NASASpaceFlight.com Forum
General Discussion => Q&A Section => Topic started by: ZachS09 on 11/14/2012 04:30 pm
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If Columbia's STS-107 crew had to be rescued by Atlantis and that orbiter was launched, what 4 crew members could've done the rescuing and prevented the Columbia disaster?
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If Columbia's STS-107 crew had to be rescued by Atlantis and that orbiter was launched, what 4 crew members could've done the rescuing and prevented the Columbia disaster?
I'm rpetty sure it would have been the original STS-114 crew:
CDR Eileen Collins
PLT James Kelly
MS1: Soichi Noguchi
MS2/FE: Stephen Robinson
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The CAIB did state that a rescue using 104 was possible if the damage had been diagnosed by FD5. The question is, would you launch a rescue mission? The obvious risk is the same or similar damage occurring to Atlantis' TPS on ascent from the ET bipod foam. I've wondered - and I'd actually be interested in a thoughful engineering analysis - what could have been done in the time given to mitigate that risk? Specifically, would it have been possible to remove the left bipod ramp foam and leave the exposed hardware in conjunction with a temporary modification to LC39's (I forget it A or B would have been used) FSS to direct heated GN2 onto the exposed metal to prevent icing? Assume that the heated GN2 could be directed via ductwork that is far enough away from the stack to have zero chance of making contact with it. Just blowing hot gas in the direction of some cold metal. Would it work, or do the thermodynamics preclude it (ie - heat energy into the metal by hot gas minus heat sunk from it by cryogenics in the ET)?
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The CAIB did state that a rescue using 104 was possible if the damage had been diagnosed by FD5.
The question is, would you launch a rescue mission?
The obvious risk is the same or similar damage occurring to Atlantis' TPS on ascent from the ET bipod foam.
I've wondered - and I'd actually be interested in a thoughful engineering analysis - what could have been done in the time given to mitigate that risk?
Specifically, would it have been possible to remove the left bipod ramp foam and leave the exposed hardware in conjunction with a temporary modification to LC39's (I forget it A or B would have been used) FSS to direct heated GN2 onto the exposed metal to prevent icing?
Assume that the heated GN2 could be directed via ductwork that is far enough away from the stack to have zero chance of making contact with it. Just blowing hot gas in the direction of some cold metal. Would it work, or do the thermodynamics preclude it (ie - heat energy into the metal by hot gas minus heat sunk from it by cryogenics in the ET)?
Bumping this thread because I feel that Wolfpack question remains very interesting, a and worth a debate by experts of that forum. ;)
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Not enough time to do the mods
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Would there be enough prop on Columbia to put her in a stable parking orbit until Atlantis showed up? Maybe say get it close to the altitude of the ISS?
Consumables is unknown, but what of fuel to by some time?
Was there , in reality, any feasible way to save Columbia's crew with the time allowed?
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Would there be enough prop on Columbia to put her in a stable parking orbit until Atlantis showed up? Maybe say get it close to the altitude of the ISS?
Consumables is unknown, but what of fuel to by some time?
This is in the CAIB report; fuel wasn't the limiting factor for a Shuttle-based rescue (LiOH canisters on Columbia for CO2 scrubbing was determined to limit the time available to save the crew). If you want to learn more, a lot of the background is detailed in the opening pages of Volume 2, Appendix D.13, "STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment," which talks about assumptions and initial conditions.
Setting aside the lack of a docking system, STS-107 was flown in a very different orbit than the ISS; there was no way to rendezvous with the ISS. That's also in the report:
5.3 ISS SAFE HAVEN
The Columbiaʼs 39 degree orbital inclination could not have been altered to the ISS 51.6 degree inclination without approximately 12,600 ft/sec of translational capability. Columbia had 448 ft/sec of propellant available.
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As described in the post accident reports, nose RCS and tail RCS pitch control were disabled per normal re-entry procedures. If damage to the wing was known and prospective flight control issues forecast, could these two control mechanisms have been software re-enabled to improve control authority?
I remember post accident discussions about increasing the angle of attack (to 50 degrees from 45) during re-entry was a possibility to decrease plasma flow directly into the wing.
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As described in the post accident reports, nose RCS and tail RCS pitch control were disabled per normal re-entry procedures. If damage to the wing was known and prospective flight control issues forecast, could these two control mechanisms have been software re-enabled to improve control authority?
I remember post accident discussions about increasing the angle of attack (to 50 degrees from 45) during re-entry was a possibility to decrease plasma flow directly into the wing.
The reason the RCS pitch is inhibited is because, as the airflow gets denser, te natural triming forces of the wing get stronger than the forces the RCS can provide. Increasing the pitch angle would just make this worse. An increased pitch angle would have probably increased the heating rate and caused the wing to fail sooner than it did. Also, no really knows where exactly the hole in the RCC panel was since not enough of panel 8 survived to determine that, but the fact that none of the foam debris was seen to go over the wing strongly suggests that the impact site was below the forward apex of the panel. In that case, pitching higher would have presented the hole more prominently to the plasma flow.
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Volume 2, Appendix D.13, "STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment,"
I found it on the web the other day. All this because of a comment on Wayne Hale blog mentionning a possible use of the last Ariane 4 (flight 159, February 15 2003, Intelsat 907) to bring supplies (oxygen and Co2 scrubbers) to a stranded crew.
That appendix is 22 pages long and written in a dry technical wording. Yet it would make a good basis for a modern-day remake of Marooned.
On this forum I've also found a paper by William Le roy Cain which described possible options to make Columbia lighter for a fluffier re-entry.
That paper is also worth a read. At some point they discuss the feasibility of throwing the 18 000 pound Spacehab module overboard. :o
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If the foam had struck the tiles on the underside instead of the rcc panel could Columbia have survived reentry? In other words was the tragedy a case of really bad luck??
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Volume 2, Appendix D.13, "STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment,"
I found it on the web the other day. All this because of a comment on Wayne Hale blog mentionning a possible use of the last Ariane 4 (flight 159, February 15 2003, Intelsat 907) to bring supplies (oxygen and Co2 scrubbers) to a stranded crew.
IIRC, Jim Oberg noted a variation on this idea in contemporary reporting after the disaster. (More along the lines of a reply to the comment you noted.)
(The in-flight options assessment has come up here multiple times and was also examined in contemporary reporting.)
That appendix is 22 pages long and written in a dry technical wording. Yet it would make a good basis for a modern-day remake of Marooned.
Perhaps, but I much prefer the dry technical wording. Maybe it's sleep-inducing for a mainstream audience, but it's the kind of material that brought me to this website in the first place.
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Please provide a link to this paper?
On this forum I've also found a paper by William Le roy Cain which described possible options to make Columbia lighter for a fluffier re-entry.
That paper is also worth a read. At some point they discuss the feasibility of throwing the 18 000 pound Spacehab module overboard. :o
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Please provide a link to this paper?
Directly, here's one:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts-107/investigation/entryoptionsfinal.pdf
From here:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts-107/investigation/index.html
(FWIW, also referenced in the aforementioned in-flight options assessment, section 4.7.)
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Thanks, psloss
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Thank you also. I had found the document via this forum, and did not knew about the whole think you linked
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts-107/investigation/index.html
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Not enough time to do the mods
Does that assume it would work?
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If the foam had struck the tiles on the underside instead of the rcc panel could Columbia have survived reentry? In other words was the tragedy a case of really bad luck??
Possibly. It all depends on how many tiles were damaged and how deep the damage went. They had succesfully landed with tiles gone all the way down to the densification layer without any damage before that.
That was actually one of the things during the flight that led to some of the decision making by MCC and the MMT. They initialy thought that only the tiles had been hit and they used an analysis tool called "CRATER" (that wasn't designed for the amout of mass involved in this incident) to estimate the amount of damage. This led to the false sense of assurance that the situation wasn't as bad as it really was.