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#280 by Jim on 20 Nov, 2012 18:02
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I think Titan-Centaur did for its shroud.
That would only be T-IIIE/D
No, it use the T-IV and T-IIIC/34D used the Delta system -
#281 by Jim on 20 Nov, 2012 23:59
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Can you say if SuperZip is still in use on Atlas-V Centaur now?
Atlas doesn't use it now or in the past. -
#282 by strangequark on 21 Nov, 2012 05:27
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Can you say if SuperZip is still in use on Atlas-V Centaur now?
Atlas doesn't use it now or in the past.
Okay, thanks for the info. I know it had been intended for use on Centaur G as well, so I'd thought it was across all Centaur versions of the time. I appreciate the clarification. -
#283 by Ben the Space Brit on 21 Nov, 2012 12:46
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Any word as to the likelihood that this was the cause of the GLORY failure too? IIRC, in both cases the PLF didn't separate.
It's good that a likely root cause has been found and even better that Orbital have a fix. Hopefully, this will wrap up this particular issue.
Of course, in the Space Biz, now we've got to wait until the next issue emerges.
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#284 by kevin-rf on 21 Nov, 2012 12:57
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Any word as to the likelihood that this was the cause of the GLORY failure too? IIRC, in both cases the PLF didn't separate.
Same article is quoted in the GLORY thread as the root cause. -
#285 by Kabloona on 23 Nov, 2012 13:14
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Since we're discussing Super*Zip type systems...the last (and only) Orbital product to actually use Super*Zip was the Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS) on the TOS/ACTS mission on Shuttle in 1994.
The Super*Zip was used to deploy the TOS/ACTS stack from the Shuttle cargo bay. I was the Orbital PIE for the Super*Zip, which we procured from the vendor and provided to our TOS subcontractor, Lockheed Martin, for integration. Unfortunately, early in the electrical design process, LockMart made an engineering error that would cause BOTH the primary and backup det cords to fire when the astronaut pressed the appropriate button to deploy TOS/ACTS, instead of only the primary det cord.
So when the astronauts actually deployed the stack, the Super*Zip fired with twice the designed force, rupturing the containment tube and spraying the cargo bay with doubler fragments. Needless to say, NASA was not pleased. Fortunately the orbiter was not seriously damaged. But, damn, that Super*Zip sure unzipped completely! Which goes to say, sometimes the answer is to just double the amount of explosives involved. ;-) -
#286 by kevin-rf on 23 Nov, 2012 14:51
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Are you implying that any problem can be solved by using enough explosives
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#287 by Kabloona on 25 Nov, 2012 01:28
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Are you implying that any problem can be solved by using enough explosives
When the problem is how to separate Part A from Part B, absolutely! -
#288 by Ben the Space Brit on 26 Nov, 2012 16:03
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Are you implying that any problem can be solved by using enough explosives
When the problem is how to separate Part A from Part B, absolutely!
It boils down to whether or not you are content to have both parts reduced to confetti or whether you want one or both parts relatively intact. -
#289 by Kim Keller on 26 Nov, 2012 19:57
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It boils down to whether or not you are content to have both parts reduced to confetti or whether you want one or both parts relatively intact.
The most critical piece of the challenge is to not damage that which you enclose. It doesn't do any good to ensure adequate separation if the act damages the payload.
And never forget - in rocketry and space travel it's ALL about the payload. -
#290 by Kim Keller on 26 Nov, 2012 20:01
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Pegaus only uses frangibles for the base ring, not the sep plane between the fairing halves, which eliminates charge holder slumping as a failure mode. If NASA thinks it affects Pegasus, then Atlas V may have some explaining to do too.
NASA does think it affects Pegasus, since the frangible joint comes from the same vendor that provided the Taurus joints. Atlas is not a customer of that vendor. -
#291 by kevin-rf on 27 Nov, 2012 01:21
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1. The only joint on Pegasus is oriented perpendicularly to the axis where charge holder slumping is a concern. If NASA is really thinks it affects Pegasus, it means they think the material's property issue can be a primary cause of failure, rather than just a contributor.
Considering Pegasus is processed and launched from a horizontal position, being perpendicular to the axis of concern places the charge in a perpendicular orientation (to gravity, but not acceleration forces)
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#292 by Kim Keller on 27 Nov, 2012 13:14
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3. Had the Centaur on Atlas used SuperZip, the vendor might be different, but it's still an aluminum extrusion of the same/similar alloy. Some confidence testing, or at least a comprehensive requirements review, would be in order.
My comments were not directed at the charge slumping, but at the frangible joint's metallurgy itself. There is concern over the processes used by the vendor in manufacturing the extrusion, not the alloy itself. -
#293 by marsman2020 on 28 Nov, 2012 03:50
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That charts from the meeting are here - http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/707192main_Gerstenmaier_HEO_NAC_20121115.pdf - with a slide on the OCO/Glory failures on slide 28.
What I find very interesting is the statement made by the poster above that a failure mode was identified through the centrifuge testing at NTS, because that testing at least started in May 2011 with the Glory NASA MIB in attendance to watch, but the Glory NASA MIB wrapped up in April 2012 without being able to find a root cause (per these charts). So the report that is eventually "summarized" to the public won't really tell anyone anything about these $700 million in total failures.... Also, it's taken 7 months to create a publicly releasable summary of the document which is way outside of NASA guidelines for how quickly it's supposed to be released.
So with the MIB wrapped up an no conclusion, the investigation continues with LSP & OSC, but there is no requirement to tell the public anything.QuoteWhat I think Gerst is referencing in the article is that we've also determined, recently, that for some rails the property in question varies pretty dramatically along the length of the extrusion. It's something that you don't necessarily pick up on unless you measure every inch or half inch. Luckily, it is something that can be measured, even for an installed vehicle.
As far as the material properties of the entire extrusion go - I recall one of the findings of the OCO MIB:Quote1) Frangible Joint Subsystem failure caused fairing not to separate.
It could not be determined if the frangible joint base ring fractured completely as designed. An incomplete fracture could have resulted in the fairing not separating. The MIB looked at the materials used and their characteristics and made the following
recommendations:
1. Verify that the Taurus launch vehicle frangible joint (fairing rail, base ring, and Stage 2/ Stage 3) extrusions have a traceable pedigree on future NASA missions. If pedigree cannot be verified, remove and replace the assigned hardware with frangible joints that have a complete pedigree.
2. Establish a single heat treat lot requirement for aluminum used to manufacture extrusion and perform sub-scale tests on the lot.
3. Institute permanent marking (which cannot be removed during processing) along the length of the extrusion at intervals to ensure traceability.
4. Implement a common procurement and assembly process for frangible joints used on Taurus similar to Orbital’s other programs.
The pedigree and correctness of the heat treat of the frangible joints was clearly *already in peoples minds* after OCO - because the joints that were installed on T8 didn't have traceability (doesn't LSP require ASA9100 as part of their contract?) I do not understand how if the recommendations above were followed prior to Glory, a joint could be installed with improper heat treatment, since the OCO MIB basically said "make some of these and measure every inch." -
#294 by catdlr on 01 May, 2019 00:47
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Bump for the conclusion of Failure Investigation:
Justice Department Notice Source
April 30, 2019
RELEASE 19-036
NASA Investigation Uncovers Cause of Two Science Mission Launch Failures
NASA Launch Services Program (LSP) investigators have determined the technical root cause for the Taurus XL launch failures of NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) and Glory missions in 2009 and 2011, respectively: faulty materials provided by the aluminum manufacturer, Sapa Profiles, Inc. (SPI).
LSP’s technical investigation led to the involvement of NASA’s Office of the Inspector General and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). DOJ’s efforts recently made public, resulted in the resolution of criminal charges and alleged civil claims against SPI, and its agreement to pay $46 million to the U.S. government and other commercial customers. This relates to a 19-year scheme that included falsifying thousands of certifications for aluminum extrusions to hundreds of customers.
NASA’s updated public summary of the launch failures, which was published Tuesday, comes after a multiyear technical investigation by LSP and updates the previous public summaries on the Taurus XL launch failures for the OCO and Glory missions. Those public summaries concluded that the launch vehicle fairing — a clamshell structure that encapsulates the satellite as it travels through the atmosphere — failed to separate on command, but no technical root cause had been identified. From NASA’s investigation, it is now known that SPI altered test results and provided false certifications to Orbital Sciences Corporation, the manufacturer of the Taurus XL, regarding the aluminum extrusions used in the payload fairing rail frangible joint. A frangible joint is a structural separation system that is initiated using ordnance.
“NASA relies on the integrity of our industry throughout the supply chain. While we do perform our own testing, NASA is not able to retest every single component. That is why we require and pay for certain components to be tested and certified by the supplier,” said Jim Norman, NASA’s director for Launch Services at NASA Headquarters in Washington. “When testing results are altered and certifications are provided falsely, missions fail. In our case, the Taurus XLs that failed for the OCO and Glory missions resulted in the loss of more than $700 million, and years of people’s scientific work. It is critical that we are able to trust our industry to produce, test and certify materials in accordance with the standards we require. In this case, our trust was severely violated.”
To protect the government supply chain, NASA suspended SPI from government contracting and proposed SPI for government-wide debarment. The exclusion from government contracting has been in effect since Sept. 30, 2015. NASA also has proposed debarment for Hydro Extrusion Portland, Inc.,formerly known as SPI,and the company currently is excluded from contracting throughout the federal government.
“Due in large part to the hard work and dedication of many highly motivated people in the NASA Launch Services program, we are able to close out the cause of two extremely disappointing launch vehicle failures and protect the government aerospace supply chain,” said Amanda Mitskevich, LSP program manager at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in, Florida. “It has taken a long time to get here, involving years of investigation and testing, but as of today, it has been worth every minute, and I am extremely pleased with the entire team’s efforts.”
To learn more about NASA’s Launch Services Program, visit:
https://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/launchingrockets/index.html
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Picture
On Space Launch Complex 576-E at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, Orbital Sciences workers monitor NASA's Glory upper stack as a crane lifts it from a stationary rail for attachment to the Taurus XL rocket's Stage 0.
Credits: NASA
