NASASpaceFlight.com Forum
Commercial and US Government Launch Vehicles => ULA - Delta, Atlas, Vulcan => Topic started by: Skyrocket on 01/28/2014 06:24 am
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ULA and USAF have signed a contract over a block buy of 36 Atlas-V and Delta-IV cores. (http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1401/27blockbuy )
The first 5 vehicles (7 cores) are:
for USAF-missions:
a Atlas-V(501)
a Atlas-V(511)
a Delta-IVM+(4,2)
a Delta-IVM+(5,4)
for NRO missions:
a Delta-4H
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Another DIVH can't think of many payloads that would need that kind of lift.
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There is a silly spelling error in the thread title.
They didn't put their signatures on a cinder block while sitting in the midst of more than three dozen rocket stages. :P
edit: my silly spelling error!
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Silly typo in title corrected ;-)
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Is this a different block buy than the recent one?
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Is this a different block buy than the recent one?
No the same one.
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This is the finalization of the one set in motion in late 2012.
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Another DIVH can't think of many payloads that would need that kind of lift.
Except the one listed under it that has always used the D-IVH or Titan IV?
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Has anyone seen (or does anyone know) the value of this contract?
Thanks in advance.
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One of the other sites just listed 4 Delta Heavies? That's one Heavy a Year.
That a large number of very expensive payloads.
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One of the other sites just listed 4 Delta Heavies? That's one Heavy a Year.
That a large number of very expensive payloads.
IIRC from the other threads. A lot of the NRO birds are near the end of their lifespan. Ideally you don't want to replace them after they become non-operational.
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One of the other sites just listed 4 Delta Heavies?
It is SpaceflightNow's story, which is a followup to the one this topic was started for:
http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1401/30blockbuy/
According to the article, the current contract value is 2.6B, or 72M per core.
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According to the article, the current contract value is 2.6B, or 72M per core.
Thanks much.
That $2.6B appears to be for production of those 36 cores.
To approximate the full cost of a single-core launch, I assume we'd have to spread ULA's $1B/yr. launch capability contract over these 36 launches and add that figure to the $72M for producing each core.
Since these 36 cores cover five years (FY13-17), that's an additional $5B or $138M per core. Added to the $72M, that gives me a full cost of $210 for a single-core launch.
Sound logic? In the ballpark? Criticism/critique? Better numbers?
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(source: DoD)
December 16, 2013
CONTRACTS AIR FORCE United Launch Services LLC, Littleton, Colo., has been awarded a $530,794,720 firm-fixed-price modification (PZ0001) on an existing contract (FA8811-13-C-0003) for fiscal 2014 through fiscal 2017 launch vehicle production services and options for that associated launch capability for fiscal 2015 through fiscal 2019 are available and may be exercised at a later date. This executes the requirements for fiscal 2014 launch vehicle production services in support of the following Air Force and National Reconnaissance Organization launch vehicle configurations: Air Force Atlas V 501, Air Force Atlas V 511, Air Force Delta IV 4,2, Air Force Delta IV 5,4, and a National Reconnaissance Organization Delta IV Heavy. Work will be performed at Centennial, Colo., Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., and Cape Canaveral Air Station, Fla., and is expected to be completed by second quarter 2018. This award is the result of a sole source acquisition. Fiscal 2014 missile procurement funds in the amount of $679,434,676 are being obligated at time of award. Launch Systems Directorate, Space and Missile Systems Center is the contracting activity, Los Angeles Air Force Base, Calif., is the contracting activity.
October 18, 2013
CONTRACTS AIR FORCE United Launch Services LLC, Littleton, Colo., was awarded a $939,085,130 cost-plus-incentive-fee modification (P00002) with cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price contract line item numbers under a previously existing contract (FA8811-13-C-0003) for Fiscal 2014 EELV Launch Capability for the Delta IV and Atlas V families of launch vehicles. The contract modification is for all launch capability effort to include mission assurance, program management, systems engineering, integration of the space vehicle with the launch vehicle, launch site and range operations, and launch infrastructure maintenance and sustainment. Work will be performed at Littleton, Colo., Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., and Cape Canaveral Air Station, Fla., and will be completed Sept. 30, 2014. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition with only one offer solicited and received. Fiscal 2013 in the amount of $294,314,145 was obligated at time of award. Launch Systems Directorate, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, Calif., is the contracting activity. (Awarded Oct. 1, 2013)
June 26, 2013
CONTRACTS AIR FORCE United Launch Services LLC, Littleton, Colo., has been awarded a $1,088,000,000 not-to-exceed letter contract for Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) production services in support of the following Air Force and National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) launch vehicle configurations: AF Atlas V 401, AF Atlas V 501, AF Delta IV 4,2, AF Delta IV 5,4 NRO Atlas 401, NRO Atlas 541, and a NRO Delta IV 5,2. Work will be performed at Centennial, Colo., and is expected to be complete by 2015. This award is the result of a sole source acquisition. Fiscal 2013 Missile Procurement funds in the amount of $525,000,000 will be obligated on this award. Launch Systems Directorate, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, Calif., is the contracting activity (FA8811-13-C-0003).
Trying to decode the above:
For FY14:
LVPS (launch vehicle production service): M531$
Annual Launch Capability: M939$
Total: M1,470$
corresponding to 5 launchers: Atlas V-501, Atlas V-511, Delta IV M+4,2, Delta IV M+5,4, Delta IV Heavy
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE XXX AFB LETTER CONTRACT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AND _________________________________________________________________ CONTRACT NUMBER F1XXXX- ___- ____________
CONTRACT FOR: ____________________________________________________________ (BRIEF DESCRIPTION) DEFINITION: A letter contract is a written preliminary contractual document that authorizes the contractor to begin immediately manufacturing supplies or performing services.
I. FAR 52.216-24 LIMITATION OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
(a) In performing this contract, the Contractor is not authorized to make expenditures or incur obligations exceeding*_______________________________dollars.
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Easier to look at the budget request when trying to estimate these numbers: Air Force Missile Procurement, FY14 (http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130521-049.pdf).* Snapshot attached as an example of what you'll find. Beware the number for FY2014 in this document. The later omnibus bill actual for FY2014 is $1487M for procurement = $809M for launch services (5 launches) + $679M for ELC (excludes $28M RDT&E).
Hope that helps.
* Other interesting stuff on the current year budget page: Fiscal Year 2014 Air Force Budget Materials (http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/).
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Refering to Space News article
U.S. Air Force Claims Big Savings on EELV Block Buy (http://www.spacenews.com/article/military-space/39348us-air-force-claims-big-savings-on-eelv-block-buy)
AFAIU the amount of the letter contract of June 2013 should not be added to the firm-fixed-price contracts of October and December 2013.
So the total combined value is not "just under $2.6 billion" but $ 1,470 million
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To approximate the full cost of a single-core launch, I assume we'd have to spread ULA's $1B/yr. launch capability contract over these 36 launches and add that figure to the $72M for producing each core.
Since these 36 cores cover five years (FY13-17), that's an additional $5B or $138M per core. Added to the $72M, that gives me a full cost of $210 for a single-core launch.
Sound logic? In the ballpark? Criticism/critique? Better numbers?
Depends on what you consider as "full cost". The attached chart shows the annual cost breakdown for USAF launches (per-launch, not per-core) FY2013-2017. Quantity is 5 launches/year for all years except 2013, which is 4, for a total of 24 launches.
All-up, it averages ~$372M per launch FY2013-2017. If you exclude FY2013, which included two acquisitions under the block buy, average is ~$363M FY2014-2015. If you exclude FY2014, which has been subject to some fiddling, averages is ~$375M FY2015-2017.
Someone with more insight into the USAF launch schedule would need to confirm whether these are all single-core, but the numbers suggest they are. Based on the SpaceNews article, 4 launches are Delta IV Heavy (NRO?), which would account for 12 cores. That leaves 24 single-core launches, which is what the USAF budget numbers show.
Of note, these numbers do not include budget for acquisition or fixed-cost contributions from other agencies. For example, the USAF and NRO split the cost for launch capability 75/25% and mission assurance 60/40%; the numbers shown are only for the USAF (with NRO contribution add ~$175M/yr).
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Of note, these numbers do not include budget for acquisition or fixed-cost contributions from other agencies. For example, the USAF and NRO split the cost for launch capability 75/25% and mission assurance 60/40%; the numbers shown are only for the USAF (with NRO contribution add ~$175M/yr).
All right but Atlas/Delta launched 11 times in 2013, for example. So per launch the cost would be lower.
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11 AIR FORCE Launches ??
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11 AIR FORCE Launches ??
No but the fixed-cost contributions per launch from the Air Force are likely bigger than the average.
In any case, ULA operates basically 4 launchers (D2, D4, D4H, A5) at 2 launch sites with vertical integration for 10+ launches a year. Its not surprising things are rather expensive.
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All right but Atlas/Delta launched 11 times in 2013, for example. So per launch the cost would be lower.
Yes; the chart shows only USAF numbers. If we make a simplistic assumption of 8 DOD launches/year (with NRO's contributions) and that launch service unit costs are the same as shown in the USAF budget projections, average per launch cost is $349M (down from $372M at 5 launches/yr).
It's hard to say much more with any justification as non-DOD launches (and some DOD launches) do not contribute to ELC or fixed program management costs.* If we assume all costs are shared pro-rata across all launches (including non-DOD), then while the per-launch cost goes down, most everyone except the DOD will be priced out of the market.
E.g., making an assumption of 12 launches/year with all costs paid pro-rata by all launches, average is ~$300M/launch. Beyond that, this discussion gets wobbly and the data thin or non-existent. For example, NRO (no information to speak of)--a few Delta IV Heavies in the mix could significantly skew the costs. Should all launch customers pay a pro-rata share for DOD-specific needs (e.g., ELC)? If not, is that an unreasonable subsidy? etc.
If the question is: How much does a single-core launch cost, and what might a non-DOD customer expect to pay for one? The first-order answer is the "launch services" line, plus maybe a bit of the "support" line, then add mission-specific services. If the question is: Why do DOD launches cost so much? The first-order answer is the "launch capability" line (amortized over launch rate), plus "launch services", plus "mission assurance", plus any mission-specific costs.
No but the fixed-cost contributions per launch from the Air Force are likely bigger than the average.
See above. The degree to which the USAF numbers inflate per-launch prices depends primarily on the split between USAF/NRO; for ELC it is 75/25%; for mission assurance 60/40%; and the ratio of flights by USAF and NRO. The USAF numbers and split with NRO are given for both ELC and mission assurance, so the NRO contributions are easily derived. The rest depends on what assumptions you make as to the number/ratio of USAF and NRO flights.
* Of the 11 launches you mentioned for 2013, 3 were NASA and 1 Navy. NASA and Navy did not contribute to fixed costs (ELC, mission assurance, or program management).
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Navy does not pay for EELV's, USAF does.
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Navy does not pay for EELV's, USAF does.
No, Navy pays/paid (except for ELC and fixed program overhead); USAF is very clear on that "All non-Air Force launch services are funded by their respective agencies." Navy FY2012 budget for MUOS was $205M for launch services (Atlas-551) + $4.7M for production support. The contract was between Navy-ULA, not Navy-USAF.
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No, Navy pays/paid (except for ELC and fixed program overhead); USAF is very clear on that "All non-Air Force launch services are funded by their respective agencies." Navy FY2012 budget for MUOS was $205M for launch services (Atlas-551) + $4.7M for production support. The contract was between Navy-ULA, not Navy-USAF.
Wrong, there is a difference between funding and contracting. Navy has no contract with ULA. Navy budgets for the ride but the contract is with the USAF.
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Wrong, there is a difference between funding and contracting. Navy has no contract with ULA. Navy budgets for the ride but the contract is with the USAF.
Then why does the Navy budget show the contractor as ULA? In any case, back to the original point: regardless of the contractual arrangements, the Navy pays for their missions, not USAF.
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Then why does the Navy budget show the contractor as ULA? In any case, back to the original point: regardless of the contractual arrangements, the Navy pays for their missions, not USAF.
Which is a distinction without a difference when it comes to EELV costs. MUOS launches are treated the same as the rest of the USAF launches.
And the USAF still pays for the launches, where the money comes has little bearing on the matter. Which was the point.
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Of note, these numbers do not include budget for acquisition or fixed-cost contributions from other agencies. For example, the USAF and NRO split the cost for launch capability 75/25% and mission assurance 60/40%; the numbers shown are only for the USAF (with NRO contribution add ~$175M/yr).
EELV program costs do not equate to ULA costs. There are non ULA costs in those numbers.
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So it would seem that a ball park figure is roughly $300m/launch.
I think I see why other people might want to offer their services to the USG if they think they can deliver the service a)Equally reliably (which is what the customer wants) and b) Much cheaper but still at a profit (which is what the supplier wants).
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Of note, these numbers do not include budget for acquisition or fixed-cost contributions from other agencies. For example, the USAF and NRO split the cost for launch capability 75/25% and mission assurance 60/40%; the numbers shown are only for the USAF (with NRO contribution add ~$175M/yr).
EELV program costs do not equate to ULA costs. There are non ULA costs in those numbers.
This was the question I was wondering about. How much of the EELV program costs were actually ULA's cost to launch the rockets, and how much of it was government personnel there to perform oversight and mission assurance?
~Jon
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Of note, these numbers do not include budget for acquisition or fixed-cost contributions from other agencies. For example, the USAF and NRO split the cost for launch capability 75/25% and mission assurance 60/40%; the numbers shown are only for the USAF (with NRO contribution add ~$175M/yr).
EELV program costs do not equate to ULA costs. There are non ULA costs in those numbers.
This was the question I was wondering about. How much of the EELV program costs were actually ULA's cost to launch the rockets, and how much of it was government personnel there to perform oversight and mission assurance?
~Jon
Don't forget Aerospace, various SETA's (like TASC, Scitor, Mantemp, etc) and greybeards that the USAF and NRO use.
It is like NASA's quoted launch service costs, which in addition to the launch vehicle includes: optional services and mission unique mods, payload processing facilities costs, spacecraft propellant, range and telemetry costs, NASA program office support contractors, range safety, etc
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EELV program costs do not equate to ULA costs. There are non ULA costs in those numbers.
This was the question I was wondering about. How much of the EELV program costs were actually ULA's cost to launch the rockets, and how much of it was government personnel there to perform oversight and mission assurance?
If you look at the budget line items (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=33911.msg1155659#msg1155659) you will find a reasonably detailed breakdown between "launch services". "launch capability" and "support".
Launch services are paid to the launch service provider (e.g., ULA); launch capability is paid to ULA; support includes mission assurance, program management, etc. The launch service providers are also listed at the end of the budget section. Mission-specific services (where defined) are *not* included in this EELV budget (e.g., AEHF includes its own budget for launch support and integration services).
In short, the "launch services" budget line, is a close approximation to what ULA is paid to launch the rocket (excluding a very hefty cost for ELC, which about doubles it).
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In short, the "launch services" budget line, is a close approximation to what ULA is paid to launch the rocket (excluding a very hefty cost for ELC, which about doubles it).
ELC also pays for extra items that the USAF requests.
And the launch services cost still contain range, telemetry and other items that ULA has to pay to other agencies/organizations.
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ELC also pays for extra items that the USAF requests.
Kinda-sorta, but that view may be a bit dated. More precisely: ELC pays for DoD requirements to sustain launch capability--no more and no less. That does not change the fact that ELC is a *significant* cost and that ELC is paid as a direct subsidy to ULA to maintain that capability, which significantly increases the DoD cost per launch.
Once upon a time ELC included pretty much anything the DoD wanted under the umbrella of the EELV program. Due to indigestion with the large projected cost increases, where the money was going, and the inability of the EELV program or contractors to show they had a handle on the problems (i.e., the program was out of control), Congress required segregation of budget information for Launch Services, ELC, and Support costs.
Thus we have a bit more insight in current budgets.
And the launch services cost still contain range, telemetry and other items that ULA has to pay to other agencies/organizations.
Note that the Support budget line now breaks out details (which were previously lumped into ELC costs, which were previously lumped into EELV program costs). Support costs include (among other things, mission support and program management) "Range, Certification, and Other Direct Govt Costs".
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1. Kinda-sorta, but that view may be a bit dated.
2. Note that the Support budget line now breaks out details (which were previously lumped into ELC costs, which were previously lumped into EELV program costs). Support costs include (among other things, mission support and program management) "Range, Certification, and Other Direct Govt Costs".
1. Not a view, I know the ELC pays for the DOD additional requirements. I have insight
2. Those are not the same costs that I delineated.
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1. Not a view, I know the ELC pays for the DOD additional requirements. I have insight
2. Those are not the same costs that I delineated.
Sorry, I should have posed that as a question, not an assertion. While I don't doubt your insight, the FY13+ budget justification provides significantly more insight than what we had before...
1. Yes, we know that ELC is DOD-specific and the DOD pays for it in whole. That does not change the fact that ELC is a major contributor to DOD launch costs, and ULA is currently the recipient of those ELC funds--as explicitly shown in the budget as ULA is the sole-source (SS).
2. So somewhere in the budget lines hides other costs not shown for launch services, ELC or support? Where in those budget lines are the costs you are referring to included? Moreover, if those costs are material, then whoever is responsilble would be in violation of and contravene Congress's intent. Assuming that is not the case, then those additional costs should be noise.
To rewind a bit... jongoff's question was with respect to the cost/price for ULA to launch a vehicle (?), exclusive of DOD-specific costs (e.g, ELC and support). The best estimate still appears to be the "launch services" budget line item, albeit that is probably high as it includes some basic DOD launch services (again, exclusive of DOD-specific ELC and support costs).
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Article on this from The Space Review site.
If the EELV program is to protect taxpayer value while keeping its very practical goal of maintaining two independent sources into the next decade, it is time to phase out the launch subsidy and insist that the incumbent at least enter the present decade. It begins with rejecting the false narrative of non-existent or exaggerated savings currently being put forward by the incumbent in an attempt to further justify its monopoly position in the market, and a clear recognition that it is time to demand the real savings through continuous competition which are already reshaping the launch industry.
http://thespacereview.com/article/2455/1
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Hasn't the analysis already been done based on planned vehicle configurations to show there will be plenty of launches in that time frame up for grabs? Furthermore, aren't the majority of the 36 contracted cores are for configurations that other providers cannot touch performance wise.
I don't see the problem.
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Hasn't the analysis already been done based on planned vehicle configurations to show there will be plenty of launches in that time frame up for grabs? Furthermore, aren't the majority of the 36 contracted cores are for configurations that other providers cannot touch performance wise.
I don't see the problem.
The issues you mention are not the primary focus of the article. The focus of the article is: (1) the veracity of the claimed $4.4B in savings from the block buy (dubious); (2) the justification for ELC (questionable); and correspondingly (3) whether ULA needs to re-examine their relationship with the government Real Soon in the face of oncoming competition.[1]
With respect to the issues you raise:
1. Presumably some analysis has been done, although there is no public indication or record of such (that I can find). That said, any new entrants[2] won't likely be launching any of those payloads before 2017 as LV selection amd contract award is 24-36mo prior to launch. So figure ULA has a lock on those launches until at least late 2016 or early 2017.*
2. Whether there are plenty of launches is unclear. One of the concerns with the original 50 core block buy strategy was that it could produce an overhang or excess due to delays in payload availability (not unusual for some of these missions). That could potentially lock out new entrants beyond 2018. (Not our fault your payloads aren't ready. You bought and paid for the LV's, and now they're piling up in a warehouse...)
3. The compromise was a reduction in the block buy (from 50 to 36 cores exclusively from ULA) and that a certain number of missions would be left as TBD and open to competition in the future. No more and no less. There is no set-aside for new entrants based on their current or planned capabilities. If SpaceX can compete (meet requirements and at lower cost), they'll get the mission; if they can't, they won't.
[1] All of which I agree with. The gravy train will not last. While ULA is pretty much guaranteed missions and ELC through 2018,* what they have beyond that is questionable (assuming SpaceX does qualify for those DOD missions and can give ULA a run for their money).
[1] For the foreseeable future "new entrants" means "SpaceX", as launch capability from both CCAFS and VAFB is required by the DOD (if you can't launch from both, don't bother applying).
* edit: ELC through FY2019; launch service contract award through FY2017.
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Probably also have to do with certification and mission capability.
Probabilty of certifying for D, C and some B rosk payloads is high. Getting that for A payloada, it's a lot more difficult.
Also, EELV have demonatrated multi hour multiple restarts missions many times. Riskier missions mean stringer certification requirements.
But the real two big issues are performance and vertical integration. Many missions require more than F9 v1.1 can do (specially high orbit), and Falcon Heavy will need at least three missions just to start qualification. And SpaceX will be lucky if they get those three flights before 2017. Then add the 24 to 36months.
Regarding VI, we have yet to see how they propose to handle that. And then they have to actually build and comission the capability. That's also a 24 or so months.
That's why I'm not surprised they have so little missions left to compete.
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DOD/NRO mission integration cycle is 5 years vs the NASA 24 -36 month or the commercial 18-24 month.
Also, there is the acquisition cycle. Spacex or ULA just doesn't get the missions. There will be a solicitation, RFP and source selection.
So the set back for the first mission is longer
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When SpaceX starts bidding for standardized payloads, like GPS. Will they have to add the one time integration and mission specific mods and validations to their price, while EELV already sunk that cost? It could amount to a pretty hefty sum.
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DOD/NRO mission integration cycle is 5 years vs the NASA 24 -36 month or the commercial 18-24 month.
Also, there is the acquisition cycle. Spacex or ULA just doesn't get the missions. There will be a solicitation, RFP and source selection.
So the set back for the first mission is longer
Yes, good point on integration lead time, at least for some missions.[1] Any extended (5yr) LV-specific integration efforts would need to start very soon, as the current EELV Phase 1 plan has all launch service acquisitions complete end FY17; fulfilled (launched) by end FY19; and with open competition for launch services starting in FY18.
While there may be "solicitation, RFP and source selection", at this time only 14 missions are potentially available for competition FY15-FY17.* The remaining missions are ULA sole source.[2] In short, ULA is guaranteed ELC through FY19 (end Phase 1 fly-out), 36 cores, and the majority of the launch service contract awards through FY17. Assuming new entrants are certified, the landscape is likely to change significantly beginning FY18. That gives ULA everyone less than 4 years to get ready for the sequel.
[1] USAF FY2014 Missle Procurement (http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120207-052.pdf) budget submission (April 2013)
EELV launch services are usually ordered No-Later-Than 24 months prior to the planned mission launch. EELV launch services may be ordered earlier than the standard 24 months to allow a longer integration period for first-time or complex integrations.
...
Once a New Entrant demonstrates a successful launch of an EELV-class launch system, the Air Force will award integration studies to the new entrant. Launch Services deemed as having higher risk tolerance by the Department may be awarded to service providers other than ULA as part of the certification process.
Note that certification is not required before award of integration studies. Granted, that doesn't mean a launch services contract, but it provides a head start.
[2] Ibid
The Department has designated 14 cores, for AF and other organization missions, across FY15-FY17 procurement years as open to competition based on the projected performance of the designs described by potential New Entrants in their Statements of Intent (SOI) as well as providing 36 cores to United Launch Alliance in FY13-17. If competition is not viable at time of need; missions will be awarded to the incumbent ...
* edit: To clarify, the fine print says "14 cores"[2] , not 14 missions, so the potentially competed missions might be less.
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Any extended (5yr) LV-specific integration efforts would need to start very soon,
There needs to be a contract in place first.
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Note that certification is not required before award of integration studies.
Integration studies are not the same as the work done in the integration cycle.
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Integration studies are not the same as the work done in the integration cycle.
Right. Sorry I was not clear and thought I had pointed that out ("Granted, that doesn't mean a launch services contract ..."). So to be clear: Of note in the DOD's statement the important point is not the integration work per-se, but the early insight provided to new entrants through integration studies--which does not require certification, only that they have demonstrated the successful launch of an EELV-class vehicle. Having some insight into integration requirements better prepares new entrants to meet future requirements in a more timely and cost-effective manner.
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Any extended (5yr) LV-specific integration efforts would need to start very soon,
There needs to be a contract in place first.
Yes, and such a contract (assuming a 5yr integration effort coupled to a specific LV) needs to be in place no later then end FY14 (Sep this year, or "very soon" as I stated). If not, they've missed the boat because according to the EELV Phase 1 plan, final fly-out will occur no later than end FY19.
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DOD/NRO mission integration cycle is 5 years vs the NASA 24 -36 month or the commercial 18-24 month.
Also, there is the acquisition cycle. Spacex or ULA just doesn't get the missions. There will be a solicitation, RFP and source selection.
So the set back for the first mission is longer
What is your opinion on this? SpaceX Moves Closer to Launching Spy Satellites
http://defensetech.org/2014/02/27/spacex-moves-closer-to-launching-spy-satellites/
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Hype
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What is your opinion on this? SpaceX Moves Closer to Launching Spy Satellites
http://defensetech.org/2014/02/27/spacex-moves-closer-to-launching-spy-satellites/
But that has been the assumption since the DOD started the purchase process for the 36 cores from ULA and left the others out there for SpaceX to potentially grab.
I don't think anyone will be shocked if SpaceX wins all 14 of the other launches that are in play. They are really SpaceX's to lose at this point.
ULA will be in a tough spot after these 36 cores are done. I suspect in 5 years that 100% of the US gov't launches will be in play.
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I don't think anyone will be shocked if SpaceX wins all 14 of the other launches that are in play. They are really SpaceX's to lose at this point.
Unfounded hype. How many launches has Spacex won for NASA spacecraft since 2008 which Falcon 9 was onramped to the NLS contract?
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It will be interesting to see if ULA submits a bid for the ISS CRS-2 contract.
Maybe they can partner with Blue Origin on a craft with capability for return cargo.
If it's going to be a "Level Playing Field", then ULA must be allowed to compete in all the same markets as SpaceX.
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It will be interesting to see if ULA submits a bid for the ISS CRS-2 contract.
They can't. They don't do spacecraft. A spacecraft has to select them
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It will be interesting to see if ULA submits a bid for the ISS CRS-2 contract.
They can't. They don't do spacecraft. A spacecraft has to select them
They COULD if they played by the same business rules as SpaceX.
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They COULD if they played by the same business rules as SpaceX.
Its a joint venture between two companies that do build spacecraft. I highly doubt that ULA's masters want it building spacecraft all on its own (especially if it is not guaranteed to make money).
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It doesn't matter what the ULA masters want. It's what's in the DoD/FTC consent decree that allowed the formation of ULA.
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I don't think anyone will be shocked if SpaceX wins all 14 of the other launches that are in play. They are really SpaceX's to lose at this point.
Unfounded hype. How many launches has Spacex won for NASA spacecraft since 2008 which Falcon 9 was onramped to the NLS contract?
a very good point just advanced again by this contract: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2014/03/atlas-v-launch-next-generation-sun-explorer-2017/
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They COULD if they played by the same business rules as SpaceX.
Its a joint venture between two companies that do build spacecraft. I highly doubt that ULA's masters want it building spacecraft all on its own (especially if it is not guaranteed to make money).
I was wondering about what kind of restraints are really on ULA.
For instance, they have published a spacecraft design, based on the Centaur upper stage called DTAL.
Then they donated a non-flight Centaur to Masten to allow them to basically refine that DTAL design.
It is possible that some day, that would turn into an actual spacecraft design.
Then what happens ? Does ULA build components and ship them to Masten to make a spacecraft out of them ?
Is it possible for ULA to become a supplier to other vendors at all, or can they only build Delta and Atlas launch vehicles ? For instance, could they build a replacement core stage for Antares on a contract basis ? They obviously have the tooling, and extra volume would lower costs for all, right ?
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can they only build Delta and Atlas launch vehicles
Yes