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#80 by Namechange User on 28 Apr, 2008 20:41
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TJL - 28/4/2008 3:36 PM
Is there any serious talk of grounding the Soyuz until an investigation determines the cause, or perhaps launching an unmanned Soyuz in order to test the landing without a crew on board?
Soyuz is in flight right now and berthed to the ISS. This vehicle may be required as a crew escape vehicle during any given minute. Grounding it in the conventional manner is not really an option. -
#81 by rsp1202 on 28 Apr, 2008 20:45
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extropiandreams - 28/4/2008 10:01 AM
The russians have to investigate this problem, and if they say it's ok to land the next soyuz, or it's ok to launch the next soyuz, i would just trust them.
Trust, but verify. To quote another biased American. -
#82 by TR1 on 28 Apr, 2008 20:46
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pm1823 - 28/4/2008 11:37 AM
//With the apparent problems of a pyrotechnic based explosive bolt configuration (atleast with the ones used by Soyuz,)
In the modules separation process used "pyro-lock" or "pyro-knife" for cables. Where you all and JimO takes these "pyrobolts" in the Soyuz?!
If electrical ignition failed pyro-lock has own independent high-thermal initiator which should work before other significant thermal or aerodynamic load will open it. And it works, as we see on TMA-10 or TMA-11 descent.
pm1823,
Can you share or point to any more information on these "pyro-locks"?
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#83 by JimO on 28 Apr, 2008 20:52
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eeergo - 28/4/2008 2:31 PM
Sometimes a bit more diplomatic approach helps in touchy subjects like this one.
No argument here.
By all means let's use all approaches to seeking more openness from space officials of any organization of any nation. Sometimes 'quiet diplomacy' can work (any examples?), sometimes teasing and mockery (as in the 'erased cosmonauts'), sometimes appeals to greed (commercial launch services require credible safety data to get affordable insurance) sometimes nothing less ugly than confrontation proves adequate. And often, nothing at all works.
We'll have to use a wide variety of techniques for the indefinite future, so I'd be curious to ask, which have historically been most useful? For example, how well did it work to to 'go along' and 'talk privately' when it came to revealing the modular separation problem last October? Confrontation didn't work either -- since the coverup was effective. When were any such methods going to produce a successful outcome, and how can they be improved?
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#84 by JimO on 28 Apr, 2008 20:54
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Let's not overlook that even with occasional Russian passengers on shuttles, they were not invited to send observers to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. But regarding Soyuz, NASA is involved as a commercial -- as in paying cash -- customer.
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#85 by JimO on 28 Apr, 2008 20:55
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IIs there really a significant difference in scorching?
And by the way, does anybody know what is that sensor probe extending from the upper curve of the DM hull on the picture on the right?
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#86 by JimO on 28 Apr, 2008 21:02
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I've always wondered -- how far from the DM landing point does the heat shield usually come down? Has anybody ever seen a photo of the landed hheat shield? Could THAT have started a grass fire?
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#87 by clongton on 28 Apr, 2008 21:07
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JimO - 28/4/2008 4:52 PM
This is what is most worrisome to me personally because it is recent, and not a historical reference to old Soviet-style behavior patterns, which I am personally familiar with. This was just last October, the last Soyuz re-entry. It's one thing to simply remain silent about something. It is quite another to participate in an official cover-up.
For example, how well did it work to 'go along' and 'talk privately' when it came to revealing the modular separation problem last October? Confrontation didn't work either -- since the cover-up was effective.
This issue was deliberately covered up'd. Justified or not, such behavior patters do provide reason to pause, and do breed suspicion. It troubles me and makes we wonder what else is being covered up, if anything. That's a natural human reaction to learning that one has been duped by someone who was previously trusted.
To put the shoe on the other foot, I would be very interested in knowing the names of the people at NASA who actually knew about the module separation problem and then concealed it, keeping that information secret from the astronauts who had to depend on Soyuz and from the President, who would be asked to request an extension to the Soyuz use authorization. What are the legal implications for participating in the cover-up, if any? -
#88 by Namechange User on 28 Apr, 2008 21:24
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JimO - 28/4/2008 3:55 PM
IIs there really a significant difference in scorching?
And by the way, does anybody know what is that sensor probe extending from the upper curve of the DM hull on the picture on the right?
Wow, that's the first good pic I've seen of the DM. A picture can speak a 1000 words....
I think it would be interesting to see a comparison of the heat shield between this one and others to see if there is less wear. -
#89 by eeergo on 28 Apr, 2008 21:25
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JimO - 28/4/2008 9:55 PM IIs there really a significant difference in scorching? And by the way, does anybody know what is that sensor probe extending from the upper curve of the DM hull on the picture on the right?
I think the probe is an really an antenna, one of the two that deploy approximately 10 minutes after landing. There's a schematic in L2 that shows where those are, and warns the rescue team to stand clear of those to avoid injuries.
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#90 by hop on 28 Apr, 2008 22:33
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JimO - 28/4/2008 2:02 PM
If I've understood correctly, the heatshield is jettisoned quite hight up. Charles Simonyi's account says (http://www.charlesinspace.com/ "coming home" page 5 unfortunately, it's a flash site and you can't link directly):
I've always wondered -- how far from the DM landing point does the heat shield usually come down? Has anybody ever seen a photo of the landed hheat shield? Could THAT have started a grass fire?QuoteFour minutes later we are at 15,000 ft (5 km) altitude. A bunch of the remaining pyrotechnics fire... We drop the heath shield to expose the soft landing rockets.
Given that the Soyuz is under parachute, and the heat shield is not, I'd expect it to fall quite far from the capsule. -
#91 by pm1823 on 28 Apr, 2008 23:55
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TR1 - 28/4/2008 3:46 PM
Can you share or point to any more information on these "pyro-locks"?
I have no picture of Soyuz' pyro-lock, but I know from books, that it is a charge-driven mechanical lock(piston) with electrical and thermal initiators, not a bolt with charge inside, like used in the Proton staging. There're a lot of such type - charge-driven locking mechanisms used the space industry.
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#92 by dsky on 29 Apr, 2008 00:18
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JimO - 28/4/2008 10:55 PM
And by the way, does anybody know what is that sensor probe extending from the upper curve of the DM hull on the picture on the right?
According to training info, the Soyuz Descent Module deploys 4 antennae: 3 ABM-274 VHF antennae at the bottom of the DM (one clearly seen in the lower part of the picture) and one ABM-279 SW/VHF antenna at the side of the DM. The "thing" seen in the picture seems to be the mount of the latter antenna. Communications through these antennae are available after landing, so it is understood that these deploy only after landing. The redundant arrangement ensure communications with any DM orientation on the ground.
Interesting to know that 2 SW antennae are also available in the parachute ropes. ABM-264 is associated to the primary parachute system and ABM-265 is associated to the backup parachute system. The two SW transmitter are connected to both antenna systems and available from parachute deployment to landing.
During the entry and landing phase a higher frequency slot antenna, ABM-273, is available close to the hatch.
(I added some additional info because I know somebody will find it of interest.)
Also, it seems nobody answered the query about the launch escape system. During an escape sequence, the DM separates from the Instrument/Assembly Module and it is carried away together with the Orbital Module. At altitude the DM separates from the OM and escape rocket and performs the landing phase.
Apparently, the same pyros discussed so far are therefore involved in a launch sequence separation. From a low fidelity drawing there are 5 Pyro Locks and 5 Spring Pushers.
A question. Could it be that the DM and the IAM remained joined by the bulky electrical harness that failed to be cut?
Edited with additional "official" info (CA=DM,
=IAM):
"The is a twelve-member aluminum alloy truss (see Figs. 34 and 35) connected to a
spherical bottom plate. Functionally, the is designed for load-bearing connection
of the ?? and. On the ?? side, the truss members end in lugs, by which they are
attached to the bottom plate, while on the ?? side the truss members end in 10 hollow
bushings (structural elements) on which the front portion of the ?? is mounted.
Redundant pyro locks fastening the ?? to the are installed in 5 of the 10 bushings
(on every other one). Spring-loaded push rods which separate the compartments are
installed in the other 5 bushings. There are a number of brackets on the truss for
installation of oxygen tanks, the, antennas, breakaway bulkhead connector plates
for communications with the ??, and a cable mast rotary mount."
See a few posts later for the text with cyrillic characters
I do hope it helps.
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#93 by Avron on 29 Apr, 2008 00:22
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JimO - 28/4/2008 3:27 PM
The point of view of my essays (and your point is well taken – perhaps they often should be labeled as ‘analysis’ rather ‘reportage’) reflect my experiences, which are mainly as a professional student of and participant in human spaceflight engineering and operations for more than four decades,
James, a great piece.. loved it.. I like to see that ‘analysis’ in your work, especially when it comes from an expert in the field..
More please.. -
#94 by pm1823 on 29 Apr, 2008 00:52
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//Edited with additional "official" info (CA=DM,=IAM):
PAO=IAM -
#95 by Chris Bergin on 29 Apr, 2008 00:53
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pm1823 - 29/4/2008 1:52 AM
//Edited with additional "official" info (CA=DM,=IAM):
PAO=IAM
Forum software doesn't like cyrillic
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#96 by dsky on 29 Apr, 2008 00:54
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hop - 29/4/2008 12:33 AM
QuoteJimO - 28/4/2008 2:02 PM
If I've understood correctly, the heatshield is jettisoned quite hight up. Charles Simonyi's account says (http://www.charlesinspace.com/ "coming home" page 5 unfortunately, it's a flash site and you can't link directly):
I've always wondered -- how far from the DM landing point does the heat shield usually come down? Has anybody ever seen a photo of the landed hheat shield? Could THAT have started a grass fire?QuoteFour minutes later we are at 15,000 ft (5 km) altitude. A bunch of the remaining pyrotechnics fire... We drop the heath shield to expose the soft landing rockets.
Given that the Soyuz is under parachute, and the heat shield is not, I'd expect it to fall quite far from the capsule.
"Officially" it goes as follows:
The Primary Parachute System deploys at 10.5 km altitude.
From 6.5 km to 5.5 km, the automatics evaluate PPS operation based on the vertical
descent rate
Pre-landing operations begin at an altitude of 5 km:
– heat shield jettison;
- switching off of ballistic descent mode;
- pressure equalization;
– jettison of the port hole covers;
– symmetrical rehooking of the Descent Module under the parachute;
– raising (cocking) of the seats.
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#97 by Blackstar on 29 Apr, 2008 00:57
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eeergo - 28/4/2008 1:07 PM
BUT I don't see how remembering past mismanagements in a long list of errors (some of them not technically related to the problem here) can help to get anywhere in mutual understanding and future open cooperation.
Agreed. Reaching back to 1969 to make a point (which I did not get) is a real stretch, and one that consider to be borderline unfair. It's like a journalistic piece about Columbia claiming that the Apollo 1 fire was similar--implying that the organization had not fixed the problem in over 30 years.
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#98 by dsky on 29 Apr, 2008 00:59
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This is the image of the text with the offending characters in cyrillic.
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#99 by Blackstar on 29 Apr, 2008 01:09
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Norm Hartnett - 28/4/2008 1:24 PM
This troubled me too. It is not the kind of article I would have expected to see on this site. I would reword this comment to read "seen through an exclusively american point of view" to read "seen through an exclusively older American point of view" though.
There are 300 million Americans. Jim Oberg only speaks for one of them. So I object to people trying to claim that this article reflects "an American point of view" and then seeking to paint all (or at least lots) of Americans with a broad brush.
Anybody who has read Jim's material over the years knows that he has a strong bias against the Russians and has been highly critical of NASA for being involved with the Russians. He was making that kind of argument during the Shuttle-Mir days. You know what you're getting with his articles and you have to take them with a grain of salt.
I do think that the article should have contained a subheader along the lines of "News Analysis" to indicate that it was not intended to be straight reporting. That's how most American newspapers label articles where the writers are given more leeway to have an opinion.
I also think that the article was undercut by two things. First, it seemed to reach rather far back and rather wide to make the case that the Russians have a long history of covering up space accidents. I thought that was stretching things a little bit. Not a lot, but probably more than it should have. Second, I think that the last paragraph was way too strong and opinionated and actually tended to undercut the rest of the article.
That said, I thought it was a generally good, thought-provoking article. Having served as an investigator on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, I'll add a few comments based upon my own experience.
First, initial press reports are always wrong. Everybody is speculating with too little information. It's important to not conclude that _any_ of these reports is correct. Just wait for the details to unfold before developing any conclusions.
Second, in the case of Columbia, NASA already had a pre-existing contingency plan for dealing with an accident. That covered the initial stages of response, including media response and data preservation. I think that they got those things exactly right. That said, there was _no_ clear model for how to conduct an investigation, and the CAIB was established as a NASA investigation at first. It's worth remembering that CAIB didn't really earn its moniker of "independent" until _after_ it produced a hard-hitting report.
All of that said, I'm not at all encouraged by the Russians' initial response to this. The lashing out and blaming people--without evidence--is not a good sign. The proper response is for them to provide an initial limited amount of data and then explain what they are doing to conduct an investigation.
=IAM):