Author Topic: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis  (Read 245688 times)

Offline FutureSpaceTourist

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #60 on: 05/12/2016 10:21 pm »
Quote
Stephen Clark ‏@StephenClark1 7m7 minutes ago

Boeing spokesperson: CST-100 pad abort slips to October 2017, uncrewed flight test to December 2017, crewed flight test to February 2018.

https://twitter.com/StephenClark1/status/730883240404226049

Quote
Stephen Clark ‏@StephenClark1 6m6 minutes ago

CST-100 delays caused by spacecraft mass challenge, aeroacoustic issue with Atlas 5/CST-100 stack, new software requirements levied by NASA.

https://twitter.com/StephenClark1/status/730883620039090176

Offline erioladastra

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #61 on: 05/13/2016 12:35 am »
Wasn't this pretty much expected when the commercial crew funding was cut by Congress a couple of years ago?  The original plan to fly unmanned in early 2016 with manned flights happening in late 2016 to early 2017 was said at the time to be out the window due to these funding factors over which neither Boeing nor SpaceX had any control.

It was always a matter of just how far to the right the dates were going to end up, not as to whether they would push out to late 2017 through mid 2018, right?

The bigger impact was the delay in starting up CCtCAP.  really put the companies on hold.  NASA has also been a big part of this with slow approvals/rejections of items and changing targets.

Offline erioladastra

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #62 on: 05/13/2016 12:43 am »
Yes, actual testing of design articles can throw some surprises at you. The models can be wrong or off.

But how is it that "suddenly" there are 2 fundamental issues such as these? Have they always known such issues existed but have just now decided they won't be able to mitigate in time? Were they riding their weight margins too close for this Atlas V variant?  Did they add weight because of acoustics or did the acoustics issues pop up because they added weight? Or are they unrelated? Did the mitigation design decisions of Centaur/CST/Abort thruster issues lead to increased weight and/or acoustics issues?

And the article also mentions a delay because NASA changed some software requirements. Were those changes made program wide or just for Boeing? For what and why? Vehicle diagnosis for human rating/abort?

Bill Gerstenmaier always had concerns that so much of Boeing's Actual Development & Testing were in the back-end of the schedule but that they had such superior management, processes and procedures as to help mitigate against their schedule ambitious. Now, a 6 to 8 month delay, in the grand scheme is not a huge deal. But when 2 of the most fundamental things such as weight and acoustics crop up at this stage...well, I hope this isn't something systemic. Because one day Aviation Week reports the Boeing/CST say they are on schedule and all issues are being handled. Then literally the next day we get another article about this delay. I guess we'll see.

(And remembering countless LAN parties at the office playing Quake3 Arena, I'm completely up for some Capture The Flag action to see who gets there first.)

The software changes were program wide.  But there were significant delays in defining some items on the NASA side, fights over others...  Keep in mind on one side you have ISS that wants a perfect vehicle and will take the time/money to get there and CCP (and partners with small teams) who wants cheap/reliable transport. 

You must always take any schedule as a target.  Often in NASA and in private companies, folks may know the dates can't be met but there are reason to not update right away (the cost/time to rebaseline, knowing more hiccups are coming...) including political.  You should always consider these dates as ballpark.  And I would not put much reliance if a date of one partner is ahead of the other.  May be a good guide to relative progress...but it could easily be one is more realistic or other issues are being worked.  Just have to watch and see and hope neither company suffers a serious problem.  None of the issues are surprising or really that worrisome (other than it delays a much needed capability).

Offline docmordrid

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #63 on: 05/13/2016 01:07 am »
If the fired ULA VP is correct about possible heat shield damage during a launch abort that seems to me a huge problem for a high suborbital abort requiring reentry, or an abort to orbit, requiring serious mitigation or a redesign. 

How far right would adding a launch abort tower, or blast reflectors & blowout panels to the SM, move their schedule? What do they do to the weight issue already in play?
« Last Edit: 05/13/2016 01:10 am by docmordrid »
DM

Offline AncientU

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #64 on: 05/13/2016 01:17 pm »
If the fired ULA VP is correct about possible heat shield damage during a launch abort that seems to me a huge problem for a high suborbital abort requiring reentry, or an abort to orbit, requiring serious mitigation or a redesign. 

How far right would adding a launch abort tower, or blast reflectors & blowout panels to the SM, move their schedule? What do they do to the weight issue already in play?

A related issue is that the Dreamchaser Starliner (CST-100) Team analyzed away the need for an in-flight abort demonstration... Is this analysis still valid or was the indicated Centaur risk a discovery in that analysis?  Is the in-flight abort demo for Dreamchaser Starliner (CS-100) on or off the table?

Edit: Wrong spacecraft name used -- corrected.
« Last Edit: 05/14/2016 01:14 pm by AncientU »
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Offline WindnWar

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #65 on: 05/13/2016 05:53 pm »
If the fired ULA VP is correct about possible heat shield damage during a launch abort that seems to me a huge problem for a high suborbital abort requiring reentry, or an abort to orbit, requiring serious mitigation or a redesign. 

How far right would adding a launch abort tower, or blast reflectors & blowout panels to the SM, move their schedule? What do they do to the weight issue already in play?

A related issue is that the Dreamchaser Team analyzed away the need for an in-flight abort demonstration... Is this analysis still valid or was the indicated Centaur risk a discovery in that analysis?  Is the in-flight abort demo for Dreamchaser on or off the table?

Is Dreamchaser abort directed back at the second stage as well?

Offline the_other_Doug

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #66 on: 05/14/2016 02:02 am »
DreamChaser will not be crewed on ascent, and therefore has no need for in-flight aborts.  As with CRS-7, if the launch goes south, it's assumed you just lose your cargo vessel.

Just because SpaceX came up with a software patch that would let them pop the 'chutes on a cargo Dragon in replica of the CRS-7 failure doesn't mean there is an in-flight abort mode for their cargo vehicle.  As long as DreamChaser is not a crewed vehicle, there will not be any requirement for any ascent abort modes.
-Doug  (With my shield, not yet upon it)

Offline AncientU

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #67 on: 05/14/2016 01:11 pm »
If the fired ULA VP is correct about possible heat shield damage during a launch abort that seems to me a huge problem for a high suborbital abort requiring reentry, or an abort to orbit, requiring serious mitigation or a redesign. 

How far right would adding a launch abort tower, or blast reflectors & blowout panels to the SM, move their schedule? What do they do to the weight issue already in play?

A related issue is that the Dreamchaser Team analyzed away the need for an in-flight abort demonstration... Is this analysis still valid or was the indicated Centaur risk a discovery in that analysis?  Is the in-flight abort demo for Dreamchaser on or off the table?

Is Dreamchaser abort directed back at the second stage as well?

Sorry, my mistake... meant to say Starliner (CST-100).  Will edit earlier question.
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Offline Rocket Science

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #68 on: 05/14/2016 01:50 pm »
Message from crew Dream Chaser..."Do you miss me now?"
"The laws of physics are unforgiving"
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Offline The Amazing Catstronaut

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #69 on: 05/14/2016 03:05 pm »
Message from crew Dream Chaser..."Do you miss me now?"

Your inference being DC would have been subject to less schedule slips?

It's a spaceplane of significant size. It's even more vulnerable. Plus you're making assumptions SNC is dramatically better at being development Gods than Boeing or SpaceX. Any switch to crew DC now and the ComCrew program gets derailed and wastes a lot of money needlessly.

DC already has a future. Let it be.
« Last Edit: 05/14/2016 03:05 pm by The Amazing Catstronaut »
Resident feline spaceflight expert. Knows nothing of value about human spaceflight.

Offline oldAtlas_Eguy

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #70 on: 05/14/2016 03:23 pm »
Message from crew Dream Chaser..."Do you miss me now?"

Your inference being DC would have been subject to less schedule slips?

It's a spaceplane of significant size. It's even more vulnerable. Plus you're making assumptions SNC is dramatically better at being development Gods than Boeing or SpaceX. Any switch to crew DC now and the ComCrew program gets derailed and wastes a lot of money needlessly.

DC already has a future. Let it be.
Wait until DC cargo has flown and gained flight experience. Then the DC crew can be revisited.

For Starliner, the warnings and reservations on such high use of computer modeling and less flight (none for a CST prior version) experience has come home. But it is also a testament to Boeing's thoroughness in their analysis that these problems were caught at this early point in the build process. They don't stop analysing just because the moved into production but they continue their analysis of each and every small change in design and even evaluate and update their models themselves when new environment data suggest the models are in error/"not near perfect and need change".

Offline Rocket Science

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #71 on: 05/14/2016 03:59 pm »
Message from crew Dream Chaser..."Do you miss me now?"

Your inference being DC would have been subject to less schedule slips?

It's a spaceplane of significant size. It's even more vulnerable. Plus you're making assumptions SNC is dramatically better at being development Gods than Boeing or SpaceX. Any switch to crew DC now and the ComCrew program gets derailed and wastes a lot of money needlessly.

DC already has a future. Let it be.
1) No
2) Always wanted all three crew vehicles to fly. Because you are relatively new here I guess you didn't know that. Since you are quoting John Lennon today it seems... "Let it be..."
« Last Edit: 05/14/2016 07:29 pm by Rocket Science »
"The laws of physics are unforgiving"
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Online llanitedave

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #72 on: 05/15/2016 01:04 am »
Message from crew Dream Chaser..."Do you miss me now?"

Your inference being DC would have been subject to less schedule slips?

It's a spaceplane of significant size. It's even more vulnerable. Plus you're making assumptions SNC is dramatically better at being development Gods than Boeing or SpaceX. Any switch to crew DC now and the ComCrew program gets derailed and wastes a lot of money needlessly.

DC already has a future. Let it be.
1) No
2) Always wanted all three crew vehicles to fly. Because you are relatively new here I guess you didn't know that. Since you are quoting John Lennon today it seems... "Let it be..."


"Let It Be" -- Paul McCartney /pedant
"I've just abducted an alien -- now what?"

Offline nadreck

Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #73 on: 05/15/2016 01:27 am »



"Let It Be" -- Paul McCartney /pedant

"Imagine" -- John Lennon (appropriate for us space cadets too)
It is all well and good to quote those things that made it past your confirmation bias that other people wrote, but this is a discussion board damnit! Let us know what you think! And why!

Offline Space Ghost 1962

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #74 on: 05/15/2016 04:48 am »
For Starliner, the warnings and reservations on such high use of computer modeling and less flight (none for a CST prior version) experience has come home.

Many sounded an alarm on this from the very beginning that going late to metal wasn't going to cut it. And were given the usual assurances that Boeing had it under control, having done so much HSF that they couldn't miss.

Well, they missed as predicted on going to metal too late. It was a political decision, and it was flawed.

So far not a tremendous deal. Here's the rub - there might be a chain of surprises. Perhaps its bounded.

But in terms of the decision vs SNC - SNC was going to metal about as fast as SX. Which likely meant similar issues to SX and not the same as Boeing here. So "no one gets fired for choosing GM or IBM or Boeing" wasn't the "catch all" promised. The huge pile of paper that proves it'll work on time came up short.

Quote
But it is also a testament to Boeing's thoroughness in their analysis that these problems were caught at this early point in the build process. They don't stop analyzing just because the moved into production but they continue their analysis of each and every small change in design and even evaluate and update their models themselves when new environment data suggest the models are in error/"not near perfect and need change".

Juries still out on that effectiveness for dependent/consecutive issues. Yes change process is working. If the number of issues doesn't climb as fabrication/assembly rises, they'll likely recover within reasonable time because the close rate will dominate the new issue rate. The virtue of being large here - you can scale to meet the challenge, and bring in the schedule at cost.

SX/SNC have a different issue - they don't have as much history so they run the risk of taking too long to close/communicate on such a complex program. Their "undiscovered country" leads to open-ended process.

The performance shortfall on the pad abort was an eye-opener. But that's why we do tests.

Its also why we go to metal not paper early.

Offline Rocket Science

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #75 on: 05/15/2016 10:40 am »
Message from crew Dream Chaser..."Do you miss me now?"

Your inference being DC would have been subject to less schedule slips?

It's a spaceplane of significant size. It's even more vulnerable. Plus you're making assumptions SNC is dramatically better at being development Gods than Boeing or SpaceX. Any switch to crew DC now and the ComCrew program gets derailed and wastes a lot of money needlessly.

DC already has a future. Let it be.
1) No
2) Always wanted all three crew vehicles to fly. Because you are relatively new here I guess you didn't know that. Since you are quoting John Lennon today it seems... "Let it be..."


"Let It Be" -- Paul McCartney /pedant
Getting old sucks... Thank you Dave! :)
"The laws of physics are unforgiving"
~Rob: Physics instructor, Aviator, Vintage auto racer

Offline yg1968

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #76 on: 05/15/2016 09:13 pm »
First crewed Starliner flight delayed to 2018;

problems with vehicle weight and Atlas V acoustics.

Ars link....

From the article:

Quote
A spokesman for SpaceX told Ars Wednesday night that the company remains on track for crewed missions in 2017.

Offline arachnitect

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #77 on: 05/16/2016 09:27 pm »
For Starliner, the warnings and reservations on such high use of computer modeling and less flight (none for a CST prior version) experience has come home.

Many sounded an alarm on this from the very beginning that going late to metal wasn't going to cut it. And were given the usual assurances that Boeing had it under control, having done so much HSF that they couldn't miss.

Well, they missed as predicted on going to metal too late. It was a political decision, and it was flawed.

So far not a tremendous deal. Here's the rub - there might be a chain of surprises. Perhaps its bounded.

But in terms of the decision vs SNC - SNC was going to metal about as fast as SX. Which likely meant similar issues to SX and not the same as Boeing here. So "no one gets fired for choosing GM or IBM or Boeing" wasn't the "catch all" promised. The huge pile of paper that proves it'll work on time came up short.

Quote
But it is also a testament to Boeing's thoroughness in their analysis that these problems were caught at this early point in the build process. They don't stop analyzing just because the moved into production but they continue their analysis of each and every small change in design and even evaluate and update their models themselves when new environment data suggest the models are in error/"not near perfect and need change".

Juries still out on that effectiveness for dependent/consecutive issues. Yes change process is working. If the number of issues doesn't climb as fabrication/assembly rises, they'll likely recover within reasonable time because the close rate will dominate the new issue rate. The virtue of being large here - you can scale to meet the challenge, and bring in the schedule at cost.

SX/SNC have a different issue - they don't have as much history so they run the risk of taking too long to close/communicate on such a complex program. Their "undiscovered country" leads to open-ended process.

The performance shortfall on the pad abort was an eye-opener. But that's why we do tests.

Its also why we go to metal not paper early.

Primary drivers of the latest delay are aero loads and software. What "metal" should Boeing have produced to uncover these issues earlier?

Offline Space Ghost 1962

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #78 on: 05/16/2016 11:03 pm »
For Starliner, the warnings and reservations on such high use of computer modeling and less flight (none for a CST prior version) experience has come home.

Many sounded an alarm on this from the very beginning that going late to metal wasn't going to cut it. And were given the usual assurances that Boeing had it under control, having done so much HSF that they couldn't miss.

Well, they missed as predicted on going to metal too late. It was a political decision, and it was flawed.

So far not a tremendous deal. Here's the rub - there might be a chain of surprises. Perhaps its bounded.

But in terms of the decision vs SNC - SNC was going to metal about as fast as SX. Which likely meant similar issues to SX and not the same as Boeing here. So "no one gets fired for choosing GM or IBM or Boeing" wasn't the "catch all" promised. The huge pile of paper that proves it'll work on time came up short.

Quote
But it is also a testament to Boeing's thoroughness in their analysis that these problems were caught at this early point in the build process. They don't stop analyzing just because the moved into production but they continue their analysis of each and every small change in design and even evaluate and update their models themselves when new environment data suggest the models are in error/"not near perfect and need change".

Juries still out on that effectiveness for dependent/consecutive issues. Yes change process is working. If the number of issues doesn't climb as fabrication/assembly rises, they'll likely recover within reasonable time because the close rate will dominate the new issue rate. The virtue of being large here - you can scale to meet the challenge, and bring in the schedule at cost.

SX/SNC have a different issue - they don't have as much history so they run the risk of taking too long to close/communicate on such a complex program. Their "undiscovered country" leads to open-ended process.

The performance shortfall on the pad abort was an eye-opener. But that's why we do tests.

Its also why we go to metal not paper early.

Primary drivers of the latest delay are aero loads and software. What "metal" should Boeing have produced to uncover these issues earlier?

Making/flying components/systems/vehicles discovers program schedule risks and voids, duh.

Aero loads they could get from CAD software, and subscale wind tunnel tests. Integrating subsystems earlier means you get a working avionics testbed on a table long ahead of vehicle integration, so you can accurately schedule software design and test.

Generating a huge pile of documents that say you can do it, then waiting to the last minute to write the software and find that the structure doesn't handle the loads, or (you didn't add ) is overweight is spectacularly poor management and execution by any sized company, no matter how arrogant.

That's how.

Offline erioladastra

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Re: Commercial Crew Schedule Analysis
« Reply #79 on: 05/17/2016 01:08 am »
For Starliner, the warnings and reservations on such high use of computer modeling and less flight (none for a CST prior version) experience has come home.

Many sounded an alarm on this from the very beginning that going late to metal wasn't going to cut it. And were given the usual assurances that Boeing had it under control, having done so much HSF that they couldn't miss.

Well, they missed as predicted on going to metal too late. It was a political decision, and it was flawed.

So far not a tremendous deal. Here's the rub - there might be a chain of surprises. Perhaps its bounded.

But in terms of the decision vs SNC - SNC was going to metal about as fast as SX. Which likely meant similar issues to SX and not the same as Boeing here. So "no one gets fired for choosing GM or IBM or Boeing" wasn't the "catch all" promised. The huge pile of paper that proves it'll work on time came up short.

Quote
But it is also a testament to Boeing's thoroughness in their analysis that these problems were caught at this early point in the build process. They don't stop analyzing just because the moved into production but they continue their analysis of each and every small change in design and even evaluate and update their models themselves when new environment data suggest the models are in error/"not near perfect and need change".

Juries still out on that effectiveness for dependent/consecutive issues. Yes change process is working. If the number of issues doesn't climb as fabrication/assembly rises, they'll likely recover within reasonable time because the close rate will dominate the new issue rate. The virtue of being large here - you can scale to meet the challenge, and bring in the schedule at cost.

SX/SNC have a different issue - they don't have as much history so they run the risk of taking too long to close/communicate on such a complex program. Their "undiscovered country" leads to open-ended process.

The performance shortfall on the pad abort was an eye-opener. But that's why we do tests.

Its also why we go to metal not paper early.

Note that much of this was known as a threat for some time so "sounding the alarm" is incorrect and hyperbole.  We will have this debate multiple times over the coming years as the schedule keep changing - for both partners.  Both companies are having their challenges, and triumphs, you just don't know them all.