using what they already had, though, wasn't it? The initial requirement was all Air Force, so far as I understand it, and then once they had it anyway, NASA looked at other things they could so with the capability. Please correct me if I'm wrong.
No, NASA agreed it had similar requirement.
Whoops, we're talking at cross purposes. I meant just the cross-range capability of 1500 miles that the Air Force requested. So far as I know, NASA only wanted 400 and only went along because the White House made it clear they weren't go to get approval for the Shuttle unless they met the USAF's needs too.
Even if that was the case, it wouldn't make your claim (that they "were never used") any less wrong.

I'll let the original shuttle program manager (Robert Thompson) do the correcting. Here's his CAIB testimony:
http://caib.nasa.gov/events/public_hearings/20030423/transcript_am.html
It was an existing USAF-controlled facility that allowed polar launches without land overflight and was within CONUS for easier logistics. It had the extra benefit (though I don't think this drove the original decision) that the groundtrack for the single-orbit mission never overflew USSR ground stations.
Yikes. You were actually thinking of launching *north* from Barrow!? Never mind abort safety; the *nominal* launch would be headed straight toward the USSR. I can think of a couple more obvious issues with that than abort safety.
I suppose my question could be rephrased more succinctly as "What's so great about Vandenberg" that NASA felt they needed to build the Shuttle as they did rather than get them to shift to some other launchpad for military-related missions to polar orbit.
To be precise, what made them decide this way in 1972 or so? Any knowledge gained after that time is unfair 20/20 hindsight
The final shuttle configuration chosen drove the need to use VAFB for the same reasons that existing launch vehicles used VAFB, no overflight of land during launch.
Were there any (alternative) shuttle configurations under consideration prior to the final selection which would not have required the use of VAFB for polar orbit flights?
I'm not sure what thread this question should be in. It isn't exclusive to shuttle but applies to shuttle. How do the T-0 umbilical quick releases work?
I have always been fascinated by the fact that a connection can be tight enough to prevent LH2 leaks but release quickly and reliably enough to be pulled away at liftoff.
Explosive bolts to the side of the Orbiter, plus cables in high tension attached to the "plates" of the umbilicals, I believe. At T-0 the bolts blow, the cables pull the umbilical plate into to tail service mast, and a very heavy clamshell door falls closed to shield from booster exhaust.
If that's the case, what was it that made the turn around processing take so much longer than the ordiginal plan? Was it just the TPS inspection/repair process?
You had most of it: "inspection, minor repair and refueling" and include testing and payload bay reconfiguring. As part of "refueling" the OMS and RCS pods were removed. As for the middeck, all the lockers and crew accommodations were removed after each flight.
They were only removed for OMDP requirements and if there was a significant issue that required an LRU to be replaced.
They were only removed for OMDP requirements and if there was a significant issue that required an LRU to be replaced.
OMRSD requirements