Author Topic: STS-120 FRR for October 23 launch date (Read 27713 times)

Ford Mustang · « **Reply #40 on:** 10/17/2007 01:26 am »

Would take 60 days to do a replacement, and they do have replacement panels, although they are not going to replace them.

psloss · « **Reply #41 on:** 10/17/2007 01:28 am »

Gerstenmeier says they have other panels on other vehicles that have similar measurements, but the question is what should the criteria be for what action...

psloss · « **Reply #42 on:** 10/17/2007 01:32 am »

Good philosophical answer from Hale to Harwood's question: engineers like to have agreed upon rules, but they are still trying to make the rules for this...

psloss · « **Reply #43 on:** 10/17/2007 01:35 am »

Conference over.

Ford Mustang · « **Reply #44 on:** 10/17/2007 01:35 am »

Concluded. Go for launch. Great questions by media, IMO.

shuttlefan · « **Reply #45 on:** 10/17/2007 01:37 am »

So they ARE flying with something they don't understand fully??

Chris Bergin · « **Reply #46 on:** 10/17/2007 01:37 am »

Some key questions were missing there. For one, the NESC comparison on data not being Discovery specific, but a comparison to another vehicle, etc.

psloss · « **Reply #47 on:** 10/17/2007 01:38 am »

Unsurprisingly, Harwood was the only one to press them to explain and the answers improved from start to end.

ChrisC · « **Reply #48 on:** 10/17/2007 01:38 am »

I'd like to know what book Hale was referring to. It sounded like a book about engineering management, written by Diane somebody. I'll see if I can figure it out once John44 upload's his video file.

Ford Mustang · « **Reply #49 on:** 10/17/2007 01:39 am »

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shuttlefan - 16/10/2007 9:37 PM

So they ARE flying with something they don't understand fully??

I believe so. They have an acceptable risk, which is what every shuttle flies with. This is a new program that they are using to look at the RCC panels, and they are still getting used to it.

Flightstar · « **Reply #50 on:** 10/17/2007 01:41 am »

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Chris Bergin - 16/10/2007 8:37 PM

Some key questions were missing there. For one, the NESC comparison on data not being Discovery specific, but a comparison to another vehicle, etc.

No big deal as you already had answered by quotes earlier.

psloss · « **Reply #51 on:** 10/17/2007 01:42 am »

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Chris Bergin - 16/10/2007 9:37 PM

Some key questions were missing there. For one, the NESC comparison on data not being Discovery specific, but a comparison to another vehicle, etc.

I need to go back and re-read the presentations again, but that one note by Gerstenmeier about other panels on other orbiters possibly having this 0.2 measurement is one of the reasons. (Of course, there's also the question of what the measurement means...)

Seattle Dave · « **Reply #52 on:** 10/17/2007 01:42 am »

Some media are going to be negative about it all, but Hale, and especially Gerst, did a good job.

Jorge · « **Reply #53 on:** 10/17/2007 01:43 am »

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ChrisC - 16/10/2007 8:38 PM

I'd like to know what book Hale was referring to. It sounded like a book about engineering management, written by Diane somebody. I'll see if I can figure it out once John44 upload's his video file.

http://www.amazon.com/Challenger-Launch-Decision-Technology-Deviance/dp/0226851761/ref=sr_1_1/105-8351179-5964433?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1192585332&sr=8-1

psloss · « **Reply #54 on:** 10/17/2007 01:44 am »

Quote

ChrisC - 16/10/2007 9:38 PM

I'd like to know what book Hale was referring to. It sounded like a book about engineering management, written by Diane somebody. I'll see if I can figure it out once John44 upload's his video file.

Diane Vaughn -- she wrote the famous book The Challenger Launch Decision. The CAIB referred to it often during their investigation.

Edit -- changed link to Google Books for a little variety...

Lee Jay · « **Reply #55 on:** 10/17/2007 01:44 am »

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shuttlefan - 16/10/2007 7:37 PM

So they ARE flying with something they don't understand fully??

A great many things. They always have. Very little in the real world is understood fully (hypersonics are especially poorly understood). The question is, is it understood enough, combined with mitigating circumstances, procedures, and techniques, to drive the risk low enough to go out fly, versus sitting on the ground until you do understand everything fully (forever). And don't forget that a great deal of the information needed to advance the understanding of some of these things can come only from going out an flying.

Understanding is not full, and risk is not zero, nor will it ever be, on anything.

ChrisC · « **Reply #56 on:** 10/17/2007 01:46 am »

Thanks guys for the book info. I knew I wouldn't have to wait long

Norm Hartnett · « **Reply #57 on:** 10/17/2007 02:17 am »

I think that the PAO really hung these guys out to dry. There should have been good analogies that could have been used to explain why this decision was reached and it should have been PAO’s responsibility to provide those analogies.

I suspect that cars would have been an excellent analogy.

Q; What is the thermography showing? A; Something like the crazing that you can see under the clear coat on your car’s paint job only at a very early stage.

Q; Why are you flying instead of replacing the worst panels? A; Like taking your car for a long trip taking the shuttle to orbit is an inherently dangerous undertaking. You check the tires, engine, and brakes but you don’t replace the worn tires unless you see an obvious problem. A tire could fail, in the worst case a tire could fail catastrophically and cause a wreck; in the very worst case the wreck could be fatal. Does this mean that you do not take the trip? Does this mean that you replace the tires before each trip? No, what you do is watch your tires; when you get to your destination you check the tires again before returning. We believe that the RCC panels do not need to be replaced at this time, we need to watch them; we need to be aware of the issue while testing to understand the possible problems.

PAO should have spent the last week and a half formulating both explanations for the decision to fly and the decision to not fly. They should have been ready to support these guys with ways of explaining the issue in terms that a layman could understand without reducing the underlying complexity of the issue. If I could come up with the above in a half hour surely PAO could have done a much better job.

rdale · « **Reply #58 on:** 10/17/2007 02:21 am »

I don't think it matters. The only way the public will care about this issue is if the panels fail during reentry and we lose the orbiter. Otherwise, just like the tile issue, it gets some page 6 billing and hype from certain writers, and passes. The best analogies in the world won't stop her from writing a doom-n-gloom story.

jmjawors · « **Reply #59 on:** 10/17/2007 02:29 am »

I don't know about the role of PAO, but I do agree with Norm that NASA (and individual employees, whether they be management all the way to astronauts) do seem to struggle with relating to the "Everyday Joe." They could clear up misconceptions and even generate interest if they were better at this.

That said, I thought Wayne and Co. did a good job tonight. This was obviously a complex engineering issue that they tried to explain to the gathered reporters. Confusing at times, sure, but overall well done. And bringing out the NESC guy was a great PAO move (I'll credit them, why not?)