Campaign begins
http://www.federalspace.ru/main.php?id=2&nid=17574
Anyone know when the Proton was delivered. Serial numbers anyone?
Campaign begins
http://www.federalspace.ru/main.php?id=2&nid=17574
Anyone know when the Proton was delivered. Serial numbers anyone?
8K82KM Proton-M/Briz-M (93521/99522)
Ekspress AM4 has been delivered to Baikonur from EADS Astrium (Toulouse) on 19th july
Does anyone has any information regarding the Briz-M ignitions? I suppose this will be a standard mission with five Briz-M ignitions and a 9 hour plus flight before spacecraft separation...
Does anyone has any information regarding the Briz-M ignitions? I suppose this will be a standard mission with five Briz-M ignitions and a 9 hour plus flight before spacecraft separation...
Yes, standard five ignitions mission: http://www.space-center.ru/ApriEvents.aspx
Hello Satori,
Where do you got your information about the flight? My live brodcast was without audio...
Hello Satori,
Where do you got your information about the flight? My live brodcast was without audio...
From http://www.space-center.ru/LiveGroundTrack.aspx
Bad news... From fourth ignition of Breeze no contact with stage and satellite.
Bad news... From fourth ignition of Breeze no contact with stage and satellite.
Uh oh!
Do we have a link?
Bad news... From fourth ignition of Breeze no contact with stage and satellite.
Uh oh!
Do we have a link?
Novosti Kosmonavtiki forum (http://www.novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=11915&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=90).
NewsRu.com (http://www.newsru.com/russia/18aug2011/sputnik_express.html)
That's unfortunate.
Does anyone know, if the Ekspress-AM4 satellite was insured?
Thanks Astropl.
Reads that the Briz-M lost all power at fourth stage ignition. No hope for the satellite, as no power = no S/C Sep, regardless of the orbit etc :(
Does this mean that Vladimir Popovkin will be fired now? ::)
That is certainly a poor system architecture, if the satellite cannot separate itself from a dead upper stage.
Heads will roll.
In this case, a failed capacitor or electrical connection caused complete LOM.
Does this mean that Vladimir Popovkin will be fired now? ::)
Typically, heads roll at the contractor level, which means that the impact will hit Khrunichev. Its one thing to have a component fail, but the system should have some capability of recovering from a single point failure. In this case, a failed capacitor or electrical connection caused complete LOM.
That is certainly a poor system architecture, if the satellite cannot separate itself from a dead upper stage.
Heads will roll.
Could you please tell us how you would have designed the upper stage to avoid this problem?
Andy
Spot on... It will be interesting to what they point to as the most likely cause. A baseless WAG, but often Russia failures get different groups pointing at other groups as the source of the failure.
You have no idea if a single failed electronic component caused the failure. You're speculating baselessly.
Besides, with regard to your "heads will roll" comment, this is hardly the first time a Briz-M has failed - how many heads are there left to be rolled over in the Russian aerospace industry these days then? ::)
In this case, a failed capacitor or electrical connection caused complete LOM.
Source?
I do not think, that any concrete reason for the LOS has been published so early.
That is certainly a poor system architecture, if the satellite cannot separate itself from a dead upper stage.
Heads will roll.
Could you please tell us how you would have designed the upper stage to avoid this problem?
Andy
A design that allows the payload to separate itself in the event of total system failure of the upper stage is not exactly rocket science.
That is certainly a poor system architecture, if the satellite cannot separate itself from a dead upper stage.
Heads will roll.
Could you please tell us how you would have designed the upper stage to avoid this problem?
Andy
A design that allows the payload to separate itself in the event of total system failure of the upper stage is not exactly rocket science.
1. What good will it do, the fifth burn never happened. Not all satellites can recover from such a failure.
2. Name one LV that works that way.
Does Briz-M have a fail-safe tank pressure relief system? I assume that in the case of a normal launch, after spacecraft separation the upper stage has a CCAM maneuver similar to Centaur to eliminate the chance of a residual fuel explosion. Is there a failsafe system in case the stage is stranded without power while partially fuelled? Just want to avoid debris-creating events like the one in February 2007:
http://apod.nasa.gov/apod/ap070222.html (http://apod.nasa.gov/apod/ap070222.html)
That is certainly a poor system architecture, if the satellite cannot separate itself from a dead upper stage.
Heads will roll.
Could you please tell us how you would have designed the upper stage to avoid this problem?
Andy
A design that allows the payload to separate itself in the event of total system failure of the upper stage is not exactly rocket science.
Considering that is the explosion of a Briz-M a year after it failed to place Badr-1 into the correct orbit, that may not be the case.
A simple relay to transfer the pyro circuits to Payload when the stage loses power would address most that. I'd guess an added on connector for the high current signals. Not as sexy as 3 million lines of code, but more the Russian way anyhow. It obviously wouldn't use the upper stage computer if the upper stage were dead. There's no problem with simple, last ditch efforts if you don't have anything to lose.
That is certainly a poor system architecture, if the satellite cannot separate itself from a dead upper stage.
Heads will roll.
Could you please tell us how you would have designed the upper stage to avoid this problem?
Andy
A design that allows the payload to separate itself in the event of total system failure of the upper stage is not exactly rocket science.
So, every spacecraft manufacturer would have to include the necessary commands to separate its spacecraft from all types of rockets that could be used for that satellite? Who tests to make sure the separation command doesn't inadvertently come from the satellite during ascent?
And, who actually generates the power for the pyro or spring command to function? The satellite's power bus doesn't extend into the upper stage usually. How about spin-up manuevers? How does the command get to the upper stage computer which has no power? Are you going to hard-wire into the separation system for every different type of upper stage?
So, actually it is rocket science. I'll ask again, could you please tell us how you would have designed the upper stage to avoid this problem? I would really like to know.
That was a few years ago, just figured someone had time since to send a memo saying 'maybe we should start installing burst discs on these tanks just in case'.
One object being tracked so far, in a (roughly) 147 x 11,338 km x 49.58 deg orbit. It may be the Briz M drop tank, which would have jettisoned prior to the fourth burn.
Great work Rui!
Speaking of which, here's William Graham's overview article:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/08/proton-m-launches-russias-ekspress-am4-communications-satellite/
(Great read, lots of info).
One object being tracked so far, in a (roughly) 147 x 11,338 km x 49.58 deg orbit. It may be the Briz M drop tank, which would have jettisoned prior to the fourth burn.
The low perigee (91 miles) is good news. If it stays intact, it will quickly reenter.
A simple relay to transfer the pyro circuits to Payload when the stage loses power would address most that. I'd guess an added on connector for the high current signals. Not as sexy as 3 million lines of code, but more the Russian way anyhow. It obviously wouldn't use the upper stage computer if the upper stage were dead. There's no problem with simple, last ditch efforts if you don't have anything to lose.
That is certainly a poor system architecture, if the satellite cannot separate itself from a dead upper stage.
Heads will roll.
Could you please tell us how you would have designed the upper stage to avoid this problem?
Andy
A design that allows the payload to separate itself in the event of total system failure of the upper stage is not exactly rocket science.
So, every spacecraft manufacturer would have to include the necessary commands to separate its spacecraft from all types of rockets that could be used for that satellite? Who tests to make sure the separation command doesn't inadvertently come from the satellite during ascent?
And, who actually generates the power for the pyro or spring command to function? The satellite's power bus doesn't extend into the upper stage usually. How about spin-up manuevers? How does the command get to the upper stage computer which has no power? Are you going to hard-wire into the separation system for every different type of upper stage?
So, actually it is rocket science. I'll ask again, could you please tell us how you would have designed the upper stage to avoid this problem? I would really like to know.
Suppose the relay triggers inadvertently and now the upper stage can no longer control the pyros during a normal mission? I'm not saying it isn't do-able, I'm just saying it isn't as easy as made out to be.
You would hate to lose a normal mission for the sake of a "nothing to lose" manuever.
You would hate to lose a normal mission for the sake of a "nothing to lose" manuever.The dreaded false redundancy: when an effort to make a system more reliable inadvertently adds enough complexity to actually make it less reliable.
Suppose the relay triggers inadvertently and now the upper stage can no longer control the pyros during a normal mission? I'm not saying it isn't do-able, I'm just saying it isn't as easy as made out to be.
You would hate to lose a normal mission for the sake of a "nothing to lose" manuever.
Suppose the satellite solar panels deploy during launch? Suppose the satellite main engine fires prematurely due to a faulty relay? At some point, system operators have to simply design the a robust command system; obviously, there has to be a trade between the risks of use of a dual separation command system and being stuck to a dead upper stage.
In the case of dead upper stages, maybe 5 Proton missions in the last 15 years have resulted in off nominal performance of an upper stage in orbit. That is probably frequent enough to warrant implementation of a dual separation system.
When an upper stage doesn't operate nominally, there is always the risk that separation won't occur, or won't be timely.
Spaceflightnow now have an article on and say nothing about a failure.
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n1108/17proton/
So did it fail or not?
It failed. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/18/us-russia-satellite-idUSTRE77H3QA20110818
Russian Space Agency blames the Briz M stage.
TsENKI will webcast the launch at http://www.tsenki.com/broadcast/ and Khrunichev at http://coopi.khrunichev.ru/main.php?id=427.
Spaceflightnow now have an article on and say nothing about a failure.
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n1108/17proton/
So did it fail or not?
It failed. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/18/us-russia-satellite-idUSTRE77H3QA20110818
Russian Space Agency blames the Briz M stage.
The SFN article was posted shortly after launch, during the 9-hour mission. It likely mentions that the ascent is still underway or some-such.
- Ed Kyle
That is why I said "may".
That is problem with storable propellants, how do you get them out of the tanks of a dead stage. In the prior case when you mentioned Centaur, due to the propellants, good or bad, something would have already happened. Now we wait for something to leak, corrode, or fatigue (from the thermal cycles) and hope nothing mixes.
The burst disks only work if the pressure is changing inside the tanks. With storable propellants, that should not be happening.
Don't forget that the satellite which by all accounts is still attached to the Briz-m, has consumables on board that can cause long term problems. It has not been, and it may not be possible at this point to safe. It has batteries that can potentially over charge and explode, it still has propellants on board, the system is still pressurized.
That is certainly a poor system architecture, if the satellite cannot separate itself from a dead upper stage.
Heads will roll.
Could you please tell us how you would have designed the upper stage to avoid this problem?
Andy
A design that allows the payload to separate itself in the event of total system failure of the upper stage is not exactly rocket science.
You are suggesting that there are no launch systems that allow the satellite to initiate separation?
A simple relay to transfer the pyro circuits to Payload when the stage loses power would address most that. I'd guess an added on connector for the high current signals. Not as sexy as 3 million lines of code, but more the Russian way anyhow. It obviously wouldn't use the upper stage computer if the upper stage were dead. There's no problem with simple, last ditch efforts if you don't have anything to lose.
A simple relay to transfer the pyro circuits to Payload when the stage loses power would address most that. I'd guess an added on connector for the high current signals. Not as sexy as 3 million lines of code, but more the Russian way anyhow. It obviously wouldn't use the upper stage computer if the upper stage were dead. There's no problem with simple, last ditch efforts if you don't have anything to lose.
Not that simple. Two leads from two different sources to the pyros? Nope a relay isn't going to work.
Ironically, the Blok-DM, which was discarded for most Proton flights, does have a model in which all vehicle avionics are contained in the payload, not the upper stage.
Might not have helped anyway. Aren't more non-separations from failed pyros or latches than failed commands?
This report http://de.rian.ru/space/20110819/260158907.html (in German) says, that they have located the position of Ekspress-AM4 detached with Briz-M.
And if the satellite is not demaged, it could be used as planned.
It seems that everybody missed this, but it was the 50th flight of the Briz-M upper stage !It was mentioned here
A Proton-M rocket, with the fiftieth Briz-M upper stage
There is only a chance, if the Briz can be commanded to seperate from the payload. And we do not have any info, that the Briz is responding.
There is only a chance, if the Briz can be commanded to seperate from the payload. And we do not have any info, that the Briz is responding.
And current US launchers do not have the ability to receive commands
There is only a chance, if the Briz can be commanded to seperate from the payload. And we do not have any info, that the Briz is responding.
And current US launchers do not have the ability to receive commands
Would the Briz-M it still be alive this many hours later?
There is only a chance, if the Briz can be commanded to separate from the payload. And we do not have any info, that the Briz is responding.
And current US launchers do not have the ability to receive commands
Would the Briz-M it still be alive this many hours later?
No.
Any chance that the trajectory of this rocket could have taken it over the ocean near the San Diego, California, U.S.A. area? Since Wednesday afternoon around 2 PM (which would be Thursday already in Russia) there were numerous reports of a mysterious odor which most people said smelled like burned kerosene or diesel fuel. It was detected over 50 miles by residents. I'm thinking it was rocket fuel from this rocket which burnt on reentry offshore and that is why the smell lingered into the next day as it was falling from the sky and the smell was strongest on our coastlines here. Numerous people called 911 and it has been on every news station here. Here is a link to one of the stories. Do you think it was from this rocket? Let me know.
http://www.cbs8.com/story/15287018/mysterious-odor-lingers-over-san-diego-county (http://www.cbs8.com/story/15287018/mysterious-odor-lingers-over-san-diego-county)
37798 EXPRESS AM-4 2011-045A
37799 BREEZE-M R/B 2011-045B
37800 BREEZE-M DEB (TANK) 2011-045C
Quote from: Stratcom37798 EXPRESS AM-4 2011-045A
37799 BREEZE-M R/B 2011-045B
37800 BREEZE-M DEB (TANK) 2011-045C
According to NK forum NORAD found both objects. Orbits:
37799 -- 51.18°, 689x20251 km, 362.7 min
37800 -- 51.32°, 996x20327 km, 368.8 min
With the latest elset, I found
Epoch August 19 at 1659UTC:
EXPRESS-AM4/11045A in 1004.5 x 20314.9 km inclined 51.33°
Epoch August 19 at 1301UTC:
Briz-M / 11045B in 697.2 x 20239.3 km inclined 51.18°
Any chance that the trajectory of this rocket could have taken it over the ocean near the San Diego, California, U.S.A. area? Since Wednesday afternoon around 2 PM (which would be Thursday already in Russia) there were numerous reports of a mysterious odor which most people said smelled like burned kerosene or diesel fuel. It was detected over 50 miles by residents. I'm thinking it was rocket fuel from this rocket which burnt on reentry offshore and that is why the smell lingered into the next day as it was falling from the sky and the smell was strongest on our coastlines here. Numerous people called 911 and it has been on every news station here. Here is a link to one of the stories. Do you think it was from this rocket? Let me know.
http://www.cbs8.com/story/15287018/mysterious-odor-lingers-over-san-diego-county (http://www.cbs8.com/story/15287018/mysterious-odor-lingers-over-san-diego-county)
What was the orbit before the attempted burn?
With the latest elset, I found
Epoch August 19 at 1659UTC:
EXPRESS-AM4/11045A in 1004.5 x 20314.9 km inclined 51.33°
Epoch August 19 at 1301UTC:
Briz-M / 11045B in 697.2 x 20239.3 km inclined 51.18°
According to NK forum NORAD found both objects. Orbits:
37799 -- 51.18°, 689x20251 km, 362.7 min
37800 -- 51.32°, 996x20327 km, 368.8 min
With the latest elset, I found
Epoch August 19 at 1659UTC:
EXPRESS-AM4/11045A in 1004.5 x 20314.9 km inclined 51.33°
Epoch August 19 at 1301UTC:
Briz-M / 11045B in 697.2 x 20239.3 km inclined 51.18°
With the latest elset, I found
Epoch August 19 at 1659UTC:
EXPRESS-AM4/11045A in 1004.5 x 20314.9 km inclined 51.33°
Epoch August 19 at 1301UTC:
Briz-M / 11045B in 697.2 x 20239.3 km inclined 51.18°
The expected orbit after Burn 4 was to have been 420 x 35,616 km x 49.1 deg.
- Ed Kyle
The elset for epoch Aug 19 at 1334UTC ("37800 -- 51.32°, 996x20327 km, 368.8 min") was wrongly allocated to the tank, it should have been allocated to EXPRESS AM4/37798/11045A (not to Briz-M)According to NK forum NORAD found both objects. Orbits:
37799 -- 51.18°, 689x20251 km, 362.7 min
37800 -- 51.32°, 996x20327 km, 368.8 min
37798 EXPRESS AM-4 2011-045A
37799 BREEZE-M R/B 2011-045B
37800 BREEZE-M DEB (TANK) 2011-045C
How can the Briz-M orbit 37799 have a significantly lower perigee than the APT, which was jettisoned before the 4th burn of the Briz? The implication is that all of the Briz propulsive maneuver was near apogee, and resulted in lowering the perigee.
OR .... the numbers are assigned to the wrong objects, and 37800 is really the Briz-M.
The expected orbit after Burn 4 was to have been 420 x 35,616 km x 49.1 deg.Express-AM4 launch mass was 5700 kg, a comparable satellite (W7, with a launch mass of 5600 kg) had these nominal parameters:
The expected orbit after Burn 4 was to have been 420 x 35,616 km x 49.1 deg.Express-AM4 launch mass was 5700 kg, a comparable satellite (W7, with a launch mass of 5600 kg) had these nominal parameters:
"Transfer orbit" (after 4th Briz burn): 420 x 35616 km x 49.1°* (same as Express-AM4)
"Geotransfer orbit" (after 5th Briz burn): 4920 x 35596 km x 20.9°
*This comes from coopi.khrunichev.ru web site (it's different from Stan's table..)
| Номинал | 419.65 | x | 35565.57 | |
| Оценка | 419.89 | x | 35610.97 | Бриз-М |
| Оценка | 422.27 | x | 35592.20 | ОКБ МЭИ (ФП "Ритм") |
| Оценка | 420.91 | x | 35585.93 | ГБЦ |
I took my values from the picture below; so there was an internal discrepancy between both sources from Khrunichev :-[ but I guess your reference was published later and should be more accurate :) ;http://coopi.khrunichev.ru/download/2009/w7/email/rus/w7_e11.htm (http://coopi.khrunichev.ru/download/2009/w7/email/rus/w7_e11.htm)
Номинал 419.65 x 35565.57
I took my values from the picture below; so there was an internal discrepancy between both sources from Khrunichev :-[ but I guess your reference was published later and should be more accurate :) ;http://coopi.khrunichev.ru/download/2009/w7/email/rus/w7_e11.htm (http://coopi.khrunichev.ru/download/2009/w7/email/rus/w7_e11.htm)
Номинал 419.65 x 35565.57
It would nice if these were available for the failed missions… Did anyone receive them for AMC14, ARABSAT4A, JCSAT11 before they were removed?I have posted (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=5966.msg795706#msg795706) some data on AMC-14 in the "Soviet/Russian space programs Q&A" thread
With the latest elset, I found
Epoch August 19 at 1659UTC:
EXPRESS-AM4/11045A in 1004.5 x 20314.9 km inclined 51.33°
Epoch August 19 at 1301UTC:
Briz-M / 11045B in 697.2 x 20239.3 km inclined 51.18°
With the 3rd object, in this orbit:
37800 -- 51.32°, 996x20327 km
It looks like the Express 37798 and the APT 37800 are in similar orbits, whereas the Briz-M 37799 has a much lower perigee, which probably means that the Briz-M is really 37800, since 37800 and 37798 are closer.
I have seen 2 different element sets for the APT here, one with a perigee of some 150 km, another with a perigee over 900 km. Its hard to speculate on whether the burn that was actually completed before the APT was jettisoned was somehow improperly executed, if there are problems with the element sets, or identification of objects.
The fourth burn occurred, but produced goofy results. Guidance?
The orbits I presented are straight from the horse's mouth, so to speak, and are today's info.I get the impression that the Stratcom orbits are sometimes search orbits for objects they are trying to locate, rather than actual data.
I have seen 2 different element sets for the APT here, one with a perigee of some 150 km, another with a perigee over 900 km. Its hard to speculate on whether the burn that was actually completed before the APT was jettisoned was somehow improperly executed, if there are problems with the element sets, or identification of objects.
The orbits I presented are straight from the horse's mouth, so to speak, and are today's info.
- Ed Kyle
The orbits I presented are straight from the horse's mouth, so to speak, and are today's info.I get the impression that the Stratcom orbits are sometimes search orbits for objects they are trying to locate, rather than actual data.
The fourth burn occurred, but produced goofy results. Guidance?
Ed, it's premature to speculate, but I can't help wondering if this isn't another perfectly healthy vehicle flown into the ground [soon, will be] by human error in the loaded burn parameters?
Other wild speculations...
What commonality do we have with the 3Glonass splash? Both errors may intersect at the pad 31 prop loading complex.
The fourth burn occurred, but produced goofy results. Guidance?
Ed, it's premature to speculate, but I can't help wondering if this isn't another perfectly healthy vehicle flown into the ground [soon, will be] by human error in the loaded burn parameters?
Other wild speculations...
What commonality do we have with the 3Glonass splash? Both errors may intersect at the pad 31 prop loading complex.
According to the Proton user guide, Briz-M prop loading happens in Building 92A-50.
The fourth burn occurred, but produced goofy results. Guidance?
Ed, it's premature to speculate, but I can't help wondering if this isn't another perfectly healthy vehicle flown into the ground [soon, will be] by human error in the loaded burn parameters?
Other wild speculations...
What commonality do we have with the 3Glonass splash? Both errors may intersect at the pad 31 prop loading complex.
According to the Proton user guide, Briz-M prop loading happens in Building 92A-50.
Are your sure? It seems to me that Briz-M fueling happens at the "service station" out of the building 92A-50, so there is no commonality with the 3 glonass fail.
Block DM03 was fueled elsewhere.
2009
7.5.1 LV Processing
The Proton LV stages, PLA, and fairings are built in Moscow by KhSC and transported by rail to the Baikonur Cosmodrome. After transportation of the Proton’s stages and fairing by rail, LV assembly takes place in an
integration and test facility. Prior to SC arrival, the fairing is moved to Building 92A-50 for SC integration, where it is stored and cleaned in preparation for encapsulation. The Breeze M US is manufactured by KhSC in Moscow and transported by air to Baikonur. After arrival, the Breeze M is delivered to Building 92A-50 for pre-launch checkout and testing. The Breeze M is then delivered to Building 44 in Area 31, the propellant fueling hall, where MMH and N2O4 are loaded in the high pressure tanks of the low-thrust settling/attitude control system thrusters. The Breeze M helium pressurant tanks are also loaded in Building 44. Following these operations the Breeze M is then moved to Building 92A-50 for integration with the SC. Payload adapters are similarly delivered to Building 92A-50, where they are cleaned and prepared for assembly of the AU.
6.1.3 Breeze M Fueling Station (Area 92)
The ILV will be transported to the Breeze M fueling facility for filling the Breeze M with low pressure propellant components, and from there to the launch complex (Area 81 or 200).
Same facility which mis-loaded the prop on the DM3 that splashed the Glonass triplet
Good info on fueling locations, thanks.
Bldg 92-50 was a real mystery when we visited in mid-1990s, it was new but empty, with wide staircases leading from the ground floor DOWNwards. Interesting wall murals [local artist quality] of military-looking spacecraft, probably just impressionistic rather than descriptive.
did you post any pics? would enjoy seeing them.
Same facility which mis-loaded the prop on the DM3 that splashed the Glonass triplet
As for DM-03 upper stage, 1.5 tonnes over-fuelling of liquid oxygen was made on the launch pad.
(high pressure components are filled earlier at Area 31).
With the latest elset, I found
Epoch August 19 at 1659UTC:
EXPRESS-AM4/11045A in 1004.5 x 20314.9 km inclined 51.33°
Epoch August 19 at 1301UTC:
Briz-M / 11045B in 697.2 x 20239.3 km inclined 51.18°
The expected orbit after Burn 4 was to have been 420 x 35,616 km x 49.1 deg.
- Ed Kyle
Ed,
Do you know the other target orbits?
Stan
173 x 173 km, 270 x 4998 km
August 18 from Baikonur cosmodrome launch vehicle (LV), "Proton-M" with the upper block (RB) "Breeze-M" and the spacecraft (SC) "Express-AM4."
Home and flight "Proton-M" were normally, in accordance with the scheduled program.
During the flight, the orbital block in the upper stage and spacecraft crashed into the control system "Breeze-M", as a result of the «Express-AM4" was put on an unplanned orbit.
Means of space control systems (SKKP) Russian Space Forces Defense Command and Aerospace Defense of North America (NORAD) were able to establish the parameters of the orbit of the spacecraft (inclination - 51.23 deg., Apogee - 20,294 km, perigee - 995 km, orbital period - 368.39 min.).
Representatives of the Federal Space Agency, Ministry of Communications of Russia (Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Space Communication") and the company EADS Astrium have been made joint efforts to establish contact with the spacecraft in order to enable its onboard systems.
Now experts are continuing to establish communications with the spacecraft.
Formed a joint working group to identify opportunities for the transfer of a spacecraft into orbit and then use for their intended purpose, subject to inclusion of on-board systems.
Interministerial Commission for the analysis of the causes of abnormal start-up carrier rocket "Proton-M" with the upper stage "Briz-M" and the spacecraft "Express-AM4 continues. We consider several possible reasons for this situation, most of which - the failure of the control system booster.
Work in preparation for launches of carrier rockets "Proton-M" and boosters "Breeze-M" temporarily suspended until the establishment and elimination of causes abnormal spacecraft into orbit, "Express-AM4."
Press release by RoscosmosIn Russian "[font="]В настоящее время специалисты продолжают работу по налаживанию связи с космическим аппаратом[/font]."
http://www.federalspace.ru/main.php?id=2&nid=17756 (http://www.federalspace.ru/main.php?id=2&nid=17756)
Google translationQuote...Now experts are continuing to establish communications with the spacecraft. ...
Электронику для разгонного блока "Бриз-М" делал другой поставщик
http://ria.ru/science/20110824/422696401.html
Электронику для разгонного блока "Бриз-М" делал другой поставщик
http://ria.ru/science/20110824/422696401.html
ЛОМО заявляет, что не поставляло электронику для блока "Бриз-М"
http://ria.ru/science/20110824/422948687.html
As for Briz-M failure's reason, it was due to programmer's mistake.
One industry official said Express-AM4 had not deployed its solar panels and was relying only on battery power. This could not be independently confirmed. It was not immediately clear how long the satellite could remain functional in orbit using only its lithium-ion batteries.
в ходе формирования циклограммы работы разгонного блока (РБ) «Бриз-М» был необоснованно «заужен» временной интервал подворота гиростабилизированной платформы. Это привело к не правильной ориентации РБ «Бриз-М» и как следствие к выведению КА на нерасчетную орбиту.which could mean:
По результатам работы комиссии снят запрет с подготовки РН «Протон-М» с РБ «Бриз-М» и подготовлены необходимые рекомендации, которые будут реализованы до очередных пусков."As a result, the ban on the preparation of Proton-M/Breeze-M is lifted and the necessary recommendations to be implemented before the next launch are being prepared."
Will the programmer be sitting underneath the next Proton-M to be launched?
the Commission has concluded that in the process of formalizing the Breeze M operating timeline, the time interval to manipulate the gyro platform into position was made unduly short. This resulted in an off-nominal orientation of the Breeze M and, as the consequence, in injecting the SC into an off-design orbit.
the ban on Proton M / Breeze M ground processing has been lifted, and appropriate recommendations have been prepared, to be implemented prior to the upcoming launches.
the time span reserved for the gyrostabilized platform's turn was miscalculated and narrowed, which caused the Briz-M upper stage's disorientation and the satellite's journey to a wrong orbithttp://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/sci/2011-08/30/c_131084969.htm
Will the programmer be sitting underneath the next Proton-M to be launched?
Actually it should be QA that sits under the next Proton-M. Programmers have right to make mistakes. QA is supposed to catch them all.
Will the programmer be sitting underneath the next Proton-M to be launched?
Actually it should be QA that sits under the next Proton-M. Programmers have right to make mistakes. QA is supposed to catch them all.
I am not yet convinced that this was a "programmers error", if "programmer" means "coder". The problem, which appears to be insufficient time allotted for a guidance platform alignment (or realignment) step, could have been due to a bad specification OR improper coding.
- Ed Kyle
Will the programmer be sitting underneath the next Proton-M to be launched?
Actually it should be QA that sits under the next Proton-M. Programmers have right to make mistakes. QA is supposed to catch them all.
I am not yet convinced that this was a "programmers error", if "programmer" means "coder". The problem, which appears to be insufficient time allotted for a guidance platform alignment (or realignment) step, could have been due to a bad specification OR improper coding.
- Ed Kyle
I wouldn't be surprised if this failure were caused by a cascade event, where multiple small errors resulted in disaster; for example, if a programmer were given faulty information on the time required for the guidance system to align, and then the programmer compounded the error by a second mistake, that sort of event(s) would explain how Briz-M could have flown for over 10 years without this failure occurring before now.
The problem, which appears to be insufficient time allotted for a guidance platform alignment (or realignment) step . . .Perhaps unsurprisingly, the information from an insider at Mars Ltd., contradicts the official reason. He conveyed that the alotted time was correct, but as it happened, the Briz was put into an orientation at which "the frames of gyroscope folded up", after which its indications became invalid. As far as I understand how a gyroscope works, this is ONLY possible if, at the moment the frames aligned, Briz has already had a rotation and its axis was exactly perpendicular to the plane in which the frames aligned themselves. Sounds much too coincidential to me. Also, surely they do not have just one gyro.
I know of two instances where tiny software numerical errors caused the loss of Mariner 1 in 1962; and an misplaced (-), instead of an (+), doomed a commercial satellite launch in the 1980's
The problem, which appears to be insufficient time allotted for a guidance platform alignment (or realignment) step . . .Perhaps unsurprisingly, the information from an insider at Mars Ltd., contradicts the official reason. He conveyed that the alotted time was correct, but as it happened, the Briz was put into an orientation at which "the frames of gyroscope folded up", after which its indications became invalid. As far as I understand how a gyroscope works, this is ONLY possible if, at the moment the frames aligned, Briz has already had a rotation and its axis was exactly perpendicular to the plane in which the frames aligned themselves. Sounds much too coincidential to me. Also, surely they do not have just one gyro.
I know of two instances where tiny software numerical errors caused the loss of Mariner 1 in 1962; and an misplaced (-), instead of an (+), doomed a commercial satellite launch in the 1980's
The launch of a Soviet martian probe (Cosmos 419) was a failure because the timer for engine ignition had been set at "1.5 year" instead of "1.5 hour"...
Is this from a different manufacturer then used before?
Sounds like gimbal lock
Is this from a different manufacturer then used before?
No, the inertially stabilized platform for Briz-M upper stage is producing only by NII KP enterprize.
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Is this from a different manufacturer then used before?
No, the inertially stabilized platform for Briz-M upper stage is producing only by NII KP enterprize.
I do not wish to offend, just to understand Russian Rocket Industry.[
From 1964, the plant launched production of space sector devices. Next years, the enterprise took part in the development and production of devices and equipment for Bion, Foton, Interkosmos, Kosmos, Soyuz-TM, Progress, Energiya-Buran, Proton, Gorizont, Ekran, Okean-0, Sich, Alfa ISS, and other programmes. At the same time, the association manufactures production equipment and consumer goods. In the last years, Kyivprylad Industrial Association works upon high technology equipment for power industry.
Ooooohhhhh, its made in the Ukraine. Look for some backwash from that.The gyroscope flown was made by NII KP, an FGUP located in St. Petersbourg, as I and Anik mentioned. So, it is impossible to pin the failure on Ukrainians. I think Mr. Prober is trying to point out an alternative with a different technology base.
Ooooohhhhh, its made in the Ukraine. Look for some backwash from that.The gyroscope flown was made by NII KP, an FGUP located in St. Petersbourg, as I and Anik mentioned. So, it is impossible to pin the failure on Ukrainians. I think Mr. Prober is trying to point out an alternative with a different technology base.
In any case, it is not established that frames have in fact folded and this is why the gyroscope exceeded the alotted time to orient. The State Commission apparently implied that giving it more time would let it orient itself, and thus the fault was with Mars Ltd. This is the official conclusion, as far as I know.
Officially because of delays with payload, but Mr. Zak notes that the GEO-IK-2 failure could be a further reason.
GEO-IK-2 failure will not impact Proton Breeze M launches based upon the reported cause of the failure. The Breeze M uses a new control system and gyro that are different (hardware and vendor) than that used on Breeze KM.
So is there any differences in gyroscopes between Briz-KM, Briz-M 885-series and Briz-M 995-series?
Quote:
between the third and fourth main engine burns the "Briz-M" upper stage has lost inertial reference system.
Quote:
Telemetry from "Briz-M" upper stage was obtained after the 4th burn. Telemetry was unstable, the signal continued to decline up to the loss of telemetry in approximately 12 minutes after receiving it.
Quote:
It was concluded that the middle gimbal ring (Pitch ring), reached a hard stop. The remaining 2 rings - yaw and roll - have a degree of freedom of 360°. At this point, inertial reference system was lost, and the error in the orientation of the pitch continued to accumulate over the length of flight.
Quote:
The entire flight program was studied. According to it, before maneuvering, guidance system of "Briz-M" upper stage performs a delta-turn of the second gimbal ring (pitch ring) in order to avoid the risk of locking the gyro. Analysis of the mission program revealed that the time allocated for the
delta-turn introduced into the program was incorrectly too little for preparing the maneuver before the third main engine burn.
According to it, before maneuvering, guidance system of "Briz-M" upper stage performs a delta-turn of the second gimbal ring (pitch ring) in order to avoid the risk of locking the gyro.Do they reorient the stage or, just the ring?
нее.. Это разные явления . Рамка на упор - это когда одна из рамок не может крутиться на 360. Скорее всего - тяжелое наследие военного дизайна. МБР летают по довольно плоским траекториям. (к тому же меньше чем на виток орбиты) Получается, что по 2-м осям из трех (по тангажу и вращению) можно сделать ход рамки 180 градусов - а то и поменьше.Google translated:
А имея такие небольшие рабочие углы рамок можно сделать внутренний, а не внешний кардановый подвес - и сэкономить на размерах и массе. (и еще сэкономить на токосьемных кольцах - но кого в 21-первом это интересует)
А чтобы не было складывания рамок (на традиционных ГСП) - нужно либо подвеску делать в виде шара, плавающего в тяжелой жидкости (американцы - сначала на МХ ставили- затем на Минитмен3) - супер точная и супер дорогая штука.
Либо 4-ю рамку добавить. (лишняя масса -и сложность)
it .. This is a different phenomenon. Frame to stop - this is when one of the frames can not spin at 360. Most likely - a heavy legacy of military design. ICBM flying on a fairly flat trajectory. (Also less than a revolution orbit) It turns out that on the 2nd of three axes (pitch and rotation) can make a move frame 180 degrees - or even less.
And with such small working angles of the framework can be internal, and no external gimbals - and save on size and weight. (And save on tokosemnyh rings - but who in the first 21 interested in this)
And that was not folding frames (in the traditional GSP) - to make a pendant in the form of a ball floating in the heavy fluid (the Americans - first in the MX-set then on Minitmen3) - super accurate and super expensive stuff. Or the 4th frame to add. (Extra weight and complexity) Although AM4 out more
AFAIU, it has to be the ring only, otherwise it wouldn't help.According to it, before maneuvering, guidance system of "Briz-M" upper stage performs a delta-turn of the second gimbal ring (pitch ring) in order to avoid the risk of locking the gyro.Do they reorient the stage or, just the ring?
Controllers in Contact with Russian Satellite Dropped Off in Useless Orbit
http://www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110912-controllers-contact-russian-sat.html
New situation
Stranded Satellite Could Be Salvaged
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/asd/2012/03/16/11.xml&headline=Stranded Satellite Could Be Salvaged
An article which is saying they plan a splash down in the VERY near future
http://www.space.com/14935-falling-russian-satellite-controlled-reentry.html
Thoughts? Credibility?
A1160/12 - QXXXX THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL SPACE AGENCY HAS PLANNED A SPACECRAFT RE-ENTRY. DEBRIS FROM THIS RE-ENTRY WILL FALL WITHIN AN AREA BOUNDED BY 4500N/17000E 4500N/16500W 3500N/16500W 3500N/17000E BACK TO THE POINT OF ORIGIN. IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY ALL NON-PARTICIPATING AIR TRAFFIC ARE ADVISED TO AVOID THE NOTAMED AREA. IFR AIRCRAFT UNDER ATC JURISDICTION SHOULD ANTICIPATE CLEARANCE AROUND THE NOTAMED AREA. SFC - UNL, 27 MAR 13:30 2012 UNTIL 27 MAR 15:30 2012. CREATED: 19 MAR 18:38 2012
NAVAREA NO.12-0176 Date:2012/03/20 12 UTC
NORTH PACIFIC.
DANGEROUS TO NAVIGATION AREA DESIGNATED
DUE TO SPACE VEHICLE ELEMENTS FALL.
251250Z TO 251450Z AND 261310Z TO
261510Z MAR. AREA BETWEEN 35-00N 45-00N
AND 170-00E 165-00W.
CANCEL THIS MSG 261610Z MAR.
NAVAREA NO.12-0183 Date:2012/03/22 12 UTC
NORTH PACIFIC.
DANGEROUS TO NAVIGATION AREA DESIGNATED
DUE TO SPACE VEHICLE ELEMENTS FALL.
271330Z TO 271530Z MAR. AREA BETWEEN
35-00N 45-00N AND 170-00E 165-00W.
CANCEL THIS MSG 271630Z MAR.
..splashed down at about the estimated time (1332UTC)http://www.kommersant.ru/news/1900938 (http://www.kommersant.ru/news/1900938)
I'm wondering why this Satellite failed to reach the designated orbit ???I would suggest reading THIS thread...
And start reading from the beginning every post to the present one.I'm wondering why this Satellite failed to reach the designated orbit ???I would suggest reading THIS thread...
Ooooohhhhh, its made in the Ukraine. Look for some backwash from that.The gyroscope flown was made by NII KP, an FGUP located in St. Petersbourg, as I and Anik mentioned. So, it is impossible to pin the failure on Ukrainians. I think Mr. Prober is trying to point out an alternative with a different technology base.
In any case, it is not established that frames have in fact folded and this is why the gyroscope exceeded the alotted time to orient. The State Commission apparently implied that giving it more time would let it orient itself, and thus the fault was with Mars Ltd. This is the official conclusion, as far as I know.
Ooooohhhhh, its made in the Ukraine. Look for some backwash from that.The gyroscope flown was made by NII KP, an FGUP located in St. Petersbourg, as I and Anik mentioned. So, it is impossible to pin the failure on Ukrainians. I think Mr. Prober is trying to point out an alternative with a different technology base.
In any case, it is not established that frames have in fact folded and this is why the gyroscope exceeded the alotted time to orient. The State Commission apparently implied that giving it more time would let it orient itself, and thus the fault was with Mars Ltd. This is the official conclusion, as far as I know.
I didn't catch this at the time, but there might have been some confusion over the role of the design bureau and the production facility in assigning blame.
Every article produced for Russian aerospace is designed by a design bureau, but generally produced (made) by a production facility. So, in the case of a failure, there is the possibility of a design flaw, or a quality control failure. In the case of this particular spacecraft failure, although the unit was made in St. Petersburg, it is possible that the unit was designed in the Ukraine (I don't know where it was designed, but earlier messages ascribe the unit to the Ukraine).
Ooooohhhhh, its made in the Ukraine. Look for some backwash from that.The gyroscope flown was made by NII KP, an FGUP located in St. Petersbourg, as I and Anik mentioned. So, it is impossible to pin the failure on Ukrainians. I think Mr. Prober is trying to point out an alternative with a different technology base.
In any case, it is not established that frames have in fact folded and this is why the gyroscope exceeded the alotted time to orient. The State Commission apparently implied that giving it more time would let it orient itself, and thus the fault was with Mars Ltd. This is the official conclusion, as far as I know.
I didn't catch this at the time, but there might have been some confusion over the role of the design bureau and the production facility in assigning blame.
Every article produced for Russian aerospace is designed by a design bureau, but generally produced (made) by a production facility. So, in the case of a failure, there is the possibility of a design flaw, or a quality control failure. In the case of this particular spacecraft failure, although the unit was made in St. Petersburg, it is possible that the unit was designed in the Ukraine (I don't know where it was designed, but earlier messages ascribe the unit to the Ukraine).
Your talking about the "all Russian" parts program.
Is this from a different manufacturer then used before?
No, the inertially stabilized platform for Briz-M upper stage is producing only by NII KP enterprize.
Головной обтекатель типа 14С75 и переходная система для запуска КА «Экспресс-АМ4» (14С75-0000-0ТУ)136 365 000 Russian ruble
Выполнение работ по транспортировке трех ракет-носителей «Протон-М» с ГО 14С75.15 для запуска КА «Экспресс-АМ4», «Луч-5А» и «Луч-5Б»23 378 000 Russian ruble
Выполнение работ по транспортировке двух разгонных блоков «Бриз-М» для запуска КА «Экспресс-АМ4» и «Луч-5Б»26 650 000 Russian ruble
Подготовка и запуск ракеты-носителя «Протон-М» и разгонного блока «Бриз-М» с космическим аппаратом «Экспресс-АМ4»570 000 000 Russian ruble
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