NASASpaceFlight.com Forum
Commercial and US Government Launch Vehicles => ULA - Delta, Atlas, Vulcan => Topic started by: edkyle99 on 05/24/2013 02:42 pm
-
If my long division is correct, this works out to an average cost of $468.2 million per EELV.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/24/us-pentagon-satellite-launches-idUSBRE94N04320130524
- Ed Kyle
-
Can't wait for Spacex to start getting a slice of this market. I wonder where they get the savings of 1 billion a year though...
-
Can't wait for Spacex to start getting a slice of this market. I wonder where they get the savings of 1 billion a year though...
Be interesting to see what ULA's response will be once they feel the heat of some actual competition.
-
Be interesting to see what ULA's response will be once they feel the heat of some actual competition.
Their response will be like any other company who feels competition - they will need to become more efficient and set themselves apart from the competition. I think you will see more Boeing and LM sub-system consolidation and a push for ACES, etc.
I know everyone has a hard on for SpaceX but right now they have a lot to prove and can't hold a candle to ULA's success rate, especially on critical payloads. Due to this, ULA still has time to adjust to more than one player in their market.
-
I know everyone has a hard on for SpaceX but right now they have a lot to prove and can't hold a candle to ULA's success rate, especially on critical payloads. Due to this, ULA still has time to adjust to more than one player in their market.
Agreed. There are already signs of change, such as the collaboration with XCOR on an upper stage engine.
-
Can't wait for Spacex to start getting a slice of this market. I wonder where they get the savings of 1 billion a year though...
Be interesting to see what ULA's response will be once they feel the heat of some actual competition.
Lowering of prices possibly?
-
Trying to understand where the bulk of the money goes.
$70 billion over 15 years, $4.67 billion a year. Divide that by a $200K/year burdened manpower cost and you end up with ~23,300 people for an average annual 'headcount' assuming the costing was 100% labor.
Now obviously it isn't all labor costs, or direct ULA costs, and ULA uses a lot of external suppliers, but ULA itself is down to what, 3,500 people? PWR seems to be what, another 1,500? If you added up ULA, PWR, other externals and the relevant USAF/DoD would it even reach 10,000 people supporting EELV? And I don't think the actual average fully-burdened cost of each head involved in the program would reach $200K...
-
...corporate profits and overhead.
-
ULA can't close any pads or down select to the Atlas V.
Some of the money helps them maintain that full capability.
Once SpaceX has FH launching from both coasts perhaps that equation will change.
-
ULA can't close any pads or down select to the Atlas V.
Some of the money helps them maintain that full capability.
Once SpaceX has FH launching from both coasts perhaps that equation will change.
Hopefully that equation will change. :)
-
$70 billion over 15 years, $4.67 billion a year. Divide that by a $200K/year burdened manpower cost and you end up with ~23,300 people for an average annual 'headcount' assuming the costing was 100% labor.
My understanding of the article is that $70 billion is the total for the entire program from its start in the mid 1990s until 2028. That's 30+ years, not 15, so your estimates are about 2x too big.
-
ULA's response will be to quit. That is what Boeing wanted to do and the DoD wouldn't let them out. If/when SpaceX is established as an EELV provider, there will still be two EELV-class rocket families. ULA will dissolve and one of Atlas or Delta will die. The survivor will revert to its parent company and have to compete on a FAR 12 basis. If the price difference is wide enough, the heritage fleet will continue at a subsistence level (like the initial 7-flight award to Atlas). The choice of more expensive Delta vs Russia-tied Atlas will be an interesting one, with the possible ingredient of Delta having more lift capacity with the Heavy than the 551. Killing Delta would have a massive effect on PWR (and MSFC engines) as well.
-
ULA's response will be to quit. That is what Boeing wanted to do and the DoD wouldn't let them out. If/when SpaceX is established as an EELV provider, there will still be two EELV-class rocket families. ULA will dissolve and one of Atlas or Delta will die. The survivor will revert to its parent company and have to compete on a FAR 12 basis. If the price difference is wide enough, the heritage fleet will continue at a subsistence level (like the initial 7-flight award to Atlas). The choice of more expensive Delta vs Russia-tied Atlas will be an interesting one, with the possible ingredient of Delta having more lift capacity with the Heavy than the 551. Killing Delta would have a massive effect on PWR (and MSFC engines) as well.
When did Boeing try and quit?
-
End of 2004, beginning of 2005. IIRC. Too little profit margin in competitive rockets compared to its other lines of business.
-
$70 billion over 15 years, $4.67 billion a year. Divide that by a $200K/year burdened manpower cost and you end up with ~23,300 people for an average annual 'headcount' assuming the costing was 100% labor.
My understanding of the article is that $70 billion is the total for the entire program from its start in the mid 1990s until 2028. That's 30+ years, not 15, so your estimates are about 2x too big.
It's $51B over the next 15 years, not $70B over 15 years or over 30+ years edit: that last is correct, but the issue is future costs, not historical costs. From Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy (http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593048.pdf), GAO Jul-Aug 2012:
DOD plans to spend about $19 billion to acquire launch services from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017, and total program costs through 2030 are expected to approach $35 billion.
This report shows doubling of that GAO estimate to $70B, or +$51B FY2013-2028.
Ed's estimate of $468.2 million per is right (I get $463.6 assuming 110 launches).
-
Addendum and correction to previous post: Based on other reports, the GAO report above appears to have a typo, or at least a conflict with other GAO and DoD estimates....
As Ed said, the average price per EELV is $468.2M over the total program life of ~1996-2030 ($70B/151). That is a fairly simple calculation, but what it does not show is the alarming increase in current and future EELV costs ("the lie of the average")...
1. Oct-1998 projected total program costs $17.8B for 181 launches for an average unit cost of $98.7M over the life of the program.
2. Mar-2012 projected total program costs $35B for 92 launches for an average unit price of $381M over the life of the program.
3. Mar-2013 projected total program costs $70B for 151 launches for an average unit price of $468.2M over the life of the program.
Granted, DoD got a steal on the first decade's EELV prices (as those prices were based on higher commercial launch rates projected way-back-when which would reduce DoD prices), but bottom line is EELV cost growth is a serious concern.
My rough approximation is the future unit cost is ~$475M/unit ~2013-2017, and ~$583M/unit ~2018-2028 (unfortunately the time frame of various estimates are different, so hard to pin to exact ranges). Note: those are "launch services" costs (which includes projected integration, mission assurance, etc.), not simply the cost of the LV.
Also of note, the FY2013-2017 numbers are based on block buys from ULA in order to reduce unit LV costs. Which means DoD is committed to buying a number of cores each year, even if they don't use them. Whether DoD can actually use them at the rate produced/bought is another point of concern, as the DoD has historically not met their schedule, so surplus LV's would go into storage and stockpile. Subsequently pulling them out of storage for use will incur additional future costs.
And lest anyone get the wrong impression, this is not solely ULA's fault. The DoD is ultimately responsible for mismanaging the program and allowing the kids to run wild. (Although one might hope and expect ULA to be more mature, per GAO reports, they have demonstrated otherwise.)
-
The original intent of the EELV program was to "reduce launch costs by at least 25 percent over heritage Atlas, Delta and Titan space launch systems".
The original plan was to down-select to one launch vehicle.
Frustrating.
- Ed Kyle
-
Factoring in inflation, where would those programs be today? I suspect Titan would be even worse, if GPS had switched to Atlas because it grew to large for Delta, Delta would also have been in a death spiral.
Personally, I think they have an overhead problem, not a manufacturing and launch cost problem. To many mouths to feed spread over to few launches.
-
Factoring in inflation, where would those programs be today? I suspect Titan would be even worse, if GPS had switched to Atlas because it grew to large for Delta, Delta would also have been in a death spiral.
Warning: BOTE WAG... Assuming 3% inflation and a 1995 baseline: $350M Titan III then would be ~$630M today; $450M Titan IV then would be ~$812M today. That assumes no learning curve or other economies and optimizations over the intervening ~20 years, which is arguably pessimistic. Throw in a 10-20% discount assuming such economies, and it's looks like pretty much a wash with todays EELV costs.
Personally, I think they have an overhead problem, not a manufacturing and launch cost problem. To many mouths to feed spread over to few launches.
Nominally agree as the original EELV program cost projections were based on overly-optimistc launch rates. However, recent "should cost" reviews indicate that DoD and ULA don't have credible and objective information or justification for the recent cost increases.
In particular, see EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE: DOD Needs to Ensure New Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information (http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-641), GAO, Sep-2011. That was GAO's way of saying "DOD's New Acquisition Strategy Is Not Based on Sufficient Information". As that report shows, that obtains from DoD's inability to answer basic questions as to what the EELV program should cost, which in turn is the result of ULA's inability to answer basic cost questions.
In short, there is a serious program management problem from the DoD through ULA and their suppliers. DoD left the program largely unchecked (arguably a significant part of that a result of declaring the program in "sustainment" phase circa 2007, which has since been rescinded). The outcome being what we see today: outrageous cost growth and a poster child for one of the worst managed DoD programs.
-
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/24/us-pentagon-satellite-launches-idUSBRE94N04320130524
and
The original intent of the EELV program was to "reduce launch costs by at least 25 percent over heritage Atlas, Delta and Titan space launch systems".
The original plan was to down-select to one launch vehicle.
Frustrating.
Thanks for starting this thread! The original plan was good, but it still isn't clear whether the modified plan (supporting two diversely redundant launch systems) was a mistake. Indeed, even if both systems eventually close out with near-perfect launch records that still won't imply either one would have had an equally good record had it been tasked with flying the entire set of missions.
As matters stand right now, USAF has bought (via the redundancy) an insurance policy against which they haven't yet needed to make a claim. In hindsight insurance that never gets used always looks like an unnecessary expense!
I'm curious whether there are many signs the USAF itself is at all dissatisfied with the cost vs. realized and anticipated benefits of the EELV program?
-
I'm curious whether there are many signs the USAF itself is at all dissatisfied with the cost vs. realized and anticipated benefits of the EELV program?
The EELV program has demonstrably not fulfilled it's promises. This is less a matter of "dissatisfied" and more "How do we justify this Really Expensive Turkey?" While the Dod/USAF may be satified (as their mission mandates), they have dropped the ball, and obviously have little clue otherwise. Which is why they continue to be pummeled by the GAO (among others) for justifications and answers which DoD, USAF and ULA don't appear able to provide.
In particular, ULA may be a mature, well-oiled, reliable machine capable of providing extremely reliable launch services, but from a business perspective, they appear to have no clue as to exactly what their costs are and why (as suggested by recent EELV "should cost" reviews). No wonder that DoD/USAF has had trouble determining, much less containing, program costs.
-
The EELV program has demonstrably not fulfilled it's promises. This is less a matter of "dissatisfied" and more "How do we justify this Really Expensive Turkey?"
The answer is, provide a better valid solution. Sadly, no one else is currently qualified to provide a lower cost alternative. I do think EELV is cheaper than Titan would be at this point. Titan had to go, and most payloads have outgrown Delta II.
Hate to say it, but DOD did this to themselves.
Jim will contradict me, and maybe throw out a no west coast Atlas Heavy pad herring, but when Boeing threatened to pull out of the program after the cheating scandal with a rocket that was not competitive in commercial markets, the DOD should have said don't let the door hit you in the rear on the way out. Instead we have this shotgun ULA wedding.
Somewhere is an archived thread from when ULA formed where many of these same arguments where made seven years ago. Honestly, my memory may be fuzzy but none of the key posters have changed position about ULA.
If (Big, Big If) SpaceX and Orbital manage to bring cost effective rockets to the DOD market place, it will be commercial forces saving DOD's bacon. Not anything DOD has done to foster lower launcher costs.
That is the sad part to me...
-
If ULA end up having to down select to one launcher which one should they keep & which one should they let die?
I suppose there is an argument for the Delta to be the one that is kept on as overall doesn't it have a greater launch capacity, especially as it includes the Heavy version amongst its manifest of variants.
-
What is frustrating? That the Air Force has a near perfect success rate using two highly versatile booster families to choose from?
SpaceX was awarded some launches. Let's see how they do and how ULA adjusts before we go overboard with the whining.
Source on down selecting? I've never once heard that...
The original intent of the EELV program was to "reduce launch costs by at least 25 percent over heritage Atlas, Delta and Titan space launch systems".
The original plan was to down-select to one launch vehicle.
Frustrating.
- Ed Kyle
-
What is frustrating? That the Air Force has a near perfect success rate using two highly versatile booster families to choose from?
SpaceX was awarded some launches. Let's see how they do and how ULA adjusts before we go overboard with the whining.
Source on down selecting? I've never once heard that...
The original intent of the EELV program was to "reduce launch costs by at least 25 percent over heritage Atlas, Delta and Titan space launch systems".
The original plan was to down-select to one launch vehicle.
Frustrating.
- Ed Kyle
Just speculation as indicated at further up this thread.
-
What is frustrating? That the Air Force has a near perfect success rate using two highly versatile booster families to choose from?
SpaceX was awarded some launches. Let's see how they do and how ULA adjusts before we go overboard with the whining.
Source on down selecting? I've never once heard that...
The original intent of the EELV program was to "reduce launch costs by at least 25 percent over heritage Atlas, Delta and Titan space launch systems".
The original plan was to down-select to one launch vehicle.
Frustrating.
- Ed Kyle
Frustrating that DoD did not stick to its original plan, which was to have only one EELV. They would now only be paying for one EELV, at probably half the cost. That one EELV would almost certainly have had the same success rate that the two together have posted.
It is not "whining" for a taxpayer to wonder why he has to pay twice as much as needed, or why the cost itself has doubled, and doubled again.
- Ed Kyle
-
How many times have the EELV programs been paused due to problems? I can think of three launch issues that have given the DOD pause.
First Delta Heavy launch cavitation issue.
Atlas NOSS launch with a leaky RL-10 valve.
And the recent Delta IV GPS launch with the RL-10 leak.
DOD bought assured access, while I feel DOD should have said to Boeing don't let the door hit you in the nozzle on the way out after the cheating scandal. DOD wants assured access, the trade is having to eat the overhead of two under utilized launchers.
-
The original intent of the EELV program was to "reduce launch costs by at least 25 percent over heritage Atlas, Delta and Titan space launch systems".
The original plan was to down-select to one launch vehicle.
Frustrating.
- Ed Kyle
What you should feel is "It was inevitable".
When did you see a monopoly working hard to lower costs???
-
What you should feel is "It was inevitable".
When did you see a monopoly working hard to lower costs???
It was not inevitable. The decision to proceed with two launch providers (instead of a down-select to one) was made back in 1998, long before ULA existed. Also, one of the most significant factors driving recent cost increases is engines, which ULA doesn't make.
There's plenty wrong with the EELV program and more than enough blame to go around; singling out ULA may be convenient and may make some feel better, but oversimplifies and distorts the situation.
-
As matters stand right now, USAF has bought (via the redundancy) an insurance policy against which they haven't yet needed to make a claim. In hindsight insurance that never gets used always looks like an unnecessary expense!
That's not how it works. You're confusing the pecuniary insurance with other types of insurance. Government launches are self insuranced. Which means that the government might opt to eat the chances of a failure and pay a new launch, or take the equivalent money to an insurance and apply it towards risk mitigation applications.
One reason to do this (self insurance) is that it requires a great degree of technical insight for pricing purposed and even more in case of a failure, and on secret programs that's not acceptable. A second one is that the amount to insure might be many times what the commercial market is used to, and thus is out of scale for the market, making it unfeasible. And thirdly (but most probably the most important factor), the capabilities are critical to national security, thus, getting their money back but loosing the location of a leading terrorist or losing troops due to lack of assets is not acceptable.
Normal commercial insurance goes between 15% to 10% of the total program cost, depending on LV reliability and total insured amount. And let's remember that those numbers (let's say 450M to round off) include a lot of custom work. And each Delta IV Heavy is more like two rockets. And you have to assume at least a 3% inflation to 2028 (that's a 55% price increase). Then, we could say that they are paying an average premium of about 250M on top of what the "commercial" launch cost should be.
So, the question is if they are having an average fully burdened cost per payload on the 2.5B range. It would seem to me that the WGS and GPS are lower than that. But I ignore the NRO, and even NOAA seems to be on that range. And the fact that the money spent meant an excellent reliability and availability record, means that the technical insurance did worked, even if it is expensive.
You might say that they are being overly cautious and risk avert. Yes, I say that could be discussed. But the reliability and availability requirements haven been fully met. And that's thanks to the "insurance" (or call it risk reduction) money spent.
-
Monday morning quarterbacking makes me yawn.
Trying to run a program with a 535-member board of directors where 3/4 get mad when you spend too much and 3/4 get mad when your launch becomes a ballistic missile makes me condescend to that BoD.
Managers set a policy and manage to that policy with the best information at the time. No one was saying 15 years ago that there wouldn't be a market. If the BoD only wants one rocket family, then provide funds for that - and live with the consequences of not being able to launch for several months. I wonder what the shareholders would say about that.
-
Assured access.
U.S. government pays for yearly overhead.
This keeps the company in business, however it also does not get the company to seek out commercial launches. Part of the solution would have been to allow the DoD to contract out some of their launches per year to other U.S. launch vehicles that might exist that they don't cover their yearly overhead ( with or without launching ). Also the should have over time reduce their support of the yearly overhead forcing the company to look for commercial launches to support the reduce amount that was supplied to them even when there could have been years without launches. If the company said they could no longer afford to do business without full coverage then look for another company and drop this one.
The DoD should have gotten it's price quote just for their needed number of launches per year with more launches from commercial side to help lower the cost. Always look at what it might cost on the high side before committing.
What was needed to keep cost down would have been the requirement for the two launch vehicles to have commercial customers also.
They needed a way to be able to have two launch vehicles ready at the same time. Atlas V if it had two MLP's and VIF could have had two ready at the same time ( one launch pad ). So if DoD needed a launch at the last minute one of the MLP's and VIF's would be on stand by for DoD.
A commercial customers cost for a launch then would have included some of the yearly overhead cost ( payed back to the U.S. government ). This would have helped keep the cost down. Also competition, keeping the two competitors separate ( no ULA ).
Both launch companies needed to find was to lower their cost. They both needed to keep all parts production in the U.S. or at least work towards that goal. Even NASA contracts could have helped lower their cost with added flights ( at least it would still have help the U.S. after Columbia in 2003 ).
-
Frustrating that DoD did not stick to its original plan, which was to have only one EELV. They would now only be paying for one EELV, at probably half the cost. That one EELV would almost certainly have had the same success rate that the two together have posted.
It is not "whining" for a taxpayer to wonder why he has to pay twice as much as needed, or why the cost itself has doubled, and doubled again.
- Ed Kyle
This is why I think it's really to bad that USAF/DoD and NASA have never seemed to been able get together and come up with a single rocket family that could take care of both of their needs.
I understand during the EELv program NASA was still flying STS, and probably figured it would continue to do so for some time. But weren't they on some level thinking about what would come after the Shuttle? About maybe going back BLEO some day? Seems like someone would have been considering that.
Not only did there not seem to be any attept at collaboration between NASA and USAF/DoD on EELV, NASA seemed to put their fingers on the scale during ESAS to specifically discount EELV options.
So not only did they just not get together, but they've seems actively hostile to it on both sides going all the way back to Titan and Saturn 1 in the 60's.
in the late 70's and Early 80's there seemed to be -some- collaboration on launching USAF/DoD payloads on the Shuttle. Not sure if they wanted that, or just that Reagan pushed it on them.
But after Challenger, that all went away.
If you add up all of NASA, USAF, and DoD's -total- launches per year, you could probably keep one LV family busy enough to get some economics of scale into play.
I know their requirements are differnet, but after listening to that clip by Dr. Sowers at ULA, he seemed to indicate that Atlas V was going to get a manrating "kit" for manned launches and that it wasn't all that expensive.
So I'd think a new common ELV could just be designed from the jump to take a man-rating kit for missions that needed it, and not when it doesn't?
So for the sake of cost sharing and both sides supporting a common LV for mutually assured access to space, you'd think both could come together to the table and see if there'd be a set of requirements that'd work for both of them?
At least for everything in the EELV-medium and up class range.
I think a set of requirements that had a common engine, common core diameter, common upper stage, etc could be agreed upon.
I think Something like Atlas Phase 2 would be a good compromise, with a short-core "stubby" version for the EELV-medium class payloads. (as ULA has in their concept).
And the full length version is a good building block for larger NASA HSF payloads. 3 and 5 core versions.
A little different Delta IV would work too. Maybe a wider core with two RS-68's on it as the base LV, with a shorter version with single RS-68 on it for medium class payloads. something more like Saturn 1 diameter of 6.6m.
3 and 5 core versions there as well.
And there's probably other better ideas. But the point being, government launching is different than commercial launching. ULA is a result of that, as was Titan IV. SpaceX is learning about it I think and we'll see how that effects their costs. So have one provider for -all- government launches, to deal with all that red-tape and beuracracy but still have a reasonable econmics of scale so things aren't too crazy.
And, as we've seen, then let other companies compete for those commercial contracts.
Either that, or do what ArianeSpace and the Russians do and just drop their price with European tax subsidies to get that work. Just with US tax payers. Which is a point of contention, but to the support of that, a relatively "modest" subsidy gets production rates up more overall, and gets that business into the US anyway.
We really can't do that I don't think with our economic rules, but I could kinda see the advantage in that. Just subsidize enought to make up for the extra costs of meeting all the government requirements for the LV provider. All the costs associated with the red tape and beuracracy of dealing with that. subsidize that and what's left should be a reasonably priced LV. ;-)
-
This is why I think it's really to bad that USAF/DoD and NASA have never seemed to been able get together and come up with a single rocket family that could take care of both of their needs.
EELVs do take care of DOD and most of NASA's needs (except for small sats), now and in the future. NASA has no real requirements that need more than Delta IV heavy
-
This is why I think it's really to bad that USAF/DoD and NASA have never seemed to been able get together and come up with a single rocket family that could take care of both of their needs.
EELVs do take care of DOD and most of NASA's needs (except for small sats), now and in the future. NASA has no real requirements that need more than Delta IV heavy
Except for the price to launch ;D.
For the near term that is true. A better priced launcher could be made with greater mass and volume to replace the Delta IV heavy, that includes greater performance to GTO.
For now and this thread, what could be done to help lower the costs of the Atlas V and Delta IV?
Would eliminating the Atlas V 400 series help?
Could the 500 series do the job of the 400 series then?
Could an RL-10 replacement help any?
-
Funny how this thread talks so much about down-selecting to one launcher, when my impression is that none of the same posters feel that way about commercial crew.
If it's so obvious now USAF should have down-selected to one provider, why shouldn't NASA do the same for commercial crew? Why isn't Senator Shelby right when he says commercial crew will end up like EELV, with the government paying to support all the teams it carries through?
And can you explain to me again, why would down-selecting to a single provider would save you lots of money? Put differently, if USAF can't drive a hard bargain with ULA now, why do you think USAF would be able to drive a hard bargain after there was only one launcher available for all launches? The only way to bargain is by having an alternative...
Separate from that, there still is the practical matter that whatever savings you did manage to realize would be reduced by either having to develop Atlas Heavy and VAFB facilities (and total national security reliance on the RD-180), or paying the higher cost of Delta IV, and selecting a team whose management wanted to exit the business (the previous management team had managed to smear excrement on the ethical reputation of the entire company, and there was NO business other than gov-business). Or have I mis-remembered how things played out?
Separate from that, there is still the possibility that Jim is right when he says the cost is in what the customer is demanding, with regard to payload management and assurance and so on.
-
As matters stand right now, USAF has bought (via the redundancy) an insurance policy against which they haven't yet needed to make a claim. In hindsight insurance that never gets used always looks like an unnecessary expense!
That's not how it works.
Thank-you for responding and sharing your thoughts on this!
I should have been more careful to make clear that I was using the term "insurance" somewhat figuratively, rather than literally, and I certainly wasn't trying to describe the insurance of individual payloads against loss due to a launch vehicle malfunction. (We agree the US government self-insures against that kind of loss.)
Your comments about risk mitigation seem completely in line with the approach the USAF has taken with the EELV program. Diversely redundant launch systems protect them in a situation where one of those systems becomes unavailable, i.e. is forced to stand down. Admittedly some payloads may have been designed in ways that inextricably wed them to either Atlas or Delta. Certainly almost any payload would require some sort of recertification before it could fly on a different launcher. But here's the big thing: if needed all mission objectives could be accomplished using payloads designed for either Atlas or Delta. So losing one of the two launch systems would not require USAF to fund development of a new launcher.
If they had selected a single EELV provider as originally planned, and then that launch system had become unusable, the US government (and indeed the "free world") would have been in deep trouble!
-
Trying to run a program with a 535-member board of directors where 3/4 get mad when you spend too much and 3/4 get mad when your launch becomes a ballistic missile makes me condescend to that BoD.
But is really Congress that drove it to this point, or the USAF? IIRC (please correct me), it was USAF's initiative to create ULA in order to "cut costs" and therefore justify not downselecting to one EELV?
-
This is why I think it's really to bad that USAF/DoD and NASA have never seemed to been able get together and come up with a single rocket family that could take care of both of their needs.
EELVs do take care of DOD and most of NASA's needs (except for small sats), now and in the future. NASA has no real requirements that need more than Delta IV heavy
NASA evaluatd Delta 4 heavy during ESAS and didn't agree with you. They didn't think it was capabe enough for and Orion crew launcher, much less for a heavy lift cargo LV.
Now, NASA's criteria and what they thought their needs were and what they could actually do during ESAS are a debate for another thread. But the point is, they didn't -think- that EELV's would work for them. Not even evolved EELV's (which I find suspect myself).
But, I don't think NASA had any input into the EELV program requirements as STS was their PoR launcher for the forseeable future at that time and they didn't really have a reason to. But...perhaps if they'd had some input. If maybe they'd seen the eventual end of STS and the need to have an ELV system that could be a building block for them, as well as [adequately] suit the needs of USAF/DoD.
But again, this would require both NASA and DoD/USAF having the willingness to -want- to come together and hammer out a common LV family that would probably be a bit of a compromise in each's wish list, but would have the potential to have a pretty reasonable flight rate.
It would also allow just one east coast pad, and one west coast pad, although NASA would probably launch their missions from KSC.
LC-37 would be interesting because there could be two identical pads at one LC in case there was a high enough flight rate for USAF/DoD payloads...since you've indicated they'd never want to deal with trying to launch from KSC.
-
For now and this thread, what could be done to help lower the costs of the Atlas V and Delta IV?
Would eliminating the Atlas V 400 series help?
Could the 500 series do the job of the 400 series then?
Could an RL-10 replacement help any?
ULA has made many cost reducing changes during the past few years. There are more changes that I imagine could be made.
1. Going to a common upper stage engine.
2. Shifting to common avionics for Atlas and Delta, eliminating RIFCA.
3. Eliminating the 4-meter Delta upper stage.
4. Shutting down one of the West Coast launch pads (Atlas only flies once per year, Delta once every other year, on average).
5. Common payload fairings?
6. Common upper stage?
7. Delete one of the EELVs entirely.
Beyond these options, I wonder about longer term planning. I wonder if the Pentagon, and NASA, might be better served by dropping entirely the idea of having a long term launch services contract like EELV. Instead, issue commercial type services contracts for launches of entire satellite families.
One contract, for example, could be for GPS. Another could be for WGS. Another for SBIRS. Others for various NRO satellite families. The result would be rockets tailored for satellites, which might result in smaller rockets for most launches and lower costs. Periodic all or nothing competitions would serve to reign in costs.
- Ed Kyle
-
This is why I think it's really to bad that USAF/DoD and NASA have never seemed to been able get together and come up with a single rocket family that could take care of both of their needs.
EELVs do take care of DOD and most of NASA's needs (except for small sats), now and in the future. NASA has no real requirements that need more than Delta IV heavy
Except for the price to launch ;D.
For the near term that is true. A better priced launcher could be made with greater mass and volume to replace the Delta IV heavy, that includes greater performance to GTO.
For now and this thread, what could be done to help lower the costs of the Atlas V and Delta IV?
Would eliminating the Atlas V 400 series help?
Could the 500 series do the job of the 400 series then?
Could an RL-10 replacement help any?
1. How does eliminating the vehicle you fly most help cut your costs?
2. There's probably less difference between the vehicles than you realize. Flying a more expensive PLF and potentially another SRB to make up for the loss of performance does not help cut costs.
3. How much will it cost to develop that engine? How much will each engine cost at the end? If there's a business case, then yes. But the RL-10 replacement discussions have quieted down of late.
-
A better priced launcher could be made with greater mass and volume to replace the Delta IV heavy, that includes greater performance to GTO.
It could be in work with FH, if that's what you imply. If it were possible, someone would have done it.
How would you have made a "requirement" to have commercial customers? You would have demanded that Atlas and Delta take a loss on those commercial launches? Commercial satellite companies won't pay ULA prices, so the govt would have had to make up the (arbitrary) difference - and got WTO scrutiny.
Sorry, but your ideas do not float with a few more layers of the onion peeled.
Trying to run a program with a 535-member board of directors where 3/4 get mad when you spend too much and 3/4 get mad when your launch becomes a ballistic missile makes me condescend to that BoD.
But is really Congress that drove it to this point, or the USAF? IIRC (please correct me), it was USAF's initiative to create ULA in order to "cut costs" and therefore justify not downselecting to one EELV?
Congress didn't drive it. It's Congress's irrational critiques that drive conservative strategies in Agencies. USAF did not initiate the formation of ULA. Boeing's intent to abandon Delta due to insufficient profit margins did.
-
3. How much will it cost to develop that engine? How much will each engine cost at the end? If there's a business case, then yes. But the RL-10 replacement discussions have quieted down of late.
Let's say that the replacement costs 20 million less than the current RL-10. That would be fairly generous, yes ? At the current usage of 10-12 engines per year, that's still only a savings of 200 million. Do you spend 1 Billion or more in development and testing costs, in order to realize a 5-year payback, best case ? That's for the USAF / DOD to decide, since it's their money.
-
Sorry, but your ideas do not float with a few more layers of the onion peeled.
I'm definitely going to keep that in mind as a candidate for my next .sig . ;)
-
Disingenuous headline to say the least... Key point here "program to add 60 more launches and extend the schedule for a decade". The headline seems to indicate the cost increase were not due to a massive increase in scope. The reality is that the numbers of launches has increased 65% (91-to-151) and the period of performance increased 150% (15-to-25). Surprise, surprise those increase in scope didn't come for free.
-
...
ULA has made many cost reducing changes during the past few years. There are more changes that I imagine could be made.
1. Going to a common upper stage engine.
2. Shifting to common avionics for Atlas and Delta, eliminating RIFCA.
3. Eliminating the 4-meter Delta upper stage.
4. Shutting down one of the West Coast launch pads (Atlas only flies once per year, Delta once every other year, on average).
5. Common payload fairings?
6. Common upper stage?
7. Delete one of the EELVs entirely.
The Fleet Standardization Program (which was supposed to have its CDR in Oct-2012), was supposed to move to common avionics (Atlas Vs), common fairings (mix of Delta IV and Altas V), true common core on DIV and full integration of RS-68A. and moving all Us to RL-10C. Thus, they are doing most of what you proposed.
the next line of work is working on a common upper stage (apparently, ACES), which implicitly, would move from three US to just one And since ACES is 4.6m, and is enclosed in fairing, I guess it will eliminate the 4m and 5m difference. So, that would leave eliminating pads, and eliminating a whole line.
Here's the interesting point. If you look at the cost of developing Atlas V Heavy (around 500M), is within a single flight of those required. And if they are going to use a new upper stage, anyways, it might have better performance than even the new enhanced DIVH. The only problem is that it would be really bad on the industrial base.
Also, most West launches are Atlas V, but Delta IV Heavy have flown and we don't know if it's going to need to fly again. Thus, it might happen that they need the pad of the rocket most likely to be deleted.
But that's not all. Currently, they can have a failure that grounds one rocket, and do dual campaigns thanks to dual pads on each coast. Thus, eliminating one rocket line and pad would mean a change on the capabilities.
Now, if there's a new entrant that actually gets certified for those missions, they could eliminate one of the rocket lines and two pads without losing any capabilities. In other words, I think that if they value that capabilities that much, the current plan of trying to get efficiencies while helping other companies get certified is the right path.
Beyond these options, I wonder about longer term planning. I wonder if the Pentagon, and NASA, might be better served by dropping entirely the idea of having a long term launch services contract like EELV. Instead, issue commercial type services contracts for launches of entire satellite families.
One contract, for example, could be for GPS. Another could be for WGS. Another for SBIRS. Others for various NRO satellite families. The result would be rockets tailored for satellites, which might result in smaller rockets for most launches and lower costs. Periodic all or nothing competitions would serve to reign in costs.
That's not how economics work. The truth is that developing and certifying a new rocket to the required capabilities level is a decade's work. But most importantly, each program, even GPS requires so little launches per year, that can't work as tenant to any LV. Thus, nobody is going to design a whole new rocket for a particular payload.
CRS is better in that regard. But it also has a completely different set of requirements and risk profile.
Also, each fleet has its own delays and schedule risk. But if you average all the programs together, you get a much smoother launch schedule. And a constant pace means lower costs.
The truth is that simply competing the launches won't mean low prices. This is a very customized and capabilities sensitive client, and game theory and experience says that bait and switch is a viable pricing strategy, even in the long run.
As long as the US doesn't have a strong commercial launch market, the government won't be able to significantly lower its launch cost. As simple as that. Costs are gonna balloon, requirements are going to grow exponentially if you want to keep the exceptional track record. You either have a commercial market where competition keep things affordable, or you go with a custom solution and pay through your nose. It's simple. Any further analysis is a more sophisticated evolution of the same concept.
-
This is why I think it's really to bad that USAF/DoD and NASA have never seemed to been able get together and come up with a single rocket family that could take care of both of their needs.
EELVs do take care of DOD and most of NASA's needs (except for small sats), now and in the future. NASA has no real requirements that need more than Delta IV heavy
To clarify, I'm guessing you are referring to unmanned launch needs, and I would agree with that statement.
For manned launches, neither EELV is designed/prepared for manned launches right now, and human ingress/egress facilities and emergency detection and abort capabilities are about as real a requirement as could be. Future plans, in the slightly less real category, have so far invariably called for more mojo than the EELVs provide. (For the depot apologists, note that I'm saying no PoR yet has taken depots as a given and down-sized future payload requirements to EELV sizes. If you take "requirement" to mean what NASA demands that a launch vehicle provide, Delta IV heavy does not meet that requirement.)
-
Sorry, but your ideas do not float with a few more layers of the onion peeled.
I'm definitely going to keep that in mind as a candidate for my next .sig . ;)
I'll be applying for Jim Taranto's next Metaphor Alert.
-
But that's not all. Currently, they can have a failure that grounds one rocket, and do dual campaigns thanks to dual pads on each coast. Thus, eliminating one rocket line and pad would mean a change on the capabilities.
True, as written: currently. But all the standardization you listed above (common avionics, common US engines, etc) increases the chances that a failure will ground both fleets. In the short term, it doubly increases the chance, because the debut flights of the common system add a bit of risk, and if something goes wrong both vehicles are grounded. Still, common sense says it needs to be done. In a really vibrant market, both supply chains might be sustainable and both might provide different innovations, but that's not the way things are right now.
As long as the US doesn't have a strong commercial launch market, the government won't be able to significantly lower its launch cost. As simple as that. Costs are gonna balloon, requirements are going to grow exponentially if you want to keep the exceptional track record. You either have a commercial market where competition keep things affordable, or you go with a custom solution and pay through your nose. It's simple. Any further analysis is a more sophisticated evolution of the same concept.
Completely agree. Once the external market for launches dried up, there's not much the government could do, except try to manage costs as best possible, and hope the market changes. And maybe it has changed, in that new companies have entered, and there possibly might be enough commercial traffic to support activity.
-
3. How much will it cost to develop that engine? How much will each engine cost at the end? If there's a business case, then yes. But the RL-10 replacement discussions have quieted down of late.
Let's say that the replacement costs 20 million less than the current RL-10. That would be fairly generous, yes ?
"Generous" is putting it mildly ???. What do you think an RL-10 costs? And where did you come up with that number? Please don't reference another thread in this forum. Any time I've seen an RL-10 cost get thrown around it's one poster quoting another and adding 25%, with no true reference.
-
This is why I think it's really to bad that USAF/DoD and NASA have never seemed to been able get together and come up with a single rocket family that could take care of both of their needs.
EELVs do take care of DOD and most of NASA's needs (except for small sats), now and in the future. NASA has no real requirements that need more than Delta IV heavy
Except for the price to launch ;D.
For the near term that is true. A better priced launcher could be made with greater mass and volume to replace the Delta IV heavy, that includes greater performance to GTO.
For now and this thread, what could be done to help lower the costs of the Atlas V and Delta IV?
Would eliminating the Atlas V 400 series help?
Could the 500 series do the job of the 400 series then?
Could an RL-10 replacement help any?
1. How does eliminating the vehicle you fly most help cut your costs?
2. There's probably less difference between the vehicles than you realize. Flying a more expensive PLF and potentially another SRB to make up for the loss of performance does not help cut costs.
3. How much will it cost to develop that engine? How much will each engine cost at the end? If there's a business case, then yes. But the RL-10 replacement discussions have quieted down of late.
1 and 2 ) My guess was so there would only be one type of core manufactured for the Atlas V and only one type of PLF. Would not have to keep both on hand for a 60 day to launch readiness. If the SRB's are all common then it might not be that much of a cost increase when on is needed do to the increased mass in the 5m fairing over the 4m.
3 ) Commercial design on their dime. Some competitor might make a better engine than the RL-10 and be great for the ACES common US too. Even Pratt & Whitney might find it practical to design a new engine that might make them more profit with lower cost in manufacturing a new type of engine ( new manufacturing technics too ).
The new engine could be a throttable engine with lower to higher thrust than the RL-10. It could possible offer higher ISP and better T/W.
A better priced launcher could be made with greater mass and volume to replace the Delta IV heavy, that includes greater performance to GTO.
It could be in work with FH, if that's what you imply. If it were possible, someone would have done it.
How would you have made a "requirement" to have commercial customers? You would have demanded that Atlas and Delta take a loss on those commercial launches? Commercial satellite companies won't pay ULA prices, so the govt would have had to make up the (arbitrary) difference - and got WTO scrutiny.
Sorry, but your ideas do not float with a few more layers of the onion peeled.
1 ) Not FH but a launch capable of greater mass to LEO and GTO than the Delta IVH. Two stage to LEO and 3rd stage or SEP for GTO/BLEO. Payload to use disposable payload canisters to fit in the larger fairing ( payloads placed in canisters fitted for the given payload. Canisters designed to then fit in a one sized all fairing. Idea of the canister came from the Venture Star X-33 program.
2 ) If I understand right ULA prices are high because of Air Force requirements. I believe with a second VIF and MLP for Atlas V and sharing the launch pad the commercial side would be competitive with other launchers. The second VIF and MLP would not have to be on stand by for a 60 readiness to launch but could also be used by the Air Force. With the possible use of SEP for GTO/BLEO commercial sats might not need DIVH so Atlas V could be the only one used for commercial use.
-
2 ) If I understand right ULA prices are high because of Air Force requirements. I believe with a second VIF and MLP for Atlas V and sharing the launch pad the commercial side would be competitive with other launchers. The second VIF and MLP would not have to be on stand by for a 60 readiness to launch but could also be used by the Air Force. With the possible use of SEP for GTO/BLEO commercial sats might not need DIVH so Atlas V could be the only one used for commercial use.
As the rules currently stand (and aren't likely to change), commercial would have to pay its fair share of ELC costs. For NASA that was estimated as much as $100M/flight (that is in addition to all other launch services costs). A high commercial launch rate might bring that down to levels which might allow ULA to be commercially competitive, but that's a big bet...
That is a significant reason why ULA is not commercially competitive and has less to do with DoD requirements and more to do with the fact that the DoD is paying a large chunk of the bill to maintain the launch infrastructure. ULA can not simply use that infrastructure (and the monies paid by DoD) to subsidize commercial business.
How do you get from here to there? Lots of money. Where does that money come from? Not from ULA-Boeing-LM, at least any time soon, and certainly not unless there is credible evidence that commercial launch would experience significant growth. Boeing-LM's likely response to that argument would be been-there-done-that, spent-billions based on that assumption, don't want to do it again.
Moreover, adding an Atlas V VIF and MLP (somewhere in the vicinity of $340M if Space Florida is to be believed) doesn't help unless ULA were able to financially segregate and firewall commercial from DoD. Given that ULA has had trouble identifying and justifying costs or late (c.f. "should cost" reviews), that is unlikely and would only add to ULA-Boeing-LM's risk.
Much of this has already been discussed in the thread How Should ULA’s Business Model Change going Forward? (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=30867.0).
-
3. How much will it cost to develop that engine? How much will each engine cost at the end? If there's a business case, then yes. But the RL-10 replacement discussions have quieted down of late.
Let's say that the replacement costs 20 million less than the current RL-10. That would be fairly generous, yes ?
"Generous" is putting it mildly ???. What do you think an RL-10 costs? And where did you come up with that number? Please don't reference another thread in this forum. Any time I've seen an RL-10 cost get thrown around it's one poster quoting another and adding 25%, with no true reference.
I just made up a number for the cost savings.
In order for the RL-10 replacement program to pay for itself in a reasonable time period, the new engine has to be basically free, right ? It's impossible to re-coup the development costs unless you think the replacement engine will be around for another 30-40 years.
-
The Fleet Standardization Program (which was supposed to have its CDR in Oct-2012), was supposed to move to common avionics (Atlas Vs), common fairings (mix of Delta IV and Altas V), true common core on DIV and full integration of RS-68A. and moving all Us to RL-10C. Thus, they are doing most of what you proposed.
I thought RL-10C was only going to fly on Centaur. Its use on Delta in place of RL-10B-2 would hurt that rocket's performance, though the only major difference is the presence or absence of the extendible nozzle, as I understand things.
Beyond these options, I wonder about longer term planning. I wonder if the Pentagon, and NASA, might be better served by dropping entirely the idea of having a long term launch services contract like EELV. Instead, issue commercial type services contracts for launches of entire satellite families.
One contract, for example, could be for GPS. Another could be for WGS. Another for SBIRS. Others for various NRO satellite families. The result would be rockets tailored for satellites, which might result in smaller rockets for most launches and lower costs. Periodic all or nothing competitions would serve to reign in costs.
That's not how economics work. The truth is that developing and certifying a new rocket to the required capabilities level is a decade's work. But most importantly, each program, even GPS requires so little launches per year, that can't work as tenant to any LV. Thus, nobody is going to design a whole new rocket for a particular payload.
CRS is better in that regard. But it also has a completely different set of requirements and risk profile.
The reason I raise this question is the obvious challenge of designing a rocket to cover the entire Medium to Heavy category. Lockheed Martin chose to defer Heavy, to minimize costs. What if the entire EELV contract had been broken into smaller mass/orbit categories, resulting in multiple contests rather than "one size fits all"? A contractor could pick and choose which ranges to bid. A Heavy might end up just being a Heavy, and so on.
I understand that the economics don't work out on paper, but then again the economics supposedly did work out on paper for EELV - until the bills came due.
- Ed Kyle
-
The reason I raise this question is the obvious challenge of designing a rocket to cover the entire Medium to Heavy category. Lockheed Martin chose to defer Heavy, to minimize costs.
Most of the costs would be in GSE. There isn't anything to change on the vehicle, just adding nose cones and forward attach fittings.
A heavy would require a whole new pad if not outfitting one that is shared with a medium.
LM did design a vehicle that only used one core design to cover the range, unfortunately, they weren't selected for the heavy mission. The contractor selected had to design 5 unique cores to cover the spectrum.
Also, the intermediate class vehicles were driven by commercial requirement and the military adopted them when it saw the cost savings of not requiring heavies for many missions.
-
I understand that the economics don't work out on paper, but then again the economics supposedly did work out on paper for EELV - until the bills came due.
Regrettably, it's not a symmetric problem. In economics, if it does work on paper, it's difficult that ti works in reality. If it doesn't works on paper, it's almost impossible that it works on reality. It's not a very exact science. And the huge problem is that you either are good at making business and actually doing them, or are "good" at doing analysis, and thus telling about a thing you can't do in real life. A bit like a cinema critic, but with bigger economic consequences.
-
The reason I raise this question is the obvious challenge of designing a rocket to cover the entire Medium to Heavy category. Lockheed Martin chose to defer Heavy, to minimize costs.
Most of the costs would be in GSE. There isn't anything to change on the vehicle, just adding nose cones and forward attach fittings.
A heavy would require a whole new pad if not outfitting one that is shared with a medium.
LM did design a vehicle that only used one core design to cover the range, unfortunately, they weren't selected for the heavy mission. The contractor selected had to design 5 unique cores to cover the spectrum.
Also, the intermediate class vehicles were driven by commercial requirement and the military adopted them when it saw the cost savings of not requiring heavies for many missions.
Not building the Heavy pad(s) saved money, which was a decision about the overall launch system. If I remember correctly, Lockheed Martin even deferred building any West Coast Atlas 5 pad initially, until the stolen Boeing launches were restored.
Your latter point, about intermediate "dial a rocket" alternatives, is an example of how a commercial solution not specified by the government can save money. What, I wonder, would Lockheed Martin have offered - if DoD had not demanded a common core approach - to launch a 3 tonne to LEO polar satellite. It surely would have been a different rocket than a 6 tonne to GTO machine.
- Ed Kyle
-
3. How much will it cost to develop that engine? How much will each engine cost at the end? If there's a business case, then yes. But the RL-10 replacement discussions have quieted down of late.
Let's say that the replacement costs 20 million less than the current RL-10. That would be fairly generous, yes ? At the current usage of 10-12 engines per year, that's still only a savings of 200 million. Do you spend 1 Billion or more in development and testing costs, in order to realize a 5-year payback, best case ? That's for the USAF / DOD to decide, since it's their money.
no need to manufacture more RL-10's at a lower cost when you have a stock of them for the Delta IV.
-
What, I wonder, would Lockheed Martin have offered - if DoD had not demanded a common core approach - to launch a 3 tonne to LEO polar satellite. It surely would have been a different rocket than a 6 tonne to GTO machine.
That was where the small class EELV vehicle was going to cover but in a cost reduction trade, that class was eliminated to reduce configurations to manage. A different rocket would require a different pad, infrastructure, GSE, etc and the associated costs. Again, these decisions were based on a vehicle that was flying many more missions and costs for using a larger vehicle would be less than fielding a whole different vehicle.
LM already responded by eliminating Atlas II & III.
-
What, I wonder, would Lockheed Martin have offered - if DoD had not demanded a common core approach - to launch a 3 tonne to LEO polar satellite. It surely would have been a different rocket than a 6 tonne to GTO machine.
That was where the small class EELV vehicle was going to cover but in a cost reduction trade, that class was eliminated to reduce configurations to manage. A different rocket would require a different pad, infrastructure, GSE, etc and the associated costs. Again, these decisions were based on a vehicle that was flying many more missions and costs for using a larger vehicle would be less than fielding a whole different vehicle.
LM already responded by eliminating Atlas II & III.
Jim,
If the Atlas V were upgraded to accept more AtlasSRB's, maybe a little like the Delta II base, could it's LEO and GTO performance match or surpas Delta IV heavy?
Or are there prohibitive technical problems with doing that?
Physically it looks like there's room for maybe another 4 more. But obviously just because there's room for them, doesn't mean it's feasible to do it.
Just curious.
-
no need to manufacture more RL-10's at a lower cost when you have a stock of them for the Delta IV.
Plus One on that, since they are talking about converting part of the RL-10 Delta IV stock to work on Centaur. The current price problem is not due to the inventory of RL-10's.
-
"Generous" is putting it mildly ???. What do you think an RL-10 costs? And where did you come up with that number? Please don't reference another thread in this forum. Any time I've seen an RL-10 cost get thrown around it's one poster quoting another and adding 25%, with no true reference.
Here's an L2 link on RL-10 costs by someone who has probably been involved with buying them: http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=31801.msg1046520#msg1046520 .
-
Here's another option to mull over. Rather than develop a complete standard launch vehicle family to cover a broad range of payload masses and orbits, how about only developing a common upper stage?
I'm thinking of Agena as my thought bubble prototype here. Agena was the best upper stage the U.S. ever flew. It was launched by Thor, by Atlas, and by Titan. Thought was even given to adapting it for Saturn I and for Shuttle. It was used for LEO spysat missions, as a docking target for Gemini, as a booster for missions to Venus, Mars, and the Moon, and as a GTO insertion stage. It was both upper stage and spacecraft bus for some missions. It stayed active in orbit for weeks, months even, at a time. It was the cheapest upper stage the U.S. flew because it was mass produced to fly multiple missions on different rockets. More Agenas flew than any other U.S. upper stage - a record it still retains.
Could a modern Agena cover the current mission ranges, if it were launched by a range of different rockets? It doesn't have to be a hypergolic, or even a liquid, stage. It doesn't have to be boosted by any particular rocket, or any particular propellant combination. It just needs to be standardized to minimize costs - because upper stages are where a lot of the costs reside. Perhaps theoretical Modern Agena could be GSE, with the launch part contracted out to the lowest bidder.
- Ed Kyle
-
Centaur comes to mind.
Are you sure Agena was cheap, I thought I saw somewhere that Agena was actually a bit on the expensive side.
-
Centaur comes to mind.
Are you sure Agena was cheap, I thought I saw somewhere that Agena was actually a bit on the expensive side.
I'll have to re-find my reference, but I saw an accounting that showed it to be cheapest on a per-unit basis during the mid 1960s. That was, of course, due to its mass production. They launched 41 Agenas in 1967, for example. During the busiest years it only cost something like $650,000 to assemble an Agena stage, but the cost to test and support the thing all the way through launch, etc., doubled that plus change. But keep in mind that Agena was not just an upper stage - it was also a spacecraft bus. Two for one!
- Ed Kyle
-
Centaur comes to mind.
Are you sure Agena was cheap, I thought I saw somewhere that Agena was actually a bit on the expensive side.
I'll have to re-find my reference, but I saw an accounting that showed it to be cheapest on a per-unit basis during the mid 1960s. That was, of course, due to its mass production. They launched 41 Agenas in 1967, for example.
- Ed Kyle
Ed I think that Orbital launch made some impression on your thinking atm. :)
-
Here's another option to mull over. Rather than develop a complete standard launch vehicle family to cover a broad range of payload masses and orbits, how about only developing a common upper stage?
I'm thinking of Agena as my thought bubble prototype here. Agena was the best upper stage the U.S. ever flew. It was launched by Thor, by Atlas, and by Titan. Thought was even given to adapting it for Shuttle. It was used for LEO spysat missions, as a docking target for Gemini, as a booster for missions to Venus, Mars, and the Moon, and as a GTO insertion stage. It was both upper stage and spacecraft bus for some missions. It stayed active in orbit for weeks, months even, at a time. It was the cheapest upper stage the U.S. flew because it was mass produced to fly multiple missions on different rockets. More Agenas flew than any other U.S. upper stage - a record it still retains.
Agena only flew as a dedicated upperstage less than 70 times. The remaining times, it was spacecraft bus which provided the last velocity increment into orbit (not unlike current commercial comsats).
Even though Agena was produced as a "standardized" vehicle, it never flew that way. It was turned over to the Air Force via DD250, who then turned it back over to Lockheed as GFE, who then modified it for the specific mission. The additional costs for the mods were in the spacecraft project costs, and often 'hidden" due to classification. These mods were often intensive. An applicable analogy would be the ABL. It used a stock 747-400F which was greatly modified.
The bulk of the Agenas were for 3 programs, Corona, Gambit-1 & 3 for 237 launches.
-
Could a modern Agena cover the current mission ranges, if it were launched by a range of different rockets? It doesn't have to be a hypergolic, or even a liquid, stage. It doesn't have to be boosted by any particular rocket, or any particular propellant combination. It just needs to be standardized to minimize costs - because upper stages are where a lot of the costs reside. Perhaps theoretical Modern Agena could be GSE, with the launch part contracted out to the lowest bidder.
That would only work with the gov't operating the launch sites and providing the launch vehicles.
Launch pads are vehicle specific and upperstage plays into that.
-
End of 2004, beginning of 2005. IIRC. Too little profit margin in competitive rockets compared to its other lines of business.
I also heard that LM originally didn't even want to bid EELV in the first place (due to worries about losing their shirt), but they were threatened by DoD with losing some of their juicier jet fighter contracts if they didn't bid.
~Jon
-
Not to enter the discussion late, but here is the actual quote referenced in the Reuters story that started the thread. I do not see it referenced/quoted anywhere above and thought it should be added. Intriguing that the words "cost saving methodologies" and "enforcing better cost management" are used...
The document is entitled "SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORT (SAR) SUMMARY TABLES As of December 31, 2012"
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) – Program costs increased $35,717.0 million (+102.1%) from $34,968.1 million to $70,685.1 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 60 launch services from 91 to 151 launch services (+$16,040.5 million) resulting from an extension of
the launch manifest from FY 2018 to FY 2028 and the program life extension from FY 2020 to FY 2030 that was directed in Space Command’s Strategic Master Plan (+$20,987.5 million). These increases incorporate cost saving methodologies implemented in the revised contracting strategy, to include incentivizing the contractor, enabling the government to implement cost cutting initiatives during technical evaluations and contract negotiations, improving insight into the contractors’ costs, and enforcing better cost management. These increases were partially offset by cost savings realized in the FY 2014 President’s Budget Future Years Defense Program due to a revised acquisition strategy and other initiatives (-$1,671.6 million).
-
The document is entitled "SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORT (SAR) SUMMARY TABLES As of December 31, 2012"
Thanks, yes; source document is here (http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/SST-2012-12.pdf) (23-May-2013). Unfortunately only the summary appears to be available, not the individual SAR.
Also related (albeit a bit dated) is EELV Program Assessment (http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_fin/11_F_1256EELV_Program_Assessment_Presentation_for_the_Honorable_Christine_Fox_March1_2010.pdf), March 2010 which is (or was) a part of an effort to:
...identify and assess alternatives for reducing US Government launch costs, including options for down-selecting to a single EELV family and leveraging commercial and foreign launch capabilities.
Unfortunately much is redacted. Interesting there is a "Consolidate to Delta Only Line" (slide 30), but apparently nothing suggesting consolidation to Atlas only. (Other points indicate NRO needs Delta and Atlas alone wouldn't suffice, but evidence is thin and hard to tell based on the information available in that presentation.)
-
It is not "whining" for a taxpayer to wonder why he has to pay twice as much as needed, or why the cost itself has doubled, and doubled again.
- Ed Kyle
In round numbers, each household contributes about 10^-8 of the federal budget. This means each time one of these rockets launches, it's about $5 out of pocket. It's frustrating because it used to cost $1 for exactly the same rocket, for everything else high tech the costs go down, and because it's not at all clear what you are getting for your money - they were just as reliable when they were $1.
In your personal life, you would never by a new car for $100,000 if your previous car, same model and features, cost you $20,000. Unless, of course, there was only one car dealer in the whole country....
-
It's not that there's one car dealer. It's that there used to be 2 end customers for the folks building what's under the hood, and the tires, and the batteries, and the airbags... Now there's only one. Too few customers is a greater problem than too few manufacturers.
-
It's not that there's one car dealer. It's that there used to be 2 end customers for the folks building what's under the hood, and the tires, and the batteries, and the airbags... Now there's only one. Too few customers is a greater problem than too few manufacturers.
This report shows doubling of that GAO estimate to $70B, or +$51B FY2013-2028.
Ed's estimate of $468.2 million per is right (I get $463.6 assuming 110 launches).
Does anyone want to venture an estimate if another 60 launches were procured by the government during the same time frame, so a total of 170 launches, and hence provide more customers? Is the "commercial" rate available, the rate to non-government customers?
-
I've been struggling with unit cost for Atlas V and Delta IV. I came up with the attached calculation based on contract announcements over the past few years. Basically, I inflated the contract dollars to CY 13 dollars, then took a guess at average unit cost of Atlas V and Delta IV until I minimized the difference between actual contract cost (inflated) and contract cost based on my unit cost guess.
My guess is that launch services are not included in this. If they are, then unit cost goes down by about $20M (my estimate of launch services cost). So basically I think I have the raw cost to the government of production of these launch vehicles.
Would appreciate any feedback you may have on this. Also how do we reconcile the $450M per launch cost mentioned earlier?
-
I've been struggling with unit cost for Atlas V and Delta IV. I came up with the attached calculation based on contract announcements over the past few years. Basically, I inflated the contract dollars to CY 13 dollars, then took a guess at average unit cost of Atlas V and Delta IV until I minimized the difference between actual contract cost (inflated) and contract cost based on my unit cost guess.
My guess is that launch services are not included in this. If they are, then unit cost goes down by about $20M (my estimate of launch services cost). So basically I think I have the raw cost to the government of production of these launch vehicles.
Would appreciate any feedback you may have on this. Also how do we reconcile the $450M per launch cost mentioned earlier?
In a not so scientific fashion i've found that 122 and 203 gives a smaller average error of about 11.1 percent per contract.
-
Thanks! Still pondering the disparity between these estimates and the SAR Summary Table. Even if launch services and launch pad maintenance/improvement/etc were included in the SAR estimate, the difference just seems too high.