Methane dropped from CEV plans

• #220 by Tap-Sa on 05 May, 2006 07:33
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  Jim - 5/5/2006  2:01 AM
   Who are going to build the ESAS LVs?  The primes.

  
  And this is going to happen with cost+fee deal, right? Meaning it doesn't much bother the primes if the costs balloon, unlike if they were contracted for launch services at fixed prices.
• #221 by Tap-Sa on 05 May, 2006 08:03
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  Kayla - 5/5/2006  6:43 AM
   
  The question was about the RL10 engine.  What specifically with the engine is wrong?  
  

  
  Nothing but too low thrust ... IF the first stage is giant SRB with oodles of thrust and ISP that is sh... oops ... wanting.
  
  With SRB the second stage + payload has to be massive enough in order to keep the G levels tolerable. The poor ISP and short burn time of SRB mean the second stage begins it's journey barely above atmosphere and has very limited time to deliver a lion's share of the speed required to get into orbit. The time limit requires considerable T/W from the beginning or the burn would take too long and stage falls back to Earth.
• #222 by Kayla on 05 May, 2006 12:03
• This is a great point.  Contracting for a launch service in a competitive environment is the way to keep launch costs down.
• #223 by Kayla on 05 May, 2006 12:07
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  Tap-Sa - 5/5/2006  3:03 AM
  
  

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  Kayla - 5/5/2006  6:43 AM
   
  The question was about the RL10 engine.  What specifically with the engine is wrong?  
  

  
  Nothing but too low thrust ... IF the first stage is giant SRB with oodles of thrust and ISP that is sh... oops ... wanting.
  
  With SRB the second stage + payload has to be massive enough in order to keep the G levels tolerable. The poor ISP and short burn time of SRB mean the second stage begins it's journey barely above atmosphere and has very limited time to deliver a lion's share of the speed required to get into orbit. The time limit requires considerable T/W from the beginning or the burn would take too long and stage falls back to Earth.

  
  You are absolutely right about the fact that an SRB first stage requires a huge upper stage with large thrust.
  
  An Atlas booster stage however worked very well with an RL10 powered upper stage.  The low cat fraction and reliability of the RL10 make clustering of RL10's very attractive due to the fact that one can truly attain affective engine out.
• #224 by publiusr on 05 May, 2006 17:54
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  Kayla - 5/5/2006  7:03 AM
  
  This is a great point.  Contracting for a launch service in a competitive environment is the way to keep launch costs down.

  
  No it isn't--or you will be paying for EELV evolutions and they will try to sell you a CaLV in the end anyway. Keep things in house and don't be dictated to. That is Griffins method that I support. And with ULA, there are only two groups--it and ATK. ATK won, and ULA lost. Time to move on.
• #225 by Jim on 05 May, 2006 18:15
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  publiusr - 5/5/2006  1:54 PM

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  Kayla - 5/5/2006  7:03 AMThis is a great point.  Contracting for a launch service in a competitive environment is the way to keep launch costs down.

  No it isn't--or you will be paying for EELV evolutions and they will try to sell you a CaLV in the end anyway. Keep things in house and don't be dictated to. That is Griffins method that I support. And with ULA, there are only two groups--it and ATK. ATK won, and ULA lost. Time to move on.

  
  ULA does not exist.   In house does not have experience
  
• #226 by rcaron on 05 May, 2006 20:31
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  Jim - 5/5/2006  2:15 PM
  ULA does not exist.   In house does not have experience
  

  
  Granted, ULA does not exist, but as I understand it the merger in a business sense only - both the Delta and Atlas lines will continue to be offered, and there can be ready transfer of a payload from one vehicle to another in case of delays (I can only infer some sort of standardized payload adapter would be required).
  
  In house may not have experience, but that's not due to their lack of trying. Also, I want things in-house! NASA's internal technical competance has been eroding away over the decades as more and more things are contracted out. Compared to the NACA/original NASA, what we have now is much more management only. In-house technical capability needs to improve for NASA's survival, I mean we're in a very real since picking up where we left off 30 years ago, and yet the skillsets don't match anymore.
  
  The only way to increase capability and gain experience is by working on these things.
  
  I should point out that the competitive environment mentioned doesn't actually work. If things were kept "competitive" then EELV would have been downselected to one manufacturer a long time ago. But of course traditional economic models don't work when the programs are government subsidized and government contracted.
  
  The flight rate neccessary for EELV/CaLV has not been proven. Risks (both flight and development) associated with a half dozen dockings (where a crew is not yet on site, mind you) per mission are not trivial. The division of mass over so many vehicles is less efficient than a single shot. SDV/CLV has hardware commonality with SDV/CaLV in regards to the boosters and J-2X (and the CLV upper stage definately has ET heritage written all over it). SDV/CLV uses existing NASA personell.
  
  Plus, and this is the biggest point, is that this has already been decided! I don't know why we're even still talking about SDV/EELV. Granted, there as the mass increases beyond the current capability, but the solution is to tweak booster performance, not replace the booster!
• #227 by impulse on 06 May, 2006 06:08
• In house may not have experience, but that's not due to their lack of trying. Also, I want things in-house! NASA's internal technical competance has been eroding away over the decades as more and more things are contracted out. Compared to the NACA/original NASA, what we have now is much more management only. In-house technical capability needs to improve for NASA's survival, I mean we're in a very real since picking up where we left off 30 years ago, and yet the skillsets don't match anymore.
  
  Yep those old NASA airplanes sure were great weren't they.  Lets get a better calibration- NACA did all the grunt work of testing and analysis that was used by private corporations to design and build competitive airplanes.  NACA was an enormous advantage to US industry.  That is a model that works.  What NASA is proposing to do now is effectively make their own airplanes so that they stay in practice.  There is NO talk of advancing technology.  It is deliberatly shied away from- because they have let many key technologies founder for decades.  They were bled white by Shuttle.  This model of government-industry interaction is rotten to the foundations.  NASA should issue a spec for what the end mission is and let industry compete to meet that mission.  Despite its inefficiencies it is the only proven way to suppress costs and get the best technology for the job.  
  
  
  
  I should point out that the competitive environment mentioned doesn't actually work. If things were kept "competitive" then EELV would have been downselected to one manufacturer a long time ago. But of course traditional economic models don't work when the programs are government subsidized and government contracted.
  
  The EELV program was highly competitive and resulted in a reduction in costs to orbit of roughly 50% of previous systems.  Even with the collapse of commercial launch. That little fact is conveniently forgotten most of the time.  
  
  It is highly likely that the USAF will downselect to one supplier in coming years.  But they would prefer to have two that have viable business cases so that in the event of a problem they have assured access to space.  They are absolutely reliant on space based assets and know it.  This is why it is rather laughable to think that EELV are some sort of scary unreliable rocket- there are crucial national assets that directly impact the lives of real soldiers in the field that rely on these rockets.  The criticality of these assets is probably an order of magnitude above any NASA activity.  Hence they are willing, at present, to spend the equivalent of two F-22's per year to maintain parallel suppliers.
  
  One of the key features of an EELV derived launch architecture is that there are enormous benefits to both programs.  Even if the vehicles are not identical they share 90% of their critical hardware.  This means that for the first time the vendors of engines, bottles, thrusters, valves and boxes will see high rates.  That alone is worth billions to the two government parties. And with rate comes repeatability and even better overall reliability.
  
  
  
  The flight rate neccessary for EELV/CaLV has not been proven. Risks (both flight and development) associated with a half dozen dockings (where a crew is not yet on site, mind you) per mission are not trivial. The division of mass over so many vehicles is less efficient than a single shot. SDV/CLV has hardware commonality with SDV/CaLV in regards to the boosters and J-2X (and the CLV upper stage definately has ET heritage written all over it). SDV/CLV uses existing NASA personell.
  
  Use of existing EELV's "as is" is probably not optimal for the long run.  They are totally adequate for near term stuff like ISS access.  The evolution plan for Atlas to support NASA's exploration goals took the immediate steps to meet immediate goals.  It took the next steps as the mission expanded.  Despite what Mr Griffin thinks, this incremental "spiral" approach to modifying vehicle design is the only proven method for controlling cost and risk on ambitious technology programs.  You can be cavalier but if you "blank sheet of paper" it you will end up in deep trouble.  Witness Ariane 5, Delta III, H2, Falcon.  How NASA has the authority to behave in such an irresponsible manner with taxpayer money is a mystery to me.  There are known successful approaches to complex system design problems just like MIL-HDBK-5 has proven methods for materials allowables.  You don't hear anyone arguing with MIL.  Calibration point: Ariane spent something like 4 times what Atlas did to achieve effectively identical performance.  And they ended up with multiple failures.  These are smart, competent engineers who had one of the most successful rockets in history under their belts and look how they got burned. NASA is not immune.
  
  Also, if you think through the exploration problem to the end, if you don't have autonomous docking and propellant transfer you have no business going to Mars or the moon.  This problem that you seem to think is so tough has already been mostly solved.  The technology is no more scary than an autopilot doing autoland.  In fact it is much easier.  I agree that doing gratuitous docking is foolish. But insisting that you can avoid ARD is just plain wrong.  
  
  Plus, and this is the biggest point, is that this has already been decided! I don't know why we're even still talking about SDV/EELV. Granted, there as the mass increases beyond the current capability, but the solution is to tweak booster performance, not replace the booster![/QUOTE]
  
  You know you sound just like the folks in the late 70's who swore that Shuttle was going to eliminate expendables forever since it was such an awesome design.  It turned out that a lot of bad decisions had been made in that design and we ended up paying for those with effectively three decades of stagnation in manned spaceflight.  In the meantime there has been absolutely tremendous advancement in the commercial space arena.  The failure of Shuttle to live up to its promises made that possible really.  As such the centroid of knowledge for expendable vehicle design now is firmly centered over industry.  NASA should learn from those with direct, recent experience.  Learning is good right?
  
  A lot of us are not motivated by what our badge says but by the realization that the same fundamental design errors are being made again- some of them for the same bad reasons.  Some out of simple ignorance or fear.  We designed these expendable launch vehicles for NASA not out of corporate greed but out of wanting to give the American public the launch system that they deserve.  They deserve the best.  ESAS is not even close to the best.  We feel that being silent when we can see blatantly bad designs being foisted upon the lay public as the "best we can do" is a direct violation of the fundamental trust people place in engineers.  If we want to avoid the mistakes of Shuttle then we cannot participate in a sick group-think that prevents open discussion.  And let me mention that Mr Griffin himself forced the removal of multiple AIAA papers that were going to illuminate these alternatives to the ESAS last fall.  He made the calls and dozens were pulled to avoid any alternatives being made public.  This alone should be a warning that the culture of NASA senior management has some serious problems.  In their blind drive to force a half-baked solution down everyone's throats they have stooped to a level that to me is a fundamental violation of acceptable behavior in science and engineering.  How would we feel if this was done on nuclear reactor design?    
  
  We want to go to the moon and Mars and we want to do it in our lifetimes.  We think that NOW is the time to force these architectures to stand on their own feet in the light of day and be fairly compared.  Realistically they are mostly viewgraphs at present.  There is still time for reason to prevail.  You have heard many folks call for real competition to bring out the best in every entity both Government and industry.  Maybe a  competitive fly-off is pretty much the only fair way to get a ground-truth based decision.  In any event, design by executive fiat is a poor path to follow.
• #228 by rcaron on 06 May, 2006 08:39
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  What NASA is proposing to do now is effectively make their own airplanes so that they stay in practice.  There is NO talk of advancing technology.

  That's not entirely accurate. The lox/lch4 engines were an advancement of technology proposed (in the original ESAS anyway) and the air-lit SSME was an obvious challenge. So, for a time perhaps, NASA was willing to advance technology. The fact that both were recinded is most unfortunate.
  
  I should point out that if one is not in practice, how can technology be advanced? A lot of work is necessary to get back to the NASA that was strong advantage for the nation in driving technology forward.
  
  

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  NASA should issue a spec for what the end mission is and let industry compete to meet that mission.  Despite its inefficiencies it is the only proven way to suppress costs and get the best technology for the job.

  To make a worthwhile specification that makes sense to the contractors NASA needs to improve its technical know-how. The only way to improve technical know-how is to do things in house. Also, what exactly are the Phase 1 and Phase 2 CEV contracts than a competition?
  
  

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  The EELV program was highly competitive and resulted in a reduction in costs to orbit of roughly 50% of previous systems.  Even with the collapse of commercial launch. That little fact is conveniently forgotten most of the time.  

  From what I have heard, EELV economically is in very rough shape, which is what created the need for the ULA proposal. Perhaps the costs have been reduced too far, sacraficing sustainability of the programs?
  
  

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  This is why it is rather laughable to think that EELV are some sort of scary unreliable rocket- there are crucial national assets that directly impact the lives of real soldiers in the field that rely on these rockets.  The criticality of these assets is probably an order of magnitude above any NASA activity.

  The requirements of orbital assets are very different than NASA requirements. Due to their very critality, the networks (GPS, communication transponders, et al) have inherent capability to deal with failures and absenses of spacecraft. GPS has robust margins, and systems continue to function even with the lost of a communications satellite or two earlier in the year on launch. Therefore, launch vehicle reliability, while high, doesn't have to be AS high as a NASA mission. Beyond TDRS, what network of anything does NASA maintain in space? Even assuming for the moment that the Shuttle was an unmanned vehicle, what do you think would have happened if we lost, say, the Destiny laboratory on launch? That was so expensive a backup could not be built. When manned flight is factored into the equation it becomes even more dire.
  
  

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  impulse - 6/5/2006  2:08 AM
  One of the key features of an EELV derived launch architecture is that there are enormous benefits to both programs.  Even if the vehicles are not identical they share 90% of their critical hardware.  This means that for the first time the vendors of engines, bottles, thrusters, valves and boxes will see high rates.  That alone is worth billions to the two government parties. And with rate comes repeatability and even better overall reliability.

  Of course high rates would be achieved if the necessary launch rate were approximately doubled! Also, to assume increased flight rate automatically improves reliability would be mistaken. Mistakes happen during high repeatability. People get complacent. With higher flight rates the launch range and facilities get backed up - reconfiguring the Eastern range can take weeks, and Falcon 1 had numerous delays despite having its own launch site due to the range being occupied for missile defense tests and the like. Plus, it isn't clear to me yet how EELV is of enormous benefit to the exploration program - it sounds more like an operational headache to me.
  
  

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  Use of existing EELV's "as is" is probably not optimal for the long run.  They are totally adequate for near term stuff like ISS access.  The evolution plan for Atlas to support NASA's exploration goals took the immediate steps to meet immediate goals.  It took the next steps as the mission expanded.  Despite what Mr Griffin thinks, this incremental "spiral" approach to modifying vehicle design is the only proven method for controlling cost and risk on ambitious technology programs.

  They are not "adequate" for even ISS access. To maintain sufficient abort windows the SM needs sufficient propellant to put the total payload requirements a couple mtons over capacity. Granted, the CEV is overkill for ISS flights (reference CEV's 5m diameter vs Dragon's 3.6m), but no nation has ever operated two different manned orbital spacecraft simultaneously. Now, before people start hitting me with technicalities, what I mean by this is that we never had Apollo in unison with the Shuttle, or the DynaSoar with Mercury. Even Russian's Buran, which overlaped the Soyuz program, was never manned. Thus, we're sending CEV to ISS because we need CEV for later. And, unless we talk about Atlas Phase 2 (and who's going to pay for it?) EELV can't make the cut.
  
  

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  You can be cavalier but if you "blank sheet of paper" it you will end up in deep trouble.  Witness Ariane 5, Delta III, H2, Falcon.  How NASA has the authority to behave in such an irresponsible manner with taxpayer money is a mystery to me.

  CLV/CaLV are hardly blank sheets of paper. These designs have flight-proven hardware and have been fleshed out for decades. The CaLV bears striking similarity to Zubrin's Ares. You simultaneously critizise NASA for using a "blank sheet of paper" (which its not) and not a lack of technology innovation (which requires at least some blank pages)...
  
  

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  Also, if you think through the exploration problem to the end, if you don't have autonomous docking and propellant transfer you have no business going to Mars or the moon.  This problem that you seem to think is so tough has already been mostly solved.  The technology is no more scary than an autopilot doing autoland.  In fact it is much easier.  I agree that doing gratuitous docking is foolish. But insisting that you can avoid ARD is just plain wrong.

  AR&D has not been solved. Instead of dwelling on my previous Kurs references, the two experimental USAF spacecraft to test AR&D were not entirely successful. ATV has been delayed for years in large part due to the automatic rendevous - and it doesn't even dock automatically! It is instead "caught" by the station's arm and subsequently berthed (much like the MPLMs are). I assume by gratuitous docking you're referring to many dockings - and that's exactly what an EELV-based exploration would require. Can AR&D be avoided completely of course not? Can you minimize the risks of AR&D? Absolutely. Besides, in the current architecture there's always a man-in-the-loop without radio latency. This would most definately not be the case if EELVs were to replace the CaLV.
  
  

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  You know you sound just like the folks in the late 70's who swore that Shuttle was going to eliminate expendables forever since it was such an awesome design.  It turned out that a lot of bad decisions had been made in that design and we ended up paying for those with effectively three decades of stagnation in manned spaceflight.  In the meantime there has been absolutely tremendous advancement in the commercial space arena.  The failure of Shuttle to live up to its promises made that possible really.  As such the centroid of knowledge for expendable vehicle design now is firmly centered over industry.  NASA should learn from those with direct, recent experience.  Learning is good right?

  I am in no way stipulating that CLV & CaLV are solutions to everything like the Shuttle was proclaimed. These vehicles are not flying DoD assets, they are not going to have two week turnaround times, reusability is not emphasized. Commercial space systems will not fly on these vehicles. Neither will ISS hardware. Science missions most likely not (Ulysses and Galileo's launch times were very much not optimal due to Shuttle delays - space science community would much perfer Delta/Atlas). The CLV & CaLV are not "awesome" designs - they rely on heritage hardware, don't expand the envelope appreciably, and despite ideas such as the ASRM and, LRB, and flyback boosters none of these will be implemented.
  
  The Shuttle was the world's first attempt at operational resusable spaceplane. Dynasoar didn't make it all the way. While the Shuttle hasn't lived up to expetations, only hindsight is 20/20. It was a attempt, and someday when the technology's better we'll try again to make access to LEO routine.
  
  The expendable launch vehicles do not line up with NASA's goals. Thus, I'm not sure how industry's centroid of knowledge on expendables is relevent. Learning is good - and somebody needs to learn how to build a really big launch vehicle. If industry had a Saturn V equivilent the situation would be very much different and NASA could finally stop focusing on the near-space and start exploring the fringes again.  
  
  

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  A lot of us are not motivated by what our badge says but by the realization that the same fundamental design errors are being made again- some of them for the same bad reasons.  Some out of simple ignorance or fear.

  While I agree the aspects of ESAS with regards to the lunar side of things are not ideal (lack of L1 utilization, limited surface tme, no provisions for long duration facilities, etc). These problems are resultant of NASA wanting to mirror Apollo methodology since that's the only way that its ever been done. Dropping lox/lch4 is another such problem. But the CaLV is not, as you put it, a "fundamental design error". It will get the critical lunar hardware up in a single shot, and Mars hardware in a few shots. How many launches would it take from a D4-H or Atlas Phase 2 to make a Mars mission? 10? 20? We NEED a big booster.
  
  Now, how this relates to the CLV/stick is pretty simple. NASA can't, at this time, afford the development of the CaLV due to Shuttle/ISS commitments. There's also the workforce/Congress issue. So, how can you keep (at least some) of the workforce and yet advance the CaLV without actually funding the CaLV? You use a subset of the CaLV hardware, in this case the SRB (hopefully 5 element), J2-X, and have Michoud build effectively a mini-ET for the upper stage. The upper stage will take far different loading than the ET, of course, due to the vertical stacking, but guess what? The CaLV uber-ET will experience the same kinds of loads, albeit much greater.
  
  

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  We designed these expendable launch vehicles for NASA not out of corporate greed but out of wanting to give the American public the launch system that they deserve.  They deserve the best.  ESAS is not even close to the best.

  The American public does have the launch system they deserve for the assets so critical to its survival, what you deemed "an order of magnitude" more important to the nation than NASA activities. Space assets are critical to the economic and security interests of this nation, but a strong manned NASA exploration program has much greater impacts in the long run.
  
  

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  We feel that being silent when we can see blatantly bad designs being foisted upon the lay public as the "best we can do" is a direct violation of the fundamental trust people place in engineers.  If we want to avoid the mistakes of Shuttle then we cannot participate in a sick group-think that prevents open discussion.

  Engineers do not live in a vacuum, and programs that do not consider political and economic viability are doomed to failure. NASP, SDI, X-33, X-38, the list goes on. All programs that would have been of value to this nation that were canceled for being too bold, too expensive, or not using the appropriate congressional districts. Granted, the long timeline of the VSE will be difficult to sustain, but that is a necessity of the economics. If you, say, fix the economics by stopping Shuttle/ISS you have international politics stopping you.
  
  I appreciate your unwillingness to follow the group think and have open discussion - and here we are. But is EELV a solution to everything? No, it is not. I'm afraid there is such a tendancy to try to apply EELVs to so many different scenarios, in part due to the difficult economics, that some are equally blinded by group think -- that isn't NASA centric.
  
  

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  And let me mention that Mr Griffin himself forced the removal of multiple AIAA papers that were going to illuminate these alternatives to the ESAS last fall.  He made the calls and dozens were pulled to avoid any alternatives being made public.  This alone should be a warning that the culture of NASA senior management has some serious problems.  In their blind drive to force a half-baked solution down everyone's throats they have stooped to a level that to me is a fundamental violation of acceptable behavior in science and engineering.  How would we feel if this was done on nuclear reactor design?

  I was not aware of this restriction of papers. That is very unfortunate and it does tarnish my respect for Dr. Griffin (who I hold in high regard). However, I would not call a 2 month engineering study blind. Granted, when presented in the fall ESAS was not complete, what one may call "half-baked".  However, the ESAS report itself was nearly there and the remaining issues in the are being worked. ESAS took into account prior designs and numerous lengthy reports that were previously written, including a lot of material on EELV.
  
  Ironically, I think nuclear reactor designs most definately have been restricted information and have been withheld. That is very sensitive material and since it has direct security implications I, as an American citizen, would be very disapointed if it had not been censored. Obviously secrets cannot be contained forever, and now nuclear security must take a defense of the materials as opposed to defense of the knowledge, but there was a time were the latter was required and effective.
  
  

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  We want to go to the moon and Mars and we want to do it in our lifetimes.  We think that NOW is the time to force these architectures to stand on their own feet in the light of day and be fairly compared.  Realistically they are mostly viewgraphs at present.  There is still time for reason to prevail.  
  

  I completely agree, if changes are to be made now is the time to make them. More important than reaching the Moon & Mars is making the program sustainable. Operational difficulties must be minimized and we need to prevent the crash in the program after Apollo.
  
  I haven't seen sufficent reasoning to replace CaLV with EELVs. You want to get rid CaLV and CLV? Then replace them - build a Saturn V, start Atlas Phase 2, revive the F-1 engine, actually prove AR&D with high reliability. There's plenty for industry to take on. Build the J2-X.
  
  Don't have the funds you say? Could never get Boeing/LockMart execs to give the go-ahead? Now you have an sense for NASA's predicament. The program is woefully underfunded, and Congress can easily kill the program if their pet projects and districts are not met.
  
  

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  You have heard many folks call for real competition to bring out the best in every entity both Government and industry.  Maybe a  competitive fly-off is pretty much the only fair way to get a ground-truth based decision.  In any event, design by executive fiat is a poor path to follow.

  Government vs industry? huh? The very notion of flying the stick against an EELV is rediculous - it is a substantial waste of funds (both government and private) and were designed wth very different purposes. And, while design by executive fiat may not yield the ideal engineering solution, it does aid in making sure that the program does happen - instead of remaining as viewgraphs and dreams for history to dutifully record as "what could have been..."
• #229 by kraisee on 06 May, 2006 21:34
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  impulse - 6/5/2006  2:08 AM
  The EELV program was highly competitive and resulted in a reduction in costs to orbit of roughly 50% of previous systems.  Even with the collapse of commercial launch. That little fact is conveniently forgotten most of the time.  

  
  The actual documented costs for the DoD-funded EELV Program actually show a massively different story to the one which has been reported so far.
  
  As we all know, the primary purpose of the EELV Program was to launch DoD satellites through to 2020.   The only place where EELV's are more fiscally efficient than the boosters they replaced, is in the Heavy categories exclusively, specifically in comparison to the Titan-IV they replace in that category.   The EELV's are approximately 45-50% more efficient today than those were.   But the Heavy missions represent only 5.5% of all the DoD's planned missions - a tiny fraction of all the costs.
  
  The other 94.5% of the flights the DoD are planning to fly between now and 2020 are in the intermediate and medium categories - and the EELV's just are *NOT* as cost effective as the ELV's they replaced for these same missions.   The costs are higher across these flights, and actually peak to around 300% higher per-flight in some cases!
  
  That is the true hidden facts behind the EELV Program.
  
  In 2002, even prior to the Commercial Satellite-market-dropout costs ever being applied to the EELV program, the overall flight manifest for the DoD thru 2020 was expected to rise by 3.3%, not drop by 25-50% as was originally planned.   This was largely due to funding two families of vehicles instead of downselecting to just one though, so could possibly be forgiven.
  
  When the DoD finally accepted, in 2004, that they were going to have to pick up all the bills for the program and could not expect to share them with the non-existant commercial market, the final costs for all those launches increased by a HUGE 68%!
  
  The bottom line is this (and everyone can work out the math for themselves):
  
  1998 original expected DoD's costs, from 2002 to 2020 for 164 ELV launches: $20,320m
  2002 initial operational DoD's costs, from 2002 to 2020 for 164 EELV launches: $21,006.8m
  2004 newly revised DoD's costs, from 2002 to 2020 for 164 EELV launches: $33,623.7m
  
  NOTE: All figures above are inflation-adjusted to the same FY2006 dollars and are publicly available from the Government Accounting Office and the DoD directly.
  
  I've got a detailed article covering this entire process, step-by-step over the evolution of the EELV program in with Chris now, with links provided to all the government-issued documentation to support the findings.   It's under review now and may be published here soon.   Watch the L2 space.
  
  Ross.
• #230 by Jim on 07 May, 2006 02:55
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  kraisee - 6/5/2006  5:34 PM[The other 94.5% of the flights the DoD are planning to fly between now and 2020 are in the intermediate and medium categories - and the EELV's just are *NOT* as cost effective as the ELV's they replaced for these same missions.   The costs are higher across these flights, and actually peak to around 300% higher per-flight in some cases!That is the true hidden facts behind the EELV Program.

  
  
  Yes, the cost of the EELV program has risen, but there is serious errors above.  
  
  Any payload requiring lift capability greater than a D-IV Medium (the Medium plus's) or Atlas V 401 (the 4X1 or 5X1 series), could not fly on a Atlas II or a Delta II, therefore a Titan IV would have to used.   Titan IV was $200-300M.
  
  The only payloads that did or will fly on the old versions of the ELVs and the EELV's are 2 DSCS. 2 DMSP,  and 1 DSP (which is flying on a Heavy).  So, there can't really be a direct comparison because most of the EELV payloads can't fly on the heritage ELV's other than T-IV (The GPS is a new version).
  
  http://www.skyrocket.de/space/doc/eelv.htm
  
  What would the be the costs of sustaining the Titan-IV, Atlas II and Delta II programs until 2020?  Were they included in the study?  
  
  Also what were the costs of the vehicles that they replaced?  Delta II's have risen significantly in the last few years.  
  
  The payloads on the EELV's NASA has flown could only be done by T-IV
  
  
• #231 by impulse on 07 May, 2006 06:17
• &Ahhh where to begin?  
  

  Quote

  rcaron - 6/5/2006  2:39 AM
  
  
  To make a worthwhile specification that makes sense to the contractors NASA needs to improve its technical know-how. The only way to improve technical know-how is to do things in house. Also, what exactly are the Phase 1 and Phase 2 CEV contracts than a competition?
  
  

  This is clearly just plain wrong. I've been involved in the writing of specs for hundreds of gizmos- and although I claim to be knowledgeable about these devices I never pretend to know as much as my supplier does about how to make a hydrazine bottle or a thruster.  It is amply clear to anyone in the industry that an enormous amount of the innovation and "know how" resides in small companies that know their products inside and out.  It is totally inappropriate for me to compete directly with them just so I can educate myself.  What a waste of time and money.  INstead we have insight into what they are doing, support them when problems get beyond their in-house capability and focus on what WE do best.  Which is the integration of parts into whole systems.  NASA has some outstanding talents too.  They should play to their strengths- not pretend that they have to design a whole set of new vehicles to show they can do it.  I am sure they will get there eventually if they stick with CLV/CaLV.  It'll just take much longer and cost way more than if they came to their senses and delegated these launch tasks to entities that have that particular talent.  
  
  
  
  
  Quote

  I said:
  The EELV program was highly competitive and resulted in a reduction in costs to orbit of roughly 50% of previous systems.  Even with the collapse of commercial launch. That little fact is conveniently forgotten most of the time.  

  you said:
  From what I have heard, EELV economically is in very rough shape, which is what created the need for the ULA proposal. Perhaps the costs have been reduced too far, sacraficing sustainability of the programs?