Tap-Sa - 2/5/2006 3:05 AM
Btw (1 - 1/87)17 yields 0.82 probability that remaining flights happen without disasters.
Yeah, I said 87 didn't I? Meant Shuttle's proven record of 2/114 (1:57) failure rate, which results in 1 in 2.9 chance of losing another orbiter in the next 17 flights.
Mind you, even with the 1/87 rate that means 82% probability of success = 18% probability of failure. That's still close to the 1 in 5 chance I mentioned.
That's the problem with statistics, you can make them say almost anything you want. Although both of these result are in the 1 in 4 (+/-1) ballpark, which is still pretty crappy odds for us to be risking the future of the exploration program on IMHO.
How come you bash the shuttle, vehicle NASA built, so freely and yet adamantly believe that another vehicle NASA insists on building will be a heaven sent delivering all promises made? Rather ... dualist thinking.
Its not dualist thinking, its contextual thinking.
The big difference is that NASA, this time, is simply not trying to push the boundaries of what's possible as was done with Shuttle. Shuttle was an awful lot of new concepts brought together - reusablity, wings, new materials, side-mounted payloads, crew & payload together, payload return capability, runway landings etc etc. It was also an unheard of degree of complexity brought together too, and yet it was a system which was never designed to have a crew escape system.
While some elements are common, it is the conceptual design of the new launchers which is so much simpler than Shuttle. The designs return to the very basics of rocketry, and are fundamentally
very simple from the inception of the program. All in a drive to get the safest possible vehicle we can make (I'll qualify that, of course, by mentioning they are still constrained by the available resources at this time; budget, engines, facilities, workforce, political will etc).
CLV, fundamentally is one of the simplest possible designs - A single solid motor for the first stage, with a single engine on a liquid upper stage and the crew module & full escape system placed on top. That's basically all there is to it. Nobody has made a conceptually simpler manned rocket since Mercury/Gemini!
CaLV, fundamentally is just a vertically stacked two-stage rocket, with solid booster strapons and the payload is placed on top. That's a pretty common configuration for a rocket anywhere in the world, and is a very well understood concept which has been well-proven over and over again for 40-odd years now. The only unusual factor is the large size and thus the capacity of the vehicle.
Although Shuttle is a quarter century old now, it is still a radically unusual configuration for a rocket. The Russians tried the same basic concept about 20 years ago, flew it once and then promtly retired it because it just wasn't cost effective and simple (that means safe) as their other systems. As it stands, America didn't accept that lesson until 2003, yet will still continue to fly it for another four years.
The configuration of the Shuttle launch vehicle is a complicated one. That complexity has meant that after 25 years of use, it still is not as well-proven as we'd like it to be. It also has some pretty serious, and now quite obvious, flaws in the design too. Columbia graphically demonstrated one of the Shuttle's unique flaws, a flaw which no regular vertical rocket design would ever have suffered from. The current fleet were all re-classified to experimental craft again, specifically because the configuration is no longer considered to be as safe as we would wish.
Yet individual elements of the Shuttle system actually work very well. For example, the SRB's now have 226 successful manned launches, and over 35 successful test firings under their belts - which is better than any other engine in America's arsenal. The SSME's have 337 successful manned launches under their belts, with just two premature shutdowns in the flight history, both caused by faulty instrumentation, not mechanical failure.
The Full Shuttle Stack actually places 115 tons of material into space every time it launches to the ISS, but the final useful payload, because of the mass of the Orbiter vehicle itself, is only 16 tons, or just 14% of the stuff which was placed up there. The same basic hardware, if just assembled in a different configuration, could actually put about 95+ tons of truly useful payload up on every flight. An evolved configuration of that same basic hardware is going to ultimately be able to put nearly 150 tons of useful stuff up there in the form of the CaLV.
These good elements just do not work so well together when "combined" into the horrifically complicated STS system we continue flying today though. For example, if there were no Orbiters riding on the side of the ET, the tank foam shedding issue becomes completely irrelevant. Similarly, if there had been no external tank next to the SRB on the ill-fated STS-51L's flight, the burn-through the SRB suffered could not have caused the strut to fail, which caused the tank to rupture. Analysis shows that if an even worse burn-through were to occur on a CLV, it would not put the crew, nor the mission, at critical risk. The SRB's are actually fixed these days, so the CaLV can take that particular risk, also it is not so dangerous because it is not planned to actually launch with crew aboard it, just lots and lots of payload.
The basic elements of the Shuttle, if simply put together in a new way, can be made into vehicles which are far, far safer than Shuttle.
Ross.