NASASpaceFlight.com Forum
Commercial and US Government Launch Vehicles => ULA - Delta, Atlas, Vulcan => Topic started by: Lobo on 01/15/2013 06:46 pm
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I looked back a couple of thread pages, but couldn’t find any topic specifically about this. Basically, what I’m wondering, is what changes to their product line and business model going forward should ULA do, if any? (Maybe what they are doing is fine and will sustain them for another decade?)
I’m certainly no expert on ULA’s operation or history, but I think I know enough to figure out the reason they have two LV’s. Boeing(McDonnell-Dougla)s and Lockheed-Martin each had their own LV’s, and the merger to ULA was sort of to settle LM’s lawsuits against Boeing for some information theft??
That and Boeing wanted to get out of the market completely, but the government didn’t want them to. So it was an overall compromise.
I’m assuming the reason the government didn’t want Boeing to get out was they wanted to LV’s for redundancy in the EELV program? As both LV’s were new and in case there was problem with Atlas V? Since Titan IV was retired.
But today, both LV’s have proven very reliable, so I wouldn’t think there’s as much need for two separate LV’s any more. And meeting USAF’s needs have make both EELV’s very expensive for commercial customers. So with little commercial business, ULA’s primarily gotten just government business which is limited. And what business there is, is split up between two LV programs. Thus we see just seemingly one or two launches of each per year. So what is the reason today and going forward for ULA to operate both LV’s? Obviously I’m assuming the government currently wants them to do so, and thus paying those high prices to maintain both systems to have them available.
But will that continue? Should that continue? Can’t ULA commonize on just one LV and one upper stage and try to bring the costs down, which might allow them to get more commercial business too?
Now add to that mix SpaceX, which sounds like they will get the opportunity to start bidding on government launch contracts in the future (I believe I’ve read around the site), -could- be a competitor of theirs in the future, although not the immediate future. And even if SpaceX only gets –some- government business, like some payloads that can be horizontally integrated (as I haven’t heard any plans for SpaceX to build a new VIF at LC-40 or VAFB), that would reduce ULA’s currently low launch rate even more. And that remaining business is still split between two LV systems.
Just seems like there would or will have to be some discussions by ULA and USAF/DoD to streamline to just a single LV system, with maximum commonality. I would assume Atlas V would probably be the LV of choice, as I think it’s cheaper to make, and smaller, and other than giving up a couple of tonnes to D4H, covers all of the rest of the Delta IV line. Also it’s getting the investment to man-rate it for commercial crew, which I would suspect at least CST-100 will get a contract, even if DC does not.
So, is there any plans or concepts at ULA to streamline to just the Atlas V? Maybe develop the AVH to replace the D4H?
Or to streamline to just an Atlas Phase 2? Which should still be man-rated as Atlas V will be man-rated. Maybe Centaur is retired, and DCSS is used on it? Or the stretched DCSS used as iCPS on SLS Block 1?
Would an Atlas Phase 2 with DCSS upper stage really be any more expensive to produce per unit than a Delta IV Medium (5,2)? Two RD-180’s vs. one RS-68 + two GEM-60’s. The rest of the costs should be about the same, but Atlas Phase 2 core would actually be shorter with less metal than the D4 core I think. And you get more than a D4H’s capacity.
Even though it’s more capacity than a lot of payloads need, if you make just that one LV with that one upper stage, and just “mass produce” it. Especially if the LV is about the same cost as a Delta IV medium. And you automatically double the flight rate since the missions aren’t split between two LV’s. And maybe pick up a few more launches a year of CST-100 to the ISS, as well as some more commercial work if the costs come down.
I would think the 5m Atlas Phase 2 core could be launched from LC-37 and SLC-6 with not a lot of modifications, as those facilities are already set up to handle 5m core LV’s. And the Atlas Phase 2 cores would be shorter (about 9m shorter I think) so the doors should handle it fine and the and platforms should be able to be moved down without too much hassle. RP-1 tanks would need to be added to both obviously.
Obviously ULA has been kicking around Atlas Phase 2 for some time, I just assume there’s been no payloads that a D4H can’t handle, and the government has been subsidizing both lines to keep them active?
So, going forward, will/should ULA stream line to just one existing LV? Or perhaps merge both lines into an Atlas Phase 2? Or just keep doing what they are doing and hope USAF/DoD keeps paying them enough to split a handful of missions each year between the two LV’s and maintain them both?
(I’m assuming Jim will have a lot of insight on this…if we can get him to say more than one sentence. :-) )
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ULA is already at work on its future plans. One step is RL10C, which will reconfigure excess Delta 4 upper stage engines to power Centaur stages on Atlas 5. Another is, reportedly, a plan to work toward common avionics for Atlas and Delta (basically replacing Delta's outmoded system with the Atlas hardware).
RS-68A is allowing ULA to begin producing a true "common" core for all Delta 4 variants. There are signs that the 4-meter diameter Delta 4 upper stage may be on the way out, longer term. Meanwhile, the 5-meter stage is going to fly on SLS.
ULA can't get rid of Delta because it needs the Heavy. It would need to get megabucks from the Pentagon for Atlas 5 Heavy first, which seems unlikely.
- Ed Kyle
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Delta 4 heavy don't seems to be able to complete with FH.
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Delta 4 heavy don't seems to be able to complete with FH.
FH does not have a flight and until it does from both coasts, it is not able to compete with Delta IV heavy
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Delta 4 heavy don't seems to be able to complete with FH.
Why do you say that? Are you comparing LEO 200km x 28 or GTO x 15 deg, or GSO?
Are you talking abouta Fairing sizes?
Are you talking about mission lengths?
Upper stage restarts?
Overall reliability?
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Delta 4 heavy don't seems to be able to complete with FH.
FH does not have a flight and until it does from both coasts, it is not able to compete with Delta IV heavy
Yes, but that's going to happen much faster than ULA could possibly come up with a Falcon Heavy competitive vehicle. So, Delta has the advantage for the next few years, but it's difficult to imagine it surviving after Falcon Heavy becomes fully operational.
Which is exactly Lobo's point: ULA needs a new business model, or they will be gradually edged out of existence by losing more and more government launch contracts. In the last round of EELV buys, about 1/3 of the cores authorized were to be competed (which favors SpaceX). Assuming no disaster, next time it will be at least most of the cores competed, and that's not good for ULA.
Personally, if I were in charge of ULA, I'd be pushing to get all the IP from Lockheed Martin's RBS entry transfered over to ULA and then continue to develop it with internal funds. A large factor why USAF canceled RBS was not because they didn't want a reusable first stage, but because they saw several companies (i.e. SpaceX and Blue Origin) developing EELV-class reusable first stages and didn't see the need to subsidize development. That rather puts ULA on the spot to either fund its own reusable first stage or give up on winning future contracts.
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Lets keep something in mind when it comes to Falcon Heavy. It is a new rocket.
It uses engines that have not yet flown, on stages that have not yet flown, with a payload fairing that hasn't flown, from pads that have not yet been completed (or, in one case, even started).
The core will be 30% taller than the existing Falcon 9. That's a whole new arena of flight control that hasn't flown. Not yet.
Heavy can't fly until F9 v1.1 flies, successfully. Assuming all of this works, and Falcon Heavy flies and works, the Pentagon is not going to jump on board with both feet. This rocket is going to have to prove itself. Over several years and several launches. (Keep in mind that the most recent Falcon 9 failed, so success is not guaranteed.)
Even then, there is no guarantee that it will actually be cheaper than Delta 4 Heavy. Remember that Delta 4 Heavy was originally supposed to cost $150 million - it was in all the news reports in the years before it finally flew. The reports, of course, were wrong. It probably costs three or four or more times that much today. I take projections of Falcon Heavy costs with that history in mind.
- Ed Kyle
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Delta 4 heavy don't seems to be able to complete with FH.
FH does not have a flight and until it does from both coasts, it is not able to compete with Delta IV heavy
Yes, but that's going to happen much faster than ULA could possibly come up with a Falcon Heavy competitive vehicle. So, Delta has the advantage for the next few years, but it's difficult to imagine it surviving after Falcon Heavy becomes fully operational.
Which is exactly Lobo's point: ULA needs a new business model, or they will be gradually edged out of existence by losing more and more government launch contracts. In the last round of EELV buys, about 1/3 of the cores authorized were to be competed (which favors SpaceX). Assuming no disaster, next time it will be at least most of the cores competed, and that's not good for ULA.
Personally, if I were in charge of ULA, I'd be pushing to get all the IP from Lockheed Martin's RBS entry transfered over to ULA and then continue to develop it with internal funds. A large factor why USAF canceled RBS was not because they didn't want a reusable first stage, but because they saw several companies (i.e. SpaceX and Blue Origin) developing EELV-class reusable first stages and didn't see the need to subsidize development. That rather puts ULA on the spot to either fund its own reusable first stage or give up on winning future contracts.
I'm not sure they need to go the reusable route to compete. They just need to reduce costs. Maybe part of that is squeezing more costs out of their suppliers (PWR). I don't know how many RL-10s ULA has in stock, but their manifest over the next couple of years looks like a opportunity to perform a rather large block purchase, which should add up to some sort of discounted price (or alternate US engine selection).
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Heavy can't fly until F9 v1.1 flies, successfully. Assuming all of this works, and Falcon Heavy flies and works, the Pentagon is not going to jump on board with both feet. This rocket is going to have to prove itself. Over several years and several launches. (Keep in mind that the most recent Falcon 9 failed, so success is not guaranteed.)
If we're going to define a partial failure as a full-on failure, Ed, then both the Atlas V and Delta IV have suffered "failures". Spacex is going to learn from that moment and be better for it. Besides, the Falcon 9 did manage to handle the situation pretty well. There was no vehicle disintegration like there was on the Ariane 5's first launch, and you'll notice the Ariane 5 is one of the dominant GTO launchers today.
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As for changing ULA's business plan? I've got a few ideas from ULA's own pages. http://www.ulalaunch.com/site/docs/product_cards/guides/AtlasVUsersGuide2010.pdf
1.4.6 Atlas V Future Enhancements
Section 8 provides insight to the Atlas V customer community of the Atlas V program plans for enhancing the Atlas V launch vehicle to meet launch services requirements of the 21st Century.
Future enhancements include:
1. Large diameter & longer PLF
2. Common Upper Stage
3. Wide-Body Booster (WBB)
4. Heavy-Lift Evolution
5. Centaur Sun Shield (CSS)
For the latest information on future and current enhancements please contact ULA.
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If I were in charge of their product planning, I'd change the Atlas V design to the wide-body booster (5 m) with the Delta IV 5m upper stage and continue adding PLF options. Around 2020, when I expect the Falcon Heavy might qualify for its first true DoD missions, I'd kill off the Delta IV and replace the Delta IV Heavy with the Atlas V Heavy. I know that wouldn't be cheap, but in my eyes inaction is a bigger risk than investing the money to make it happen. This single family approach would max out the Atlas V family's flight rate and should bring down costs. Assuming that wasn't enough, I'd upgrade the upper stage to the ACES, preferably using a newer engine (NGE or RL-10C) that is more easily mass-produced. I'd replace the RD-180 with the AJ-1-E6 not long afterwards and look into adding engine-out redundancy to the US for better reliability.
More ambitiously I'd probably look into a more advanced, potentially reusable design for the Atlas VI if Spacex keeps pushing farther with Grasshopper. In terms of business, although it might be too much to hope, I'd try to control prices and compete for at least some commercial contracts to make up for Orbital & Spacex cutting into NASA & DoD business.
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If we're going to define a partial failure as a full-on failure, Ed, then both the Atlas V and Delta IV have suffered "failures".
I do count the EELV failures, and the successes. There have been 53 EELV successes. Falcon v1.1 and Heavy need to prove themselves equally reliable, which is not a given and will take time.
If I were in charge of their product planning, I'd change the Atlas V design to the wide-body booster (5 m) with the Delta IV 5m upper stage and continue adding PLF options.
But isn't high cost the EELV problem? Wouldn't making EELV fatter and heavier exacerbate the problem? Europe is thinking about shrinking Ariane to cut costs.
- Ed Kyle
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But isn't high cost the EELV problem? Wouldn't making EELV fatter and heavier exacerbate the problem? Europe is thinking about shrinking Ariane to cut costs.
I've seen three modern theories about scalability. Use cores plus solids (EELV), which you can only made with Vertical Integration (at least at the solids side), use many small cores (Angara and Long March 5), use just two cores, have a single and a heavy version and apply all your savings to making the heavy cheap enough (like Falcon 9/Heavy and Ariane 6).
It seems to me that the current EELV's are exactly what the government ordered. May be, just may be, if they move to Wide Centaur with IVF, and wide core and do away with the solids, or at least do like the Delta IV and only have the expensive vertical integration on the pad when required, an Atlas V Ph2 with no solids could cover everything currently on the manifest but a couple of NROL (I'm assuming) and with dual manifesting might even be commercially competitive.
And if they went with a single RD-175, they might simply cover everything with a single launcher, no need for solids. Just two stages (Ph2 + Wide Centar), one faring with, may be, a couple of fairing extensions, and horizontal integration until sending it to the pad. The economics should lower a lot of overhead. I don't think that the current cost of an 401 is very competitive.
I mean, from what I've seen, the marginal cost of each rocket is not that bad, it's the whole supporting infrastructure and dual production lines (though they are consolidating).
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If we're going to define a partial failure as a full-on failure, Ed, then both the Atlas V and Delta IV have suffered "failures".
I do count the EELV failures, and the successes. There have been 53 EELV successes. Falcon v1.1 and Heavy need to prove themselves equally reliable, which is not a given and will take time.
If I were in charge of their product planning, I'd change the Atlas V design to the wide-body booster (5 m) with the Delta IV 5m upper stage and continue adding PLF options.
But isn't high cost the EELV problem? Wouldn't making EELV fatter and heavier exacerbate the problem? Europe is thinking about shrinking Ariane to cut costs.
- Ed Kyle
The cost of EELV's is the problem, but I think very little of that cost is a factor of the amount of alloy in the tanks and barrel.
Besides, Delta IV is -aready- a 5m "wide body" booster. I don't think the problem is it's size, it's the overhead given the very low production rate.
I would think the actual cost of the alloy and the fuel are a very small part of the cost per LV.
A Ford F150 is "bigger and fatter" than a Lamborgini, but costs only a fraction of the price, because a million of them roll off the assembly line every year vs. a few hundred (or thousand, or whatever rate Lamborgini's are built).
A little of the cost might be in the Lamborgini's high performance components, but much of it is probaboy economics of scale.
If Ford only built 1000 F150's a year, the cost per truck would probably be very expensive because those 1000 trucks would have to support the entire cost of the production line. Even worse if it's just 3 or 4 trucks a year.
I think you get costs down more by getting commonality and production rate up, than going smaller per se.
Barring some severe problem with what prices SpaceX really needs to sell F9 v1.1 for, it will be a more powerful (first stage) rocket than either a single stick Atlas V or Delta IV, but much cheaper.
I think SpaceX is on the right track as far as production rate and commonality. Everything uses the same upper stage, the same engines, the same MPS, the same cores, the same propellants, etc.
It doesn't matter if a customer only needs 1/2 of what a F9 can do, the F9 cost is such that they still use it, driving up production scale further.
From the outside looking in, this would -seem- to be the way ULA ought to go. Since they already have 5m core and tank tooling, it's not like they have to make a -new- investment for it. They already are making a 5m upper stage. A 5m Atlas Phase 2 would need the tanking and plumbing changed, and barrel shortened, for the different propellant ratios, but I wouldn't think that would be a bad expense. once the existing tooling is adjusted for the new lengths, all the same existing equipment should still be used.
REtire the 3.71m production line, as well as the Centaur production line. Stop buying RS-68's. Make every core the shorter, kerolox version of the curent Delta IV 5m core, put two RD-180's on the bottom and a DCSS on the top, and put everything on that. No SRB's, no two types of RL-10's, no 3 different upper stages, no two different cores, no two different avionics. One booster engine, one CCB first stage, one upper stage, and one PLF (either the Delta 5m, or Atlas 5.4m). And that's it.
No chocolate, vanilla, straberry and rocky road ice cream. Just Vanilla...and make lots and LOTS of vanilla.
But again, that's from the outside looking in with my limited knowledge. That's why I'm asking. :-)
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Yes, but that's going to happen much faster than ULA could possibly come up with a Falcon Heavy competitive vehicle. So, Delta has the advantage for the next few years, but it's difficult to imagine it surviving after Falcon Heavy becomes fully operational.
Which is exactly Lobo's point: ULA needs a new business model, or they will be gradually edged out of existence by losing more and more government launch contracts. In the last round of EELV buys, about 1/3 of the cores authorized were to be competed (which favors SpaceX). Assuming no disaster, next time it will be at least most of the cores competed, and that's not good for ULA.
Well, my -question- is does ULA need a new business model?, because from the outside, it seems like they should.
It seems like they are doing things about as inefficiently as possible with two separate LV lines to split between a limited number of annual launches. Partly the result of the low flight right, and partly due to government requirement, prices are so high that commercial markets have mostly gone to other providers like Araine, Russia, and soon to be SpaceX.
There are reasons it is what it is, like how ULA was formed, and government wanting redundancy. I get that. But it seems like today much has changed or is changing, and is there still enough reason for ULA to keep going the way they've been going? Or could/should still change, and ULA try to see if they can go with a cheaper, more common single LV that would meet USAF's requirements for EELV's, but be able to compete and try to get more commercial work? With all of their infrastruction and experience with USAF's requirements, could they streamline, and still keep that reliability up for the government?
I suppose that's a shorter version of why I started this thread.
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Delta 4 heavy don't seems to be able to complete with FH.
FH does not have a flight and until it does from both coasts, it is not able to compete with Delta IV heavy
Jim,
What is your opinion on ULA's business model going forward? Any desire by them or USAF to streamline to perhaps just one LV? Especially given the very successful track record of Atlas and Delta? Are two separate LV's really needed by USAF today and going forward?
And SpaceX won't be eating into any of their business in the near future, but I have to think ULA would be aware of that potential down the road, at least on government payloads which can be horizontally integrated. Wouldn't they? Even if SpaceX were to only nibble off like 20% of government payloads, that's 20% of an already limited number of yearly launches that would still be split between two LV's. Seems like ULA would have to charge even more per launch to keep both lines open.
If USAF is still willing to pay it to keep the two EELV's at thier disposal, then I suppose ULA would have not reason or need to change anything. But from the outside looking in, it seems like an untennable business model at worst, and a highly inefficient one at best.
At least from the outside...what say you?
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Delta 4 heavy don't seems to be able to complete with FH.
FH does not have a flight and until it does from both coasts, it is not able to compete with Delta IV heavy
Jim,
What is your opinion on ULA's business model going forward? Any desire by them or USAF to streamline to perhaps just one LV? Especially given the very successful track record of Atlas and Delta? Are two separate LV's really needed by USAF today and going forward?
And SpaceX won't be eating into any of their business in the near future, but I have to think ULA would be aware of that potential down the road, at least on government payloads which can be horizontally integrated. Wouldn't they? Even if SpaceX were to only nibble off like 20% of government payloads, that's 20% of an already limited number of yearly launches that would still be split between two LV's. Seems like ULA would have to charge even more per launch to keep both lines open.
If USAF is still willing to pay it to keep the two EELV's at thier disposal, then I suppose ULA would have not reason or need to change anything. But from the outside looking in, it seems like an untennable business model at worst, and a highly inefficient one at best.
At least from the outside...what say you?
Tempting Jim to respond, eh? Good luck with that. :D The best bet I'd think is hedging on ULA moving towards common avionics and upper stage. After that, I think they really need to move everything to a single production plant. I still say they ought to kill off Delta in a few years and concentrate everything on the cheaper Atlas family. They'll need to invest in some pad upgrades and in the Atlas family, but inaction does not seem a smart strategy in the face of growing competition. They should save money in the long run by reducing their fixed costs by halving their number of plants, launchpads, chopping their number of upper stages from 3 to 1, and halving their CCB count along with their lower stage engine types. If they go to the Wide-body booster design (5 m) and add a second RD-180 they should be able to eliminate their need for solids. That'd make things quite simple with only 2 engines, 2 stages, 1 avionics package, and 2 pads to use. That would at least make it a tougher fight for Spacex and potentially Orbital.
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Even then, there is no guarantee that it will actually be cheaper than Delta 4 Heavy. Remember that Delta 4 Heavy was originally supposed to cost $150 million - it was in all the news reports in the years before it finally flew. The reports, of course, were wrong. It probably costs three or four or more times that much today. I take projections of Falcon Heavy costs with that history in mind.
- Ed Kyle
I had no idea what the original cost estimates for Detla 4 Heavy were to be. But let's pull on this thread a little. Why are the actual rates so much higher? When were those old estimates given? Delta IV Heavy flew two years before the formation of ULA. Were they under the assumption of perhaps MD, then Boeing-MD were get a sole EELv supplier contract? So that the production rate would be for the full annual government manifest, plus cheap enough to land a good chunk of the commercial market?
If so, then the fact that D4 cores are only produced at a fraction of the rate that they may have been estimated to be producted could be part of that. I remember someoen saying that RS-68 would be a very cheap engine if the production rate was sufficient.
Also, I imagine MD, then Boeing, then ULA inherrited all of the heritage liability as that progressed, like union costs and political forces, being as large as they are. So, you might have massively high overhead with very low production, which is always a recipe for high costs. Now add to that that ULA has not gotten very much commercial business (I assume due to high costs), and that they have to split up what limited business they do get...primarily from the government...between two LV with basically overlapping capabilities. Seems like about the most inefficient way possible. Which -could- be why costs are 3-4 times what they were initially estimated to be.
If that -is- the case, then the only way SpaceX's costs would go up 3-4 times too, woul be if they get locked into the same situation. They'd have to split up their business between two completely different LV’s with completely different equipment, engines, infrastructures, and launch facilities. And those LV’s would have to be sort of managed by two different groups that weren’t necessarily trying to work together in all things (like Boeing and LM), with competing turf-wars, etc. And they’d have to unionize, and take on a lot of legacy liabilities.
However…none of those things are likely to be a factor in SpaceX’s business plan. Quite the opposite it would seem. They have a single CEO/owner, and thus a single goal and vision. They are new, so there is no legacy liabilities or unions liabilities. They seem to be striving for maximum commonality and streamlining, and going with as much “off-the-shelf” as possible. They seem to be specifically going after the commercial market by focusing on keep costs down to a level where they will get a big chunk of that market. Which will get production rates up, and help keep costs down. If they are flying a single LV (including F9 & FH as one LV because of commonality), and flying it 20 times a year, probably the cost per launch will be much less than if you are flying two LV’s, each 1-3 times per year.
I am certainly no expert, and FH could very well end up being much more expensive than planned. But…I think probably a lot of ULA’s cost issues are a combination of specifically catering to the government (which is complicated, beuracratic, and expensive), and the legacy of how they were formed, as well as maintaining two redundant LV’s which don’t even compete with each other. It might be better if Boeing and LM competed for contracts, but in their formation, they had a monopoly on the government launching business for a decade…which is usually a situation where things get more costly, not less.
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Tempting Jim to respond, eh? Good luck with that. :D The best bet I'd think is hedging on ULA moving towards common avionics and upper stage. After that, I think they really need to move everything to a single production plant. I still say they ought to kill off Delta in a few years and concentrate everything on the cheaper Atlas family. They'll need to invest in some pad upgrades and in the Atlas family, but inaction does not seem a smart strategy in the face of growing competition. They should save money in the long run by reducing their fixed costs by halving their number of plants, launchpads, chopping their number of upper stages from 3 to 1, and halving their CCB count along with their lower stage engine types. If they go to the Wide-body booster design (5 m) and add a second RD-180 they should be able to eliminate their need for solids. That'd make things quite simple with only 2 engines, 2 stages, 1 avionics package, and 2 pads to use. That would at least make it a tougher fight for Spacex and potentially Orbital.
Actually, I am more begging Jim to indulge my curiosity because I think his views on this would be the most informative in the real world. We can speculate all we want, but I think most of us will have criteria we don’t know how to factor in that he does.
As to your other comments. I think Atlas Phase 2 using the Delta’s 5m tooling, and going with a common DCSS, and launching it from the Delta Launch facilites would be the –best- plan going forward, in the long run for reasons we’ve both mentioned.
However, what might be the fastest/cheapest in the short term, and a decent option in the long run, would be to upgrade Delta with the Atlas avionics (sounds like Atlas has the better avionics?), retire Altas completely, and just fly D4 and D4H. At least now you are getting commonality in infrastructure and hardware. Delta IV could also be upgraded with lighter weight Al-Li for better performance (according to Boeing’s slides anyway). And D4H could mount 6 GEM-60’s, to get LEO performance in the 30-40mt range and be very similar to what FH will likely do, with much better GTO performance…if/when necessary.
One problem with this, would be what to do with CST-100 and DC, as the RD-180 is the one that will be getting the man-rating upgrade. Not sure what they’d do about that. But if they could figure something out, then maybe they could just streamline on an upgraded Delta IV system. Commercial crew might be a mute point if NASA downselects to only SpaceX. In which case there won’t be a need for a man-rated RD-180.
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Tempting Jim to respond, eh? Good luck with that. :D The best bet I'd think is hedging on ULA moving towards common avionics and upper stage. After that, I think they really need to move everything to a single production plant. I still say they ought to kill off Delta in a few years and concentrate everything on the cheaper Atlas family. They'll need to invest in some pad upgrades and in the Atlas family, but inaction does not seem a smart strategy in the face of growing competition. They should save money in the long run by reducing their fixed costs by halving their number of plants, launchpads, chopping their number of upper stages from 3 to 1, and halving their CCB count along with their lower stage engine types. If they go to the Wide-body booster design (5 m) and add a second RD-180 they should be able to eliminate their need for solids. That'd make things quite simple with only 2 engines, 2 stages, 1 avionics package, and 2 pads to use. That would at least make it a tougher fight for Spacex and potentially Orbital.
Actually, I am more begging Jim to indulge my curiosity because I think his views on this would be the most informative in the real world. We can speculate all we want, but I think most of us will have criteria we don’t know how to factor in that he does.
As to your other comments. I think Atlas Phase 2 using the Delta’s 5m tooling, and going with a common DCSS, and launching it from the Delta Launch facilites would be the –best- plan going forward, in the long run for reasons we’ve both mentioned.
However, what might be the fastest/cheapest in the short term, and a decent option in the long run, would be to upgrade Delta with the Atlas avionics (sounds like Atlas has the better avionics?), retire Altas completely, and just fly D4 and D4H. At least now you are getting commonality in infrastructure and hardware. Delta IV could also be upgraded with lighter weight Al-Li for better performance (according to Boeing’s slides anyway). And D4H could mount 6 GEM-60’s, to get LEO performance in the 30-40mt range and be very similar to what FH will likely do, with much better GTO performance…if/when necessary.
One problem with this, would be what to do with CST-100 and DC, as the RD-180 is the one that will be getting the man-rating upgrade. Not sure what they’d do about that. But if they could figure something out, then maybe they could just streamline on an upgraded Delta IV system. Commercial crew might be a mute point if NASA downselects to only SpaceX. In which case there won’t be a need for a man-rated RD-180.
I think the big problem with going exclusively with the Delta IV family is going to be cost. The Atlas V family is cheaper and flies more often, and thus seems the more logical of the two to use. There's also the fact that cheap all-hydrolox rockets are not exactly seen anywhere. The Chinese, French and Russians may now have some very nice hydrolox engines, but they are either used on relatively expensive (but reliable) launchers like the Ariane 5, or they're exclusively for use on upper stages (China & Russia). Atlas V Phase 2 seems to me to have fewer complications due to hydrogen only being used on the Centaur stage and the fact that unlike the Delta IV family it would likely not require solids to launch all Atlas V 401-551 payloads. That's something a 5 m Delta IV simply cannot do.
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I had no idea what the original cost estimates for Detla 4 Heavy were to be. But let's pull on this thread a little. Why are the actual rates so much higher?
As you went on to suggest, a big part of the cost has to do with EELV not proceeding as originally planned. It was supposed to be winner take all, but the Pentagon couldn't take the leap, deciding to keep two systems while simultaneously running into payload issues that cut the number of overall government launches. Delta 4, especially, was designed to support all of the EELV requirements, but was left with a fraction of the expected total work.
Another factor is the DoD requirements themselves, which require two launch sites, and systems and payload processing that requires more man-hours than commercial satellite campaigns. These same issues will add costs to Falcon, which makes me wonder how it can compete commercially while still meeting the DoD requirements.
- Ed Kyle
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I had no idea what the original cost estimates for Detla 4 Heavy were to be. But let's pull on this thread a little. Why are the actual rates so much higher?
As you went on to suggest, a big part of the cost has to do with EELV not proceeding as originally planned. It was supposed to be winner take all, but the Pentagon couldn't take the leap, deciding to keep two systems while simultaneously running into payload issues that cut the number of overall government launches. Delta 4, especially, was designed to support all of the EELV requirements, but was left with a fraction of the expected total work.
Also the no-show of the then projected Real Big Real Soon commercial launch market which colored many decisions way-back-when. Then compounded by seemingly perrenial EELV management issues, for which DoD at. al. have been spanked several times. (Search for "GAO EELV" and pull on that thread--enough reading and references to make even the strongest weep.)
Another factor is the DoD requirements themselves, which require two launch sites, and systems and payload processing that requires more man-hours than commercial satellite campaigns. These same issues will add costs to Falcon, which makes me wonder how it can compete commercially while still meeting the DoD requirements.
Those requirements will certainly add costs, some fixed and some variable. How much those costs can be isolated or apportioned to different classes of customers, and thus how much those costs will add to SpaceX's commercial side is an open question.
Arguably ULA's (and hence BLS and LMCLS) cost and management structure has evolved over the years to primarily serve one customer: the U.S. government, and in particular NSS (DoD, NRO, ...). Unwinding or segregating that from commercial is going to be difficult and will take time (assuming ULA-Boeing-LM choose that path).
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As you went on to suggest, a big part of the cost has to do with EELV not proceeding as originally planned. It was supposed to be winner take all, but the Pentagon couldn't take the leap, deciding to keep two systems while simultaneously running into payload issues that cut the number of overall government launches. Delta 4, especially, was designed to support all of the EELV requirements, but was left with a fraction of the expected total work.
Yea, that’s what I thought the case was. So when trying to figure out if SpaceX will be in the same boat as ULA on government launches, I was just trying to figure out if the circumstances that lead to ULA’s current cost issues would apply to SpaceX. This big one here won’t apply to SpaceX, which will just be operating one LV system rather than two.
Additionally, since SpaceX will probably have a pretty busy commercial manifest, this one LV system will be launched much more often than just government payloads. That’s very key, because I very much doubt SpaceX will get all the government payloads. They’ll probably start out with just a few to make sure they can get the job done as ULA can. As SpaceX doesn’t appear to have any way to vertically integrate payloads, I think several government payloads would have to stick with ULA based on that alone.
Another factor is the DoD requirements themselves, which require two launch sites, and systems and payload processing that requires more man-hours than commercial satellite campaigns. These same issues will add costs to Falcon, which makes me wonder how it can compete commercially while still meeting the DoD requirements.
- Ed Kyle
Yea, and that will be key. I don’t know what all of the DoD requirements are, so it’s hard to predict how that may effect SpaceX’s ability to compete for them at their normal rates.
When you say they need two launch sites, won’t they have that when the VAFB site is finished? Or do you mean they need two launch sites at the Cape? But that wouldn’t make too much sense, because while ULA does have both LC-41 and LC-37, prior to the ULA merger in 2006, Boeing only had LC-37, and LM only had LC-41. Then each had a pad at VAFB (or was in the process of modifying old VAFB for Atlas and Delta, prior to the formation of ULA I believe.)
So SpaceX should have what Boeing and LM had prior to merging into ULA. If SpaceX puts a new HIB at LC-40 at the came able to handle FH at 90 degrees to the existing HIB, they should be able to effectively double their launch rate from LC-40.
Perhaps that new HIB would be designed and built to whatever government requirements there might be for [horizontal] integration if their payloads? (if there are any such requirements the existing HIB would need to have upgraded)
And actually, there’s probably no reason SpaceX couldn’t build a vertical integration building large enough for both F9 and FH instead of a new FH compatible HIB at LC-40, if they feel they that would be beneficial to them going forward.
A VIB could open up more SpaceX competition to ULA. And even if meeting government red-tape means they’d have to charge more per launch for government payloads than for the commercial prices they keep touting, they’d have to go up quite a bit before they’d have parity with ULA. And even if they were close, they could still poach some contracts by just being a little cheaper.
One way or the other, SpaceX will probably start to get some government work that’s currently going to ULA. I don’t think they’d have built the new pad at VAFB if they didn’t feel they could.
And the folks at ULA I’m sure must see this and have ideas for ways to streamline to better compete. If they were smart, IMHO, they’d take steps to not only get their government costs down so they can continue to get the bulk of government launches and make sure SpaceX doesn’t get too far in that market, but I think they could get their commercial prices down enough to get more commercial contracts.
But who knows? Maybe the government has given ULA assurances that they’ll get enough money to keep going the way they are going, in order to retain the assets as they sit now, so ULA won’t change anything? I guess that’s what I’m curious about. Seems horribly expensive and inefficient to go on that way, but maybe that’s the plan going forward?
Personally, I’d love to see ULA get in the market of really competing for commercial launches again, whatever they need to do to do that. I think that competition would spur an overall reduction in costs, and in more payloads world-wide because of it. They should get in there and try to start poaching AraineSpace’s customers, as well as the Russia’s commercial customers. Bring that work back here to the US. I think that’s SpaceX’s plan (to try). Especially with all the smack talk from Elon about beating out China, Russian and AraineSpace. I’d love to see the bulk of the world commercial launch work being does by ULA and SpaceX, and the US owning that market. Be great if LC-41 and LC-37 were shooting off rockets every month or two, rather than just a handful of times per year.
Perhaps what’s really required, is the government reevaluating their requirements, so that more standard commercial hardware and procedures could be used without needing to carry a bunch of extra expenses and overhead? So that ULA would be free to streamline their offerings as they see fit in order to get costs down, and SpaceX could compete with their commercial offering with few changes, which would get the government’s costs down accordingly.
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Don't forget that ULA has subsantial sunk costs; eliminating an LV, pads. etc. would likely require a significant and immediate write off and hit to their finances (and thus Boeing and LM). Thus, ULA not only has the challenge of being operationally more efficient and competitive, but also digging themselves out of a financial hole. I've no idea how big that hole is today, but the original Boeing and LM investment was on the order of $4+B--so maybe on the order of $hundreds-of-millions, if not $billions, and on which decisions are dependent on ULA's masters? I bet it really sucks to be ULA's CFO these days.
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As SpaceX doesn’t appear to have any way to vertically integrate payloads, I think several government payloads would have to stick with ULA based on that alone.
I remember hearing on a podcast with someone from SpaceX. Something about SpaceX might build a mobile tower to vertically integrate DOD & NRO payloads at VAFB similar to way it's being done at CCAFS LC-37 for the Delta IV.
So I think SpaceX could competed for all the current ULA payload types, once the Air Force have confidence in the F9/FH LV family.
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As SpaceX doesn’t appear to have any way to vertically integrate payloads, I think several government payloads would have to stick with ULA based on that alone.
I remember hearing on a podcast with someone from SpaceX. Something about SpaceX might build a mobile tower to vertically integrate DOD & NRO payloads at VAFB similar to way it's being done at CCAFS LC-37 for the Delta IV.
So I think SpaceX could competed for all the current ULA payload types, once the Air Force have confidence in the F9/FH LV family.
That's interesting. But now that I think on it, SpaceX left the Titan mobile tower parking area pretty much untouched as far as I can tell. Not sure if the rails are still there (cant' really tell from the Google EArth photos I've seen). No reason a Falcon Mobile launch tower couldn't be built right there and used just as the old Titan one was for missions that require it, and do the rest in the new HIB.
If ULA isn't concerned today about SpaceX eating into their government contracts at some time down the road, if they see a new mobile tower going up at SLC-4E, then I think they should start getting nervous then. Unless they do some major changes here in the near future (which I hope they do) I'm not sure how they survive if they get many fewer government launches than they get now, as they are priced too high to get more than just the occasional commercial paylaod any more.
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Don't forget that ULA has subsantial sunk costs; eliminating an LV, pads. etc. would likely require a significant and immediate write off and hit to their finances (and thus Boeing and LM). Thus, ULA not only has the challenge of being operationally more efficient and competitive, but also digging themselves out of a financial hole. I've no idea how big that hole is today, but the original Boeing and LM investment was on the order of $4+B--so maybe on the order of $hundreds-of-millions, if not $billions, and on which decisions are dependent on ULA's masters? I bet it really sucks to be ULA's CFO these days.
Yea, there are two ways to make enough money to recoup those sunk costs. A small number of launches with very large price tags, or a large number of launches with much smaller price tags.
Unfortunately, the possibility of the latter is probably past. A decade ago, Boeing, LM, and then ULA was the only game in town for US launch providers. They probably could have scooped up a big chunk of that market before anyone had really heard of SpaceX or Orbital and owned it today. Perhaps after the ULA merger, they should have attempted to create a "budget" LV and go after the commercial market aggressively. streamlined one LV down to the bare minimum and dropped prices down to the bare minimum, and kept the other LV fully compliant with government red tape and beuracracy. Maybe that could have justified keeping both LV's, and been a better business model? Then SpaceX would have had a much more difficult task to try to break into that market with perhaps only marginally better prices against an established entity with an established good track record.
However, Boeing with Delta and LM with Atlas designed both their LV's with all of the redundancy/overhead/beuracracy to get the government launches. So when ULA was formed, they had two high end "Cadillac" LV's which much may not have been possible to be trimmed down into an economical "Ford Focus" offering to compete cost-wise for customers who could only afford a "Ford" sedan.
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When you say they need two launch sites, won’t they have that when the VAFB site is finished? Or do you mean they need two launch sites at the Cape?
Both ULA and SpaceX must support GTO and sun synchronous, and other types of orbits for DoD. The Cape can't handle near-polar orbits, so Vandenberg AFB is required, forcing duplicate facilities.
If SpaceX were only going for the commercial GTO market, it would only need one launch site, which is all that its competitors are forced to support. Ariane, for example, can fly to both GTO and near-polar from only one launch pad at Kourou. SpaceX is building Vandenberg only because it wants to compete for U.S. government launches, but that choice means that it will have higher launch site fixed costs than its commercial competitors.
- Ed Kyle
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SpaceX is building Vandenberg only because it wants to compete for U.S. government launches, but that choice means that it will have higher launch site fixed costs than its commercial competitors.
- Ed Kyle
Is this necessarily the case? There are also commercial imaging (GeoEye, etc.), sats from other countries (RadarSat from Canada, for example) and lots of scientific satellites that want polar orbits. I'd imagine SpaceX would like to compete for these, as well. So I agree SpaceX needs Vandenberg for govt. launches, but maybe not only for this.
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Vandenberg is also a heck of a lot closer to their headquarters.
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Would it be possible for ULA to move Delta launches to LC-41 (or move Atlas launches to LC-37), so that they could consolidate maunch pad operations ? I suppose they might still need separate integration buildings for Atlas and Delta, but reducing the footprint could help save some costs for maintaining 2 separate sets of launch pads on each coast.
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Not really, the vehicles are too different.
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Not really, the vehicles are too different.
I'd thought that would be the case, but I am glad Jim confirmed it. I think the facilities at LC-37 were built by MD-Boeing specifically for their EELV to compete for that work.
The current facilities at LC-41 were built by LM for their EELv for the same reason. I don't think either was designed to accomodate anything other than the LV's they support.
Although, perhaps LC-37, as well as VAFB SLC-6, could be made to accomodate an Atlas Phase 2 family of the same diameter as the Delta IV, if ULA decided to combine their two lines into a single 5m diameter kerolox booster. Especially if that new 5m kerolox booster was designed to readily use the existing Delta IV pad facilities.
But aside from that, I think a streamlining strategy would better be to drop one or the other line completely, close up it's associated launch facilities, and operate all launches off the one LV system.
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Actually, as a side note, if the government was no longer wanting and subsidizing ULA to maintain both EELV's for them, does Boeing and LM even want to continue the consortium?
Would they even want to "consolidate" their two LV's into a single common one, in order for ULA itself to move forward as a launch provider to more openly compete for government and commercial contracts?
As I understand, ULA was a bit of a shotgun marriage to begin with, sort of demanded and funded by the US government. If that dynamic changed, would Boeing and LM rather just get a divorce, split up the belongings, and go there own way?
Maybe LM would streamline Atlas into a system that could start getting commercial paylaods regularly again, and Boeing would get out completley (which I think they sort of wanted to do before ULA was formed), and just focus on their part of SLS, as well as they're potential future parts in the Gateway plan?
Anyone have any insight into that?
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After that, I think they really need to move everything to a single production plant.
Essentially already done. Decatur now builds Delta cores, Delta second stages, Atlas cores and Centaurs.
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After that, I think they really need to move everything to a single production plant.
Essentially already done. Decatur now builds Delta cores, Delta second stages, Atlas cores and Centaurs.
That's good. But they still operate two different booster cores with two different upper stages (3 really including 4m DCSS), with two different booster engines, and two pairs of launch facilities. Everything separate, with really nothing shared (as far as my limited knowledge goes). Both systems basically have the same capabilities, so they are both really redundant.
And all of that splits a manifest that isn't even large enough to keep just one LV system working anywhere near full capacity.
So its good they consolidated production, but it still seems like about the most inefficient way possible to operate. Even if the government is footing the bil for you to operate that inefficiently.
I guess it would be like if SpaceX was working on another booster that would have the same capabilities as F9 and FH, but have nothing in common with it. It would be a hydrolox or methane first stage, with a hydrolox or methane 2nd stage. It would need new pads at the CApe and VAFB. It would duplicate F9 and FH's capabilites, but share nothing with it. And they would split their manifest with this new separate system.
I think a lot of people would scratch their head and wonder what the heck Elon was thinking, as that seems totally illogical and inefficient.
Yet that's what ULA does.
Now, ULA didn't really chose to do that, they were sort of pushed into forming and inherrited the liabilities and assets of Boeing and LM. But at this point right now, it seems like they woudl be looking at streamlining down to one common booster and upper stage, and try to get it's costs down and it's flight rate up.
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Now, ULA didn't really chose to do that, they were sort of pushed into forming and inherrited the liabilities and assets of Boeing and LM. But at this point right now, it seems like they woudl be looking at streamlining down to one common booster and upper stage, and try to get it's costs down and it's flight rate up.
More like three bricks (Boeing, LM, US gov) looking for a life raft. Also, since ULA is still a Boeing+LM joint venture, ULA's business model is dependent Boeing and LM. While much of what you've said about ULA's business might make sense if ULA was independent, it's going to work only if it also makes sense for Boeing and LM individually.
What an equitable arrangement between the parties might look like--and which would allow ULA to proceed on the path you suggest--is very difficult to say, as there is little visibility into ULA and their arrangements or commitments with Boeing and LM. In any case, the business issues appear to dwarf the technical issues.
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Given that much of the discussion seems to focus on Atlas/LM being the preferred heir apparent (?)... maybe Boeing might let loose of ULA some time in the not-so-distant future? Of note, the original Boeing-ULA 2006 Delta Inventory Supply Agreement (http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312507033902/dex10vi.htm) required payment of $60M/core or $1.86B to Boeing for 31 Delta IV CCB's prior to 31-Mar-2021.
(Which, if I read that correctly, requires payment of $1.86B regardless of how may Delta IV cores ULA uses/launches on or before 31-Mar-2021. Which could be read as demand for a royalty payment of $60M/core, or as a demand that Boeing be compensed for $1.86B for their investment in Delta IV. That the contract verbiage caps the payment at 31 cores or $1.86B suggests the latter?)
At last count, ULA is at ~24 Delta IV cores (Oct 2012), with a projected additional ~11 through 2015, so maybe Boeing will have their guaranteed pound of flesh and would be willing to let loose of ULA by 2016 (which also happens to be when the consent decree (http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510165/0510165.shtm) is up for review).
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the original Boeing-ULA 2006 Delta Inventory Supply Agreement (http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312507033902/dex10vi.htm)
Nice find! Is that agreement still in effect and unmodified? It sure makes it difficult for ULA to make Delta price-competitive!
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the original Boeing-ULA 2006 Delta Inventory Supply Agreement (http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312507033902/dex10vi.htm)
Nice find! Is that agreement still in effect and unmodified? It sure makes it difficult for ULA to make Delta price-competitive!
I expect those sipulations are still in effect (give or take a few $M) or we would see evidence in Boeing's SEC filings or as an amendment to the FTC filings if they constituted a significant change to Boeing's or ULA's financial position. I've looked and haven't found such evidence.
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I would assume Atlas V would probably be the LV of choice, as I think it’s cheaper to make, and smaller, and other than giving up a couple of tonnes to D4H, covers all of the rest of the Delta IV line.
From this story
http://spaceflightnow.com/atlas/av036/flow.html
it looks like they are improving the Atlas flow, which presumably takes time and money (and I suspect would not happen unless the spectre of SpaceX was not upon them). Unless they are trying similar improvements to Delta, this could be writing on the wall as to which one survives...
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and I suspect would not happen unless the spectre of SpaceX was not upon them
It has be happening all along.
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and I suspect would not happen unless the spectre of SpaceX was not upon them
It has be happening all along.
I agree that continual process improvement is always there, but I don't think this a "natural" path for ULA. I think their natural bias is "do everything possible to ensure a successful launch, even if it's expensive". This makes sense for their current market, very expensive payloads, and has resulted in extremely reliable launchers. But I suspect that in the absence of SpaceX, if someone inside suggested "Let's skip the WDR; it will save time and money and not hurt the reliability", it would have been turned down. The burden of proof would be on the proposer, to *prove* beyond a shadow of a doubt that reliability would not be compromised. The management mindset would be "why save a little time and money if it has even a small chance of hurting our major selling point, reliability?" Rocket managers tend to very conservative, for good historical reasons - there is a long history of seemingly innocuous changes leading to disaster.
Adding SpaceX to the mix changes the equation. Now "it's cheaper, and we see no reason it will hurt reliability" will be accepted, whereas before it would be rejected, since any change *might* hurt reliability.
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and I suspect would not happen unless the spectre of SpaceX was not upon them
It has be happening all along.
I agree that continual process improvement is always there, but I don't think this a "natural" path for ULA. I think their natural bias is "do everything possible to ensure a successful launch, even if it's expensive". This makes sense for their current market, very expensive payloads, and has resulted in extremely reliable launchers. But I suspect that in the absence of SpaceX, if someone inside suggested "Let's skip the WDR; it will save time and money and not hurt the reliability", it would have been turned down. The burden of proof would be on the proposer, to *prove* beyond a shadow of a doubt that reliability would not be compromised. The management mindset would be "why save a little time and money if it has even a small chance of hurting our major selling point, reliability?"
Deleting WDR does not decrease reliability, it only increases schedule risk.
Also, deleting WDR is an old idea and was looked at for heritage Atlas and may have been incorporated (don't remember)
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Also, deleting WDR is an old idea and was looked at for heritage Atlas and may have been incorporated (don't remember)
I agree it's an old idea - that's exactly my point. If there has long been this cost saving on the table, and it does not hurt reliability, then why did they not try it until now, just as competition is appearing on the horizon? It's possible that this is coincidence, and they would have tried this anyway in the absence of SpaceX. But my experience with bureaucracies managing complex and risky projects is that they seldom make big work-flow changes unless forced by the competition. Otherwise the risk is not worth the small cost savings, particularly if the customer has no other option.
This is entirely rational on the part of the ULA managers. In the absence of SpaceX, what's the number of launches gained/lost by reducing the cost by a few million dollars? It's precisely zero, so why change? But with SpaceX in the game, there's a chance (not yet proven) that they will be cheaper and reliable enough, and some customers might switch. So now cost savings have a positive value, and are being pursued.
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1. I agree it's an old idea - that's exactly my point. If there has long been this cost saving on the table, and it does not hurt reliability, then why did they not try it until now, just as competition is appearing on the horizon? It's possible that this is coincidence, and they would have tried this anyway in the absence of SpaceX.
2. In the absence of SpaceX, what's the number of launches gained/lost by reducing the cost by a few million dollars?
1. Because they wanted a good number of launches under their belt before adopting this.
2. It isn't money saved but time. Saving 5 days per launch with 6-8 launches per year equates to almost another launch
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this could be writing on the wall as to which one survives...
Yes, it certainly does seem to indicate which one will get be used for most launches. But what are you predicting for the payloads that require DIV-H? Certainly one possibility is, "NRO will have no more of those." But absent any inside knowledge that's difficult to believe.
Going forward it seems ULA will likely take Atlas and Delta on quite different paths; Atlas "optimized" for rapid flow and many launches, and Delta "optimized" for a much more sedate pace, albeit with some critical payloads.
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2. In the absence of SpaceX, what's the number of launches gained/lost by reducing the cost by a few million dollars? [ It's zero... ]
2. It isn't money saved but time. Saving 5 days per launch with 6-8 launches per year equates to almost another launch
Are there more payloads ready, so they could launch more if they could cycle faster? My impression was that they were already launching almost all payloads soon after they were ready.
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Also, deleting WDR is an old idea and was looked at for heritage Atlas and may have been incorporated (don't remember)
I agree it's an old idea - that's exactly my point. If there has long been this cost saving on the table, and it does not hurt reliability, then why did they not try it until now, just as competition is appearing on the horizon? It's possible that this is coincidence, and they would have tried this anyway in the absence of SpaceX. But my experience with bureaucracies managing complex and risky projects is that they seldom make big work-flow changes unless forced by the competition. Otherwise the risk is not worth the small cost savings, particularly if the customer has no other option.
This is entirely rational on the part of the ULA managers. In the absence of SpaceX, what's the number of launches gained/lost by reducing the cost by a few million dollars? It's precisely zero, so why change? But with SpaceX in the game, there's a chance (not yet proven) that they will be cheaper and reliable enough, and some customers might switch. So now cost savings have a positive value, and are being pursued.
The article says that by eliminating the WDR, they reduced overall processing time, and were able to add an additional flight to this year's manifest. I guess you can say they gained a flight by this change.
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Are there more payloads ready, so they could launch more if they could cycle faster? My impression was that they were already launching almost all payloads soon after they were ready.
Payloads can move around launch dates. Other than science spacecraft, which are built one at a time, the others are "block" buys. Which means the spacecraft assembled in groups and then stored until needed for launch.
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What about these various private companies looking to fly to the moon surely ULA would be interested in getting some of this business?
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Now, ULA didn't really chose to do that, they were sort of pushed into forming and inherrited the liabilities and assets of Boeing and LM. But at this point right now, it seems like they woudl be looking at streamlining down to one common booster and upper stage, and try to get it's costs down and it's flight rate up.
More like three bricks (Boeing, LM, US gov) looking for a life raft. Also, since ULA is still a Boeing+LM joint venture, ULA's business model is dependent Boeing and LM. While much of what you've said about ULA's business might make sense if ULA was independent, it's going to work only if it also makes sense for Boeing and LM individually.
What an equitable arrangement between the parties might look like--and which would allow ULA to proceed on the path you suggest--is very difficult to say, as there is little visibility into ULA and their arrangements or commitments with Boeing and LM. In any case, the business issues appear to dwarf the technical issues.
Yea, that’s all pretty good points. ULA doesn’t act only in a way that would be in it’s own best business interest. They have to act also in a way that’s ok with LM, Boeing, and the government who is almost all of their business. That’s sorta like trying to a get a bill past both Houses of Congress and the President. Tough to do without a bunch of pork in it.
If ULA was like an independent spin off company, independent of Boeing and LM, then they probably would and could streamline and operate more efficiently.
Hmmm…I wonder if that’s actually a possibility? Would Boeing and LM being willing to sort of sell off (or lend, or lease, or whatever) their rocketry assets in Decatur, the Cape, and VAFB to ULA and have it operate as an independent spin off company? Especially if SpaceX looked to eat into their limited government business, and if the governments attitude ever changed to go away from paying for the legacy and overhead of the current ULA structure, to one of more free-market competition only?
Currently they have a difficult time competing for commercial work, so even just a 20% reduction in their already limited government work could be difficult if the government said they’d not longer pay such high launch prices as standard practice.
Or, in such a case, would ULA more likely split back up to Boeing and LM directly? Could that untangling even be done at this point?
I’m sure ULA can go on as they always have as long as the government is willing to subsidize the large overhead and legacy of two separate LV’s, but if they decided not to, I wonder what that would mean for ULA?
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Given that much of the discussion seems to focus on Atlas/LM being the preferred heir apparent (?)... maybe Boeing might let loose of ULA some time in the not-so-distant future? Of note, the original Boeing-ULA 2006 Delta Inventory Supply Agreement (http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312507033902/dex10vi.htm) required payment of $60M/core or $1.86B to Boeing for 31 Delta IV CCB's prior to 31-Mar-2021.
(Which, if I read that correctly, requires payment of $1.86B regardless of how may Delta IV cores ULA uses/launches on or before 31-Mar-2021. Which could be read as demand for a royalty payment of $60M/core, or as a demand that Boeing be compensed for $1.86B for their investment in Delta IV. That the contract verbiage caps the payment at 31 cores or $1.86B suggests the latter?)
At last count, ULA is at ~24 Delta IV cores (Oct 2012), with a projected additional ~11 through 2015, so maybe Boeing will have their guaranteed pound of flesh and would be willing to let loose of ULA by 2016 (which also happens to be when the consent decree (http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510165/0510165.shtm) is up for review).
Interesting.
So, if I am understanding this correctly, Boeing needed a guarantee of some sort of return on their investment into Delta IV, and 31 cores at $60 million per core would cover them for that, with a deadline of payment complete (31-MAR-2021) whether 31 cores had flown or not? Sort of a car warranty. 5 years ofr 50,000 miles, whichever occurs first. In this case, 31 cores @ $60 million/core or $1.86 billion dollars total, whichever occurs first?
And Boeing may not be interested in staying a part of ULA once that investment has been recouped?
Maybe that’s why all of Boeing’s proposals for SLS gateway and lunar mission concepts focus on the use of Boeing’s equipment like the DCSS, and not Centaur or a future ACES. I know Boeing originally had concept art showing CST-100 on Delta IV. That was changed to Atlas V due to the easier job of man-rating Atlas…but if Boeing was thinking about getting out of ULA and the Delta IV line, then that would have been a reason to switch Atlas V as the LV…because Delta IV might be retired then…?
(pure speculation here, obviously).
So, would ULA fold back into LM only then? And they’d operate the facility at Decatur? And I imagine LC-37 and SLC-6 would be shut down? With Atlas operations being done from LC-41 and SLC-3 then? If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?
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If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?
In this scenerio, it might even help ULA if Falcon-Heavy succeeds. Then they could simply drop the Delta line completely, and concentrate on Atlas. The savings from just one line of rockets might well overwhelm the loss of a few heavy missions.
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this could be writing on the wall as to which one survives...
Yes, it certainly does seem to indicate which one will get be used for most launches. But what are you predicting for the payloads that require DIV-H? Certainly one possibility is, "NRO will have no more of those." But absent any inside knowledge that's difficult to believe.
No inside knowledge, but the evolution of the questions being asked, from "What are the payloads?" to more recently "How much do we save if we get rid of it?" is suggestive; from Senate Report 112-043 (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp112&sid=cp11223vD4&refer=&r_n=sr043.112&item=&&&sel=TOC_42426&) ...
The Committee also questions the cost of maintaining a Delta-IV Heavy lift capability. Barring a coherent strategy to evolve the Delta-IV Heavy to meet NASA requirements, there are very few requirements for this system. Therefore, the Committee wishes to understand the potential savings of doing away with a Delta-IV Heavy launch capability. Consistent with language in the classified annex accompanying this bill, the Committee requests that the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office certify expected cost savings to the EELV Launch Capability contract under three scenarios relating to the Delta-IV Heavy: (1) removing launch requirements from Cape Canaveral, (2) removing launch requirements from Vandenberg AFB, and (3) removing all launch requirements.
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If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?
In this scenerio, it might even help ULA if Falcon-Heavy succeeds. Then they could simply drop the Delta line completely, and concentrate on Atlas. The savings from just one line of rockets might well overwhelm the loss of a few heavy missions.
Yea, it would be interesting. Obviously there aren’t that many loads that would really required a D4H over an Atlas V variant. After the demonstration launch of D4H, there have only been 5 other D4H launches (according to Wikipedia anyway). So giving up a few to SpaceX wouldn’t be too bad, especially if it meant the standard Atlas V could start getting some commercial payloads.
However, there are things ULA (or LM if they took it over and Boeing got out) could do.
http://oi40.tinypic.com/2rzsao7.jpg
They could just start to expand the Atlas V family per that link. Starting with AVH, then add a wide body Centaur, or perhaps put 5m DCSS on it, so the sole ULA EELV would share that stage with NASA for some cost sharing. Not sure if Boeing would retain that stage as property if they pulled out of ULA, or if ULA could build, or how that would work. Maybe LM could buy them from Boeing. Either way, if NASA were to adopt Boeing’s Gateway and lunar plans, the DCSS/iCPS would be used by NASA for the iCPS and the in-space stage, so it seems like that might be a cheaper upper stage than developing a separate 5m wide body Centaur…but I might be wrong there. LM might just want their own stage separate from anything Boeing.
That’s probably as far as they’d need to go any time soon until there’s payloads that would need more, then they could look at Atlas V Phase 2.
The link says any of these options can use existing pad and infrastructure. And they already have experience flying tri-core LV’s in D4H, so putting together AVH shouldn’t be much of a leap. As the AVH concept keeps popping up on various mentions of Atlas V, even though D4H covers that capability, I’m assuming LM has kept it in their back pocket if there’s such a time when D4H wasn’t available. So the Atlas line would be similar to the Falcon line at that point.
I tend to think that there might be a benefit to jumping right to AVP2 if Boeing pulled out and they still had access to that 5m tooling, and bypassing AVH entirely. That would certainly be a more flexible size and probably overall less costly as you are flying one 5m core on a AVP2 with just two RD-180’s, rather than three 3.8m cores and three RD-180 engines on AVH. And it allows for a lot of future growth very easily if there’s every a demand for it. But it would require some up front investment, and hard to say if LM/ULA would want to do that, rather than just commonizing on the 3.8m core. After all, a single 3.8m Atlas with various SRB options can handle most government and commercial payloads already.
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If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?
In this scenerio, it might even help ULA if Falcon-Heavy succeeds. Then they could simply drop the Delta line completely, and concentrate on Atlas. The savings from just one line of rockets might well overwhelm the loss of a few heavy missions.
Or we could see the Atlas V Heavy replacing the D4H. And possibly to complete with the Falcon Heavy for GSO & BEO missions.
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this could be writing on the wall as to which one survives...
Yes, it certainly does seem to indicate which one will get be used for most launches. But what are you predicting for the payloads that require DIV-H? Certainly one possibility is, "NRO will have no more of those." But absent any inside knowledge that's difficult to believe.
No inside knowledge, but the evolution of the questions being asked, from "What are the payloads?" to more recently "How much do we save if we get rid of it?" is suggestive; from Senate Report 112-043 (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp112&sid=cp11223vD4&refer=&r_n=sr043.112&item=&&&sel=TOC_42426&) ...
The Committee also questions the cost of maintaining a Delta-IV Heavy lift capability. Barring a coherent strategy to evolve the Delta-IV Heavy to meet NASA requirements, there are very few requirements for this system. Therefore, the Committee wishes to understand the potential savings of doing away with a Delta-IV Heavy launch capability. Consistent with language in the classified annex accompanying this bill, the Committee requests that the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office certify expected cost savings to the EELV Launch Capability contract under three scenarios relating to the Delta-IV Heavy: (1) removing launch requirements from Cape Canaveral, (2) removing launch requirements from Vandenberg AFB, and (3) removing all launch requirements.
Interesting. That would make me think that by extension, doing away with D4H would do away with the D4 line entirely, as Atlas V can cover any D4-Medium variants. And as D4-Medium launches from the same pads that launch D4H, and those pads already exist, by “removing the launch requirements” form the Cape and VAFB, I would take that to mean shut down LC-37 and SLC-6 completely. It wouldn’t make much sense to stop launching D4H from those facilities, but keep them open and operational and launching D4-Medium LV’s. In essence that would be maintaining the D4H capabilities.
Also if interesting note in all of this, is barring a problem with the development and launching of FH, VAFB and later the Cape will be getting the capabilities of an LV with the capacity of D4H, for really no investment by the government. Which could be factoring in. (Although, not sure if the payloads that require a D4H or FH would need to be integrated vertically, or if they could be integrated horizontally).
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If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?
In this scenerio, it might even help ULA if Falcon-Heavy succeeds. Then they could simply drop the Delta line completely, and concentrate on Atlas. The savings from just one line of rockets might well overwhelm the loss of a few heavy missions.
A contrarian view might suggest that since Delta IV medium and heavy exist and share a common core design and are operational, keeping Delta IV vs. Atlas V might be a logical path. OTOH, indications of costs for Delta IV vs. Atlas V suggest Delta IV is not competitive in the same classes.
Also, in late 2010 there were reports of Delta IV NLS-II on-ramp slated for Aug-2011, but that seems to have disappeared (simply a delay or have they decided to forego on-ramp?). Then there's Atlas V as the preferred CCP vehicle, but that's not yet a given and would only add a couple flights per year.
Are there a systemic cost issues that preclude Delta IV from being competitive with Atlas V for similar mission classes at similar flight rates--and thus would substantively argue for Atlas V over Delta IV as the heir apparent? Are or have we aleady seen indications of ULA-Boeing-LM throwing in the towel on Delta IV, and relegating it only to NSS missions for however long they can milk it?
Clear as mud to me.
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Are there a systemic cost issues that preclude Delta IV from being competitive with Atlas V for similar mission classes at similar flight rates--and thus would substantively argue for Atlas V over Delta IV as the heir apparent?
The costs associated with procuring engines are markedly different. Atlas is the beneficiary of LM's agreement with RD-AMROSS for the acquisition of a billion dollars worth of RD-180 engines from a manufacturer that was eager for payment in hard currency. Nothing like that exists with PWR for RS-68.
There is also the claim, and it seems to be substantiated, that RS-68 underperforms compared with the initial expectations. This is said to be the reason why the RS-68A effort was required. That effort was not inexpensive, and since ULA is the only customer of RS-68 of course they bear the cost of that.
Finally although the Delta CBC acronym uses "common" just like the Atlas CCB acronym, Delta cores for different vehicle configurations have not all the been the same. Again this is said to have been due to RS-68 underperformance, and will be somewhat rectified as RS-68A rolls out. Still there will be at least four core variants required to keep both medium and heavy vehicles flying.
Just to be clear, I personally prefer Delta. Hydrolox rules! But ... not if it can't compete on costs.
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Finally although the Delta CBC acronym uses "common" just like the Atlas CCB acronym, Delta cores for different vehicle configurations have not all the been the same. Again this is said to have been due to RS-68 underperformance, and will be somewhat rectified as RS-68A rolls out. Still there will be at least four core variants required to keep both medium and heavy vehicles flying.
With RS-68A, it will be six down to 4 different cores.
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If so, I wonder what they’d do with the payloads that currently fly on D4H?
In this scenerio, it might even help ULA if Falcon-Heavy succeeds. Then they could simply drop the Delta line completely, and concentrate on Atlas. The savings from just one line of rockets might well overwhelm the loss of a few heavy missions.
Upon thinking on this a bit more, anyone know what a Atlas V 551 with DCSS could put through GTO? If something like that could cover the D4H capability, Atlas could probably cover the whole of the needed range without actually needing AVH, and use the 5m Delta PLF on top.
And it would save the development of another stage in the WBC, as well as likely cost sharing the stage with NASA as they use it for SLS.
Just wondeirng what such performance would be?
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East coast heavies go to GSO.
The Phase II wide body Centaur on a 55X would provide a west coast heavy equivalent.
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East coast heavies go to GSO.
The Phase II wide body Centaur on a 55X would provide a west coast heavy equivalent.
Thanks Jim. Would a Phase II wide body Centaur on a 55x privide an east coast equivalent of D4H launching from the Cape?
And by wide body Centaur, is that an ACES-41? or is that a different stage? As in, about 41mt of propelalnt? I see referenced to each used interchangably sometimes, so I'm not sure if that' what WBC woudl be, or if WBC is a different/smaller stage tahn ACES-41.
So I'm assuming that a DCSS on a 55x couldn't get enough capacity to replace D4H? (41mt vs. about 27mt? prop capacity) I was just thinking since the stage already axisted, and looks like it may be used by NASA, that it might not be a bad stage to use on Atlas 55x, unless there was some technical reason it couldn't be used?
Would it be cheaper/easier to develop and fly AVH with existing Centaur (or possibly 5m DCSS) as a D4H replacement?
Or would it be cheaper/easier to develop WBC (or ACES?) and just fly it on the 55x single stick config and not fly a tri-core config?
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Given CCP needs, there's also DEC to consider in the mix of possible upper stages. at least for Atlas V. Not sure that will help or would be another low-volume variant ULA has to lug around for the foreseeable future (assuming Atlas gets a CTS contract)?
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After that, I think they really need to move everything to a single production plant.
Essentially already done. Decatur now builds Delta cores, Delta second stages, Atlas cores and Centaurs.
That's good. But they still operate two different booster cores with two different upper stages (3 really including 4m DCSS), with two different booster engines, and two pairs of launch facilities. Everything separate, with really nothing shared (as far as my limited knowledge goes). Both systems basically have the same capabilities, so they are both really redundant.
And all of that splits a manifest that isn't even large enough to keep just one LV system working anywhere near full capacity.
So its good they consolidated production, but it still seems like about the most inefficient way possible to operate. Even if the government is footing the bil for you to operate that inefficiently.
I guess it would be like if SpaceX was working on another booster that would have the same capabilities as F9 and FH, but have nothing in common with it. It would be a hydrolox or methane first stage, with a hydrolox or methane 2nd stage. It would need new pads at the CApe and VAFB. It would duplicate F9 and FH's capabilites, but share nothing with it. And they would split their manifest with this new separate system.
I think a lot of people would scratch their head and wonder what the heck Elon was thinking, as that seems totally illogical and inefficient.
Yet that's what ULA does.
Now, ULA didn't really chose to do that, they were sort of pushed into forming and inherrited the liabilities and assets of Boeing and LM. But at this point right now, it seems like they woudl be looking at streamlining down to one common booster and upper stage, and try to get it's costs down and it's flight rate up.
Well at the very least all 4 m Delta IV cores and the 4 m DCSS are on their way out. It can't hurt going to a common 5 m DCSS and core for the Delta IV. That at least chops the number of different cores down to 2, and drops a full third of their upper stages. I think if ULA's going to survive long-term it has to be a fully independent business, not an appendage of a larger organization. Just look at Iridium and Motorola. Motorola took a huge brunt of losses creating the infrastructure for global satellite phone service, but Iridium wasn't turning a substantial profit until it was spun off as an independent firm. I suspect management benefits from a more focused business approach.
If I were making ULA into an independent firm, the first thing that'd have to happen is getting out from under Boeing and the Delta IV. To enable this, I'd invest in the infrastructure and engineering needed to make an Atlas V Heavy a reality. Then, when 2016 came around, the firm might be ready to take on Spacex with a more competitive approach. If I were assembling the next-gen "Atlas VI" I'd do a bit of picking and choosing.
Wide-body Booster--take advantage of Delta production facilities and make the new Atlas VI CCB 5 m in diameter.
5 m DCSS--The WBB allows you to use this, so why not save money and time and start with it? That gets you down to one upper stage.
Engines--I'd mount five AJ-500 engines on the new core, which should allow you to ditch all SRMs and if they're in an x-layout, you could potentially match Spacex in 1st stage reusability.
The new Atlas VI should then be able to just about do it all, though long-term I'd be looking into either cheaper hydrolox engines (and more of them for engine-out reliability) or methalox engines on the upper stage. You'd also probably have to make some pad upgrades for both the prospective Atlas VI and Atlas VI Heavy.
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Well at the very least all 4 m Delta IV cores and the 4 m DCSS are on their way out. It can't hurt going to a common 5 m DCSS and core for the Delta IV. That at least chops the number of different cores down to 2, and drops a full third of their upper stages.
Huh? Heavy uses 3 unique cores. 4m is not going away. Only the medium with no SRM is going away. 4m DCSS is not going way, until there is a common upperstage.
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Perhaps comments from the George Sower's Q&A (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=29751.0;all) would be informative:
Implementing commonality between the Atlas and Delta product lines is a key element in increasing efficiency and reducing cost. In the first 5 years of ULA we have made great strides on the process and organization side of the house. And we are starting to make progress on the hardware side as well. The RL10C engine is an important example. Common Avionics is 100% internally funded and will reduce our avionics parts count by factors. ACES is the next big step.
So ULA is internally organizing to reduce duplication. For the hardware side, we can look forward to a couple things:
- Common RL-10
- Common avionics
- Common upper stage
After that, it becomes more of a guess, but the QA did have some other comments by Sowers that are interesting; basically saying that an Atlas V heavy is unlikely, but that 5m Atlas cores are an intriguing path forward.
Personally, I would not be surprised to see ULA moving towards trying to launch everything they can on Atlas, and only using Delta IV Heavy for the payloads that require it, especially once there's a common upper stage. That way there's no need to buy ATK solids, and (hopefully) lower costs for the Atlas aerojet solids with the (presumably) increased quantity there. Additionally, Delta core production is further simplified by dropping the medium/medium+ cores. The question with this, though, is do Delta costs then rise (wiping out any savings) because Delta infrastructure is not being used as much (especially the RS-68)? Tough to tell that looking in from the outside.
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I advocate that ULA simply accepts that they will not be able to compete with either Atlas V or Delta IV and go all-in on reusability. There are so many companies trying to make cheap expendable launchers that probably no one will make much money.
They should drop Atlas V completely and in the Delta IV, replace the RS-68 with twin RS-25 and develop VTVL booster fly-back and cross-feed.
*sigh*
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I advocate that ULA simply accepts that they will not be able to compete with either Atlas V or Delta IV and go all-in on reusability. There are so many companies trying to make cheap expendable launchers that probably no one will make much money.
They should drop Atlas V completely and in the Delta IV Heavy, replace the RS-68 with twin RS-25 and develop VTVL booster fly-back and cross-feed. The two side cores return to the pad. The center core goes to LEO and then returns to pad after a few orbits. Use a small kick-stage for BLEO. 6 identical engines, 3 identical cores (save for TPS).
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I advocate that ULA simply accepts that they will not be able to compete with either Atlas V or Delta IV and go all-in on reusability. There are so many companies trying to make cheap expendable launchers that probably no one will make much money.
They should drop Atlas V completely and in the Delta IV Heavy, replace the RS-68 with twin RS-25 and develop VTVL booster fly-back and cross-feed. The two side cores return to the pad. The center core goes to LEO and then returns to pad after a few orbits. Use a small kick-stage for BLEO. 6 identical engines, 3 identical cores (save for TPS).
I don't think so.
First, reusability needs a pretty high flight rate to realize savings. I don't think ULA's current manifest is enough to justify it. They'd need to be able to cut their prices down enough to compete in the commercial market.
I think if they were to pursue it, they'd need to develop really a new booster entirely.
LM has looked at various techniques of mid-air capture of a jettisoned engine, etc, for partial reusability. And they never chose to adopt any of it.
I think if they were to go that route, they'd first have to streamline enough to get costs down to start getting more business than just the government. Then if there was a high enough flight rate to justify looking at reusability, they could.
That sort of what SpaceX is doing. Although their experimenting with grasshopper is probably premature as they've only launched a few F9's. But I think they hope to get a high enough flight rate to justify actually trying to implement it. Until then, I expect it'll be more of a pet side-project.
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Joel has a good point. There's a chance SpaceX will make boost-back, powered-landing first stages look "easy." Were that to happen, any ULA business model that continued to fly expended first stages could be doomed. If RS-25 is 2.4 m in diameter, and two would fit under the 5.1 m Delta tanks, that might lead to a launch system able to compete with a reusable Falcon.
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My main point is that there is soon to be a huge overcapacity of expendable launchers in general. SpaceX, Orbital, maybe ATK, Europeans, Russians, Ukrainians, Chinese, all of them compete with ULA for expandable launchers and the competition is only getting fiercer. What will inedibly happen is that all of them will lose money, unless they have significantly lower costs than all the other in some segment.
So, what I'm saying is that any attempt by ULA to compete with expendables is doomed to fail. At the same time, ULA has most of the hardware needed for a RLV and I think that you can argue that they are closer to achieving a RLV than any other entity. They have access to a large knowledge database, they are already working with hydrolox, which is the propellant of choice for RLV and there is an engine that they could use off-the-shelf, the SSME.
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So, what I'm saying is that any attempt by ULA to compete with expendables is doomed to fail.
Not true, RLV at low flight rates is worse than expendables.
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So, what I'm saying is that any attempt by ULA to compete with expendables is doomed to fail.
Not true, RLV at low flight rates is worse than expendables.
Maybe - the existing model for a rlv indicates that a low flight rate is costly
If xcor builds an orbital system as they claim they are interested in, they may have a better model. For now, ULA and SpaceX are building a system that works within the funding profiles here in the us. ULA uses reliability as a metric to beat the competition and right now it's working well.
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My main point is that there is soon to be a huge overcapacity of expendable launchers in general. SpaceX, Orbital, maybe ATK, Europeans, Russians, Ukrainians, Chinese, all of them compete with ULA for expandable launchers and the competition is only getting fiercer.
So, what I'm saying is that any attempt by ULA to compete with expendables is doomed to fail. [...]
This is not clear to me, if they decide to make a serious run at this. The question is, can technical experts learn low-cost faster than low-cost folks can learn the technical needs?
I used to work at HP back when it was a high-tech, high-cost, performance based, scientific instrument company. One division wanted to get into consumer computer peripherals. We laughed at them, saying that there was no way they could compete in products costing only a few hundred dollars. The manual alone (for the products we were currently building) cost more than their target build price.
But they surprised us. They studied how the low-cost guys did it and copied methods where appropriate. They put their R&D bucks into methods that could be produced at low cost, rather than those that had world-beating performance. They would introduce new models with lower performance but even lower cost.
Pretty soon, they were making more money than the old instrument builders. Soon after, HP as a whole decided to concentrate on this market, and spun out the scientific instruments as Agilent. Now they are almost completely a consumer, high volume, low-cost, company.
So leopards CAN change their spots, if they are sufficiently motivated and focused. However, I suspect the only way this might happen is if ULA is cast free of Boeing and LM, such that the jobs and futures of all concerned rest on making this work.
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So, what I'm saying is that any attempt by ULA to compete with expendables is doomed to fail.
Not true, RLV at low flight rates is worse than expendables.
This is besides the point. I'm saying that they won't be able to make money with expendables. If they also cannot make money with RLVs, they should just liquidate the whole rocket division.
I do think, however, that ULA has a better shot at getting a RLV than any other entity (including SpaceX). They would obviously need to dramatically cut the cost per flight and hope that this will translate into high flight rates. It's a high-risk, but potentially high-gain venture.
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So, what I'm saying is that any attempt by ULA to compete with expendables is doomed to fail.
Not true, RLV at low flight rates is worse than expendables.
This is besides the point. I'm saying that they won't be able to make money with expendables.
No, that can not be said. They are making money now and will continue to.
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I do think, however, that ULA has a better shot at getting a RLV than any other entity (including SpaceX). They would obviously need to dramatically cut the cost per flight and hope that this will translate into high flight rates. It's a high-risk, but potentially high-gain venture.
ULA only exists to operate the EELV's and their derivatives. A new RLV is not within their scope and would be up to Boeing or LM to develop.
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ULA has been using its reliability as a competitive tool against Ariane, Russian LV's and SpaceX. SpaceX has a shot at competing with both the Atlas and Delta once they can show a proven track record, I suspect this will take several years of continuous successful launches. Payload builders spending hundreds of millions on the payload (or more) are most concerned with getting that payload to the right orbit, right now IMO ULA is the best option. The cost reduction methods used by ULA are not transparent at this time but, I suspect as SpaceX becomes more viable, we shall see a reduction or stabilization in ULA cost structure.
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ULA has been using its reliability as a competitive tool against Ariane, Russian LV's and SpaceX. SpaceX has a shot at competing with both the Atlas and Delta once they can show a proven track record, I suspect this will take several years of continuous successful launches. Payload builders spending hundreds of millions on the payload (or more) are most concerned with getting that payload to the right orbit, right now IMO ULA is the best option. The cost reduction methods used by ULA are not transparent at this time but, I suspect as SpaceX becomes more viable, we shall see a reduction or stabilization in ULA cost structure.
ULA is not competitive against Ariane. They are kept alive artificially by the US gvmt, but it's just a matter of time before SpaceX overtakes them there. Now is the time for them to look ahead and be proactive. And with ULA I mean LM and/or Boeing. Probably Boeing if it builds on Delta IV.
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ULA has been using its reliability as a competitive tool against Ariane, Russian LV's and SpaceX.
ULA--or in this context Boeing and LM commercial launch services--haven't been considered viable commercial providers for some time, and unless there are substantive changes in U.S. policy (edit: not to mention ULA's costs), that's unlikely to change in the foreseeable future; see:
National Security and the Commercial Space Sector (http://csis.org/publication/national-security-and-commercial-space-sector), CSIS, July 2010
In particular:
C.1 Lack of reliable access to launch suppliers effectively reduces launch supply.
D.1 Limited access to U.S. launch opportunities for commercial satellites.
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I advocate that ULA simply accepts that they will not be able to compete with either Atlas V or Delta IV and go all-in on reusability. There are so many companies trying to make cheap expendable launchers that probably no one will make much money.
They should drop Atlas V completely and in the Delta IV Heavy, replace the RS-68 with twin RS-25 and develop VTVL booster fly-back and cross-feed. The two side cores return to the pad. The center core goes to LEO and then returns to pad after a few orbits. Use a small kick-stage for BLEO. 6 identical engines, 3 identical cores (save for TPS).
I don't think so.
First, reusability needs a pretty high flight rate to realize savings. I don't think ULA's current manifest is enough to justify it. They'd need to be able to cut their prices down enough to compete in the commercial market.
I think if they were to pursue it, they'd need to develop really a new booster entirely.
LM has looked at various techniques of mid-air capture of a jettisoned engine, etc, for partial reusability. And they never chose to adopt any of it.
I think if they were to go that route, they'd first have to streamline enough to get costs down to start getting more business than just the government. Then if there was a high enough flight rate to justify looking at reusability, they could.
That sort of what SpaceX is doing. Although their experimenting with grasshopper is probably premature as they've only launched a few F9's. But I think they hope to get a high enough flight rate to justify actually trying to implement it. Until then, I expect it'll be more of a pet side-project.
Not premature, strategic.
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I do think, however, that ULA has a better shot at getting a RLV than any other entity (including SpaceX). They would obviously need to dramatically cut the cost per flight and hope that this will translate into high flight rates. It's a high-risk, but potentially high-gain venture.
They have certainly given thought to partial re-usability.
http://www.ulalaunch.com/site/docs/publications/EELVPartialReusable2010.pdf (http://www.ulalaunch.com/site/docs/publications/EELVPartialReusable2010.pdf)
As far as I know they haven't attempted to implement any of these ideas yet. Possibly they think there is no economic case for it. But note that the engine section recovery impacts much less on the payload than what SpaceX is proposing.
EDIT. I missed Jim's reply on this point. I'm not sure if recovering the Atlas propulsion section falls into the definition of "a new RLV" in this context.
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ULA only exists to operate the EELV's and their derivatives. A new RLV is not within their scope and would be up to Boeing or LM to develop.
That bears repeating. What ULA can do is proscribed by the DOD and FTC decree, and to a much lesser extent by LM and Boeing.
The sole reason for ULA's and the EELV program's existence is the DOD's requirements for "assured access to space". DOD is paying for it, and they take a dim view of anyone or anything which puts the program at risk or tries to get in that sandbox--and that includes Boeing or LM so much as looking at ULA for any reason other than supporting the EELV program.
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ULA only exists to operate the EELV's and their derivatives. A new RLV is not within their scope and would be up to Boeing or LM to develop.
That bears repeating. What ULA can do is proscribed by the DOD and FTC decree, and to a much lesser extent by LM and Boeing.
The sole reason for ULA's and the EELV program's existence is the DOD's requirements for "assured access to space". DOD is paying for it, and they take a dim view of anyone or anything which puts the program at risk or tries to get in that sandbox--and that includes Boeing or LM so much as looking at ULA for any reason other than supporting the EELV program.
No, it is the opposite. It is Boeing and LM limiting what ULA can do more than the gov't. LM and Boeing share ULA's revenue, and hence it is better for each to go alone on new projects where they get 100% of the revenue.
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ULA--or in this context Boeing and LM commercial launch services--haven't been considered viable commercial providers for some time
They haven't been generally considered competitive. But as recently as 2011 DigitalGlobe purchased through Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services launch on an Atlas (scheduled for 2014) for a nominally commercial payload.
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/03/16/atlas-launch-digitalglobal-satellite/
In the past Intelsat has also used Atlas V (launched in 2009; purchased in 2004). With the Sea Launch loss of IS-27 Intelsat could conceivably turn to Atlas again for a high assurance launch of a replacement satellite.
The choices of DigitalGlobe and Intelsat might be influenced by the preferences of one of their customers, i.e. a government/defense related consumer of their services. (IS-27 would have hosted a military communications payload; DigitalGlobe's high resolution imaging -- well -- everyone likes that! ;-) )
Only about now (Landsat DCM will be the 36th Atlas V launch) do the statistics begin to "prove" what ULA claims about mission success. Maybe that can lead to a viable business serving customers for whom the "time value" of lost satellites is irreplaceable?
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No, it is the opposite. It is Boeing and LM limiting what ULA can do more than the gov't. LM and Boeing share ULA's revenue, and hence it is better for each to go alone on new projects where they get 100% of the revenue.
At a first order, maybe. However, since the government is ULA's only customer, and the government has made the rules and effectively defined the cost structure and what is and is not allowed, then fundamentally no. Heck, it was only recently that DOD considered competition much more other than a destabilizing influence and a risk to EELV and assured access.
DOD will allow changes in the name of cost savings only if those do not substantively alter the complexion of ULA, including two LV's. If DOD allowed ULA to rationalize to a single LV--regardless of what Boeing or LM might desire or competition may demand--then the entire EELV program, ULA's reason for existence, and the DOD's "assured access" assertion would largely evaporate. It would be suicide for everyone involved.
In any case, 100% of revenue is not necessarily optimal, as that also implies 100% of the cost and 100% of the risk. Most joint ventures exist to spread cost and risk among the partners.
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They haven't been generally considered competitive. But as recently as 2011 DigitalGlobe purchased through Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services launch on an Atlas (scheduled for 2014) for a nominally commercial payload.
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/03/16/atlas-launch-digitalglobal-satellite/
In the past Intelsat has also used Atlas V (launched in 2009; purchased in 2004). With the Sea Launch loss of IS-27 Intelsat could conceivably turn to Atlas again for a high assurance launch of a replacement satellite.
The choices of DigitalGlobe and Intelsat might be influenced by the preferences of one of their customers, i.e. a government/defense related consumer of their services. (IS-27 would have hosted a military communications payload; DigitalGlobe's high resolution imaging -- well -- everyone likes that! ;-) )
Only about now (Landsat DCM will be the 36th Atlas V launch) do the statistics begin to "prove" what ULA claims about mission success. Maybe that can lead to a viable business serving customers for whom the "time value" of lost satellites is irreplaceable?
ULA may have great reliability, but they are too expensive and they can not adequately guarantee launch dates or launch opportunities. Those are the opinions of the commercial launch customers. If ULA's reliability was financially significant, then it should be reflected in the cost of insurance, which it is not--at least not sufficiently to make a difference.
Yes, the failure of Sea Launch and Proton's problems may cause renewed interest in ULA/Atlas. However, I wouldn't hold my breath. In the past concerns have been expressed (primarily by Intelsat IIRC) about the fallout if Ariane or ILS suffered problems and commercial GSO payloads were dependent on one provider. Nary a mention of ULA, not even as a backup provider.
p.s. I suspect DigitalGlobe's LV selection was influenced by several factors, including whether they could have launched on any non-U.S. LV given their primary customer and source of revenue (NGA), ITAR constraints, and the fact that the US government helped fund development (as GeoEye) Also, note the Intelsat commitment was before ULA.
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No, it is the opposite. It is Boeing and LM limiting what ULA can do more than the gov't. LM and Boeing share ULA's revenue, and hence it is better for each to go alone on new projects where they get 100% of the revenue.
At a first order, maybe....
There is no question, it is exactly what I said.
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DOD will allow changes in the name of cost savings only if those do not substantively alter the complexion of ULA, including two LV's. If DOD allowed ULA to rationalize to a single LV.....
It is already trending that way
- Common RL-10
- Common avionics
- Common upper stage
- ..............
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There is no question, it is exactly what I said.
If that were the case I'd expect to see more cash flow from ULA to Boeing/LM and less equity in ULA. At present the former totals ~$700M and the latter through ~$1150M through 2011, and both have increased at relatively constant rates with the exception of a $200M one-time "dividend" payment in 2008 ($100M each to LM and Boeing).
What is missing? Or are you saying that ULA is primarily constrained my Boeing/LM's unwillingness to increase investment in ULA (e.g., eithe increase equity or forego cash flows from ULA, or both)?
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What is missing? Or are you saying that ULA is primarily constrained my Boeing/LM's unwillingness to increase investment in ULA (e.g., eithe increase equity or forego cash flows from ULA, or both)?
Both. Both companies cut off ULA years ago. And that the inventory supply agreement is still in affect is a clue.
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Both. Both companies cut off ULA years ago. And that the inventory supply agreement is still in affect is a clue.
Thanks. Ok, so now that we've established that (per your assertion) LM+Boeing are going to continue to suck ULA dry and deprive it of investment thus depriving it of much freedom of movement; and (per my assertion) that the DOD isn't going to allow ULA much freedom of movement because that would be a suicide pill... ULA's future looks bleak.
Maybe the operative question is not How Should ULA’s Business Model Change going Forward?, but How Can ULA’s Business Model Change going Forward?
So here's a thought experiment... Say you are proposing significant investment to Boeing's or LM's board and on the wall is--give or take a few--the estimated average launches per year ~2016-2020 for which you might compete...
15 -- World commercial GSO; 20 satellites
6 -- World commercial NGSO
2 -- US NASA medium (e.g., Delta II, F9, Antares)
2 -- US NASA intermediate (e.g., Atlas V, F9)
5 -- US NASA CRS
2 -- US NASA CTS
7 -- US DOD/NSS medium-intermediate (e.g., Atlas V, Delta IV M)
1 -- US DOD/NSS heavy (e.g., Delta IV H)
NOTE: "world commercial" means competed internationally and open to any provider (FAA term is "addressable"); number of GSO satellites higher due to dual manifest. Sources: FAA, NASA, GAO.
... which is essentially flat for the foreseeable future. Doesn't look promising. Those projections may be wrong, but to justify such investment will require more than a hope that lower costs will produce higher flight rates.
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What is missing? Or are you saying that ULA is primarily constrained my Boeing/LM's unwillingness to increase investment in ULA (e.g., eithe increase equity or forego cash flows from ULA, or both)?
Both. Both companies cut off ULA years ago. And that the inventory supply agreement is still in affect is a clue.
How much freedom do LM and Boeing have to evolve the Atlas/Delta concepts with ULA still existing? I imagine that a strategic development into a new (hopefully an order of magnitude cheaper) LV by Boeing would evolve from of the Delta IV and that any development by LM would likely evolve from the Atlas V.
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LM & Boeing can not compete in the EELV arena. Anyways LM and Boeing no longer have any Delta or Atlas experience base to do such a thing.
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I found the leading question and on-going discussion interesting. The premise appears to be that ULA’s rockets are too expensive. What is the basis of this premise? What would a reasonable price be for an Atlas or Delta?
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I found the leading question and on-going discussion interesting. The premise appears to be that ULA’s rockets are too expensive. What is the basis of this premise? What would a reasonable price be for an Atlas or Delta?
IMO, 10000$ (or whatever) per pound to orbit is expensive in absolute terms, regardless what other rockets cost. Prices need to go down two or more orders of magnitude for humanity to become a spacefaring civilization. I find it frustrating that while LM and Boeing are better positioned than anyone to be part of the solution to this, they are now part of the problem, standing in the way of other, more promising approaches (SpaceX, Blue Origin, ...).
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standing in the way of other, more promising approaches (SpaceX, Blue Origin, ...).
How is that?
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standing in the way of other, more promising approaches (SpaceX, Blue Origin, ...).
How is that?
Ok, the connection to SpaceX and Blue is not watertight. But the main point is that the two companies that are possibly the best positioned to revolutionize access to space via innovation, LM and Boeing, don't appear to be moving in that direction. My impression is that the reason for this is short-sightedness; it would take a decade or more to get a (potentially huge) return-on-investment on developing a fully-reusable launcher. SpaceX and Blue stand out because they appear to be able to look beyond the next fiscal quarter.
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standing in the way of other, more promising approaches (SpaceX, Blue Origin, ...).
How is that?
Ok, the connection to SpaceX and Blue is not watertight. But the main point is that the two companies that are possibly the best positioned to revolutionize access to space via innovation, LM and Boeing, don't appear to be moving in that direction. My impression is that the reason for this is short-sightedness; it would take a decade or more to get a (potentially huge) return-on-investment on developing a fully-reusable launcher. SpaceX and Blue stand out because they appear to be able to look beyond the next fiscal quarter.
Boeing and LM are large publicly held corporations so that's going to drive their thinking. SpaceX isn't, yet, it's still private. Blue may NEVER go public, who knows.
So they can take the longer view, presumably.
And that's why I hope most NewSpace companies never go public.
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The premise appears to be that ULA’s rockets are too expensive. What is the basis of this premise?
Their price--at least to the U.S. government, which is effectively ULA's only customer. NB: It's not just the cost of the rocket, it's the cost of putting payloads in orbit. However, since you can't buy an Atlas or Delta and launch it yourself, the difference is academic. (search for "EELV costs" and scan the first few hits)
What would a reasonable price be for an Atlas or Delta?
From a U.S. government perspective... If you find an answer to that question, contact the GAO and DOD as they would also like to know. (not a joke, search for "EELV should cost review") From a commercial perspective... The facile but only reasonable answer is "competitive with other commercial providers".
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What would a reasonable price be for an Atlas or Delta?
From a commercial perspective... The facile but only reasonable answer is "competitive with other commercial providers".
Ariane would seem to be the most similar cost benchmark. They are in the same "expensive but reliable" niche, and successfully attract commercial customers. By what percentage would ULA need to bring Atlas costs down to be competitive with Ariane?
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standing in the way of other, more promising approaches (SpaceX, Blue Origin, ...).
How is that?
Ok, the connection to SpaceX and Blue is not watertight. But the main point is that the two companies that are possibly the best positioned to revolutionize access to space via innovation, LM and Boeing, don't appear to be moving in that direction. My impression is that the reason for this is short-sightedness; it would take a decade or more to get a (potentially huge) return-on-investment on developing a fully-reusable launcher. SpaceX and Blue stand out because they appear to be able to look beyond the next fiscal quarter.
How are they standing in the way of the other's?
Also, maybe there is no revolution to be had.
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How are they standing in the way of the other's?
I mean, there is a fight for scarce gvmt resources. But it's more a lost opportunity than anything else.
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What would a reasonable price be for an Atlas or Delta?
From a commercial perspective... The facile but only reasonable answer is "competitive with other commercial providers".
Ariane would seem to be the most similar cost benchmark. They are in the same "expensive but reliable" niche, and successfully attract commercial customers. By what percentage would ULA need to bring Atlas costs down to be competitive with Ariane?
This seems like a reasonable comparison.
Based on Ariane 2012 sales of $1.7B and launches of 7 Ariane 5 and 2 Soyuz rockets, one can surmise simply that the cost of an Ariane 5 is about $220m to $230m. Similarly, ULA’s sales were somewhere around $2B and they had 10 Atlas V and Delta IV launches, indicating around $200m/launch.
Within ULA’s price they must still be recouping the $5B combined Boeing and Lockheed investment (less the couple billion already written off as total loss). On the other hand, Europe paid about $12B for the development and upgrades of Ariane V, so no Ariane recoupment is required. If amortized over a generous 100 launches (66 have flown in last 17 years), this amounts to $120m not included in the Ariane Price.
By these metrics EELV’s are actually quite the bargain.
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Ok, the connection to SpaceX and Blue is not watertight. But the main point is that the two companies that are possibly the best positioned to revolutionize access to space via innovation, LM and Boeing, don't appear to be moving in that direction. My impression is that the reason for this is short-sightedness; it would take a decade or more to get a (potentially huge) return-on-investment on developing a fully-reusable launcher.
You are making an assumption that a fully-reusable launcher is cost effective. Where is the proof? It is technically very challenging getting a useful payload to LEO on a reusable launcher, let alone GTO or GSO. Than to say one has to do this cost effectively adds even greater challenge. Now do this in a limited payload market with very diverse orbital destinations.
Can you describe the reusable architecture that supports the range of missions required by the US government currently enabled by EELV’s? This includes 10 to 42 klb to LEO, 10 to 20 klb to GTO, up to 14 klb to GSO, not to mention sun synch, MEO and Earth escape.
SpaceX and Blue stand out because they appear to be able to look beyond the next fiscal quarter.
Elon and investment partners have invested less than $200m of private sector money in SpaceX. This has been coupled with over $800m in already received in government investment. This is good business. The jury is still out on SpaceX’s ability to provide cost effective, reliable launches.
Blue Origin has demonstrated limited VTVL, about 1% the energy required to get to orbit. For now it is an interesting hobby, I have no idea if it will lead to an orbital launch capability.
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Based on Ariane 2012 sales of $1.7B and launches of 7 Ariane 5 and 2 Soyuz rockets, one can surmise simply that the cost of an Ariane 5 is about $220m to $230m.
You need to add the European government support money (nearly $200 million?) to that sales total, then divide.
Same with EELV. You need to add the roughly $1 billion annual launch support contract (or whatever it is called).
- Ed Kyle
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With the recent Russian issues with quality assurance (ie Proton, Sealaunch failures) I would like to see the effect it will have on the general LV market. If ULA is able to start the dual launch manifest, that could dramatically lower their prices and make them competitive in the market place.
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You are making an assumption that a fully-reusable launcher is cost effective.
No, I am not saying that. I am saying that decreasing the launch cost with say 2 orders of magnitude (which would bring down the price for a person to go to orbit from the ridiculously expensive $20M to the still very expensive $200K) would not be possible without fully-reusable launchers.
It is technically very challenging getting a useful payload to LEO on a reusable launcher, let alone GTO or GSO.
Fully-reusable transport from LEO to GTO/GSO is much less of a challenge, since the thrust requirements are so much lower. Think SEP. The real challenge is to get to LEO.
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Based on Ariane 2012 sales of $1.7B and launches of 7 Ariane 5 and 2 Soyuz rockets, one can surmise simply that the cost of an Ariane 5 is about $220m to $230m.
You need to add the European government support money (nearly $200 million?) to that sales total, then divide.
Same with EELV. You need to add the roughly $1 billion annual launch support contract (or whatever it is called).
- Ed Kyle
The $1B support contract is included in ULA's sales figure.
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It is technically very challenging getting a useful payload to LEO on a reusable launcher, let alone GTO or GSO.
Fully-reusable transport from LEO to GTO/GSO is much less of a challenge, since the thrust requirements are so much lower. Think SEP. The real challenge is to get to LEO.
SEP and other options could be implemented now. A typical expendable rocket gets 4 times the payload to LEO as GSO. SEP is currently sometimes used to support GSO insertion and station keeping, but only when the satellite has large amounts of power available. With today's “high” launch prices you would think that there is ample motivation for someone (rocket manufactures, satellite builders, others) to develop your suggested SEP tug. It isn’t happening for a number of reasons including long transit times, radiation damage in the Van Allen Belt, development cost, etc. It is easy to say that getting to LEO is the real challenge, but it is only a fraction, energy wise or cost, of the way to GSO.
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With the recent Russian issues with quality assurance (ie Proton, Sealaunch failures) I would like to see the effect it will have on the general LV market. If ULA is able to start the dual launch manifest, that could dramatically lower their prices and make them competitive in the market place.
I know the Zenit uses Russian-built engines, but wouldn't it still count as Ukrainian? I don't know about dual manifests making ULA competitive against the others, considering that'd require the Delta IV Heavy for many GTO launches. Ariane is much more likely to benefit from Russian troubles than anyone else, since they already do dual manifests. There's also the problem that within the next three years the big GTO satellite market will suddenly see not one but three new competitors. We've got the Angara 5 derivatives (Angara A5 & Angara A5/KVRB), Spacex's Falcon Heavy, and the new Chang Zheng 5 family. All of those families have more capacity to LEO than the Delta IV Heavy, and all but the Falcon Heavy should outmatch the Delta IV Heavy to GTO.
What ULA needs now is an absolutely driven CEO who takes the company independent of Boeing & Lockheed, rationalizes down to one LV family, and makes the investments needed to compete full-on against Spacex, Ariane, the Chinese and the Russians. That sounds like a tall order for anyone.
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What ULA needs now is an absolutely driven CEO who takes the company independent of Boeing & Lockheed
And how is he to do that?
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With the recent Russian issues with quality assurance (ie Proton, Sealaunch failures) I would like to see the effect it will have on the general LV market. If ULA is able to start the dual launch manifest, that could dramatically lower their prices and make them competitive in the market place.
Sealaunch Intelsat 27 does not appear to have been a "Russian" failure. The system currently under suspicion is part of the Ukrainian launch vehicle.
- Ed Kyle
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What ULA needs now is an absolutely driven CEO who takes the company independent of Boeing & Lockheed
And how is he to do that?
It could be a she for all we care, Jim. 8) The way I see this might happen is you get together a group of investors who offers to buy out enough of Boeing & Lockheed Martin's stakes to gain majority control of the firm. Once the firm is nominally under the new investors' control, you implement the turnaround plan. Given the contract with Boeing, I figure any such action would have to be taken around 2016.
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Similarly, ULA’s sales were somewhere around $2B and they had 10 Atlas V and Delta IV launches, indicating around $200m/launch.
Do you have a source for that $2B? That seems very low based on what NASA and DOD suggest. There have been substantial EELV cost increases recently; to paraphrase the fine print, "beware of past pricing as an indicator of future pricing".
Based projections over the next 5-7 years... NASA's estimate is closer to $300M each (Atlas V), or FY2013 $219M through FY2020 $329M (not including launch infrastructure costs, see below). DOD's original block buy proposal puts the price at $375M/core ($15B, 8 cores/year, 5 years). Commercial would presumably insure their payloads through third parties, which may reduce those costs vs. what the U.S. government pays for "mission assurance" (how much, if any, is unclear).
NASA also estimates that if they have to pay their share of launch infrastructure costs, it could add an average $100M to each EELV (Atlas V) mission. Given current policy, commercial would have to pay a share of infrastructure costs, and is one of the reasons noted for EELVs not being competitive; a change to allow ULA to charge only the marginal cost to commercial is unlikely. Then there is the complaint that ULA can not adequately guarantee commercial launch dates or opportunities, as commercial has to take second seat to U.S. government demands.
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What ULA needs now is an absolutely driven CEO who takes the company independent of Boeing & Lockheed
And how is he to do that?
The way I see this might happen is you get together a group of investors who offers to buy out enough of Boeing & Lockheed Martin's stakes to gain majority control of the firm. Once the firm is nominally under the new investors' control, you implement the turnaround plan. Given the contract with Boeing, I figure any such action would have to be taken around 2016.
Won't happen before 1-May-2017 unless by some miracle the FTC's consent order is rescinded before then (regardless of the Boeing contract), which would require DOD's agreement, Boeing and LM being reasonably cooperative, and market conditions which allowed it--which would mean a competitive U.S. government launch market (specifically DOD/NSS payloads, or the reason for ULA's/EELV's existence).
With those out of the way (*cough*), you're now free to finance and implement that turnaround plan.
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Given current policy, commercial would have to pay a share of infrastructure costs, and is one of the reasons noted for EELVs not being competitive; a change to allow ULA to charge only the marginal cost to commercial is unlikely.
This is a serious problem for American competitiveness in the commercial market. It is very hard for a US company to compete with foreign governments. Remember the 1990’s, sort of the hay day of commercial competition, where Atlas and Delta had a significant fraction of the global commercial satellite market. This also represented a period of serious losses for all players. This is unsustainable for a company, but no problem for a nation where this is part of national policy.
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What ULA needs now is an absolutely driven CEO who takes the company independent of Boeing & Lockheed
And how is he to do that?
The way I see this might happen is you get together a group of investors who offers to buy out enough of Boeing & Lockheed Martin's stakes to gain majority control of the firm. Once the firm is nominally under the new investors' control, you implement the turnaround plan. Given the contract with Boeing, I figure any such action would have to be taken around 2016.
Won't happen before 1-May-2017 unless by some miracle the FTC's consent order is rescinded before then (regardless of the Boeing contract), which would require DOD's agreement, Boeing and LM being reasonably cooperative, and market conditions which allowed it--which would mean a competitive U.S. government launch market (specifically DOD/NSS payloads, or the reason for ULA's/EELV's existence).
With those out of the way (*cough*), you're now free to finance and implement that turnaround plan.
Well it's more likely to happen than you might think. Things you think can't happen or aren't predicted to happen by intelligence agencies happen quite regularly throughout history. Witness the US intel agencies missing the signals pointing towards the Iranian Revolution in 1979, their total lack of predicting the demise of the USSR in 1989, and being caught flat-footed again by the Arab Spring in 2011. You see the same unpredictability to some degree in aerospace, particularly because geopolitics is so inherently tied to the sector. In 1990, I rather doubt either Boeing or Lockheed Martin were predicting that in just 15 years the Russians, French, their own missteps and DoD contracting would wipe them out of the commercial launch market. Nor would they have been predicting that the two firms' rocket businesses would merge. They almost certainly were not expecting the Atlas rocket family to adopt a Russian engine as its main powerplant.
You think it'll take a sea change to see ULA significantly change their way of business. I'd say based on the changes their employees have seen since the Cold War alone that big changes in aerospace are more regular than one might think. Just look at the Soyuz launching out of Kourou for one example, or Russian moon rocket engines being used on a Ukrainian/American rocket called the Antares.
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Won't happen before 1-May-2017 unless by some miracle the FTC's consent order is rescinded before then (regardless of the Boeing contract), which would require DOD's agreement, Boeing and LM being reasonably cooperative, and market conditions which allowed it--which would mean a competitive U.S. government launch market (specifically DOD/NSS payloads, or the reason for ULA's/EELV's existence).
With those out of the way (*cough*), you're now free to finance and implement that turnaround plan.
Well it's more likely to happen than you might think.
I agree. A broad outline might be:
First, suppose SpaceX succeeds in its government test flights. Now the government has an second American vendor, so the FTC is less concerned. DOD would like ULA to survive (to keep two launch options), but only needs them to make one rocket, so they remove the constraints about needing two vehicles from ULA, and maybe even help with the transition. Boeing and LM would rather lose less money, so they let ULA free. Now you only(!) need a big enough market.
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Given current policy, commercial would have to pay a share of infrastructure costs, and is one of the reasons noted for EELVs not being competitive; a change to allow ULA to charge only the marginal cost to commercial is unlikely.
This is a serious problem for American competitiveness in the commercial market. It is very hard for a US company to compete with foreign governments. Remember the 1990’s, sort of the hay day of commercial competition, where Atlas and Delta had a significant fraction of the global commercial satellite market. This also represented a period of serious losses for all players. This is unsustainable for a company, but no problem for a nation where this is part of national policy.
Conversely, when there is a government run agency, over time they inherently become less efficient usually. Our government is an easy example of this, but I’d assume it’d be the case to some degree in foreign governments too. Which means even a rocket subsidized by a foreign government has costs that grow and grow until either the government has to subsidize with a ton of money, or they decide to do something else.
I think Ariane 5 is having some financial issues, and that’s part of the reason they are looking to move to the smaller Ariane 6 later. And Arianespace isn’t exactly a government agency, but a company a little like ULA that tries to guarantee governments space access, as well as compete commercially.
I’m not sure if Japan’s H-IIA or H-IIB will run into increasing costs like ArianeSpace and ULA have, as those are a government primary launcher too.
Anyway, the point being, is a quick and nimble and efficient private company which always has an eye on making a better product for a lower price, could carve itself out a very lucrative niche as these various LV’s have costs go up over time due to the costs of either being part of a government, or having to service a government as a primary customer, raise launch costs over time making commercial customers look for lower cost alternatives.
SpaceX seems to be making a run in that direction. They conform to government overhead when lucrative to do so, but always seemingly with keeping prices down to be attractive in the commercial market first and foremost. They’ve certainly got some government investment dollars from NASA to help get things going, but that was always with the goal of having a commercial viable launcher that could a also meet –some- government needs. At least enough to get some government seed money and some government contracts to further their goals in the commercial market. Yet they don’t seem to be doing too much that takes them away from their commercial goals chasing government dollars. Where it’s inline with their goals of cost and efficiency, they pursue it, where it’s not, they don’t seem to.
Sort of going after the 80% of the market, even though margins might not be as high in that area, rather than the 20% of the market (US government) even if there’s higher margins to be had. And that 20% market already has a boutique supplier for most of their needs. But there are some needs that ULA doesn’t do, and I think they target meeting that rather than trying to directly compete with ULA on standard launch services.
Those needs being a cargo spacecraft that can go to the ISS, and a crew spacecraft for the same. Additionally, an over 23mt heavy lift vehicle built from their standard commercial LV’s.
And I suppose, what most who are questioning or critical of ULA’s business model are mainly not understanding is why doesn’t ULA really try to get more than just that limited bread-and-butter government work? Why don’t they make moves to try to start getting commercial market share? Either streamline to one LV, or perhaps have one LV as the uber-expensive and reliable government LV (Delta IV for example) and then streamline the other LV to be a viable competitor in the commercial market. The more commercial launches Atlas would get, the higher the production rate, and the lower the cost. Just standard economics of scale.
So some of us look at ULA and wonder why they don’t seem to really do anything in that direction. Or at least not much that’s apparent.
But, maybe the answer is simply, unless the government changes what they need for their normal launch services, and what they are willing to pay for that, ULA doesn’t have to change it’s business model at all. If they are willing to pay huge sums of money in ensure redundant access to space for their national security payloads, and they need that access to space to comply with their massively regulated and beuracratic needs, and ULA can….then maybe that’s a pretty good and safe business model.
ULA offers the government something no one else can right now. A domestic launch service with two very reliable redundant vehicles in the range they need, and full national security secrecy when needed, that can launch for either coast, and integrate all the payloads vertically.
It was like after the Iraq war when Halliburton got a lot of government contracts which caused a lot of heartburn by the political Left because of the VP’s former seat at their board of directors. But in truth Halliburton could just do what the government needed done and very few other companies could. Favoritism really had nothing to do with it. Bill Clinton gave a ton of contract sot Halliburton too prior to the Bush Administration, and they get government contracts now under the Obama Administration (although, suddenly we don’t hear a peep from those who had issues with it when Cheney was VP…funny that…)
Halliburton is one of the few companies that can conform to government bueracracy and secrecy, and red tape, and has the capabilities to do what is needed done quickly.
ULA is perhaps like that too, and perhaps we all keep thinking that they should be doing all they can to compete commercially, when they don’t really care too…unless the government is telling them they need to. They got their niche and share of the market that they are interested in, and aren’t all that interested in the rest.
Why aren’t they streamlining down to just Atlas V, or Delta IV, or Atlas Phase 2, etc? Because the government hasn’t told them they need them to…so they don’t. When the government changes what they want, then ULA will change what they do and/or how they do it. And probably not before regardless of how the rest of us armchair space fans think they should.
;-)
But that position leave a chunk of launch services market underserved, and it would seem that Musk is making a play for that market. ArineSpace, Sealaunch, Russia, etc. have all sort of tried, but had probably for various reasons to create a relatively low cost option for companies with decent sized payloads.
And later, it will be interesting to see how much Musk decides to try to nibble into ULA’s bread and butter, if at all. It might just require too many changes to their basic services to get too much into the US government launch businesss, and it might be deemed not worth the trouble. (although the pad at VAFB would indicate Musk does want to nibble in there, as I think the number of commercial payloads that have orbits that are best served from VAFB are limited compared to government payloads that do…but I could be wrong about that)
So that will be interesting to see how that might play out in the latter half of this decade…
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Probably no chance of this happening, but it would be interesting if say Aerojet could find a way to buy out ULA now that they've bought out P&WR. Vertical integration might make more sense than the current monopoly/monopsony arrangement that Aerojet and ULA "enjoy", and they'd have incentive to make sure their flight systems remain commercially competitive going forward. They'd probably also have less incentive to tie ULA's hands when it comes to depots, in-space stages, etc.
Just thinking out loud.
~Jon
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… And I suppose, what most who are questioning or critical of ULA’s business model are mainly not understanding is why doesn’t ULA really try to get more than just that limited bread-and-butter government work? Why don’t they make moves to try to start getting commercial market share? Either streamline to one LV, or perhaps have one LV as the uber-expensive and reliable government LV (Delta IV for example) and then streamline the other LV to be a viable competitor in the commercial market. The more commercial launches Atlas would get, the higher the production rate, and the lower the cost. Just standard economics of scale.
So some of us look at ULA and wonder why they don’t seem to really do anything in that direction. Or at least not much that’s apparent…
Wow, this is certainly a mouth full. Part of the SpaceX – ULA difference that you describe can be attributed to historic lessons learned.
General Dynamics, then Martin Marietta (Atlas II) and McDonald Douglas (Delta II) went after the commercial launch market in a big way through the 1990’s. They lost their shirts in the process. Ariane would offer a customer a launch for 10% less than whatever the US company offered. Proton a further 10% less. This was great for the satellite builders and end customers, but all of the launch companies lost money. Interestingly, despite the 30% drop in launch prices, the commercial demand for launch services was static. While the Russian and European governments ensured at least break even for their companies, the American companies were expected to simply take the loss.
Toward the end of the 1990’s Boeing and Lockheed Martin invested heavily in Delta IV and Atlas V, lured by the national security and huge “internet from the sky” markets. Cellular technology and incredible pace of fiber optic distribution essentially eliminated demand for satellite based internet. Problems developing next generation military satellites resulted in substantial delays in security payloads, with delays of up to a decade or outright cancelation. Boeing and Lockheed Martin had to write off well over a billion dollars.
Enter SpaceX. They have gotten further than any of the few dozen rocket start ups of the past 2 decades, with some 50 payloads on the manifest including CRS. But SpaceX has had various struggles. The Falcon 1 market turned out to be much smaller than expected, despite the attractive pricing. Learning a lesson, SpaceX bypassed the Falcon 5 and went straight to the 9, go where the market is. In February 2011 SpaceX showed 7 Falcon 9 launches on their manifest for launch in 2011. Reality was no 2011 launches, followed by one in 2012. Performance issues of the Falcon 9 required a major redevelopment resulting in the Falcon 9 1.1 to be launched later this year. With all of these changes can SpaceX start providing actual, regular launch services? Can SpaceX afford to deliver these launches according to the contracted launch prices? If succesful, how will foreign governments react to this threat to their national space access programs?
Personally I think the next couple of years will be very interesting for the global launch industry.
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Wow, this is certainly a mouth full.
It's not the first time I've been accused of being long winded. ;-)
Part of the SpaceX – ULA difference that you describe can be attributed to historic lessons learned.
General Dynamics, then Martin Marietta (Atlas II) and McDonald Douglas (Delta II) went after the commercial launch market in a big way through the 1990’s. They lost their shirts in the process. Ariane would offer a customer a launch for 10% less than whatever the US company offered. Proton a further 10% less. This was great for the satellite builders and end customers, but all of the launch companies lost money. Interestingly, despite the 30% drop in launch prices, the commercial demand for launch services was static. While the Russian and European governments ensured at least break even for their companies, the American companies were expected to simply take the loss.
Toward the end of the 1990’s Boeing and Lockheed Martin invested heavily in Delta IV and Atlas V, lured by the national security and huge “internet from the sky” markets. Cellular technology and incredible pace of fiber optic distribution essentially eliminated demand for satellite based internet. Problems developing next generation military satellites resulted in substantial delays in security payloads, with delays of up to a decade or outright cancelation. Boeing and Lockheed Martin had to write off well over a billion dollars.
Enter SpaceX. They have gotten further than any of the few dozen rocket start ups of the past 2 decades, with some 50 payloads on the manifest including CRS. But SpaceX has had various struggles. The Falcon 1 market turned out to be much smaller than expected, despite the attractive pricing. Learning a lesson, SpaceX bypassed the Falcon 5 and went straight to the 9, go where the market is. In February 2011 SpaceX showed 7 Falcon 9 launches on their manifest for launch in 2011. Reality was no 2011 launches, followed by one in 2012. Performance issues of the Falcon 9 required a major redevelopment resulting in the Falcon 9 1.1 to be launched later this year. With all of these changes can SpaceX start providing actual, regular launch services? Can SpaceX afford to deliver these launches according to the contracted launch prices? If succesful, how will foreign governments react to this threat to their national space access programs?
Personally I think the next couple of years will be very interesting for the global launch industry.
Yes, good points. Note that I said it looked like this is what SpaceX is making a drive at...not that they'll for sure get there...
As for lowering their prices for foreign government launchers, yes, that could happen. Two things that might throw a kink in that. First is where SpaceX is -shooting- to come in price wise. We'll see if they can do it, but if they can, I don't think foreign governments will be able to drop their prices by 50% (Ariane 5 thinking of specifically).
Second is I think they are already running into rising costs issues for the same reason ULA has and most government departments or government conractors do over time. There is just usually little incentive to get costs down, so they don't often do a lot to try. Government overhead and beuracracy and rules tends to go up over time, not down, and thus costs...
So, can Arainespace drop their prices much now, when they are already looking at having to go to a cheaper launcher to get prices down?
I don't know much about Russia, so I don't know where they stand or what they can do price wise today. I think there might be some difficulties in dealing with the Russian government, and some recent reliability issues that might make customers look at paying a -little- more to deal with someone they like better.
But maybe not....
Yes, it will be interesting to see if SpaceX can do what they say. if so, they do have a whole market they could get a big chunk of that's currently being serviced by mainly foreign government launchers.
So...do you think there's -any- business models that any US company could use to be truely free market competative against foreign governments without needing the US government to basically subsidize them?
How is the issue of foreign governments subsidizing their launchers resolved unless the US government does the same thing?
And as a side note, with all of the government money ULA gets, why can't they compete using that subsidy money the way ArianeSpace does?
Seems like they should be the company that can drop their prices to snag commercial business away from other foreign governments. Instead, all of that money seems to drive their launch costs on the commercail market up, and not down.
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General Dynamics, then Martin Marietta (Atlas II) and McDonald Douglas (Delta II) went after the commercial launch market in a big way through the 1990’s. They lost their shirts in the process.
Not true at all for many reasons. Atlas II and Delta II were financially successful and competitive in the commercial launch market. They didn't even compete against each other. Delta II made money on non GSO comsats (Iridium and Globalstar). This was due in part to the USAF funding development of the basic vehicles (Delta 6925/7925 and Atlas II). GD funded the Altas IIA/IIAS variants and MCD funded the 10m composite fairing and the dispensers.
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The Falcon 1 market turned out to be much smaller than expected, despite the attractive pricing. Learning a lesson, SpaceX bypassed the Falcon 5 and went straight to the 9, go where the market is.
I'm not sure that's necessarily the correct conclusions from what happened, based on discussion with my contacts here in Surrey, some of whom have very strong ties with SpaceX. The impression I go was that there was an enormous amount of interest in Falcon 1, especially from small satellite manufacturers like SSTL. Getting launches for small satellites is still a massive problem, and the Falcon 1's price point and payload actually was very attractive.
As I understand it, there were two main reasons for canning Falcon 1. Firstly, the Falcon 1 was never going to contribute significantly to SpaceX's long term ambitions --- interplanetary spaceflight, manned spaceflight, interplanetary manned spaceflight, etc. --- because it was too small. For SpaceX, it provided a good way to make some money while developing the technology, processes, business knowledge, and reputation required to be able to move on two larger launchers. Once NASA provided the opportunity, via COTS, to develop a larger launcher and capsule based on Falcon 1 technology, it made good strategic business sense to drop Falcon 1 and focus all efforts on moving to Falcon 9. After all, there would still be a market for commercial launches for the larger launcher, and SpaceX would still be able to fly the small satellites as secondary payloads. The second main reason was that flying Falcon 1 from Kwajalein was a logistical nightmare for everyone involved (both SpaceX and their payload providers).
Getting back on topic, I'm not sure that ULA's business model should change. The arrangement that they have now works very well for them, and they have a very well-established and robust set of relationships with contractors and government agencies that let them relatively efficiently deal with all sorts of onerous and possibly unreasonable requirements (ranging from unusual payload processing needs, to correct handling of top secret payloads, to FAR requirements to pass a certain proportion of subcontracting business to companies owned by minorities). They also have a solid line-up of mature and reliable launchers, covering a wide range of different mission requirements. As long as Boeing and LM continue to enjoy strong bipartisan political support, ULA's current business model will be a strong one.
I think it's reasonable to assume that the top brass at Boeing and LM have been keeping tabs on what SpaceX have been up to, and that if they felt that SpaceX actually provided an existential threat to ULA's business model, they'd have already moved to start making changes. The fact that they don't appear to have done so suggests that they feel quite confident, and that seems fairly well-justified to me. With SpaceX so focussed on commercial crew right now, I think that even if SpaceX succeeds in getting their marginal costs down and flight rate up ULA won't have anything to worry about before the start of 2017, and even then, the rate at which Boeing/LM will need to shake things up will be limited by the glacial ponderousness of government bureaucracy.
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Ariane would offer a customer a launch for 10% less than whatever the US company offered. Proton a further 10% less. This was great for the satellite builders and end customers, but all of the launch companies lost money. Interestingly, despite the 30% drop in launch prices, the commercial demand for launch services was static.
Which is exactly why ULA (or Boeing/LM whatever), if they are to survive, must find something radically cheaper, that taps latent demand. With a RLV they could actually underbid the competition. Or they could just stop building rockets.
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Ariane would offer a customer a launch for 10% less than whatever the US company offered. Proton a further 10% less. This was great for the satellite builders and end customers, but all of the launch companies lost money. Interestingly, despite the 30% drop in launch prices, the commercial demand for launch services was static.
Which is exactly why ULA (or Boeing/LM whatever), if they are to survive, must find something radically cheaper, that taps latent demand. With a RLV they could actually underbid the competition. Or they could just stop building rockets.
Basic premise is wrong. there is no proof that a RLV will be cheaper or that the market will support one. What says an ELV can't compete?
There isn't a commercial launch service provider in existence. Everyone has received/receives gov't subsidies.
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Now that We know that Ariane 6 will use a solid first stage, I wonder if US launch services providers like ULA will be looking at similar options for the future, as a means of cutting launch costs.
Ed Kyle
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I wonder if the economics of big solids changes when the number of launch sites goes from 1 to 2. Arianespace will have most of the production infrastructure for Ariane 6 at CSG, right? But if the U.S. DoD requires ULA to operate each launch system from both coasts; would the duplication of large solids production infrastructure (or the increased transport costs if production is at only a single location) tip the balance for ULA towards economic in-feasibility, even if it is economically feasible for Arianespace?
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Now that We know that Ariane 6 will use a solid first stage, I wonder if US launch services providers like ULA will be looking at similar options for the future, as a means of cutting launch costs.
No, because ULA only does EELV's. Just because Ariane does it, doesn't mean it works for others.
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Now that We know that Ariane 6 will use a solid first stage, I wonder if US launch services providers like ULA will be looking at similar options for the future, as a means of cutting launch costs.
Ed Kyle
Is ULA able to anything other than make some basic improvements to the Atlas and Delta rockets ? They aren't allowed to build an Athena-clone for instance.
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Now that We know that Ariane 6 will use a solid first stage, I wonder if US launch services providers like ULA will be looking at similar options for the future, as a means of cutting launch costs.
No, because ULA only does EELV's. Just because Ariane does it, doesn't mean it works for others.
Jim,
This an many other comments you’ve made that I’ve read begs a question that I (and probably others) maybe don’t quite understand.
I think when many of us think “EELV”, we think of Delta IV, Atlas V, and similarly sized LV’s. However, when you talk about EELV’s, I think you specifically mean Delta IV and Atlas V are not just types of EELV’s….but the EELV label only applies to them.
I guess I think of “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle” like I do “smartphone” Android, Windows 8, and iPhones are all smart phones.
But iPhone –only- refers to the Apple phone. The phone made by HTC or Motorola is not an “iPhone”.
It’s just that “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle” would seem to apply to any modern expendable launch vehicle by definition. Being a generic term where “Atlas” and “Delta” are specific names for specific LV’s.
So, when you say ULA only does EELV’s, I think that they could do anything in the EELV class. Right now they do Delta IV and Atlas V, but they could create a new liquid, or replace everything with an Ariane 6 type solid launcher, or whatever. To me and I think others, any of that would still be ULA making EELV’s.
But I think you are saying ULA can –only- do Atlas and Delta, and direct derivatives of the intellectual property of Atlas and Delta? And they can’t do anything BUT that, or else…what? They’d be dissolved by the government? Maybe you could clarify so that at least myself understands what ULA can and can’t do going forward. Because I think Ed is postulating a scenario where SLS gets ATK advanced boosters, and if they are really as cheap as ATK is claiming (and ArianeSpace’s probably move to a solid LV sorta makes that seem plausible) maybe ULA buys booster segments from ATK to create an Ariane 6 type LV? So if NASA wasn’t efficiency minded enough to use Atlas and Delta for their launchers, maybe DoD/USAF could use NASA boosters for their LV’s? And maybe that one common SLS composite based solid LV system lowers costs enough to also get some commercial business for ULA, as well as bringing costs down for USAF/DoD?
I think a scenario like that is what Ed is kicking around. But…maybe that’s not even possible for ULA to do, as an American Araine 6 wouldn’t be Atlas or Delta derived, and thus not technically an “EELV”, and thus, ULA is somehow prohibited from doing it?
Do you have some clarification on this?
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Now that We know that Ariane 6 will use a solid first stage, I wonder if US launch services providers like ULA will be looking at similar options for the future, as a means of cutting launch costs.
Ed Kyle
Is ULA able to anything other than make some basic improvements to the Atlas and Delta rockets ? They aren't allowed to build an Athena-clone for instance.
I suppose this is a much more pithy way to ask what I just asked Jim.
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Now that We know that Ariane 6 will use a solid first stage, I wonder if US launch services providers like ULA will be looking at similar options for the future, as a means of cutting launch costs.
No, because ULA only does EELV's. Just because Ariane does it, doesn't mean it works for others.
Jim,
This an many other comments you’ve made that I’ve read begs a question that I (and probably others) maybe don’t quite understand.
I think when many of us think “EELV”, we think of Delta IV, Atlas V, and similarly sized LV’s. However, when you talk about EELV’s, I think you specifically mean Delta IV and Atlas V are not just types of EELV’s….but the EELV label only applies to them.
I guess I think of “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle” like I do “smartphone” Android, Windows 8, and iPhones are all smart phones.
But iPhone –only- refers to the Apple phone. The phone made by HTC or Motorola is not an “iPhone”.
It’s just that “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle” would seem to apply to any modern expendable launch vehicle by definition. Being a generic term where “Atlas” and “Delta” are specific names for specific LV’s.
So, when you say ULA only does EELV’s, I think that they could do anything in the EELV class. Right now they do Delta IV and Atlas V, but they could create a new liquid, or replace everything with an Ariane 6 type solid launcher, or whatever. To me and I think others, any of that would still be ULA making EELV’s.
But I think you are saying ULA can –only- do Atlas and Delta, and direct derivatives of the intellectual property of Atlas and Delta? And they can’t do anything BUT that, or else…what? They’d be dissolved by the government? Maybe you could clarify so that at least myself understands what ULA can and can’t do going forward. Because I think Ed is postulating a scenario where SLS gets ATK advanced boosters, and if they are really as cheap as ATK is claiming (and ArianeSpace’s probably move to a solid LV sorta makes that seem plausible) maybe ULA buys booster segments from ATK to create an Ariane 6 type LV? So if NASA wasn’t efficiency minded enough to use Atlas and Delta for their launchers, maybe DoD/USAF could use NASA boosters for their LV’s? And maybe that one common SLS composite based solid LV system lowers costs enough to also get some commercial business for ULA, as well as bringing costs down for USAF/DoD?
I think a scenario like that is what Ed is kicking around. But…maybe that’s not even possible for ULA to do, as an American Araine 6 wouldn’t be Atlas or Delta derived, and thus not technically an “EELV”, and thus, ULA is somehow prohibited from doing it?
Do you have some clarification on this?
EELV was/is a USAF program with requirements that Boeing and LM specifically designed Delta IV and Atlas V to meet, which then the USAF procured. So Delta IV and Atlas V are the only vehicles that are EELV's. they were evolved from existing ELV's, hence the name. It isn't the same as smartphones. There can be other vehicles that are in the EELV class, but they are not EELV's.
ULA exists specifically to manufacture and operate the Delta IV and Atlas V (EELVs) and their derivatives. Also, Boeing and LM can not develop anything similar that would compete with the EELV's. For anything new out of this box, Boeing and LM would go it alone and compete against each other.
Also, the USAF/DOD is not going to drop the EELV's for a least a decade and some.
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EELV was/is a USAF program with requirements that Boeing and LM specifically designed Delta IV and Atlas V to meet, which then the USAF procured. So Delta IV and Atlas V are the only vehicles that are EELV's. they were evolved from existing ELV's, hence the name. It isn't the same as smartphones. There can be other vehicles that are in the EELV class, but they are not EELV's.
ULA exists specifically to manufacture and operate the Delta IV and Atlas V (EELVs) and their derivatives. Also, Boeing and LM can not develop anything similar that would compete with the EELV's. For anything new out of this box, Boeing and LM would go it alone and compete against each other.
Also, the USAF/DOD is not going to drop the EELV's for a least a decade and some.
Ok, that does clarify some. Thank you.
So, Boeing and LM can’t develop an EELV-class launcher to compete with ULA? So neither could buy ATK’s advanced solid segments if SLS goes with them, and build a Boeing or LM “Ariane 6”?
They could only develop something like that if ULA was dissolved? If so, how might ULA be dissolved? USAF/DOD would probably have to decide not to subsidize them to maintain their capacity? Or is there some other way that could or would happen?
Also, as a side note, could ULA buy ATK composite SLS booster segments (assuming again ATK were to win the SLS booster competition) and put those on a Delta IV or Atlas V, and create basically an EELV-heavy without needing D4H’s outboard liquid cores? Would they be considered just different boosters, and thus not violating the EELV and derivatives requirements?
I imagine an Atlas V with a pair of 1-seg or 2-seg SLS SRB motors would have pretty good performance and probably be cheaper than D4H, as the booster segs would be cost shared with NASA. Throw a WBC on top and maybe the whole Delta line could be retires as well as both the GEM and Atlas SRB lines. Be sort of like a ground lit more powerful Titan IV.
Actually, probably more like a more powerful H-IIB, with the shorter, fatter SRB’s.
The Advanced SRB segments are within 0.5ft diameter of Atlas V cores. And Atlas V cores can already mount two outboard Atlas V cores, so I’d think they could mount two outboard 3.71m SRB’s.
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Now that We know that Ariane 6 will use a solid first stage, I wonder if US launch services providers like ULA will be looking at similar options for the future, as a means of cutting launch costs.
No, because ULA only does EELV's. Just because Ariane does it, doesn't mean it works for others.
Right. ULA is a bit like United Space Alliance in that regard. It would have to be a new entrant for EELV class business, not necessarily Lockheed or Boeing, but not ULA.
Ed Kyle
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It's also worth reviewing the DoD's statement in support of the formation of ULA to the FTC (http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510165/0510165dodletterkriegtomajoras.pdf), for example...
To avoid losing the ability to launch critical national security payloads, the National Space Transportation Policy requires the Department to sustain two evolved expendable launch vehicles (EELV) until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle. The Department cannot yet accept the risks of only one of the EELV launch vehicle families because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience. A single supplier might achieve some of the cost saving benefits projected by the companies with ULA, but a single launch vehicle presents unacceptable risk to national security for the foreseeable future.
Boeing and LM may starve ULA, but DoD holds the key to its cage.
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I really think that ULA should be looking to break into the commercial launch market. It occurs to me that there is plenty of spare Delta-IV capacity and maybe even some Atlas-V capacity (although I'd imagine a lot of the latter will ultimately go to commercial crew). The point is that, if they can get their prices down, the downfall of Sea Launch and the occasional problems with BRIZ-M could send some income their way.
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I really think that ULA should be looking to break into the commercial launch market. It occurs to me that there is plenty of spare Delta-IV capacity and maybe even some Atlas-V capacity (although I'd imagine a lot of the latter will ultimately go to commercial crew). The point is that, if they can get their prices down, the downfall of Sea Launch and the occasional problems with BRIZ-M could send some income their way.
ULA can't do commercial itself. It was created to perform EELV contract launches for the government. Boeing or Lockheed could contract ULA for that purpose (commercial), but that seems cumbersome, and obviously has not been effective.
Ed Kyle
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ULA can't do commercial itself. It was created to perform EELV contract launches for the government. Boeing or Lockheed could contract ULA for that purpose (commercial), but that seems cumbersome, and obviously has not been effective.
Ed Kyle
That's a good point. I'd forgotten that. There has been some discussion in the light of Sea Launch's difficulties of payloads moving to other vehicles. It will be interesting to see if any end up on EELVs (Atlas V in particular.)
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ULA can't do commercial itself. It was created to perform EELV contract launches for the government. Boeing or Lockheed could contract ULA for that purpose (commercial), but that seems cumbersome, and obviously has not been effective.
Ed Kyle
That's a good point. I'd forgotten that. There has been some discussion in the light of Sea Launch's difficulties of payloads moving to other vehicles. It will be interesting to see if any end up on EELVs (Atlas V in particular.)
In that case, could ULA be dissolved now? Could the LM and Boeing assets be separated? Could that happen or would it be a messy divorce?
Seems to me now that Atlas and Delta have proven reliable and Mature, as Joek cited above, a major reason ULA was formed is now gone, and even more irrelevant if SpaceX is able to prove reliable over the next few years. Let LM and Boeing compete their LV's for government contracts and commercial contracts on their own. And if one makes a decision to retire their line, they can do that.
I mean, if the government decided to no longer foot the bill to keep ULA's capacity operational for the sake of having it available, what would happen?
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In that case, could ULA be dissolved now?
No. It is too integrated. Only if Atlas V and* Delta IV go away would it be possible to dissolve it. But as long as both exist, there is no way to separate them back into the parent company.
*Maybe or, and the remaining vehicle program (people, hardware, facilities, etc) goes back to the original parent company. And then there is question of compensation to the other company.
But it isn't going away, ULA has contracts for more than 5 years out.
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It's also worth reviewing the DoD's statement in support of the formation of ULA to the FTC (http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510165/0510165dodletterkriegtomajoras.pdf), for example...
To avoid losing the ability to launch critical national security payloads, the National Space Transportation Policy requires the Department to sustain two evolved expendable launch vehicles (EELV) until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle. The Department cannot yet accept the risks of only one of the EELV launch vehicle families because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience. A single supplier might achieve some of the cost saving benefits projected by the companies with ULA, but a single launch vehicle presents unacceptable risk to national security for the foreseeable future.
Boeing and LM may starve ULA, but DoD holds the key to its cage.
Seems like a better way to have gone would have been to subsidize both individually for a period of time until one or both LV's proved adequately reliable. And then let it go to the "open market" after that. If one wanted to retire their line because there was too much overhead to maintain without full government funding, then so be it, the other one would get all the government work. If one or the other was able to reduced prices enough to get commercial contracts, so be it. If a new company is able to start up and compete for that government work against LM and/or Boeing, then so be it. But this way it seems like the government has to go on funding ULA forever, or let it fold as it would likely collapse under it's weight without full government funding with it's overhead and costs structure (currently). And folding would mean both Atlas and Delta going bye-bye. LEaving no EELV for the government. I'm sure there was probably a good reason for the formation of ULA rather than funding the two companies separately for a period of time, but with my limited knowledge I can't see it.
Also, couldn't they have downselected to just one EELV, but retained Titan IV capability for a time (say 5 years) as the backup until the chosen EELV proved adequately reliable? SOunds likethe fear was both EELV's were new and unproven, and the government didn't want to run into a situation like they had after Challenger? So keep the Titan IV facilities at the CApe and VAFB in reserve for a few years until the EELV of choise demonstrates itself adequately, then retire Titan and have the single EELV. Then other upstart companies like SpaceX could later compete for that government work against Delta or Atlas if they were able to.
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1. Seems like a better way to have gone would have been to subsidize both individually for a period of time until one or both LV's proved adequately reliable.
2. And then let it go to the "open market" after that. If one wanted to retire their line because there was too much overhead to maintain without full government funding, then so be it, the other one would get all the government work. If one or the other was able to reduced prices enough to get commercial contracts, so be it.
3. If a new company is able to start up and compete for that government work against LM and/or Boeing, then so be it. But this way it seems like the government has to go on funding ULA forever, or let it fold as it would likely collapse under it's weight without full government funding with it's overhead and costs structure (currently). And folding would mean both Atlas and Delta going bye-bye. LEaving no EELV for the government. I'm sure there was probably a good reason for the formation of ULA rather than funding the two companies separately for a period of time, but with my limited knowledge I can't see it.
4. Also, couldn't they have downselected to just one EELV, but retained Titan IV capability for a time (say 5 years) as the backup until the chosen EELV proved adequately reliable? SOunds likethe fear was both EELV's were new and unproven, and the government didn't want to run into a situation like they had after Challenger? So keep the Titan IV facilities at the CApe and VAFB in reserve for a few years until the EELV of choise demonstrates itself adequately, then retire Titan and have the single EELV. Then other upstart companies like SpaceX could later compete for that government work against Delta or Atlas if they were able to.
1. it would have cost more
2. They already released LM from having to provide a Heavy and a west coast pad. So, they couldn't go all in and Boeing already cheated at this time
3. There were no other competitors.
3. There were only two launch vehicle providers in the late 1990's (LM and Boeing). There were no upstarts around. There were suppose to be many commercial constellations that would have sustained both companies.
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Now that We know that Ariane 6 will use a solid first stage, I wonder if US launch services providers like ULA will be looking at similar options for the future, as a means of cutting launch costs.
No, because ULA only does EELV's. Just because Ariane does it, doesn't mean it works for others.
Right. ULA is a bit like United Space Alliance in that regard. It would have to be a new entrant for EELV class business, not necessarily Lockheed or Boeing, but not ULA.
Ed Kyle
Ok, so an American Arinae 6 serived from ATK's composite SRB segments for SLS would have to be created by another company..like ATK itself?
Which I suppose makes the most sense. Although it would probably look more like "Liberty" than "Ariane 6". If ATK were to get the SLS booster contract, and if those composite boosters really are that much easier and cheaper as they are claiming, there could be a business model for them to launch at least from the Cape and compete for some commercial and government contracts. If they don't get the SLS advanced booster contract, then going it on their own would seem unlikely, with no cost sharing ability and no infrastructure already in place.
But...I assume that ULA -could- buy an ATK SLS advanced booster segment derived motor (1 or 2 seg motor) and put them on an EELV? Wouldn't that still be technically an EELv and EELV derivative? If ULA had some financial appeal to try that?
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In that case, could ULA be dissolved now?
No. It is too integrated. Only if Atlas V and* Delta IV go away would it be possible to dissolve it. But as long as both exist, there is no way to separate them back into the parent company.
*Maybe or, and the remaining vehicle program (people, hardware, facilities, etc) goes back to the original parent company. And then there is question of compensation to the other company.
But it isn't going away, ULA has contracts for more than 5 years out.
The more I've been learning from this discussion about ULA, the more I was wondering if that were the case. (It's been an informative discussion for me, for sure) And this is why it seems the formation of ULA created a bit of a problem with this. One EELV that was less competative in price could loose out and be retired if they were still with their parent companies, but with ULA, the governent has to float the full costs of both LV's and their programs, or loose them both, whcih they can't do because they need one of them at least.
So, as a related question, is there any reason ULA itself (if the government was ok with it) couldn't retire one LV and just focus on the other and stream line on that?
Or merge the two into a single Atlas Phase 2 that used parts of both, but was a singular LV system?
I know I've postulated that a few times on this thread, as that would seem from the outside as being the clear and obvious way forward, but maybe they can't or won't do that for reasons I don't really understand yet. (but I am learning!) .
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1. it would have cost more
2. They already released LM from having to provide a Heavy and a west coast pad. So, they couldn't go all in and Boeing already cheated at this time
3. There were no other competitors.
4. There were only two launch vehicle providers in the late 1990's (LM and Boeing). There were no upstarts around. There were suppose to be many commercial constellations that would have sustained both companies.
Ok, thanks for the information Jim.
A couple of follow ups though.
#2: Atlas doesn't have a heavy, but they do have a pad at SLC-3, right? SO I'm not sure I understand this...
#3 & #4 There were no other competators, and no upstarts on the horizon back then. But wouldn't they have at least thought of the possibility that at some point in the future there -might- be? Seems unlikely they would have thought there'd never be another potential player...ever..other than LM and Boeing...
But this is the government we are talking about, so I can put nothing past them...
#4 Still, couldn't they have retained Titan capability for a few years, and chose just one EELV (and dealt with Boeing's cheating as a separate issue). Both EELV's were new, but even if the chosen one had a problem, it woudln't have been a program-ending problem, and would be able to be fixed and resolved by the EELV supplier. Titan could have been used as a backup during that prodcess. After a time, certainly whichever EELV was chosen, it would attain an adequate level of reliability, allowing Titan assets to be fully retired. Titan was expensive, but it's assets existed, and it was proven reliable. It wouldn't seem like there'd be a reason not to use it as the backup while the new EELV was proving itself.
But again, maybe there's things that were going on at that time I don't understand, and reasons they didn't do that.
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1. it would have cost more
2. They already released LM from having to provide a Heavy and a west coast pad. So, they couldn't go all in and Boeing already cheated at this time
3. There were no other competitors.
4. There were only two launch vehicle providers in the late 1990's (LM and Boeing). There were no upstarts around. There were suppose to be many commercial constellations that would have sustained both companies.
Ok, thanks for the information Jim.
A couple of follow ups though.
#2: Atlas doesn't have a heavy, but they do have a pad at SLC-3, right? SO I'm not sure I understand this...
#3 & #4 There were no other competators, and no upstarts on the horizon back then. But wouldn't they have at least thought of the possibility that at some point in the future there -might- be? Seems unlikely they would have thought there'd never be another potential player...ever..other than LM and Boeing...
But this is the government we are talking about, so I can put nothing past them...
#4 Still, couldn't they have retained Titan capability for a few years, and chose just one EELV (and dealt with Boeing's cheating as a separate issue). Both EELV's were new, but even if the chosen one had a problem, it woudln't have been a program-ending problem, and would be able to be fixed and resolved by the EELV supplier. Titan could have been used as a backup during that prodcess. After a time, certainly whichever EELV was chosen, it would attain an adequate level of reliability, allowing Titan assets to be fully retired. Titan was expensive, but it's assets existed, and it was proven reliable. It wouldn't seem like there'd be a reason not to use it as the backup while the new EELV was proving itself.
But again, maybe there's things that were going on at that time I don't understand, and reasons they didn't do that.
SLC-3E and SLC-3W are currently reserved by USAF for ULA Atlas, but SLC-3W remains inactive at this time and has not been upgraded since its last Atlas launch on 24 March 1995 with USA-109 on an Atlas-E/F launcher. Since this last launch, all metal Atlas-E/F structures except for the concrete pad structures have been dismantled and for a while, they were stored on site before being sent for scrap by LM. The concrete Atlas pad structures remain intact at this time. After the brief use by SpaceX SLC-3W was returned to Lockheed Martin, which in turn transferred the pad to ULA for future use by Atlas V.
Nr TNr Vehicle Serial Date LS Payload
523 19 Atlas-E Star-37S-ISS 45E 24.03.1995 Va SLC-3W DMSP-5D2 13 (USA 109)
LINK: http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/dmsp-5d2.htm (http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/dmsp-5d2.htm)
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SLC-3E and SLC-3W are reserved by USAF for ULA, SLC-3W remains inactive at this time and has not been upgraded since its last Atlas launch on 24 March 1995 with USA-109 on an Atlas-E/F launcher.
SLC-3W was modified and supported a Falcon 1 flight readiness firing in 2005
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SLC-3E and SLC-3W are reserved by USAF for ULA, SLC-3W remains inactive at this time and has not been upgraded since its last Atlas launch on 24 March 1995 with USA-109 on an Atlas-E/F launcher.
SLC-3W was modified and supported a Falcon 1 flight readiness firing in 2005
Yes, I know, so I modified my post to add the word currently as well as its brief SpaceX use.
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#3 & #4 There were no other competators, and no upstarts on the horizon back then. But wouldn't they have at least thought of the possibility that at some point in the future there -might- be? Seems unlikely they would have thought there'd never be another potential player...ever..other than LM and Boeing...
But this is the government we are talking about, so I can put nothing past them...
To be fair, the original EELV down select, was supposed to be one from four(?) entrants, but DOD decided that is was better to have at least two providers to avoid the falling into the shuttle trap again.
At that point you had Atlas II (III), Delta II, Delta III in the works, Titan IV, Titan refurbs, Boeing's Sealaunch, Pegasus, Athena, and Commercial payloads still flying on Delta II and Atlas II.
Commercial Titan had already failed and com payloads started outgrowing Delta II.
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It doesn't sound like ULA really has much choice, but to continue their current business model.
They will continue to support Atlas / Delta, and will implement whatever cost savings and improvements to the manufacturing process are possible without effecting the performance or reliability of their launch vehicles. Unless the corporate parents or the DOD comes up with significant levels of additional funding, Atlas Phase 2 and ACES might never happen.
Then they slowly follow the same path as USA, where they get efficient in performing their jobs, but are priced out of the market because they have to continue to support the legacy products instead of developing lower cost alternatives. Atlas V and the Delta IV will follow the path of the Delta II eventually. Great LV, but just costs too much.
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#4 Still, couldn't they have retained Titan capability for a few years, and chose just one EELV (and dealt with Boeing's cheating as a separate issue). Both EELV's were new, but even if the chosen one had a problem, it woudln't have been a program-ending problem, and would be able to be fixed and resolved by the EELV supplier. Titan could have been used as a backup during that prodcess. After a time, certainly whichever EELV was chosen, it would attain an adequate level of reliability, allowing Titan assets to be fully retired. Titan was expensive, but it's assets existed, and it was proven reliable. It wouldn't seem like there'd be a reason not to use it as the backup while the new EELV was proving itself.
But again, maybe there's things that were going on at that time I don't understand, and reasons they didn't do that.
Titan IV actually was not particularly reliable with several failures.
Titan was very expensive. Either EELV is very cheap compared to Titan.
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If a new company is able to start up and compete for that government work against LM and/or Boeing, then so be it. But this way it seems like the government has to go on funding ULA forever, or let it fold as it would likely collapse under it's weight without full government funding with it's overhead and costs structure (currently). And folding would mean both Atlas and Delta going bye-bye. LEaving no EELV for the government. I'm sure there was probably a good reason for the formation of ULA rather than funding the two companies separately for a period of time, but with my limited knowledge I can't see it.
Think 2005/6, what options did the AF, Lockheed or Boeing have? As independent companies the overhead costs were much higher than ULA. There was no alternative launch offering. So there was a shotgun wedding. Now 8 years later was that the correct decision? ULA has delivered what was intended, reduced cost, assured access to orbit and reliable launch. Even today there is no viable alternative, a lot of hope, but a lot more broken promises.
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So, as a related question, is there any reason ULA itself (if the government was ok with it) couldn't retire one LV and just focus on the other and stream line on that?
Or merge the two into a single Atlas Phase 2 that used parts of both, but was a singular LV system?
I know I've postulated that a few times on this thread, as that would seem from the outside as being the clear and obvious way forward, but maybe they can't or won't do that for reasons I don't really understand yet. (but I am learning!) .
Isn't this merging of rockets what Mark Wilkin's pitched?
http://www.ulalaunch.com/site/docs/publications/UpperStageEvolutionJPC2009.pdf
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Upper-stage engines (along with fairings) seem to be among the most troublesome components of today's launch vehicles. Doesn't pushing Atlas V and Delta IV toward a common upper stage eliminate much assuredness of assured space launch, thereby undermining the whole rationale for keeping two EELVs in the first place?
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Upper-stage engines (along with fairings) seem to be among the most troublesome components of today's launch vehicles. Doesn't pushing Atlas V and Delta IV toward a common upper stage eliminate much assuredness of assured space launch, thereby undermining the whole rationale for keeping two EELVs in the first place?
Going to a more common upper stage would make things "worse" in that more anomalies would have to be resolved for both vehicles. But the programs already have to address crossover for many components, so the cost benefit may still be in favor of a common stage. The engine versions are already quite common. Not identical yet, but an anomaly on one still has to be resolved for the other.
Of course, there's no common upper stage in the near (5 year) future.
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If a new company is able to start up and compete for that government work against LM and/or Boeing, then so be it. But this way it seems like the government has to go on funding ULA forever, or let it fold as it would likely collapse under it's weight without full government funding with it's overhead and costs structure (currently). And folding would mean both Atlas and Delta going bye-bye. LEaving no EELV for the government. I'm sure there was probably a good reason for the formation of ULA rather than funding the two companies separately for a period of time, but with my limited knowledge I can't see it.
Think 2005/6, what options did the AF, Lockheed or Boeing have? As independent companies the overhead costs were much higher than ULA. There was no alternative launch offering. So there was a shotgun wedding. Now 8 years later was that the correct decision? ULA has delivered what was intended, reduced cost, assured access to orbit and reliable launch. Even today there is no viable alternative, a lot of hope, but a lot more broken promises.
Which promises did ULA break?
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Even today there is no viable alternative, a lot of hope, but a lot more broken promises.
Sorry for the confusion, this last sentence was aimed at folks in this forum thinking that today the Air Force has a viable alternative to Atlas V and Delta IV. So far one of SpaceX’s key accomplishments is the setting of what appear to be unrealistic launch cost expectations. Unrealistic based on SpaceX’s demonstrated history and existing global launch prices.
The next few years will be interesting.
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Upper-stage engines (along with fairings) seem to be among the most troublesome components of today's launch vehicles. Doesn't pushing Atlas V and Delta IV toward a common upper stage eliminate much assuredness of assured space launch, thereby undermining the whole rationale for keeping two EELVs in the first place?
Going to a more common upper stage would make things "worse" in that more anomalies would have to be resolved for both vehicles.
That's exactly what I meant -- we seem to agree on this point.
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Upper-stage engines (along with fairings) seem to be among the most troublesome components of today's launch vehicles. Doesn't pushing Atlas V and Delta IV toward a common upper stage eliminate much assuredness of assured space launch, thereby undermining the whole rationale for keeping two EELVs in the first place?
Yes, but two completely different EELV's was not necessarily forever. Per the DoD in 2006, "for the foreseeable future", "because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience", and "until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle".
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Upper-stage engines (along with fairings) seem to be among the most troublesome components of today's launch vehicles. Doesn't pushing Atlas V and Delta IV toward a common upper stage eliminate much assuredness of assured space launch, thereby undermining the whole rationale for keeping two EELVs in the first place?
Yes, but two completely different EELV's was not necessarily forever. Per the DoD in 2006, "for the foreseeable future", "because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience", and "until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle".
YEs, Atlas has a great track record. I think they could downsize to just At;as at this point with pretty good confidence. According to Jim, Atlas-55x with a WBC upper stage can do D4H's performance.
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Think 2005/6, what options did the AF, Lockheed or Boeing have? As independent companies the overhead costs were much higher than ULA. There was no alternative launch offering. So there was a shotgun wedding. Now 8 years later was that the correct decision? ULA has delivered what was intended, reduced cost, assured access to orbit and reliable launch. Even today there is no viable alternative, a lot of hope, but a lot more broken promises.
Well, with the details of the politics and legalities aside (as I don’t understand it enough to know them all), There were some options.
Jim and you both said the overhead of two independent companies would be higher than ULA, and I’ll take you guys at your word. But how much more? Would it be significant, or more of a drop in the bucked of the huge amount that’s spent on the joint ULA anyway. If we are talking a few million more per year to keep them separate, is it worth it to have this separate entity now that can’t be separated now?
If we are talking tens of millions or hundreds of millions per year, that may be another story.
I mean, I really don’t know, but I have to assume there’s a certain amount of extra costs associated with physically merging Boeing and LM operations into a single entity, especially when their parent companies are often competitors with often opposing interests. Even a shotgun wedding is between two people that like each other enough to get knocked up. It takes a pretty big shotgun to force two people that don’t particularly like each other (or hate each other), and who’ve never liked each other, and who don’t really even have anything in common, into a marriage. And it’s probably a pretty ugly process.
How much cheap is that –really- than keeping the two separate, but splitting the contracts for both for a period of time, and then studying an option to downselect to just one? I’m just looking at it form afar, and that wouldn’t seem to be much more expensive than pushing the two together. And now USAF is married to that new entity with both of their LV’s and all of the legacy liabilities brought in from both sides (the same as they’d have been separately I’d think).
But then, they could have downselected to one and kept Titan as a backup standby while the new EELV proves itself. Then fully retire Titan once the chosen EELV hit an acceptable level of reliability. Both designs were known by USAF and were legitimate, and it should be assumed that any problem that did arise would not be catastrophic or program ending. It would be worked through and fixed. Since humans are not at risk on them like they were After Challenger or Columbia, the criteria for fixing a problem would not be as onerous. A backup would really only be needed temporarily. Maybe they could buy some Titan LV’s and store them somewhere in case they were needed, then retired the production. If not needed by the time the EELV proved itself, they could be fitted with payloads and launched (to get them used so not to go to waste), and then the pads and facilities retired. IF needed, then they could be used while the EELV was being fixed. It’s not like –most- USAF/DoD payloads couldn’t have been delayed 6 months or a year while the EELV issue was getting fixed. And if there was a payload that absolutely –couldn’t- wait as a matter of national security, there’d be an inventory of say 5 Titan IV LV’s which could be tapped.
Would that have been more expensive then supporting two full new LV’s, with new pads, and new infrastructure, full staffs, etc? I dunno, but it seems like there could have been options other than this shotgun wedding that married USAF to two redundant EELV’s forever.
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They consolidated from 3 factories into one. They have reduced their staff by %50. It is now irreversible. They aren't going to split back up. They
EELV's didn't just replace Titan IV, it also replaced Atlas II and somewhat Delta II. Titan IV wasn't an option, production was shut down years before the last launch. Hindsight is 20/20, there was suppose to be sufficient commercial market to support both vehicles.
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Hindsight? Down selecting to two instead of one was driven by national security concerns and rationalized with magic of the commercial market. Two EELV's was about assured access to space, preserving two teams capable of producing launch vehicles, and not being held hostage by the commercial markets.
A shame the rationalized economics didn't work out, but neither did it for the shuttle. Hence the willingness to produce two EELV's.
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Also, the DOD only gave each 500 million and the companies contributed 2.5 to 4 billion total.
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They consolidated from 3 factories into one. They have reduced their staff by %50. It is now irreversible. They aren't going to split back up. They
EELV's didn't just replace Titan IV, it also replaced Atlas II and somewhat Delta II. Titan IV wasn't an option, production was shut down years before the last launch. Hindsight is 20/20, there was suppose to be sufficient commercial market to support both vehicles.
Well that is encouraging.
Thanks for the other additional information too.
I didn't realize Titan IV production had been shut down that early.
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Not to turn this into an EELV history thread, but the history (and future) of the EELV program and ULA are inexorably intertwined. The consolidation and rationalization of ULA has essentially followed the plan laid out in 2006--this was not something they made up along the way. As Jim suggested, pulling them apart would be difficult...
Engineering has been consolidated to Denver CO (ex-LM); manufacturing has been consolidated to Decatur AL (ex-Boeing); LV common systems (avionics and upper stage) and processes (payload integration and pad processing) continues. Boeing and LM have little or no Atlas and Delta expertise remaining; that now resides in ULA.
Also, the DOD only gave each 500 million and the companies contributed 2.5 to 4 billion total.
No argument that Boeing and LM put significant skin in the game, but should also be noted that concurrently with those $500M awards in 1998 they also received significant delivery contracts (through FY2003): Boeing $1.38B 19 launches; LM $650M 9 launches. That said...
Hindsight is 20/20, there was suppose to be sufficient commercial market to support both vehicles.
Bears repeating. Key decisions were made by DOD, Boeing and LM based on (in hindsight) ecstatic forecasts of the time, which projected that the US government would consume only 30% of EELV launches, with commercial the rest. By the time reality arrived--4-5 years after those decisions and 7-8 years prior to ULA's formation--everyone was in deep and there was no time or money for a do-over.
For those wishing to refresh their memory of those euphoric years...
EELV Program — An Acquisition Reform Success Story (http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/PubsCats/PM/articles99/eelvmj.pdf), Program Management, May-June 1999*
1999 Commercial Space Transportation Forecasts (http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/leo-99.pdf), FAA, May 1999
For a (somewhat) counterpoint and a bit more history, which includes EELV predecessor programs (e.g., why not Titan, Atlas II/III, ...?), see:
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) — Acquisition and Combat Capability (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a392958.pdf), Air Command and Staff College, March 1997
* That optimisim persisted for several years in some quarters; see later version:
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System — The Next Step in Affordable Space Transportation (http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/PubsCats/PM/mar-apr-02.pdf), Program Management, March-April 2002
edit: correct first link for "EELV Program — An Acquisition Reform Success Story".
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Hindsight? Down selecting to two instead of one was driven by national security concerns and rationalized with magic of the commercial market. Two EELV's was about assured access to space, preserving two teams capable of producing launch vehicles, and not being held hostage by the commercial markets.
A shame the rationalized economics didn't work out, but neither did it for the shuttle. Hence the willingness to produce two EELV's.
And now similar logic is being used to keep two commercial crew providers in the game.
The only lesson we can learn from history is that the lessons never seem to be learned.
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And now similar logic is being used to keep two commercial crew providers in the game.
The only lesson we can learn from history is that the lessons never seem to be learned.
That's a bit harsh; I think we have learned a bit, and commercial crew's approach reflects it. The EELV program and providers were confident there was a commercial market, and thus convinced themselves that the original plan for down-select to one was unnecessary or short-sighted The commercial crew program has made clear that down-select to one provider is very likely.
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It might be better to phrase the original question, "After May 1, 2017 and if the FTC imposes no ongoing restrictions at that point, what should Boeing and LM do with ULA?"
One possibility is they could continue to direct ULA to work solely on EELV. It seems to me another possibility would be for the two parent companies to agree to use their ULA child as a joint venture more broadly focused on space launch. Would there be anything stopping them from doing that?
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It might be better to phrase the original question, "After May 1, 2017 and if the FTC imposes no ongoing restrictions at that point, what should Boeing and LM do with ULA?"
One possibility is they could continue to direct ULA to work solely on EELV. It seems to me another possibility would be for the two parent companies to agree to use their ULA child as a joint venture more broadly focused on space launch. Would there be anything stopping them from doing that?
Good question, but I'd rephrase that as:
It might be better to phrase the original question, "After May 1, 2017 and if the DoD imposes no ongoing requirements [as the FTC will likely follow DoD's lead as they have in the past] at that point, what should Boeing and LM do with ULA?"
The likely answer is that US policy and DoD will continue to require and direct ULA to continue on their present path, until there are alternative providers that meet DoD's needs, which by DoD's own reckoning probably won't happen until 2018+.
Will the market in 2018+ prevent ULA's parents from taking a more aggressive stance? Doubtful. Will the market in 2018+ motivate ULA's parents to take a more aggressive stance? Hard to tell. IMHO depends entirely on what ULA is able to do to remain competitive 2018+ without significant support from their parents between now and then, which at present doesn't appear to look good.
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... two completely different EELV's was not necessarily forever. Per the DoD in 2006, "for the foreseeable future", "because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience", and "until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle".
That's interesting. I wonder whether DoD could ever truly "certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle."
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Maybe they should just scrap either Atlas or Delta. What the point of having two EELVs with almost the same payload range? Its not like there is a shortage of launchers in the US. Atlas, Delta, Falcon, Nasa stuff...
Um sorry, guess has already been said :)
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Maybe they should just scrap either Atlas or Delta. What the point of having two EELVs with almost the same payload range? Its not like there is a shortage of launchers in the US. Atlas, Delta, Falcon, Nasa stuff...
Um sorry, guess has already been said :)
IF, and that's a big 'if', ULA (via its parents or through a modified corporate constitution) can find more customers, then I think there would be a justification to maintain both Delta-IV and Atlas-V. As matters stand, I think the only thing keeping Delta-IV's nose above the water is the fact that DoD seems to prefer the type and Delta-IVH is currently the only operation vehicle of its type available from US launch providers.
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Not to turn this into an EELV history thread, but the history (and future) of the EELV program and ULA are inexorably intertwined.
Thank you for the excellent history and links
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As matters stand, I think the only thing keeping Delta-IV's nose above the water is the fact that DoD seems to prefer the type and Delta-IVH is currently the only operation vehicle of its type available from US launch providers.
Well then scrap Atlas, uses a russian engine anyway.
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Maybe they should just scrap either Atlas or Delta. What the point of having two EELVs with almost the same payload range? Its not like there is a shortage of launchers in the US. Atlas, Delta, Falcon, Nasa stuff...
Um sorry, guess has already been said :)
What US rockets other than Atlas V and Delta IV are available to launch medium to large national security paylaods?
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And now similar logic is being used to keep two commercial crew providers in the game.
The only lesson we can learn from history is that the lessons never seem to be learned.
That's a bit harsh; I think we have learned a bit, and commercial crew's approach reflects it. The EELV program and providers were confident there was a commercial market, and thus convinced themselves that the original plan for down-select to one was unnecessary or short-sighted The commercial crew program has made clear that down-select to one provider is very likely.
Or it could just be that in life, there are multiple competing lessons to be learned. For instance, the interested reader could probably find a case or two where going to just one provider didn't end up being the financial panacea that naive analysis would suggest. I think the problem is that at the demand rate of government launch, and with the demand of government customers of very high reliability, that you're never going to see cheap launch without there also being a large amount of commercial demand going along with it. Regardless of whether there is one provider, two or three.
Personally, I think that even if the EELVs had been downselected to one (which with the early wins Boeing had, it likely would've been Delta IV), that we wouldn't actually be in much better of a position as far as launch prices are concerned.
~Jon
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Maybe they should just scrap either Atlas or Delta. What the point of having two EELVs with almost the same payload range? Its not like there is a shortage of launchers in the US. Atlas, Delta, Falcon, Nasa stuff...
Well, officially the idea is that DoD needs both Atlas and Delta, because 1) if one is grounded, the other is still available to launch most of DoD's payloads, and 2) Falcon isn't sufficiently reliable for DoD's purposes. Given the increasing commonality between the Atlas and Delta, however, there is actually a lot of assuredness of launch capability to be had in an independent vehicle, even if it hasn't demonstrated terribly high reliability.
Consider two scenarios for DoD's assured access to space. The first is reliance on Atlas V and Delta IV, with their high demonstrated reliabilities and increasing commonality. The other is reliance on just one of those two and on a new vehicle, e.g., Falcon 9, whose demonstrated reliability is, say 90% (Falcon certainly isn't there yet; let's imagine we're further down the road and it has demonstrated that). Let e be the probability of either EELV failing (e.g., 1%), and let f be the fraction of such failures which are common to both EELVs (e.g., 30%). Then the probability of a common failure is fe, and the probability of either EELV suffering an intrinsic failure unrelated to the other is (1 - f)e. Now, there are two ways the EELV system can fail: either a common failure occurs, or both EELVs suffer intrinsic failures. The combined probability of these events is
E = fe + [(1 - f)e]2 .
Now suppose the fleet consists of a single EELV and a new independent vehicle of lower demonstrated reliability, such as the Falcon. Let the probability of failure of the new vehicle be n. The probability that this mixed fleet fails is simply
M = en .
Attached is a plot of E and M for p=1%, n=10% and a range of values of f. The fraction of common EELV failures, f, need not be very high before a relatively unreliable vehicle provides better back-up than a second EELV. This suggests discontinuing one of the EELVs in the relatively near future if SpaceX is even modestly successful.
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Well, officially the idea is that DoD needs both Atlas and Delta, because 1) if one is grounded, the other is still available to launch most of DoD's payloads
Sorry but what does "grounded" mean in this context? Normally you keep up production of the "old" launcher until the new one has sufficiently proven itself, so there should be no risk of "grounding".
Personally, I think that even if the EELVs had been downselected to one (which with the early wins Boeing had, it likely would've been Delta IV), that we wouldn't actually be in much better of a position as far as launch prices are concerned.
Just looked up the numbers, Delta IV medium (5,4) is $170m for 6.56t to GTO, which admittedly doesn't compare very favourably to Ariane 5 ($200m), or Proton ($110m). But if you could bring it down to $130 or so...what are the expensive parts?
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IMHO depends entirely on what ULA is able to do to remain competitive 2018+ without significant support from their parents between now and then, which at present doesn't appear to look good.
that isn't true.
a. ULA doesn't get any support from its parents and hasn't for several years
b. it does look good for being competitive
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As matters stand, I think the only thing keeping Delta-IV's nose above the water is the fact that DoD seems to prefer the type and Delta-IVH is currently the only operation vehicle of its type available from US launch providers.
Well then scrap Atlas, uses a russian engine anyway.
Delta can't do human launch, so Atlas is needed for Commercial Crew. That's the delightful situation in which we find ourselves: D-IVH is needed for heavy launch and Atlas-V is needed for crew launch.
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... two completely different EELV's was not necessarily forever. Per the DoD in 2006, "for the foreseeable future", "because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience", and "until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle".
That's interesting. I wonder whether DoD could ever truly "certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle."
Never was a valid requirement. There was no backup for Titan IV and there is no backup for Delta IV Heavy
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Sorry but what does "grounded" mean in this context? Normally you keep up production of the "old" launcher until the new one has sufficiently proven itself, so there should be no risk of "grounding".
In this context, an LV is "grounded" if either it failed on its most recent flight and the failure mode hasn't yet been fixed, or an element of the LV that it shares with the other LV failed on the other LV's most recent flight and hasn't been fixed yet.
Just looked up the numbers, Delta IV medium (5,4) is $170m for 6.56t to GTO, which admittedly doesn't compare very favourably to Ariane 5 ($200m), or Proton ($110m). But if you could bring it down to $130 or so...what are the expensive parts?
Regarding prices, I believe -- need to check this -- that based on the most recent purchase, the EELVs are actually quite a bit more expensive than the numbers you've found.
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Never was a valid requirement. There was no backup for Titan IV and there is no backup for Delta IV Heavy
So what, pray tell, is the justification for keeping both EELVs on line?
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Regarding prices, I believe -- need to check this -- that based on the most recent purchase, the EELVs are actually quite a bit more expensive than the numbers you've found.
Well I guess its almost impossible to get accurate numbers. I got it from here :)
http://newworlds.colorado.edu/documents/ASMCS/nwo_appendix_K_launch.pdf
The heavy is listed at $265m.
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It becomes more of a matter that ULA's internal fate, future sustainability, and viability hinges a great deal on Boeing and Lockheed Martin resolving their differences and agreeing on pursuing a common upper stage for both launcher systems. That is sort of a logical step one. further steps could include switching to 5 metre Atlas stages, common new generation lightweight fairings, common stage zero solid rocket booster motors, common launch pads capable of both vehicles, common launcher processing center for both vehicles, common universal Launch Control Centres, etc. Standardization where ever possible for both systems must occur to further reduce associated costs. Atlas V and Delta IV must standardize to the point where Atlas and Delta IV first stages must be interchangeable depending upon the mission, while every other element that makes up a vehicles stack is the identical. The only primary difference for the first stage other than slight stage height difference, should be the fuel (RP-1 or LH2) and their associated engines.
That is my take on the situation and that is only a beginning of a long list cross system standardization that needs to occur to become sustainable.
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If sustainability is the issue, wouldn't it be simpler and more effective to simply eliminate one of the two vehicles?
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If sustainability is the issue, wouldn't it be simpler and more effective to simply eliminate one of the two vehicles?
EELV is not about sustainable, it's about assured access.
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It becomes more of a matter that ULA's internal fate, future sustainability, and viability hinges a great deal on Boeing and Lockheed Martin resolving their differences
Boeing and LM differences have no bearing on this matter. It is up to ULA.
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And now similar logic is being used to keep two commercial crew providers in the game.
The only lesson we can learn from history is that the lessons never seem to be learned.
That's a bit harsh; I think we have learned a bit, and commercial crew's approach reflects it. The EELV program and providers were confident there was a commercial market, and thus convinced themselves that the original plan for down-select to one was unnecessary or short-sighted The commercial crew program has made clear that down-select to one provider is very likely.
Frustratingly, it was the EELV manufacturers themselves who helped kill the commercial market. Both were involved in international launch ventures (Sea Launch and International Launch Services) that used Russian or Ukrainian rockets. Both built commercial satellites launched on those and other rockets. Both lobbied the U.S. government to remove quotas that had existed on Proton. At the end of 2000, they won and the quotas were removed entirely. You can plot the annual numbers of U.S. launched commercial satellites and almost see the moment it happened.
Boeing and Lockheed prospered from the decision, because they got to sell more satellites. They simultaneously reap more rewards by building even more expensive satellites to fly on EELVs. The EELVs lost money, but now ULA is probably gradually helping to recover some of those losses via. higher prices.
And the U.S. government did it to itself!
- Ed Kyle
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common launch pads capable of both vehicles, common launcher processing center for both vehicles,
Not going to happen since they are unique to the cores and the cores are not going to change.
It makes no sense to develop a common core that only differs on propellant and engines. There is no requirement for specific propellant or engines. So there is a need or drive to go to one core, it will be a "common" core and will eliminate the other one. Will look more like an Atlas since it will be easier to adapt.
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Frustratingly, it was the EELV manufacturers themselves who helped kill the commercial market. Both were involved in international launch ventures (Sea Launch and International Launch Services) that used Russian or Ukrainian rockets. Both built commercial satellites launched on those and other rockets. Both lobbied the U.S. government to remove quotas that had existed on Proton. At the end of 2000, they won and the quotas were removed entirely. You can plot the annual numbers of U.S. launched commercial satellites and almost see the moment it happened.
Boeing and Lockheed prospered from the decision, because they got to sell more satellites. They simultaneously reap more rewards by building even more expensive satellites to fly on EELVs. The EELVs lost money, but now ULA is probably gradually helping to recover some of those losses via. higher prices.
Actually, it wasn't the EELV manufacturers, it was the companies who didnt have a launch business (Boeing and Lockheed), who made the deals with the Russians. It just happened that those companies later merged or bought the companies (MCD and Martin) that were the EELV contractors
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common universal Launch Control Centres,
Can't happen until common avionics and common propellants/core.
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As matters stand, I think the only thing keeping Delta-IV's nose above the water is the fact that DoD seems to prefer the type and Delta-IVH is currently the only operation vehicle of its type available from US launch providers.
Well then scrap Atlas, uses a russian engine anyway.
Delta can't do human launch, so Atlas is needed for Commercial Crew. That's the delightful situation in which we find ourselves: D-IVH is needed for heavy launch and Atlas-V is needed for crew launch.
the simple fix as Jim stated is to move to a common core, offload prop to increase the payload mass, top off the tanks in LEO, effectively doubling (or more) the payload capacity. of course, much cheaper if the depot is utilized for Exploration BEO.
Oops, need a lightweight capsule.
Well conceptually simple. :D
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common universal Launch Control Centres,
Can't happen until common avionics and common propellants/core.
Yep I know and that is what should move towards. Having different and incompatible everything generally leads to higher costs. Streamlining where possible is what is needed.
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It becomes more of a matter that ULA's internal fate, future sustainability, and viability hinges a great deal on Boeing and Lockheed Martin resolving their differences and agreeing on pursuing a common upper stage for both launcher systems. That is sort of a logical step one. further steps could include switching to 5 metre Atlas stages, common new generation lightweight fairings, common stage zero solid rocket booster motors, common launch pads capable of both vehicles, common launcher processing center for both vehicles, common universal Launch Control Centres, etc. Standardization where ever possible for both systems must occur to further reduce associated costs. Atlas V and Delta IV must standardize to the point where Atlas and Delta IV first stages must be interchangeable depending upon the mission, while every other element that makes up a vehicles stack is the identical. The only primary difference for the first stage other than slight stage height difference, should be the fuel (RP-1 or LH2) and their associated engines.
That is my take on the situation and that is only a beginning of a long list cross system standardization that needs to occur to become sustainable.
If I understand your take. You are basically asking someone to start funding the Atlas VI (AKA Atlas phase 2) program. IMO, if that happens, the Delta IV Heavy and the D-IV family became redundant.
IIRC from the AV user guide. Atlas P2 single stick with 6 SRB can lift about 40 mT to LEO. You might cross some Congressional critters who support SLS, since the triple-core Heavy version of the Atlas P2 can lift about 75 mT to LEO. So will be in competition with the SLS for the HLV role.
Sounds more like an EELV follow-on new LV with very iffy funding IMO, unless both the current ongoing 50+ mT LV projects fizzles out.
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It becomes more of a matter that ULA's internal fate, future sustainability, and viability hinges a great deal on Boeing and Lockheed Martin resolving their differences and agreeing on pursuing a common upper stage for both launcher systems. That is sort of a logical step one. further steps could include switching to 5 metre Atlas stages, common new generation lightweight fairings, common stage zero solid rocket booster motors, common launch pads capable of both vehicles, common launcher processing center for both vehicles, common universal Launch Control Centres, etc. Standardization where ever possible for both systems must occur to further reduce associated costs. Atlas V and Delta IV must standardize to the point where Atlas and Delta IV first stages must be interchangeable depending upon the mission, while every other element that makes up a vehicles stack is the identical. The only primary difference for the first stage other than slight stage height difference, should be the fuel (RP-1 or LH2) and their associated engines.
That is my take on the situation and that is only a beginning of a long list cross system standardization that needs to occur to become sustainable.
If I understand your take. You are basically asking someone to start funding the Atlas VI (AKA Atlas phase 2) program. IMO, if that happens, the Delta IV Heavy and the D-IV family became redundant.
IIRC from the AV user guide. Atlas P2 single stick with 6 SRB can lift about 40 mT to LEO. You might cross some Congressional critters who support SLS, since the triple-core Heavy version of the Atlas P2 can lift about 75 mT to LEO. So will be in competition with the SLS for the HLV role.
Sounds more like an EELV follow-on new LV with very iffy funding IMO, unless both the current ongoing 50+ mT LV projects fizzles out.
It will probably happen eventually. Change will be increasing pushed for a more efficient system, but how and when is unknown at this time but it will be jolted forward when the involved parties are shocked into another reality check, well you will get it that is why this thread and some others post what needs to happen. Cannot really figure out what I want to say at the moment. But similar yes.
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Frustratingly, it was the EELV manufacturers themselves who helped kill the commercial market. Both were involved in international launch ventures (Sea Launch and International Launch Services) that used Russian or Ukrainian rockets. Both built commercial satellites launched on those and other rockets. Both lobbied the U.S. government to remove quotas that had existed on Proton. At the end of 2000, they won and the quotas were removed entirely. You can plot the annual numbers of U.S. launched commercial satellites and almost see the moment it happened.
Boeing and Lockheed prospered from the decision, because they got to sell more satellites. They simultaneously reap more rewards by building even more expensive satellites to fly on EELVs. The EELVs lost money, but now ULA is probably gradually helping to recover some of those losses via. higher prices.
Actually, it wasn't the EELV manufacturers, it was the companies who didnt have a launch business (Boeing and Lockheed), who made the deals with the Russians. It just happened that those companies later merged or bought the companies (MCD and Martin) that were the EELV contractors
And these satellite manufactures lost a large share of the market to European options, thanks in part to ITAR.
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And now similar logic is being used to keep two commercial crew providers in the game.
The only lesson we can learn from history is that the lessons never seem to be learned.
That's a bit harsh; I think we have learned a bit, and commercial crew's approach reflects it.
Or it could just be that in life, there are multiple competing lessons to be learned.
No doubt. One such lesson is that a free market is one where the government isn't involved and therefore applying free market economics to a situation where the government is the primary (or only) customer is just silly.
Paging Dr Bigelow.
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IMHO depends entirely on what ULA is able to do to remain competitive 2018+ without significant support from their parents between now and then, which at present doesn't appear to look good.
that isn't true.
a. ULA doesn't get any support from its parents and hasn't for several years
b. it does look good for being competitive
Right; as I said, "without significant support from their parents". That support could come in two ways: (1) injection of new money; (2) reduction in the amount of money they take out of ULA. (Excluding significant credit lines and guarantees which Boeing and LM provide to ULA, but those are constrained and for specific purposes.)
Assuming Boeing and LM won't go for option (1), then the question is how much of ULA's profits they're willing to let ULA keep? ULA's profitability sets an upper bound on that amount, and is effectively determined by the DOD. Subtract from that the amount Boeing and LM are willing to let ULA keep, and you have the maximum amount ULA has to invest in ongoing improvements.
The alternative is to assert that for ULA to compete in the market 2018+, they will require no improvements and thus no investment between now and then. Doubtful.
It becomes more of a matter that ULA's internal fate, future sustainability, and viability hinges a great deal on Boeing and Lockheed Martin resolving their differences
Boeing and LM differences have no bearing on this matter. It is up to ULA.
See above. Maybe "resolving their differences" isn't the correct framing, but the amount ULA has available to invest in improvements depends on agreement between Boeing and LM. While execution within given boundaries may be up to ULA, ULA is largely at the mercy of others in drawing those boundaries.
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As matters stand, I think the only thing keeping Delta-IV's nose above the water is the fact that DoD seems to prefer the type and Delta-IVH is currently the only operation vehicle of its type available from US launch providers.
Well then scrap Atlas, uses a russian engine anyway.
Delta can't do human launch, so Atlas is needed for Commercial Crew. That's the delightful situation in which we find ourselves: D-IVH is needed for heavy launch and Atlas-V is needed for crew launch.
I'm pretty sure the Atlas would be the better one to keep. I -think- it's cheaper, and it will be man rated. I believe Jim said earlier in this thread or another than with a wide body Centaur, Atlas 55x would have the capacity of current D4H. ULA's been kicking around the idea of a common 5m upper stage for awhile now for both lines. So that could be an avenue to get D4H capacity while downsizing to just the one booster core.
Adding a tri-core Atlas V-heavy would be a pretty easy upgrade uption from there that would get over 30mt with the WBC, if there was ever a payload and customer for it.
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... two completely different EELV's was not necessarily forever. Per the DoD in 2006, "for the foreseeable future", "because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience", and "until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle".
That's interesting. I wonder whether DoD could ever truly "certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle."
Never was a valid requirement. There was no backup for Titan IV and there is no backup for Delta IV Heavy
Yea, wasn't the "backup" of keeping both initially mainly because they were both new and they weren't sure if problems might arise in one or the other? Until they proved their reliability?
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Never was a valid requirement. There was no backup for Titan IV and there is no backup for Delta IV Heavy
So what, pray tell, is the justification for keeping both EELVs on line?
I'm guessing the main reason is Atlas can't duplciate D4H, but Atlas is probably potentially the better and more flexible LV? And easiest to man-rate.
And it would take investment to upgrade Atlas V to meet D4H performance. Might be some issues with needing to produce a certain number of Delta cores to recoup initial sunk costs in the program? Before you'd break even and could retire it.
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common launch pads capable of both vehicles, common launcher processing center for both vehicles,
Not going to happen since they are unique to the cores and the cores are not going to change.
It makes no sense to develop a common core that only differs on propellant and engines. There is no requirement for specific propellant or engines. So there is a need or drive to go to one core, it will be a "common" core and will eliminate the other one. Will look more like an Atlas since it will be easier to adapt.
Yea, I couldn't see them going with a common diameter core, but still keeping cores with different propellants.
Just retire one so production of the other can increase. They could commonize on a single 5m kerolox core, which would basically be a short D4 core, with different LOX and fuel tank ratios...otherwise known as Atlas Phase 2. But that requires the new development of a new 5m kerolox core. Even if using exisitng engines and tank tooling as it would, I imagine it wouldn't be cheap.
Good to hear Atlas would be the more likely of the two to keep. That'd be what I have guessed, but interesting to hear it from Jim.
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Never was a valid requirement. There was no backup for Titan IV and there is no backup for Delta IV Heavy
So what, pray tell, is the justification for keeping both EELVs on line?
I'm guessing the main reason is Atlas can't duplciate D4H, but Atlas is probably potentially the better and more flexible LV? And easiest to man-rate.
And it would take investment to upgrade Atlas V to meet D4H performance. Might be some issues with needing to produce a certain number of Delta cores to recoup initial sunk costs in the program? Before you'd break even and could retire it.
The Atlas family can duplicate the performance of the Delta IV Heavy and better it. An Atlas V Heavy is supposed to be able to put 29 mt into LEO and lift 13.5 mt to GTO. If that isn't adequate for the USAF's needs I don't know what would be adequate. What needs to happen is ULA needs to make the investments necessary to make the Atlas V Heavy a reality. Do that and they can kill off the Delta IV entirely. Or they could sit there, fiddling at the margins, until Spacex and possibly even Orbital knock down their front door. They're already losing NASA contracts to both of those firms, so it's not like ULA is benefiting from the status quo. If they want to survive in the long run, they're going to have to make some serious investments, slim down, and go independent. Short of outright independence, ULA is too hamstrung to be an effective competitor long-term to Spacex.
I would hazard a guess the nightmare scenario is Orbital upgrading the Antares with an LRE upper stage and renovating a pad at Cape Canaveral. It might not happen, but I've long since learned that firms often move into new markets in steps. If Orbital follows Spacex' lead, ULA will have to take action.
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They're already losing NASA contracts to both of those firms, so it's not like ULA is benefiting from the status quo. If they want to survive in the long run, they're going to have to make some serious investments, slim down, and go independent. Short of outright independence, ULA is too hamstrung to be an effective competitor long-term to Spacex.
Not true. Between the two of them, there has only been one launch. COTS and CRS don't count, since those involve a spacecraft.
Also, unsupported conclusion. 4 launches is not enough data to base such a claim.
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Short of outright independence, ULA is too hamstrung to be an effective competitor long-term to Spacex.
I tend to think that Lockheed buying out Boeing’s share would be just as good. The problem isn’t necessarily lack of independence, it’s trying to serve two masters.
COTS and CRS don't count, since those involve a spacecraft.
Wait, what? >.<
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Short of outright independence, ULA is too hamstrung to be an effective competitor long-term to Spacex.
I tend to think that Lockheed buying out Boeing’s share would be just as good. The problem isn’t necessarily lack of independence, it’s trying to serve two masters.
COTS and CRS don't count, since those involve a spacecraft.
Wait, what? >.<
ULA only supplies launch services and not cargo and therefore is excluded from directly competing
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Never was a valid requirement. There was no backup for Titan IV and there is no backup for Delta IV Heavy
So what, pray tell, is the justification for keeping both EELVs on line?
I'm guessing the main reason is Atlas can't duplciate D4H, but Atlas is probably potentially the better and more flexible LV? And easiest to man-rate.
And it would take investment to upgrade Atlas V to meet D4H performance. Might be some issues with needing to produce a certain number of Delta cores to recoup initial sunk costs in the program? Before you'd break even and could retire it.
The Atlas family can duplicate the performance of the Delta IV Heavy and better it. An Atlas V Heavy is supposed to be able to put 29 mt into LEO and lift 13.5 mt to GTO. If that isn't adequate for the USAF's needs I don't know what would be adequate. What needs to happen is ULA needs to make the investments necessary to make the Atlas V Heavy a reality. Do that and they can kill off the Delta IV entirely. Or they could sit there, fiddling at the margins, until Spacex and possibly even Orbital knock down their front door. They're already losing NASA contracts to both of those firms, so it's not like ULA is benefiting from the status quo. If they want to survive in the long run, they're going to have to make some serious investments, slim down, and go independent. Short of outright independence, ULA is too hamstrung to be an effective competitor long-term to Spacex.
I would hazard a guess the nightmare scenario is Orbital upgrading the Antares with an LRE upper stage and renovating a pad at Cape Canaveral. It might not happen, but I've long since learned that firms often move into new markets in steps. If Orbital follows Spacex' lead, ULA will have to take action.
Ummm...I meant the versions of Atlas currently flying can't match D4H which also is currently flying.
Of course they could build an AVH. I just meant what's flying now without more investment.
As I mentioned earlier though, the better investment might be a WBC/ACES to put on top of the Atlas-55x LV. According to Jim that will meet D4H's performance, and it would get ULA the 5m common upper stage that seem to be wanting, at least given they've been studying it and talking about it for a long time.
AVH has significantly better LEO performance than D4H, but I think it's GTO/GSO/escape peroformance isn't much different because D4H has a bigger upper stage in the 5m DCSS than current Centaur. AVH with current Centaur has it's BLEO capacity limited compared to it's LEO capacity because of Centaur's size.
A 5m WBC would fix that, and even have more fuel than DCSS I believe.
So I'm thinking that upgrade would make more sense than AVH with current Centaur. And it would be a next gen upper stage will all the cool tech ULA's been tinkering with for the last several years. It wouldn't require any pad modifications either I don't think, as AVH would for the two outboard CCB's.
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I would hazard a guess the nightmare scenario is Orbital upgrading the Antares with an LRE upper stage and renovating a pad at Cape Canaveral. It might not happen, but I've long since learned that firms often move into new markets in steps. If Orbital follows Spacex' lead, ULA will have to take action.
That is no threat to ULA.
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ULA only supplies launch services and not cargo and therefore is excluded from directly competing
True, but changing that to "directly or indirectly" doesn't appear to change much. I would also hope that ULA feels as a partner that they are competing for CRS CCP as much as Boeing and SNC, otherwise they have institutional problems that go far beyond legal constraints.
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So I'm thinking that upgrade would make more sense than AVH with current Centaur. And it would be a next gen upper stage will all the cool tech ULA's been tinkering with for the last several years. It wouldn't require any pad modifications either I don't think, as AVH would for the two outboard CCB's.
The $M (or $B?) question is where is the money going to come from to fund such changes? DOD is focused on cost control, and that will likely continue for the foreseeable future. Boeing and LM don't appear to be interested--or maybe they are and they have a plan which we haven't seen indications of?
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ULA only supplies launch services and not cargo and therefore is excluded from directly competing
True, but changing that to "directly or indirectly" doesn't appear to change much. I would also hope that ULA feels as a partner that they are competing for CRS as much as Boeing and SNC, otherwise they have institutional problems that go far beyond legal constraints.
I was referring to the past CRS and COTS competition. The context was ULA "losing" contracts to OSC and Spacex, which isn't true, except for one launch, Jason.
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I was referring to the past CRS and COTS competition. The context was ULA "losing" contracts to OSC and Spacex, which isn't true, except for one launch, Jason.
Oops, right. And original post corrected: CCP not CRS.
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They're already losing NASA contracts to both of those firms, so it's not like ULA is benefiting from the status quo. If they want to survive in the long run, they're going to have to make some serious investments, slim down, and go independent. Short of outright independence, ULA is too hamstrung to be an effective competitor long-term to Spacex.
Not true. Between the two of them, there has only been one launch. COTS and CRS don't count, since those involve a spacecraft.
Also, unsupported conclusion. 4 launches is not enough data to base such a claim.
So let me get this straight, ULA is going from having a monopoly on both NASA and DoD launches to only one on DoD launches that is now under threat, and this is a good situation to find themselves in? Losing a monopoly by definition means they're losing market share, meaning had Orbital and Spacex not become involved, those future COTS launches could have been revenue for ULA instead. I also think the attitude of dismissing one's competition is really dangerous.
Let me tell you about a firm that once did that. I'm sure you've used a cellphone. Well, the inventor of that was a firm called Motorola. Their management, with which I am familiar, believed that Motorola would become the world's first trillion dollar company in the 1980s and early 1990s. When competition began to spring up, they dismissed it. Nokia? "Nokia's better at making toilet paper than cellphones!" Motorola further shot itself in the foot by not recognizing the importance of transitioning from analog to digital, and soon found itself losing its crown to a firm that once manufactured toilet paper. Even after all that, members of the firm totally missed the appeal of the iPhone, and now Motorola is a bit player in a sector it started.
There may be more barriers to entry for Spacex and Orbital, but make no mistake, dismissing them as threats now is a bad idea. It's not like Orbital couldn't get a more ambitious CEO who wanted to upgrade the Antares and compete for more NASA & DoD launches. Orbital does have the cash to make that happen. All they need is the right individual in power and suddenly ULA could find itself in a dogfight with 2 competitors for NASA launches. Ah, but what do I know? I'm sure right now you're calling your family on a Motorola cellphone, no? ;)
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Losing a monopoly by definition means they're losing market share, meaning had Orbital and Spacex not become involved, those future COTS launches could have been revenue for ULA instead.
Well, technically "losing a monopoly" does not "by definition" mean "they're losing market share". But yes, practically speaking in this case it does, as putting anything in orbit requires launch services, for which ULA is demonstrably not competitive other than for a narrow subset of the "launch services" market.
I also think the attitude of dismissing one's competition is really dangerous.
Agree. Betting on the failure of your competition is not a recipe for success. That might have been a valid (if low-probability) argument a few years ago; today, not so much, and decreasing rapidly with every passing month.
There may be more barriers to entry for Spacex and Orbital...
I'd argue the opposite. ULA does not have a Secret Sauce that only They know how to concoct; they have no Secret Technology that only They are privvy to. It is a matter of organizational rigor, discipline and hunger.
In short, ULA may be able to defend their patch of turf for some time to come, but that patch will be a decreasingly small part of the pie. Eventually--unless there are subsantive changes--defending that patch will become unsustainable or it will be reduced to irrelevance.
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There may be more barriers to entry for Spacex and Orbital, but make no mistake, dismissing them as threats now is a bad idea. It's not like Orbital couldn't get a more ambitious CEO who wanted to upgrade the Antares and compete for more NASA & DoD launches. Orbital does have the cash to make that happen. All they need is the right individual in power and suddenly ULA could find itself in a dogfight with 2 competitors for NASA launches. Ah, but what do I know? I'm sure right now you're calling your family on a Motorola cellphone, no? ;)
You are absolutely correct, one should never dismiss potential threats. That said, a key assumption is that Antares or Falcon are cheaper than the EELV's. While there is a lot of speculation that Falcon is very cheap, and SpaceX has sold contracts at low values, what is the actual cost. With SpaceX's staffing now equivalent to ULA's why does anyone think that Falcon is cheaper to build and launch?
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While there is a lot of speculation that Falcon is very cheap, and SpaceX has sold contracts at low values, what is the actual cost. With SpaceX's staffing now equivalent to ULA's why does anyone think that Falcon is cheaper to build and launch?
Committed (NTE) NLS-II contract pricing (http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY11/IG-11-012.pdf) is one indication.
edit: include link.
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In short, ULA may be able to defend their patch of turf for some time to come, but that patch will be a decreasingly small part of the pie. Eventually--unless there are subsantive changes--defending that patch will become unsustainable or it will be reduced to irrelevance.
I think joek knows this so this isn't really a reply to him, but: there is a viable business strategy which defends a shrinking fraction of the pie. It depends on the entire pie growing at a rate faster than the rate at which one's defended piece is shrinking.
I mention it because this is what I hope happens with ULA. I don't think the demand for launching "Class A" (USAF/NRO most critical) payloads will shrink in absolute terms anytime soon, but I hope it becomes an increasingly small fraction of the overall spacelaunch pie.
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With SpaceX's staffing now equivalent to ULA's why does anyone think that Falcon is cheaper to build and launch?
While I think that SpaceX takes vertical integration too far, and worry about their growing headcount, I'm not sure this is a fair apples to apples comparison. Sure, SpaceX's staff is almost as high as ULA's, I'm pretty sure that doesn't include all of the people working at major subcontractors/vendors for ULA (such as those working full-time at Rocketdyne building engines for ULA's vehicles). Also, as others have noted the SpaceX total includes all of those working on and supporting Dragon and DragonRider. Because SpaceX is also selling cargo/crew delivery as well as normal satellite launches, some of the fixed cost of those people can be covered by higher priced crew and cargo missions.
Not saying that SpaceX's prices won't start increasing over time (they've already increased quite a bit just for Falcon 9), just that comparing their staff to ULA's staff isn't an apples-to-apples comparison.
~Jon
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With SpaceX's staffing now equivalent to ULA's why does anyone think that Falcon is cheaper to build and launch?
Doesn't ULA buy RL-10 engines for roughly $40M each, whereas the SpaceX staffing includes building their own engines? Even this one item could make ULA rockets noticeably more expensive than SpaceX ones, even with similar staff, and I suspect it's far from the only example.
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With SpaceX's staffing now equivalent to ULA's why does anyone think that Falcon is cheaper to build and launch?
Doesn't ULA buy RL-10 engines for roughly $40M each, whereas the SpaceX staffing includes building their own engines? Even this one item could make ULA rockets noticeably more expensive than SpaceX ones, even with similar staff, and I suspect it's far from the only example.
Well now, that implies a very interesting possibility. Would ULA be better off making their own upper stage engines? It's not like there aren't laid off Rocketdyne people they couldn't hire. If a single RL-10 is really costing 40 million dollars, would that push ULA towards emulating the Spacex business model someday? In their position, I'd certainly be tempted to build my own if I could get the unit price down dramatically. Sure it'll require some investment, but there's no gain without risk in business.
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Pre formation of ULA a large number of RL-10's where acquired by Boeing for an unknown price. So many that ULA has been talking about modifying some to work on Atlas. $40 million is the often quoted as the assumed price if you where to have a new small run batch built.SpaceX's advantage is they can shift people to produce small batches as needed without incurring other unrelated overhead.
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This may only be tangentially related (more "how should DoD influence ULA's business model going forward"), but why shouldn't the DoD structure its "infrastructure" payment as payment for a few extra launches?
Here's the idea: instead of $1 billion paid to do nothing, DoD pays a roughly equivalent amount for perhaps 4-5 launches. Perhaps no more than a couple hundred million extra for materials costs. These launches are not allowed to fly "Class A" DoD payloads, they are instead required to be developmental missions. Those missions might be expected to fly for example an ACES upper stage, Al-Li tanking construction, DIVH propellant cross-feed, emergency detection systems, perhaps (with greater IR&D funds) propellant densification, glide-back boosters, and solids on the DIVH. These ideas were taken from ULA suggestions for EELV improvements over the years.
While ULA would not be allowed to fly "Class A-requiring" or commercial payloads on these flights, they might still be used to fly experimental DARPA or government/university payloads--any non-commercial payload for which the sponsor understands the risk of failure is higher (because of the developmental nature of the launch vehicle). Any such payload would have to pay the additional cost for integration. Some consideration would have to be made to make sure this didn't siphon off the missions needed to move SpaceX to class A launcher status.
The benefit to ULA is that they get a sort of "launch customer" for improvements to their launchers. It's a golden opportunity to improve their competitive footing, boost the TRL level of new capabilities or improvements, without risking a class A payload. The downside is that instead of getting a fat check for launches-that-do-not-exist, they'd actually have to finish designs and bend metal and risk a launch. On the other hand, in fierce budget fighting, money for doing _something_ would be much easier to justify. Some internal investment would be required to finish the engineering for the improvements, but that would be offset by fewer launches than $1 billion would otherwise buy, and by not including payload integration in those launch costs.
The benefit to the DoD/AF (NASA sneaks in here, too) is that they would get improvements to the major two launch vehicles, and indeed to US space capabilities. For example, rather than delaying a spy satellite for years because it required more capability than existing launchers could provide, this program would expand out capability without risking a perhaps billion-dollar payload. The ACES upper stage could provide more flexibility and all sorts of options for BLEO missions. Once a basic ACES design is flown, you could target a follow-on mission, perhaps with a bit of DARPA or NASA money, to demonstrate cryogenic propellant transfer and long-term storage. I'm not aware of how the ULA infrastructure payments are handled, but performing actual launches is probably better able to keep subcontractors' production lines employed. Almost certainly it protects the entire infrastructure better than a simple payment.
SpaceX proponents will no doubt protest this is an unfair subsidy, and indeed it is. But in the near term, SpaceX has more launches on its plate than it has demonstrated the capability to put away, so it won't affect their prospects in the short term. Furthermore, the program should be structured in such a way that it does not rob payloads from SpaceX--because it is intended for launch vehicle development. In the longer term, SpaceX is competing commercially, and their pricing structure is still much more attractive, so they are still in good shape. Furthermore, the alternative is the status quo, which is a blank check to ULA. Over time, if SpaceX proves its capability and maintains its prices, the infrastructure payment (and/or this program) will likely disappear.
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So let me get this straight, ULA is going from having a monopoly on both NASA and DoD launches
It never had a monopoly on NASA missions.
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It's not like Orbital couldn't get a more ambitious CEO who wanted to upgrade the Antares and compete for more NASA & DoD launches.
The fact that they are using a solid second stage and launching from Wallops means they aren't serious.
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those future COTS launches could have been revenue for ULA instead. I also think the attitude of dismissing one's competition is really dangerous.
Never said anything about future cargo missions, was only referring to the past.
Not dismissing the competition, just your characterization of ULA.
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Here's the idea: instead of $1 billion paid to do nothing,
It isn't just to do nothing (sustaining the launch capability), it is used to meet the DOD's extra requirements.
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It's not like Orbital couldn't get a more ambitious CEO who wanted to upgrade the Antares and compete for more NASA & DoD launches.
The fact that they are using a solid second stage and launching from Wallops means they aren't serious.
For now. If however they put someone more ambitious into the CEO position, there's really nothing fundamentally stopping Orbital from upgrading the Antares and building a pad at Cape Canaveral. I'm sure I don't need to post their financials yet again to prove they have both the cash and the operating margins to afford doing all of that. All they need now is different leadership and some time.
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Here's the idea: instead of $1 billion paid to do nothing,
It isn't just to do nothing (sustaining the launch capability), it is used to meet the DOD's extra requirements.
What requirements are those? Would anyone in the DoD or Congress share your opinion of why that money is appropriated?
Would you expect SpaceX, if it were to gather some share of DoD business, would need to charge some fraction of that billion just to meet the same requirements, in addition to launch pricing? I'm not aware of any discussion of that need during the talks for launch buys over the last few years.
More broadly, ULA's current philosophy is largely "we'll build it if they come, and pay up front." That contrasts with most innovative businesses, where they find opportunities "if we build it, they will come." The first approach works well if you have a rich, willing client; the question is whether ULA's client (DoD) will remain rich (in the face of tighter budgets) and willing (in the face of cheaper competition) going forward.
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More broadly, ULA's current philosophy is largely "we'll build it if they come, and pay up front." That contrasts with most innovative businesses, where they find opportunities "if we build it, they will come." The first approach works well if you have a rich, willing client; the question is whether ULA's client (DoD) will remain rich (in the face of tighter budgets) and willing (in the face of cheaper competition) going forward.
Which is doubly odd, because Lockheed in particular has somewhat of a history of designing random aircraft and then convincing the government they need them. But then Lockheed Martin Aeronautics ≉ Lockheed Martin Space Systems ≉ ULA.
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Which is doubly odd, because Lockheed in particular has somewhat of a history of designing random aircraft and then convincing the government they need them. But then Lockheed Martin Aeronautics ≉ Lockheed Martin Space Systems ≉ ULA.
No, they did not "design" them, they came up with some concepts and got the gov't to fund the design and development. Lockheed spent very little company fund on those aircraft. No different than what ULA is doing with ACES and IFV.
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Here's the idea: instead of $1 billion paid to do nothing,
It isn't just to do nothing (sustaining the launch capability), it is used to meet the DOD's extra requirements.
1. What requirements are those? Would anyone in the DoD or Congress share your opinion of why that money is appropriated?
2. Would you expect SpaceX, if it were to gather some share of DoD business, would need to charge some fraction of that billion just to meet the same requirements, in addition to launch pricing? I'm not aware of any discussion of that need during the talks for launch buys over the last few years.
3. "if we build it, they will come"
1. Extra rehearsals, security, manifest games, west coast pad sustainment (one flight a year is not enough to maintain a workforce).
2, Yes
3. Doesn't really happen.
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Xplor: SpaceX had 2 launches in 2012, not just one. Granted, that's still too low and caused them to bleed a customer or two (or swap satellites with the same customer, launching a bird on Proton), but the bleeding is less than I would've expected. If they can't get at least 3 launches, they'll be in trouble in 2013. In order to do well, they need 4, and it's already February...
Ben: Delta IV could do human launch, if required. It could even do Orion (and will do Orion, in fact, unmanned). Atlas V is significantly cheaper, but D4/D4H is pretty capable (and has room for capacity growth with almost all the same launch infrastructure).
SpaceX's manifest shows that they can be pretty competitive globally, IF they ever manage to get their launch rate up. Along with their ISS duties (which serve an analogous stabilizing role as ULA's payment for fixed cost from DoD), this steady stream of payloads improves the situation by quite a bit and keeps them price-sensitive (even as they'll probably keep climbing up the value chain with Falcon Heavy, etc). They actually /may/ be able to improve costs with a reusable first stage (and the consistent ISS flights--if SpaceX also gets crew--are in the right payload range and already provide nearly enough flights just by themselves to justify a flyback first stage, if you believe Lockheed's analysis and don't count the development cost against it). But this is all contingent with SpaceX actually managing to hit their ambitious manifest flight rate (16 flights per year??? they've done 2 at best!).
As far as ULA's business model needing changing...
In 2010, ULA had 8 launches. SpaceX had 2.
In 2011, ULA had 11 launches. SpaceX had 0.
In 2012, ULA had 10 (and there were no Delta II flights in 2012). SpaceX had 2.
Right now, it looks like ULA is far ahead of SpaceX. SpaceX is retiring v1.0 this year, and v1.1 has never launched and it's all they have right now (until Falcon Heavy). ULA still has 3 years of 3 different launch vehicles, providing a good source of income in case one has a stand-down or something. Then, ULA has contracts a good 5 years out. If SpaceX doesn't make some serious headway on their manifest this year (has to be 3 launches... MAYBE just two), then they're in danger of closing up.
ULA is in a far less precarious position and they are focusing on trimming costs (consolidation, increasing commonality, etc) while SpaceX is investing heavily in R&D, bringing three or four major new projects online (v1.1, crewed dragon with vertical landing, Falcon Heavy, another launch pad, and the start of Falcon 9 reuse) in the next few years while ULA will be heavily focused on profitability.
ULA has a very solid base with almost a dozen launches every year (plus the fixed cost payment), SpaceX has a max historical yearly launch rate of 2. This doesn't mean SpaceX WILL fail, but they are a gamble (with a pretty sweet payoff, even if only half of what they're planning comes to fruition).
And as far as stealing all of ULA's launches, SpaceX will have to learn all the intricacies of USAF's payload integration requirements, which counts as another big project (they will need something like a vertical integration facility). And that will take a long time.
If I were a betting man, I would say ULA is less likely to go out of business within the next five years than SpaceX. Actually, let's reduce that to three years. If SpaceX survives the next three years, they will have had to have gotten their launch rate up significantly and would be a credible threat to ULA. But right now, ULA is winning the game.
...but I think SpaceX has the slight advantage that the company is in heavy-growth-investment mode, not profit-taking mode (this doesn't outweigh the disadvantage of low flight rate). ULA is stable enough that their parent companies expect ULA to make a good profit, not just be a bucket where you throw your money. SpaceX is growing and presumably reinvesting any profit they make (and they may be less than profitable right now, since they're investing so much and bringing so many new projects online), while ULA is presumably producing a reasonable profit to Boeing and Lockheed (nothing spectacular, I'm sure... you're not going to get filthy rich in this business).
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With SpaceX's staffing now equivalent to ULA's why does anyone think that Falcon is cheaper to build and launch?
Doesn't ULA buy RL-10 engines for roughly $40M each, whereas the SpaceX staffing includes building their own engines? Even this one item could make ULA rockets noticeably more expensive than SpaceX ones, even with similar staff, and I suspect it's far from the only example.
When someone mentioned RL-10 prices a year ago, it was only $30M. There was no justification for that number then, and there is no justification for the number you've created now. Provide a reference that isn't some other post on a forum, please.
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Here's the idea: instead of $1 billion paid to do nothing,
It isn't just to do nothing (sustaining the launch capability), it is used to meet the DOD's extra requirements.
1. What requirements are those? Would anyone in the DoD or Congress share your opinion of why that money is appropriated?
2. Would you expect SpaceX, if it were to gather some share of DoD business, would need to charge some fraction of that billion just to meet the same requirements, in addition to launch pricing? I'm not aware of any discussion of that need during the talks for launch buys over the last few years.
3. "if we build it, they will come"
1. Extra rehearsals, security, manifest games, west coast pad sustainment (one flight a year is not enough to maintain a workforce).
2, Yes
3. Doesn't really happen.
1. Extra rehearsals could be satisfied by actual countdowns and launches. (Or incorporated in individual launch prices.) So could west coast pad sustainment. An ACES test or Al-Li tanking could be proven from the west coast as easily as the east. Manifest games should be much easier to handle with more constant production and commonality between the two launchers (DIVs with common cores, and possibly a shared ACES upper between both Atlas and Delta).
2. We'll have to see, I suppose.
3. Yes and no. Yes, in the world of government contracting, it isn't done. It isn't needed. The government has been happy to assume all risk, and pay nicely even when designs are half-baked. That I think is why the US government HAD to be involved in space at the beginning, because the risk was too great and the costs too high and the rewards too far off for any commercial venture to sustain. I do not believe any of those apply to satellite launches today. Exhibit A: the launch insurance industry.
No, "build it and they will come" happens all the time in the broader business world. That is almost the definition of entrepreneurial activity. Apple built a do-it-yourself "home computer," a windowed and mouse-driven personal computer, an iPod and an online music store, an iPhone smartphone and an online app store, and an iPad tablet, all before these markets existed. Certainly, in the case of the tablet, many previous attempts had crashed and burned. IMO, the jury is still out on the suborbital market, and the jury hasn't even been chosen for Bigelow's market. But that approach does happen, and it does pay off handsomely for the right idea at the right time.
The problem I see is that both ULA and DoD/NRO/NASA/etc need the EELVs to be trying out and incorporating improvements. But right now, both are risk averse past the paper study stage. Certainly NASA programs and to a lesser extent DoD programs are heavily motivated to design to the launchers as they are now by TRL evaluations of projects, and ULA is forced to maintain its highly proven designs. Don't mess with success. But the definition of success changes over time--we aren't still using those successful and practical rotary dial telephones. There's a reason why biology is all about mutation and evolution, even for successful organisms. Look at the Soyuz: it is incorporating improvements. The Briz upper stage is incorporating changes. The Chinese are tweaking and upgrading their launchers. The Ariane has a thought-out evolution path. Those are proven designs; of course the less-proven competitors are working all-out to improve their capabilities.
Somebody needs to be strategic, looking forward at capability enhancements, and selectively funding through the flight stage ones that make sense. NASA should, for its science payloads if not for many others, but its science budget is continually gutted and its exploration budget is consumed by SLS. DoD should too, and I think this is a line-item in the budget that could be seized upon to accomplish the task. Even if you did it partially, 3/4 billion and 1 exp launch the first year (1/4 billion for this), 1/2 billion + 2 exp launches (1/2 billion paid for these) + material costs the second year, or
some variation like that.
Has Al-Li really not been incorporated in Atlas V or Delta IV tanks? What's the scale of that performance improvement compared to RS-68As for the DIVH?
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Looking specifically at the benefit to ULA of discontinuing the 4m DCSS and replacing it with a "common Centaur", how aggressively could that be done? For which of the launches listed below is it definitely ruled out?
2013
November - GPS IIF-5 - Delta IV-M+(4,2) - Canaveral SLC-37B
2014
May - GPS IIIA-1 - Delta-IV-M+(4,2) - Canaveral SLC-37B
2nd half - GPS IIF-9 - Delta IV-M+(4,2) - Canaveral SLC-37B
NET 2nd half - GPS IIF-10 - Delta IV-M+(4,2) - Canaveral SLC-37B (or 1st half 2015)
TBD - AFSPC-4 - Delta IV-M+ (4,2) - Canaveral SLC-37B (or 2015)
TBD - SBIRS-GEO 3 - Delta IV-M+(4,2) - Canaveral SLC-37B
2015
February - GPS IIIA-2 - Delta-IV-M+(4,2)/Atlas V 401 - Canaveral
December 2016 - TDRS-M - EELV - Canaveral
2nd half - GPS IIF-12 - Atlas V 401/Delta IV-M+(4,2) - Canaveral
TBD - SBIRS-GEO 4 - Delta IV-M+(4,2)/Atlas V 401 - Canaveral
Unclear:
NET 2016 - SBIRS-GEO 5 - Delta IV-M+(4,2)/Atlas V 401 (TBD) - Canaveral
NET 2016 - SBIRS-GEO 6 - Delta IV-M+(4,2)/Atlas V 401 (TBD) - Canaveral
TBD - GPS IIF-13 - TBD - Canaveral
TBD - GPS IIF-14 - TBD - Canaveral
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If sustainability is the issue, wouldn't it be simpler and more effective to simply eliminate one of the two vehicles?
EELV is not about sustainable, it's about assured access.
That was my impression too (though Jim seems to disagree (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=30867.msg1010216#msg1010216)), and that's why I said "if."
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... two completely different EELV's was not necessarily forever. Per the DoD in 2006, "for the foreseeable future", "because they are relatively new, unproven systems with limited flight experience", and "until the Department can certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle".
That's interesting. I wonder whether DoD could ever truly "certify assured access to space through reliance in a single vehicle."
Never was a valid requirement. There was no backup for Titan IV and there is no backup for Delta IV Heavy
Are you really sure assured access isn't at least the official reason for keeping both Atlas V and Delta IV? I've heard the term "assured access" so many times....
I'd have thought the reason there was no back-up for Titan IV was that reliance on Titan at all from the mid-1980s on was more or less the back-up plan to using the Shuttle. The Shuttle failed to serve DoD's needs, so it went the Titan route. As for Delta IV Heavy having no back-up, I'd have guessed that was the result of a cost-benefit analysis: payloads for the Heavy are few and far between, so backing it up would be particularly expensive. These are just my guesses, of course.
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Never was a valid requirement. There was no backup for Titan IV and there is no backup for Delta IV Heavy
So what, pray tell, is the justification for keeping both EELVs on line?
I'm guessing the main reason is Atlas can't duplciate D4H, but Atlas is probably potentially the better and more flexible LV? And easiest to man-rate.
I don't think DoD cares about human-rating -- that's NASA's problem.
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With SpaceX's staffing now equivalent to ULA's why does anyone think that Falcon is cheaper to build and launch?
Doesn't ULA buy RL-10 engines for roughly $40M each, whereas the SpaceX staffing includes building their own engines? Even this one item could make ULA rockets noticeably more expensive than SpaceX ones, even with similar staff, and I suspect it's far from the only example.
When someone mentioned RL-10 prices a year ago, it was only $30M. There was no justification for that number then, and there is no justification for the number you've created now. Provide a reference that isn't some other post on a forum, please.
Only one company makes it, and only one buys it, and neither has the slightest self interest in disclosure (I suspect that if *was* published, ULA would be embarrassed by how much they pay, and P&W embarrassed by how much they are screwing their only customer.) So a solid reference is hard to find. But we know NASA said this:
"We know the list price on an RL-10. If you look at cost over time, a very large portion of the unit cost of the EELVs is attributable to the propulsion systems, and the RL-10 is a very old engine, and there's a lot of craftwork associated with its manufacture," says Dale Thomas, associate director of technical issues at NASA Marshall. "That's what this study will figure out, is it worthwhile to build an RL-10 replacement?" "
So if NASA, which is not very cost sensitive, thinks this is worthwhile to study, it's surely significant.
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The benefit to ULA is that they get a sort of "launch customer" for improvements to their launchers. It's a golden opportunity to improve their competitive footing, boost the TRL level of new capabilities or improvements, without risking a class A payload.
Most the country would welcome this parallel, competitive development effort of the smaller, existing LV fleet, withthe approach outline here and in many other papers. It is clear that each of these would benefit from more NASA launch mass, as would the country. It would most certainly provide anytime access.
Flight rate would reduce the impact of the RL-10 costs dramatically, for example. Flight rate spurs many other technology improvements too numerous to list. Its ironic that ever study leads to smaller with higher flight rate, yet....
Just imagine what could be done with the cash redirected from the HLV programs. Would you rather scramble into action vehicle(s) flying 10 times a year or one every other for anytime access, especially after one, two, or three decades of operation?
Can you imagine having the option to top off the tanks to increase payload mass (provided the volume exists) to include in the mission(s) trade?
Over the decades, everyone has recognized the *few* that have little interest in space or science, instead creating massive programs that perpetuate directed cash flow, without competition.
golden indeed. SpaceX delivering ISS cargo, others providing propellant. and eventually crew.
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1. Extra rehearsals could be satisfied by actual countdowns and launches. (Or incorporated in individual launch prices.) So could west coast pad sustainment.
2. No, "build it and they will come" happens all the time in the broader business world. That is almost the definition of entrepreneurial activity. Apple built a do-it-yourself "home computer," a windowed and mouse-driven personal computer, an iPod and an online music store, an iPhone smartphone and an online app store, and an iPad tablet, all before these markets existed.
3. The problem I see is that both ULA and DoD/NRO/NASA/etc need the EELVs to be trying out and incorporating improvements.
1. No, the rehearsals are for the spacecraft teams. Adding the cost to individual launch prices still means the DOD pays for it from the same pot of money as the sustainment funds. There are no "extra" spacecraft that need west coast launches (or east coast) to provide the sustainment. No one is going to pay for a launch without a payload on an existing launcher no matter what the tanks are made of. There is no engineering reason to do such a launch
No, the manifest games exist no matter what the vehicle is.
2. Not really, those are just evolving modifications of existing concepts that were marketed differently.
3. What do you called common avionics, common RL-10, common factory, common practices, etc?
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With SpaceX's staffing now equivalent to ULA's why does anyone think that Falcon is cheaper to build and launch?
Doesn't ULA buy RL-10 engines for roughly $40M each, whereas the SpaceX staffing includes building their own engines? Even this one item could make ULA rockets noticeably more expensive than SpaceX ones, even with similar staff, and I suspect it's far from the only example.
When someone mentioned RL-10 prices a year ago, it was only $30M. There was no justification for that number then, and there is no justification for the number you've created now. Provide a reference that isn't some other post on a forum, please.
Only one company makes it, and only one buys it, and neither has the slightest self interest in disclosure (I suspect that if *was* published, ULA would be embarrassed by how much they pay, and P&W embarrassed by how much they are screwing their only customer.) So a solid reference is hard to find. But we know NASA said this:
"We know the list price on an RL-10. If you look at cost over time, a very large portion of the unit cost of the EELVs is attributable to the propulsion systems, and the RL-10 is a very old engine, and there's a lot of craftwork associated with its manufacture," says Dale Thomas, associate director of technical issues at NASA Marshall. "That's what this study will figure out, is it worthwhile to build an RL-10 replacement?" "
So if NASA, which is not very cost sensitive, thinks this is worthwhile to study, it's surely significant.
Your quote is still not justification for the number Xplor stated. RL-10 is not the only propulsion system on the EELV's. And your definition of significant may be different than NASA's.
When did Dale Thomas make that quote? What was the outcome of the study? There's been a lot of talk about RL-10 replacements, but what has been determined? Developing a new LOX/LH2 engine from scratch isn't going to be cheap or easy. If the price of an RL-10 isn't as much as this forum thinks it is, then it's a lot harder to justify the development costs for a new design.
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"We know the list price on an RL-10. If you look at cost over time, a very large portion of the unit cost of the EELVs is attributable to the propulsion systems, and the RL-10 is a very old engine, and there's a lot of craftwork associated with its manufacture," says Dale Thomas, associate director of technical issues at NASA Marshall. "That's what this study will figure out, is it worthwhile to build an RL-10 replacement?" "
So if NASA, which is not very cost sensitive, thinks this is worthwhile to study, it's surely significant.
Your quote is still not justification for the number Xplor stated. RL-10 is not the only propulsion system on the EELV's. And your definition of significant may be different than NASA's.
When did Dale Thomas make that quote? What was the outcome of the study? There's been a lot of talk about RL-10 replacements, but what has been determined? Developing a new LOX/LH2 engine from scratch isn't going to be cheap or easy. If the price of an RL-10 isn't as much as this forum thinks it is, then it's a lot harder to justify the development costs for a new design.
The statement appears to have been made in April, 2012, so almost surely the study is not out yet.
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/nasa-us-air-force-to-study-joint-rocket-engine-370660/
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So I'm thinking that upgrade would make more sense than AVH with current Centaur. And it would be a next gen upper stage will all the cool tech ULA's been tinkering with for the last several years. It wouldn't require any pad modifications either I don't think, as AVH would for the two outboard CCB's.
The $M (or $B?) question is where is the money going to come from to fund such changes? DOD is focused on cost control, and that will likely continue for the foreseeable future. Boeing and LM don't appear to be interested--or maybe they are and they have a plan which we haven't seen indications of?
Well the USAF would need to initiate this with a desire to retire the Delta line, then upgrading Atlas to WBC in order to retain D4H's capability. My guess is ULA would have no problem with this if directed by USAF/DoD to do so, and they'd come up with a proposal stating they'd need X amount of money to develop WBC, but launch costs to the government woudl go down over time by Y if ULA doesn't need to staff and operate LC-37 and SLC-6, as well as whatever other accociated costs there are to the Delta IV hardware specifically. And that proposal would have to show enough savings over the long run vs. keeping the current status quo in order to get USAF/DoD to approve the investment.
Without USAF/DoD approving it and funding the development costs for the promise of future per launch savings, yea, I don't think ULA will do that change on their own. And they don't have to. USAF/DoD is currently funding their business model. Unless that changes, why -would-d they change their business model? They are currently meeting their customer's demands, and nothing will probably change unles there are new demands.
(Jim can correct this if I'm incorrect on my assumptions).
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With SpaceX's staffing now equivalent to ULA's why does anyone think that Falcon is cheaper to build and launch?
While I think that SpaceX takes vertical integration too far, and worry about their growing headcount, I'm not sure this is a fair apples to apples comparison. Sure, SpaceX's staff is almost as high as ULA's, I'm pretty sure that doesn't include all of the people working at major subcontractors/vendors for ULA (such as those working full-time at Rocketdyne building engines for ULA's vehicles). Also, as others have noted the SpaceX total includes all of those working on and supporting Dragon and DragonRider. Because SpaceX is also selling cargo/crew delivery as well as normal satellite launches, some of the fixed cost of those people can be covered by higher priced crew and cargo missions.
Not saying that SpaceX's prices won't start increasing over time (they've already increased quite a bit just for Falcon 9), just that comparing their staff to ULA's staff isn't an apples-to-apples comparison.
~Jon
I think that's a fair assessment. In addition, SpaceX, as a new company (which allpies to any new company competing against legacy veterans for a market share) doesn't have all of the legacy liabilities they do. Part of the reason Southwest Airlines has usually been profitable even in years when the larger legacy airlines were loosing money and struggling. They don't have a bunch of retiries on pensions, entrenched union oblicatiosn to meet, etc. etc. I've heard the single most expensive part of a new car built by US car companies is labor includes all of the retirees still getting pensions and healthcare benefits that that the unions got for them decades ago.
Without getting into a debate on unions, I just mean the fact is, that legacy union companies usually have much greater current cost, adn legacy liabilities. I beleive SpaceX is not union, and since they are new, their current clabor costs are more moderate, and they don't have an army of retirees collecting beenfits for the rest of their lives on the books. So their labor costs could be WAY down from ULA's, even if their cost of facilties and materials are on par with ULA's.
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1. Extra rehearsals could be satisfied by actual countdowns and launches. (Or incorporated in individual launch prices.) So could west coast pad sustainment.
1a. No, the rehearsals are for the spacecraft teams.
A billion dollars should pay quite a large spacecraft team for one year. My suspicion is still that this is like a celebrity divorce case, where one party says the settlement money is paying the other to sit around and do nothing, and the other party says it's paltry reimbursement for all the trouble they've had to put up with.
1b. No one is going to pay for a launch without a payload on an existing launcher no matter what the tanks are made of. There is no engineering reason to do such a launch
The customer, budget origin, and reasoning have all been specified. There IS an engineering reason, but it is about manufacturing engineering rather than design engineering. Beyond that, there are obvious benefits toward retiring programmatic risk.
2. No, "build it and they will come" happens all the time in the broader business world. That is almost the definition of entrepreneurial activity. Apple built a do-it-yourself "home computer," a windowed and mouse-driven personal computer, an iPod and an online music store, an iPhone smartphone and an online app store, and an iPad tablet, all before these markets existed.
2a. Not really,
2a. Yes, really. Apple built an online music store before any online music store had generated income, with their own funding.
2b. those are just evolving modifications of existing concepts that were marketed differently.
2b. This is so nebulous it could dismiss something like the electric light bulb (an evolving modification of the existing concept of a lamp that was marketed differently). More importantly, it has nothing to do with 2a: "if you build it, they will come" is not about innovation, but about shouldering risk and paying up-front costs. Your contention was that companies do not assume risk and build things in anticipation of markets opening up. Some do. Even ULA is getting dangerously near to taking such a risk with the Emergency Detection System (although Boeing could potentially have provided some guarantees).
3. The problem I see is that both ULA and DoD/NRO/NASA/etc need the EELVs to be trying out and incorporating improvements.
3. What do you called common avionics, common RL-10, common factory, common practices, etc?
Does the GM J-body or T-body ring a bell? More seriously, I respect the work that has gone into those results, but I can't put my finger on what sort of substantial improvement those have been _for the customer_. In theory they would result in lower prices, but that hasn't happened.
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A billion dollars should pay quite a large spacecraft team for one year.
To make that comment means you don't understand how a launch campaign works. Also, it is a childish statement, when you know it is not for just that.
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The customer, budget origin, and reasoning have all been specified. There IS an engineering reason, but it is about manufacturing engineering rather than design engineering. Beyond that, there are obvious benefits toward retiring programmatic risk.
No, you have not. Budget can not be from the sustainment moneys. Manufacturing engineering is not a valid reason for flight testing.
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3. What do you called common avionics, common RL-10, common factory, common practices, etc?
Does the GM J-body or T-body ring a bell? More seriously, I respect the work that has gone into those results, but I can't put my finger on what sort of substantial improvement those have been _for the customer_. In theory they would result in lower prices, but that hasn't happened.
Not the same thing. Also have you heard about common booster core?
The things I listed will save more than your ideas.
The list in the the reserve order of implementation. The first two haven't even been through all the design reviews yet. The fact that you don't know this, along with positive impacts of the these items, means you don't know what you are talking about and just pontificating about fuzzy ideas vs dealing with real world hardware.
Common avionics is a big deal. One guidance computer supplier, one IMU supplier, one set of flight program software, one SIL, one set of launch control hardware and software, etc
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After reading many of Jim’s posts, and gleaning what I can from his terse style, it seems to be the answer to the question that I started this thread with is, “ULA’s business model will change going forward when needed to continually suit the requirements by USAF/DoD..”.
ULA is a political/legal compromise formed for the specific purpose of providing assured access to space via the new EELV’s for the government to replace their other ELV’s of the class (primarily Titan). It was thought those EELV’s would get significant commercial business to help cost share with the government, but that never materialized so the government, up to this point, has chosen to adequately fund ULA to maintain both of their EELV’s in a status that meets all the complex needs and requirements by the government.
And that IS their business model. And they probably see little reason to change that until the government decides they no longer need both EELV’s maintained, and decided to only provide enough funding for one. This would have to be a decision discussed with ULA well ahead of time so they can decide how to do it and still secure reliable access to space with just one of the two EELV’s. And would be phased in over an adequate period of time for ULA to make the changes.
And this is what most of the rest of us aren’t quite seeing, or getting our heads wrapped around. We keep looking at ULA like a private company competing for commercial market in a free and open market. And through that prism, it seemed they do things pretty inefficiently. But they provide the services they do for a single customer that’s willing to pay for it. And as long as that single customer is willing to pay for it, and the primary reason they were formed is to service that customer, they will continue to do just that, in exactly the way they’ve been doing it. Until the customer says otherwise.
Maybe it’s a little like that show, “American Chopper” on the Discovery Channel. Orange County Choppers makes custom bikes that cost a ton of money. They don’t make bikes very quickly or efficiently, but they can make exactly what the customer wants for a price. OCC (with the help of the publicity from the show I’m sure) had been very successful by making these low volume, high cost bikes, rather than a much more streamlined mass-produced pike using all kids of common off-the-shelf components. They are making money and doing well. And they probably won’t change that business model until people with unique needs and deep pockets stop paying them to do it, and decide they’d be ok with a more standard, common, off-the-shelf bike.
We seem to look at OCC and say, “hey, they’ve carved out a niche market and are doing well in it, that’s good business!”. But we look at ULA doing the same thing and view it as onerous and inefficient. (Of course, some of that might have to do with it being our tax dollars paying for ULA’s operation. And if it were government departments buying these expensive, unique choppers, we might start asking why they can’t go with standard bikes instead? Heheheh)
There are other custom chopper companies out there, but OCC has so far done well, probably based on their history and reliability that they’ll deliver the goods and make the customer happy. Or those companies don’t make quite as crazy and unique bikes. Whatever. But, until something starts eating into their current business model, they’ll probably go on the as they have been.
ULA’s primary concern is servicing the government. And the services they provide are geared towards that. I’d guess in this business anyway, it’s hard to also offer a “budget” launch service for the more economically minded commercial sector. Afterall, they have to use the same hardware and launch facilities they do for the government, and ULA can only build Atlas and Delta and their derivatives, so they don’t have a choice. OCC could probably make a chopper a –little- cheaper than their big flashy ones, but it’d still be a lot more money that a production line brand, because they are a labor and overhead intensive custom job shop, not a production line. All of those cool gadgets they have in their shop, and all of the high-talent machinists and artists and designers still need paid regardless of if they are trying to make a chopper look like a jet aircraft, or just make it look like a simple motorcycle.
Anyway, that’s what I –think- I’ve gleaned from this whole conversations.
I’m going to go out on a limb here and say that ULA probably does have a “Plan B”, for a time when the government decides they can live with less assured access to space, they can live with less stringent integration and processing requirements and can go with something more “industry standard”, and they can live with a bit more launch risk. And they’ll only pay X dollars for a launch of Y capability. At that time there will probably be a long sit-down with ULA, deciding what reduced red-tape the government can live with, and what ULA’s cost estimates would be various degrees of reduction of those requirements and red-tape. And the government would then decide on their new launch-requirement model, and create a phase in for both themselves, and ULA over a multi-year time frame. ULA probably has some proposals in their back pocket for such an event. What they might be, we can only speculate. But probably eliminating the more expensive Delta IV line and it’s launch facilities would be one. And streamlining processing and operations to a more “industry standard” level as well. (again, all guesses here).
In such a circumstance SpaceX would probably then be in a much better situation to compete for that work, as it would be closer to their commercial work and they wouldn’t need to venture so far from –their- business model to get that government work. But then ULA would probably be more competitive in the commercial market, so SpaceX might have to watch their backsides as well. Which I think would be a pretty ironic circumstance.
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The customer, budget origin, and reasoning have all been specified. There IS an engineering reason, but it is about manufacturing engineering rather than design engineering. Beyond that, there are obvious benefits toward retiring programmatic risk.
No, you have not. Budget can not be from the sustainment moneys. Manufacturing engineering is not a valid reason for flight testing.
It is a childish statement, when you know it is not just that. Why did Delta IV Heavy launch without a commercial payload? There are valid, and valuable, engineering reasons for doing such tests. True, such reasons are normally not enough to justify the cost of a flight test, and any sensible company will try to sell that space even if at cost, but there are circumstances where it may be worth it. And there are enormous risk, retirement of risk, and perception of risk issues. Some of the risk may be viewed as an engineering issue, and some of it is "political" or "perceptual."
The problem I see is that ULA is waiting for a launch customer, some science/military program that can only be successful using for example an ACES upper stage (as an example of some new capability), which is willing to fund its completion, and to risk launching on its first implementation: a cost-plus contract for ACES, including a launch. Such a program would eat most of the risk associated with the development. But, at the same time, normally no such program can arise (with very rare exceptions like the reported NRO : RS-68A connection), because any sane manager with alternatives would pick something safer than depending on an as-yet-undeveloped launch capability. Even for upgrades that seem like a sure bet, the time table may be prohibitive and the costs will usually outweigh the benefits any one program can get from the upgrade.
So programs will design payloads for the existing launcher, and the existing launcher will continue largely unchanged to provide the lowest risk for programs.
Occasionally, ".gov" steps in and funds specific capability upgrades (e.g. the RS-68A). The idea I was proposing was to view this as part of sustainment, which I think it ultimately is, and plan to do it regularly and push projects all the way to TRL 7-9. (Recall that virtually all DoD launches wanted a Class A launcher.) I was probably proposing far too many, too quickly--maybe one project every five years is more appropriate--but the concept should be as sacred as not eating the seed corn. ULA (and Jim) object to pulling that money from the blank check they currently get. I understand that. My feeling was that budgets are tight (and more ominously that corporate pseudo-welfare might be producing a culture of dependency and a lack of risk-taking and initiative), but maybe DoD is flush enough for additional funding.
Ideally, USAF/DoD would convene something like NASA's Decadal Survey groups but for suggested launch vehicle improvements, representing every group that schedules government launch buys. I think ULA (and perhaps SpaceX and others too) should be allowed to market planned upgrades to these customers, to seed the ideas and let people visualize what different upgrades might mean for future projects, and then the group votes on decadal launch vehicle upgrade priorities (given budgets for each of course). The highest priority(s) inside the funding space gets funded through launch or on-orbit demo.
None of this prevents ULA from funding and finishing internal improvements, of course. Nor does it prevent agencies like the NRO or USAF from funding their own high-priority needs, like making sure a certain heavy-lift capacity is present, or secret somethings like the X-42 are developed, or oddities like the OTV which might be viewed as part launch vehicle / part payload.
Instead, it's an attempt to make sure the launch services capabilities continue to evolve to meet the needs of its launch customers, who need those capabilities to be tested and proven before they propose to use them.
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3. What do you called common avionics, common RL-10, common factory, common practices, etc?
Does the GM J-body or T-body ring a bell? More seriously, I respect the work that has gone into those results, but I can't put my finger on what sort of substantial improvement those have been _for the customer_. In theory they would result in lower prices, but that hasn't happened.
Not the same thing. Also have you heard about common booster core?
The things I listed will save more than your ideas.
The list in the the reserve order of implementation. The first two haven't even been through all the design reviews yet. The fact that you don't know this, along with positive impacts of the these items, means you don't know what you are talking about and just pontificating about fuzzy ideas vs dealing with real world hardware.
Common avionics is a big deal. One guidance computer supplier, one IMU supplier, one set of flight program software, one SIL, one set of launch control hardware and software, etc
Oh, I agreed those are a big deal for ULA. I think most of the ideas I tossed out (from various ULA conf papers) were capability upgrades, so of course the things you listed will save more. And, to be honest, if you had said saving was more important than capability upgrades, I'd probably have to agree with you...as long as the benefits accrue to the customer.
The point of the reference to the J-body and T-body was a cautionary tale: the disparate brands of GM worldwide standardized on these platforms, but the benefits of all that commonality accrued to GM and not so much the customer. Whereas before the customer got customized crap from each brand, they now got the same homogenized crap from all the brands, with bonus extra problems from the new platform and the guarantee that switching to another GM brand would not help (since the platform was standardized). Furthermore, while that work was taking place, not much in terms of innovation for the customer happened. Meanwhile, non-traditional competitors had sprung up, they listened to the customers and gave them neat new ideas with a rapid product cycle and rigorous quality control.
Granted, that was a harsh analogy; the Atlas V and Delta IV are fantastic, reliable launchers, if a bit pricey. Very far from crap. The reliability is of course a huge and important difference for this industry. But standardization means nothing to the customer until the price tag reflects savings. Otherwise, it's just a fuzzy analogy, I doubt any parallels to the current situation with real world hardware can be drawn.
The programs you describe are process and standardization improvements. I'll take them as evidence that ULA is working to become more competitive: fantastic.
I still think there is room yet for *.gov to regularly, methodically fund capability improvements. Those improvements could eventually apply to SpaceX or Orbital just as easily as ULA, but right now it seems the other potential competitors are pretty stretched in just delivering what they've committed. And, the priority for capability upgrades right now would have to go to the company which has handled all of the DoD launches so far.
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1. It is a childish statement, when you know it is not just that. Why did Delta IV Heavy launch without a commercial payload?
2. Occasionally, ".gov" steps in and funds specific capability upgrades (e.g. the RS-68A). The idea I was proposing was to view this as part of sustainment.....
3. Ideally, USAF/DoD would convene something like NASA's Decadal Survey groups but for suggested launch vehicle improvements,
1. Wrong again. Delta IV Heavy Demo launch was for design validation and not manufacturing validation. Big difference.
2. Then it would be a different pot of money. the sustainment money isn't for design side of the house, it is for operations side. New hardware doesn't keep launch site techs employed.
3. Completely unnecessary and unmanageable. When the DOD or NASA needs a capability, it pays for it. No need to spend money on unneeded capabilities from multiple contractors. Anything done for one contractor in a certain vehicle class has to be done for all of them in the same class.
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A child would know the difference.
I know it's a big and onerous request but, just for a week or so, could you try not gratuitously insulting people every time you turn around?
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Jim, a few years ago at a campfire I had a friend who is a shrink turn to friends kid and say your going to be a serial killer someday. Well, it really stuck with him, so much that last summer we where around the campfire and he began bugging same shrink about why he thought that. The shrink was in total horror at the thought, since he had said it as a joke many years before.
My point being, yeah, not everyone who posts in NSF is able to completely differentiate between real spaceflight, and the flights of fancy like propelant depots, rlv's, SPS, colonies on mars, ect. Brutally crushing them results in them not wanting to pursue this. Meaning, we know they will not make the next mars colony, but it may discourage them from making real advancements towards understanding real spaceflight and what can be done and maybe helping on the edge advance some part of it.
That said, I work with an engineer I would love to duct tape inside the nozzle of the next space bound rocket ;)
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My point being, yeah, not everyone who posts in NSF is able to completely differentiate between real spaceflight, and the flights of fancy like propelant depots, rlv's, SPS, colonies on mars, ect. Brutally crushing them results in them not wanting to pursue this.
If that were true, that would probably begin with less responses here. It sure looks like the trend remains pointed in the other direction.
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1. ...No one is going to pay for a launch without a payload on an existing launcher no matter what the tanks are made of. There is no engineering reason to do such a launch
1. Why did Delta IV Heavy launch without a commercial payload?
1. Wrong again. Delta IV Heavy Demo launch was for design validation and not manufacturing validation. Big difference.
I'll let you slap whatever validation label on it you want so you can say you were right and I was wrong. Somebody paid for a launch without a payload on an existing rocket. There were some engineering reasons for doing so, and there were issues of programmatic risk.
Why can't Falcon 9 sell a USAF Class A launch tomorrow? There are questions of risk. Maybe USAF or NRO wouldn't balk at putting upwards of a billion dollar payload on the first launch of ACES, but I thought perhaps they might. The proposal was to identify desired capability upgrades like this, and launch. The original idea did not include major design work--the ideas I listed were from ULA's own documents on very straightforward upgrades for EELV, and there are competitive reasons why they might want to help with IR&D--and thus the launches could be viewed as part of sustainment. The subsequent "launch vehicle decadal survey" idea would be a separate budget item/program, because it would/could tackle items requiring more R&D. But they still go to first flight. I would imagine the decadal survey would fit more naturally as a complement to the block buy program: we're going to buy this many launches of the existing rocket, and we're going to buy a launch of this upgrade, and (if necessary) fund the development program.
2. ...
3. ...
I don't think I need to respond further. My original posts had enough clarity, and more than enough length; in trying to respond, I end up restating everything again, and trying to refocus back from your nit to the original context. It's a waste of the other readers' time, and mine.
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My original posts had enough clarity,
Quite the opposite. They show a complete lack of understanding the issues at hand and only talk of nonsensical proposals. Such as the "launch vehicle decadal survey" idea which the DOD has no money to throw at.
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I'll let you slap whatever validation label on it you want so you can say you were right and I was wrong. Somebody paid for a launch without a payload on an existing rocket. There were some engineering reasons for doing so, and there were issues of programmatic risk.
Yeah, right. Can't admit that you completely wrong and then twist the wording to throw it back at me. I never said demo launch were viable ideas, just not for manufacturing reason. Launch vehicles cut in new manufacturing techniques, subsystem upgrades, fixes, updates, material changes etc all the time without having to do test flights.
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We seem to look at OCC and say, “hey, they’ve carved out a niche market and are doing well in it, that’s good business!”. But we look at ULA doing the same thing and view it as onerous and inefficient. (Of course, some of that might have to do with it being our tax dollars paying for ULA’s operation. And if it were government departments buying these expensive, unique choppers, we might start asking why they can’t go with standard bikes instead? Heheheh)
I cut most of this post away because I think it's a pretty good analysis/summation, so thanks, Lobo!!!
I left this paragraph to comment on it... I have the ability to buy an OCC bike, or not. So I get to choose how the money's spent, and if I want to spend it on custom stuff, bully for me. It's my money.
That's not the case with ULA, (not that they're the only outfit this is true of... ) and that galls me.
Further discussion veers into politics more than I care to here.
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I cut most of this post away because I think it's a pretty good analysis/summation, so thanks, Lobo!!!
Thanks Lar. I do my best. ;-)
I left this paragraph to comment on it... I have the ability to buy an OCC bike, or not. So I get to choose how the money's spent, and if I want to spend it on custom stuff, bully for me. It's my money.
That's not the case with ULA, (not that they're the only outfit this is true of... ) and that galls me.
Well, no analogy is perfect. But I think it works pretty good. Yea, like I said, ULA is not producing LV's that the government is buying with -their- money, it's with -our- money, and we should want the best value for the money. But really, it's USAF/DoD who are making the decisions to require things of ULA that drive up prices of their LV's to a range most commercial customers can't afford. They are the ones wanting these "custom choppers", and ULA is providing them and making a profit doing it.
So I think the ire should be more directed at USAF/DoD that they aren't doing a better job of requiring the best value for their dollars, and doing their best to structure their needs so they can use as much "industry standard" as possible.
As a guy who has to bid equipment to the government sometimes, I can certainly attest to them usually requiring the most expesive options humanly possible, and I have to build in a lot of extra money into those bids vs. "industry standard". And I'm dealing with much more simple equipment than rockets, so I can only imagine what they are like to bid work to for ULA.
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So I think the ire should be more directed at USAF/DoD that they aren't doing a better job of requiring the best value for their dollars, and doing their best to structure their needs so they can use as much "industry standard" as possible.
Nominally agree. However, availability of "industry standard" solutions requires a viable U.S. commercial launch industry. (That was the rationale for the EELV program structure way-back-then, and it didn't pan out.) Without that, we have the U.S. government driving requirements and the market.
A bit of a chicken-and-egg problem. Solving that will require national policy changes (not just DoD), or market changes (providers not solely dependent on the U.S. government), and likely both--which we've seen. At the risk of wandering into policy territory, I'll leave it with reference to a previous post (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=30867.msg1007249#msg1007249); specifically:
National Security and the Commercial Space Sector (http://csis.org/files/publication/100726_Berteau_CommcialSpace_WEB.pdf), CSIS, July 2010
An excellent review of the issues, recommendations, and a rich set of references.
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What I have not seen here is any attempt to estimate where the launch market is going.
Only by doing this can you try to figure out what changes they need to make.
Based on several articles and papers I guess that the average commercial satellite will grow from 5MT now to about 6.5 MT in the 2030s both to GTO. ACES would be more then enough to meet this increase.
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What I have not seen here is any attempt to estimate where the launch market is going. Only by doing this can you try to figure out what changes they need to make.
Based on several articles and papers I guess that the average commercial satellite will grow from 5MT now to about 6.5 MT in the 2030s both to GTO. ACES would be more then enough to meet this increase.
Could you provide references to those forecasts?. My previous numbers (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=30867.msg1007981#msg1007981)--which was an attempt to address the question you raise--are based on FAA (http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/2012_Forecasts.pdf) and OECD (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-space-economy-at-a-glance-2011_9789264111790-en) projections, which don't go out to 2030. Based on those...
While GSO satellite mass in the heavier classes has shown historical growth, the forecast for the heaviest (>5400kg) is flat or declining through 2021. If anything, advances in satellite propulsion appear to argue against ever-increasing LV capabilities (and expense). Unless there's another compelling reason for ACES--Atlas V 421+ can put ~6500kg in GTO today--I don't see how ACES would make much difference in ULA's commercial competitiveness?
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What I have not seen here is any attempt to estimate where the launch market is going. Only by doing this can you try to figure out what changes they need to make.
Based on several articles and papers I guess that the average commercial satellite will grow from 5MT now to about 6.5 MT in the 2030s both to GTO. ACES would be more then enough to meet this increase.
Could you provide references to those forecasts?. My previous numbers (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=30867.msg1007981#msg1007981)--which was an attempt to address the question you raise--are based on FAA (http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/2012_Forecasts.pdf) and OECD (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-space-economy-at-a-glance-2011_9789264111790-en) projections, which don't go out to 2030. Based on those...
While GSO satellite mass in the heavier classes has shown historical growth, the forecast for the heaviest (>5400kg) is flat or declining through 2021. If anything, advances in satellite propulsion appear to argue against ever-increasing LV capabilities (and expense). Unless there's another compelling reason for ACES--Atlas V 421+ can put ~6500kg in GTO today--I don't see how ACES would make much difference in ULA's commercial competitiveness?
I was trying to look at the mass side but should have mentioned your satellite number estimates. The two combined make up future growth potential.
The FAA paper same as you was my main source.
I went based on about 1.4% growth over the last decade plus.
I do expect some slowdown in growth as well as Hall and Ion drives are used more.
At best it was a guess but it also fits with the planned improvements to Ariane V.
ACES and NextGen alone are more then enough to keep ULA competitive in terms of mass till at least 2050 probably longer. I do not see how the likely market could support something as big as the Phase 2 Atlas.
Average is good for estimates but there will be extremes like the MOUS satellite.
What is important for competition is to cover most of the market.
Without either ACES or NextGen by the late thirties these largest satellites will only be able to launch on a Delta IV Heavy or Delta 5,8 opening up a window for the competition.
I actually think one of the problems ULA has faced is it’s rockets are bigger than NASA wants. The slow growth actually helps this.
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Unless there's another compelling reason for ACES--Atlas V 421+ can put ~6500kg in GTO today--I don't see how ACES would make much difference in ULA's commercial competitiveness?
That's a 1,800m/s delta-v deficit. Commercial is specified as 1,500m/s. Thus, 421 can do 5.2tonnes, 431 5.8, 541 6.2tonnes and 551 6.8tonnes. That's good for almost every satellite in the pipeline. Regrettably, it's almost at twice the price for Ariane 5 on a USD/kg basis (assuming 230M for a 551).
They need to slash their costs to compete on the commercial market. But, you've got to do the numbers right. ULA is currently launching about eight times per year. With an average cost of about 400M and practically an assured profit (cost plus). Now, let's assume they get 50% of the GTO market. That's some extra 10 launches. But they can't charge more than 100M or so per launch. And they have the contingency of not knowing if they are going to get that many. And they would have to lower their launch price to DoD/NASA, too.
I'm not saying that they are overcharging now. I'm quite sure they do have the cost structure that costs so much. And their launch record is really impressive. Not only that, just look at how many delays have they introduced to their clients (almost less than a month per launch). I'm just saying that they have a great client, and they are a super premium supplier with safe and nice profits. I would try to keep it that way.
That being said, I know they have done enormous efforts to actually lower their costs. I suspect that the cost increase has to be looked further down the production chain.
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While GSO satellite mass in the heavier classes has shown historical growth, the forecast for the heaviest (>5400kg) is flat or declining through 2021. If anything, advances in satellite propulsion appear to argue against ever-increasing LV capabilities (and expense). Unless there's another compelling reason for ACES--Atlas V 421+ can put ~6500kg in GTO today--I don't see how ACES would make much difference in ULA's commercial competitiveness?
I believe ACES would do a few things.
First, it provides one common centaur based upper stage accross the line, rather than the 3 upper stages ULA mantains now. ULA has several papers indicating they would like to go to just one common upper stage.
It should bring costs down some over time to have just one upper stage being built and maintained.
Secondly, it upgrades Atlas's performance. Per Jim in a previous post, it would give Atlas V-55x the equivalent performance to D4H. Once that is done, there's really no need for the Delta IV line at all. That could give USAF/DoD an option to let ULA retire D4, and build only Atlas V cores and the ACES upper stage. That streamlines Decatur, and would allow ULA to close down LC-37 and SLC-6, saving them (I'd think) a decent chunk of change.
Of course, the USAF/DoD would have to decided they didn't want to keep subsidizing ULA to maintain Delta IV for "assured access to space".
Atlas V is pretty mature now, and higly reliable. So I think perhaps that dynamic has chanced since the formation of ULA.
I think if that were to happen, it could bring Atlas V's costs down enough to at least compete -better- on the commercial market. And hopefully save the government some money.
Additionally, if more capacity than Atlas V-55x + ACES is ever needed, Atlas V Heavy + ACES could be orderd and fly in about 30 months from order date? (I think that's what I've heard). And apparently it can fly from the exisiting Atlas pads. So ULA could keep just their one Atlas pad on each of the coasts. Atlas Heavy + ACES would give upwards of 39mt to LEO capacity, which should be adequate for anything the commercial market, USAF, or DoD would have needs of for some time, and set ULA up well going forward.
Maybe they could eventually cut a deal with Aerojet for the AJ-1E6, which should be a pretty easy switch for Atlas, and would be domestically produced, if there was ever a need for that.
That likely won't happen as long as USAF/DoD is willing to foot the bill to maintain both EELV's though.
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While GSO satellite mass in the heavier classes has shown historical growth, the forecast for the heaviest (>5400kg) is flat or declining through 2021. If anything, advances in satellite propulsion appear to argue against ever-increasing LV capabilities (and expense). Unless there's another compelling reason for ACES--Atlas V 421+ can put ~6500kg in GTO today--I don't see how ACES would make much difference in ULA's commercial competitiveness?
I believe ACES would do a few things.
...
To be commercially competitive ULA needs to lower costs, not increase capability--capabilities which are adequate for existing (DoD) and potential (commercial) customers. ACES would only increase costs for the foreseeable future, which would only add to the problem.
Assume funding for ACES was available tomorrow... ACES becomes available some months/years later... in the interim the existing upper stages have to be maintained... the DoD is going to require another qualification cycle, likely requiring years... and then maybe ULA can retire the alternatives.
If the objective is to lower cost through a common upper stage, there are cheaper alternatives. In particular, if ULA wins a CTS contract, they're committed to supporting DEC for some time. So why not DEC instead of ACES?
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AV Week (1-8 April 2013) in an article "Boost to the Future" says that the Air Force is doing a block buy of at least 36 ULA cores, to last through 2016. In 2015 the 2017 launches will be competed, provided at least one competitor is certified. If not, ULA will get an order for another 14 cores, and USAF will compete again a year later, and so on until at least one competitor is certified. The Air Force has "high confidence" of at least one competitor will be certified by 2015.
The ULA CEO, Gass, says that the proposed contract to the government will reduce the price by $7 billion over individual buys. Even if he was talking about all 50 cores, that's *reducing* the price by $7B/50 = $140 million *per core*. Either that's a phenomenal percentage reduction, or they'll still have an interesting time competing with SpaceX at $56 million per Falcon 9 (in quantity one). Granted that Falcon 9, v 1.1, is not yet proven/certified and that SpaceX prices may increase with experience, I'd still be very worried if I was ULA.
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AV Week (1-8 April 2013) in an article "Boost to the Future" says that the Air Force is doing a block buy of at least 36 ULA cores, to last through 2016. In 2015 the 2017 launches will be competed, provided at least one competitor is certified. If not, ULA will get an order for another 14 cores, and USAF will compete again a year later, and so on until at least one competitor is certified. The Air Force has "high confidence" of at least one competitor will be certified by 2015.
The ULA CEO, Gass, says that the proposed contract to the government will reduce the price by $7 billion over individual buys. Even if he was talking about all 50 cores, that's *reducing* the price by $7B/50 = $140 million *per core*. Either that's a phenomenal percentage reduction, or they'll still have an interesting time competing with SpaceX at $56 million per Falcon 9 (in quantity one). Granted that Falcon 9, v 1.1, is not yet proven/certified and that SpaceX prices may increase with experience, I'd still be very worried if I was ULA.
Hmmm...very interesting. That gives SpaceX some time to get F9 v1.1 operating with a track record, as well as FH.
They'll still have the issue with vertical integration that I think is requires on at least some government launches. (Is it all government launches? Or all of them?
SpaceX would probably have to build a mobile tower at VAFB like the old Titan tower they tore down (They still have the space open where the MSS retracted to, so I assume they could put up a F9 version right back there.).
As for the Cape I dunno how hard it would be to put one back at LC-40. However, they could launch from KSC pad 39A and integrate in the VAB if it wouldn't be too expensive and too much of a pain to work around NASA.
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http://www.youtube.com/v/RmWHGMidQ3w?version=3&hl=en_US&rel=0
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Can't happen until common avionics and common propellants/core.
I've read that the first Atlas with common avionics will fly in the third quarter of next year. When will the first Delta fly with them? And when will the last Delta and Atlas fly with their old avionics?
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At its core, ULA is simply a business designed to make money for parent companies LM & Boeing. It also serves those parent companies by creating jobs for political goodwill and anything to do with the space program has the benefit of generating good publicity.
So this question really boils down to this: At what point does Space-X threaten that income stream?
After 12 years of development work, Space-X are now beginning to threaten ULA's dominance in the US marketplace. They clearly have a competing product that has already proven to be reliable and cost competitive. They also have solid plans to provide larger capacity at even better prices in the relatively near future and those plans do appear to hold water.
Space-X's recent actions are also now taking the fight into both the public and political domain.
I can't see any way for ULA to get the prices of the current Delta-IV or Atlas-V down to the levels Space-X are clearly aiming for, so there comes a point where their only realistic chance of competing with this new paradigm is to design a new vehicle that targets a competitive price point.
Whether such a new vehicle would be able to generate sufficient profit to satisfy the parent companies is open to debate. Personally, I don't think so. Perhaps the political and publicity might be sufficient to keep them interested, despite significantly reduced profits, but I doubt it.
I therefore suspect the most profitable route for Boeing and LM, will be to sell ULA within the next few years, for as much as they can get.
The logical purchaser would be Aerojet, but frankly, they would be better off repeating Space-X's approach and building an optimized operation specifically built for their needs, instead of inheriting a less optimised operation like ULA. It would take Aerojet longer to build their own, but it would also cost them a lot less in both the short- and long-term.
Who else could buy ULA? ATK? Dynetics?
-MG.
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At its core, ULA is simply a business designed to make money for parent companies LM & Boeing. It also serves those parent companies by creating jobs for political goodwill and anything to do with the space program has the benefit of generating good publicity.
So this question really boils down to this: At what point does Space-X threaten that income stream?
After 12 years of development work, Space-X are now beginning to threaten ULA's dominance in the US marketplace. They clearly have a competing product that has already proven to be reliable and cost competitive. They also have solid plans to provide larger capacity at even better prices in the relatively near future and those plans do appear to hold water.
Space-X's recent actions are also now taking the fight into both the public and political domain.
I can't see any way for ULA to get the prices of the current Delta-IV or Atlas-V down to the levels Space-X are clearly aiming for, so there comes a point where their only realistic chance of competing with this new paradigm is to design a new vehicle that targets a competitive price point.
Whether such a new vehicle would be able to generate sufficient profit to satisfy the parent companies is open to debate. Personally, I don't think so. Perhaps the political and publicity might be sufficient to keep them interested, despite significantly reduced profits, but I doubt it.
I therefore suspect the most profitable route for Boeing and LM, will be to sell ULA within the next few years, for as much as they can get.
The logical purchaser would be Aerojet, but frankly, they would be better off repeating Space-X's approach and building an optimized operation specifically built for their needs, instead of inheriting a less optimised operation like ULA. It would take Aerojet longer to build their own, but it would also cost them a lot less in both the short- and long-term.
Who else could buy ULA? ATK? Dynetics?
-MG.
Jim has said before that ULA can -only- operate the two EELV's. They can only build and operate Atlas V and Delta IV, and there derivatives. They can't come up with a new lower cost LV to better compete with SpaceX that isn't a Delta IV or Atlas V. It's outside the legal agreements under which they were formed.
I think that's why their various growth concepts were called "Atlas V, Phase 2" or Phase 3, rather than an Atlas 6 as a 5m core Atlas seems like it would be called.
I'm not sure what exactly qualifies something to be an Atlas V or Delta IV derivative, but I don't think they can get too far away from the avionics, engines, etc of them.
I don't know if ULA could or would be sold off. I think if it couldn't survive, it would be dissolved and split back up to it's parent companies. It could be a more ugly divorce than the original marriage was. ;-)
But, before something like that would happen, I would think ULA would downsize and restructure in an attempt to get more competative if USAF wasn't going to subsidize them to retain their capabilities any more.
My guess. The EELV's get downsized to just Atlas V. Delta IV goes away, as does LC-37 and SLC-6. (LC-37 could be converted to Atlas if they expected enough launches). ULA would be sure to have enough RD-180's to float them until a domestic RD-180 or equivalent is produced. Then they would develop a new 5m upper stage, so that the Atlas V-55x could handle D4H payloads. That, and some hard downsizing of work force, particularly the unionized work fork, and I think they could be competative. Atlas V-55x with a 5m upper stage could possiby compete with Ariane 5 for dual paylaod launches.
ULA would take a stab and making this work, and the USAF would ensure they get enough government business to facilitate the restructuring, to see if they can start sustaining themselves on the open market.
Just a wild guess though.
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This thread is extremely presumptive with lots of passionate posts. Many well meant too.
But its kind of like apples and oranges in a lot of ways, a mixture of inconsistent units.
ULA isn't doing what SpaceX does. Neither wants anything to do with the other.
Yet they occupy roles as launch service providers. One can argue about exactly how service offerings intersect.
They both have viewed the future of providers very differently. One has a storied history of accomplishment and studied evolution, the other an engaging theory, some parts proven, of how to change an industry, possibly from the bottom up.
If I'm AF and have something I need, I'm not big on theory but practice. And I don't want the model for that to change. Because it means I could lose and my job is about winning.
So how do you deal with that? This is mandatory to the DNA here.
Most of what I see in this thread doesn't start with this as a given. And you can't graft "fire" and "ice" together and get something coherent.
That doesn't mean a clear path forward for any of the providers. One of my interests is in understanding all of the twisted paths that might come from this thrash - don't see anything I could write a business model around yet.
In a like way, I can see that SpaceX can't work by ULA in reverse, yet as Jim correctly, constantly points, it's constrained to a large degree, simply by that storied history. So SpaceX is a business model that is a work in progress compared to ULA changes microscopically, the others spread in between.
Clearly chaos favours King Stork over King Log, and we are seeing that now. Especially as events have lit fires under King Log, who has thick bark, and whose main concern is retaining as much as possible for as long as possible.
How do you advocates for changing ULA business model cope with this fundamental contradiction?
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I can't see any way for ULA to get the prices of the current Delta-IV or Atlas-V down to the levels Space-X are clearly aiming for, so there comes a point where their only realistic chance of competing with this new paradigm is to design a new vehicle that targets a competitive price point.
That isn't for ULA to do, that would be up Boeing or LM individually to decide if they want to do it themselves.
ULA can't do anything but EELV's.
LM and Boeing can't do ELV's in the EELV class. But they could do RLV's in any class.
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I can't see any way for ULA to get the prices of the current Delta-IV or Atlas-V down to the levels Space-X are clearly aiming for, so there comes a point where their only realistic chance of competing with this new paradigm is to design a new vehicle that targets a competitive price point.
That isn't for ULA to do, that would be up Boeing or LM individually to decide if they want to do it themselves.
ULA can't do anything but EELV's.
LM and Boeing can't do ELV's in the EELV class. But they could do RLV's in any class.
Jim,
Maybe you can help us understand a little, what can or might happen to ULA if in at some point in the future, USAF let's ULA restructure as they like, and competatively bids -all- launches. And assuming that at ULA's current prices, SpaceX is able to undercut them on each launch (even if SpaceX's prices go up from where they are now in order to meet USAF and DoD requirements.)
You've said ULA can only operate the Atlas and Delta EELV's. They can't develop a new, lower cost ELV in that class.
What would likely happen? Would ULA streamline and downselect to just one EELV?
Would they disolve and go back to their parent companies, as the environment in which they were created would have changed?
Can their "charter" be changed such that they could develop any new/different ELV's in the EELV class to better compete in open bidding with SpaceX for government and commercial payloads, and ArianeSpace for international payloads?
I've gathered ULA is as it is because of the conditions and events that existed in the early 2000's. Will USAF and DoD ever start competing all launches? And if so, how do you see ULA's actions going forward?
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If I understand it correctly, ULA's charter is a disaster. It prevents them from developing new launch systems, and it prevents the two biggest aerospace corporations in the United States from doing their own medium-heavy launch systems. It's programmed from the outset to be a dead end, and it practically ensures that a new generation of launch providers will have to leap-frog the incumbents and carry the future of the U.S. launch industry.
The question isn't how should ULA's business model change. How could it? ULA is the original kind of corporation, like we used to have at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, where corporations where narrowly chartered for a specific purpose (e.g. build a bridge) and then dissolved after their designated role had been exhausted.
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Couldn't someone (say Aerojet) approach Boeing and LM with a proposal to buy ULA, or at least a stake in it? Is there anything in the consent decree that would disallow this?
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Perhaps we are looking at this from the wrong end. ULA seems to be the unwanted stepchild of two parents who did not do well in the EELV program. Faced with a declining government launch rate and rising prices, they had no reason to stay in the market at all.
The Air Force, however, absolutely needs to launch a variety of payloads and has to pay whatever it takes. They can beg and plead for lower costs, but the only way to be sure the payloads are launched is to pay enough to make it worthwhile for the seller.
Could there be one faction in the Air Force that pushed the block buy as a way to ensure that the rockets, and the people that they have learned to deal with, are still around in a few years time? Another faction is willing to take a chance on lower prices and hope that the capability and schedule performance will be there when needed.
If SpaceX takes some of the launches, the remainder will be even more expensive for the Air Force, and the total savings may not be as expected. ULA will survive until ALL of its capabilities can be matched by someone else.
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Well meant posts but a little off.
The "special existence" of ULA is none of those things. It's rather obvious - US govt needed an ELV better than the past Atlas Delta Titan, so the deal was to have a competition and end up with one they could hold onto to answer specific need effectively.
For various reasons we ended up with both. To make both into one, we took parts out of two firms and glued them together as one.
This is why its "special". Nothing more. Please leave it at that.
You have two shareholders as a direct result. The shotgun marriage of sorts has a very specific prenuptial, because these are major league competitors. The rules are clear and aren't going to change.
So what's the limits here? The two shareholders desires as far as how much to adjust/improve joint EELV offering addressing F9/FH - maybe a little, maybe more. Up to them.
What's not in bounds - ULA making a F9R/FHR/FXX direct competitor. Because LockMart/Boeing would be the one to do so.
ULA isn't an unwanted stepchild. Its a tremendous success that has defined the norm and is hard to dismiss with its successes.
It means that Boeing and LockMart can bid on related work and not have to depend upon another firm to get things on orbit (or not). Extremely valuable.
But you can't wave a magic wand and turn it into this thing or that thing as you like. Not mutable. Hard to get two big companies to agree on much different, especially when they have so much riding on things not changing.
Which is not to mean they won't change because they are. But not in unreal ways. Only in real ways.
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What's not in bounds - ULA making a F9R/FHR/FXX direct competitor. Because LockMart/Boeing would be the one to do so.
I'm not sure that true. It's my understanding that Lockheed and Boeing aren't allowed to pursue EELV-class launch vehicles of the type they'd need to compete with SpaceX. Jim mentioned that they are permitted to do RLVs, but as SpaceX is demonstrating, it's a lot easier to develop an RLV if you can market the prototypes as ELVs.
ULA can't change, and its parents can't enter the market.
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What's not in bounds - ULA making a F9R/FHR/FXX direct competitor. Because LockMart/Boeing would be the one to do so.
I'm not sure that true. It's my understanding that Lockheed and Boeing aren't allowed to pursue EELV-class launch vehicles of the type they'd need to compete with SpaceX. Jim mentioned that they are permitted to do RLVs, but as SpaceX is demonstrating, it's a lot easier to develop an RLV if you can market the prototypes as ELVs.
ULA can't change, and its parents can't enter the market.
Understand. But ... this is about contracts ... legal definitions ... which work by specific semantics. I'll try to help you on this.
At the time of the ULA creation, no one had done an RLV that was optionally an ELV. Didn't exist for the contract to take it into account.
Now one exists. Has a business model. It clearly does not fit against specific definition of Atlas V or Delta IV. In law it is discrete and non-overlapping. To add more, in the history between the start of ULA to present, nothing ULA has done falls within the province of such. Closest is a proposal to recover and reuse engines as a recoverable engine pod - not in F9R.
So yes unsurprisingly Jim is right. I've helped you.
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With legal shackles like this binding all three companies, there doesn't appear to be an easy path for any of them to actually compete with Space-X, assuming of course that they do pull-off the re-usability technology trick and can thereby drop their prices in the manner they are clearly aiming for.
What is becoming even clearer than ever, is that LM/Boeing are going to have to fix this first, if they want any hope of remaining competitive in this changing marketplace.
I still say that selling ULA as a going concern, together with providing appropriate permissions for ULA to continue to develop its products completely independently, is going to be the most profitable route for the parents at this point. I wouldn't be surprised to start hearing noises in public, along this direction, before the end of the year.
Maybe even sooner given the Orbital/ATK merger.
-MG.
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With legal shackles like this binding all three companies, there doesn't appear to be an easy path for any of them to actually compete with Space-X, assuming of course that they do pull-off the re-usability technology trick and can thereby drop their prices in the manner they are clearly aiming for.
What is becoming even clearer than ever, is that LM/Boeing are going to have to fix this first, if they want any hope of remaining competitive in this changing marketplace.
Well, I don't know they they would compete per se. It depends if USAF/DoD continues to pay them enough to "retain" their services as is, and use them for most of their launches.
If USAF/DoD decides they won't do that any more, and they would allow each launch (or perhaps small groups of launches) to be competed openly, ULA probably won't be able to compete as they are now. They'll need to restructure. There's not need to restructure until USAF/DoD stops paying them to retain their current operation and capabilities. So it really depends on that happening. Yes, they have shackles on, but they are paid to wear them, so it's not necessarily detrimental to them.
Maybe even sooner given the Orbital/ATK merger.
-MG.
Yes, that has interesting possibilities. Especially if they decide to upgrade Antares enough with big ATK solid segmented boosters to push it up into EELV class performance. It could be pretty low cost if all solid, and if ATK's new shuttle booster diameter booster segments are relatively cheap.
They could continue to launch from Wallops. They could lease a VAB bay and modify an old STS MLP to launch at 39B (NASA's trying to get someone to do that anyway). The solid booster segments could use the SLS SRB infrastructure directly to get there and stack.
And VAFB or Kodiak to be used to launch on the West Coast. I believe Kodiak has vertical integration capabilities. Might be an issue of access to the payload on the pad, which I believe USAF requires. Wallops and KSC won't have that, and I don't know if Kodiak does. It would have to be added new for sure to any place at VAFB. So not sure how they'd handle that for USAF/DoD launches.
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Once Falcon Heavy has completed 3 launches and is certified by the USAF, would that be sufficient to qualify SpaceX to compete for 100% of the same launches that ULA currently provides? Is there some other category of payload that the Falcon 9 or Falcon Heavy would still not be able to handle?
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CCAFS and VAFB are the only approved launch sites for the DOD because of the existing payload processing infrastructure.
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The real question is how should the EELV program model be changed going forward.
ULA has been simply catering to the requirements as set forth by a vital Govt' concern. It is that concern and the requirements set forth to ensure the successful facilitation of that concern that have been driving this bus.
I'd just assume a top to bottom review of the entirety of the EELV program. Without that, it's not practical to expect ULA to be able to alter their business model in a meaningful way. IMO
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The real question is how should the EELV program model be changed going forward.
ULA has been simply catering to the requirements as set forth by a vital Govt' concern. It is that concern and the requirements set forth to ensure the successful facilitation of that concern that have been driving this bus.
I'd just assume a top to bottom review of the entirety of the EELV program. Without that, it's not practical to expect ULA to be able to alter their business model in a meaningful way. IMO
The 'top' of that review should be the 'no price is too high' and 'what NRO wants, NRO gets' commandments. Everyone is assuming we need and are getting all the 'safety' we are paying for from the tens of billions of dollars we are orbiting in the name of security. (Note: $10B = lifetime income of 2,500 professionals)
Maybe, just maybe, they could get along with less (say 50%, just to pick a number).
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Everyone is assuming we need and are getting all the 'safety' we are paying for from the tens of billions of dollars we are orbiting in the name of security.
Maybe the National Security folks should always have a few more spare satellites when they contract for them. That would permit a "riskier" calculation for launch platforms and could well be cheaper and more robust in the end and spares available for emergencies.
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The real question is how should the EELV program model be changed going forward.
ULA has been simply catering to the requirements as set forth by a vital Govt' concern. It is that concern and the requirements set forth to ensure the successful facilitation of that concern that have been driving this bus.
I'd just assume a top to bottom review of the entirety of the EELV program. Without that, it's not practical to expect ULA to be able to alter their business model in a meaningful way. IMO
I think there is some truth to what you are saying.
Regardless how ULA got to this point, they can't just drop their prices and suddenly be able to compete with SpaceX and be as profitable as SpaceX (which is the only way to survive long term). They have built up their infrastructure to match not only their customers every need, but also to match the prices they charge.
So if the Air Force wants ULA to be a service provider for the long term after SpaceX starts taking away business from them, AND for ULA to drop their prices so as to stay competitive with SpaceX, then the Air Force and the U.S. Government entities that have payloads to be launched are going to have to be involved too.
That's going to have to take leadership from someone within the government, likely someone in the Air Force. Someone whose mission is to take a lot of cost out of the system, which means they are not going to be popular with those that don't want to remove people and infrastructure from the gravy train. We'll see if that happens.
In the mean time Boeing and Lockheed Martin have to figure out how to deal with a smaller pie for launches, and pressure to reduce costs far more than they supposedly have. And that's going to be interesting to watch.
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This article could have gone under multiple threads but I liked the part about ULA engineering team. It would be great to see what ULA could do if they were given more freedom by their owners.
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2014/07/28/space-access-society-update/
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This article could have gone under multiple threads but I liked the part about ULA engineering team. It would be great to see what ULA could do if they were given more freedom by their owners.
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2014/07/28/space-access-society-update/
I am curious about one point raised by the article: Boeing doing the upper stage work for SLS, when ULA has the experts.
I vaguely remember this coming up before, and Jim saying it was complicated...Jim, could you set us straight again?
The Centaur hardware folks are at ULA now? DCSS hardware and design guys are at ULA too?
Does the Boeing upper stage contract for SLS cut out Kutter et al and all the ACES and IVF work? Or would Boeing subcontract to ULA?
Does Bernard Kutter (or any such ULA employee) put on a Boeing hat and do work for SLS, and then put on a ULA hat and do ACES and IVF, or is that impossible by the terms of the merger?
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1. The Centaur hardware folks are at ULA now? DCSS hardware and design guys are at ULA too?
Does the Boeing upper stage contract for SLS cut out Kutter et al and all the ACES and IVF work? Or would Boeing subcontract to ULA?
2. Does Bernard Kutter (or any such ULA employee) put on a Boeing hat and do work for SLS, and then put on a ULA hat and do ACES and IVF, or is that impossible by the terms of the merger?
1. yes, yes, yes, don't know
2. Not possible. They are either one or the other, but not both.
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1. The Centaur hardware folks are at ULA now? DCSS hardware and design guys are at ULA too?
Does the Boeing upper stage contract for SLS cut out Kutter et al and all the ACES and IVF work? Or would Boeing subcontract to ULA?
2. Does Bernard Kutter (or any such ULA employee) put on a Boeing hat and do work for SLS, and then put on a ULA hat and do ACES and IVF, or is that impossible by the terms of the merger?
1. yes, yes, yes, don't know
2. Not possible. They are either one or the other, but not both.
Ouch, that's too bad. ULA really does have all the experience, have shown they are thinking very closely about exploration features in upper stage designs, have been pursuing innovative ideas... sigh.
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1. The Centaur hardware folks are at ULA now? DCSS hardware and design guys are at ULA too?
Does the Boeing upper stage contract for SLS cut out Kutter et al and all the ACES and IVF work? Or would Boeing subcontract to ULA?
2. Does Bernard Kutter (or any such ULA employee) put on a Boeing hat and do work for SLS, and then put on a ULA hat and do ACES and IVF, or is that impossible by the terms of the merger?
1. yes, yes, yes, don't know
2. Not possible. They are either one or the other, but not both.
Ouch, that's too bad. ULA really does have all the experience, have shown they are thinking very closely about exploration features in upper stage designs, have been pursuing innovative ideas... sigh.
Lockheed had the shuttle era external tank experience. ULA has the nations LH2 upper stage experience. Apparently NASA had other priorities then building on experience.