NASASpaceFlight.com Forum
Commercial and US Government Launch Vehicles => ULA - Delta, Atlas, Vulcan => Topic started by: Robotbeat on 04/14/2011 11:09 pm
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So, $30 million for an RL-10? All because SSME is going away (maybe)?
What about the RS-68 engine? How much has it gone up?
It seems to me that PWR has some fat it will need to cut, otherwise they will lose business. ULA is already pursuing the idea of an RL-10 replacement with XCOR. SpaceX apparently can produce Merlin engines pretty inexpensively.
Why such high costs? Is there any fat there to cut, or is it just that they don't want to cut it?
(mods: I think this is a good place for this thread, but feel free to move it to another location)
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So, $30 million for an RL-10? All because SSME is going away (maybe)?
Well I doubt it's simply that SSME is going away, but rather there is no longer a contract in place to service them for the shuttle.
If by some miracle the SD-HLV goes ahead with an SSME-based system, then we are likely to see a reversal in these price increases. If they go further and implement an RS-25e or just a channel-wall nozzle, then there will likely be similar savings, if not greater.
But in the interim, with a stockpile of SSMEs to use, and the first flight of a full-up block 0 potentially in 2015-2016, then that's at least 4 years of 0 flight engines being manufactured.
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So, $30 million for an RL-10? All because SSME is going away (maybe)?
Well I doubt it's simply that SSME is going away, but rather there is no longer a contract in place to service them for the shuttle.
If by some miracle the SD-HLV goes ahead with an SSME-based system, then we are likely to see a reversal in these price increases. If they go further and implement an RS-25e or just a channel-wall nozzle, then there will likely be similar savings, if not greater.
But in the interim, with a stockpile of SSMEs to use, and the first flight of a full-up block 0 potentially in 2015-2016, then that's at least 4 years of 0 flight engines being manufactured.
Right, but why does it automatically mean they raise the prices on all their other engines? The presumed answer is that they still are paying for much of the overhead needed to produce the SSME. Can't they just cut their overhead?
It seems to me that they are just trying to profit (which isn't bad) and think that $30 million per RL-10 is what the market (or, rather, ULA) will bear so why should they charge a lower price?
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So, $30 million for an RL-10? All because SSME is going away (maybe)?
Well I doubt it's simply that SSME is going away, but rather there is no longer a contract in place to service them for the shuttle.
If by some miracle the SD-HLV goes ahead with an SSME-based system, then we are likely to see a reversal in these price increases. If they go further and implement an RS-25e or just a channel-wall nozzle, then there will likely be similar savings, if not greater.
But in the interim, with a stockpile of SSMEs to use, and the first flight of a full-up block 0 potentially in 2015-2016, then that's at least 4 years of 0 flight engines being manufactured.
Right, but why does it automatically mean they raise the prices on all their other engines? The presumed answer is that they still are paying for much of the overhead needed to produce the SSME. Can't they just cut their overhead?
It seems to me that they are just trying to profit (which isn't bad) and think that $30 million per RL-10 is what the market (or, rather, ULA) will bear so why should they charge a lower price?
Yes, there is some 'profit taking', but this is the capitalist market we all love... ;) oh wait.
You still have all the buildings to heat/air-condition, machinery & maintenance, test facilities, retain a certain amount of the workforce to keep certain skills, you have all the administrative people that have a much-reduced work load, but still present. I'm not sure if P&W is unionized down there, but they certainly are up here in Canada - so there is inflation-adjusted pay, and don't forget to expect severance packages or job retention costs. If they have to pay property taxes, they aren't going down.
You also have volume price reductions for metals now lost. Commodities are also going up drastically, which is compounding the problem.
Add it all up, and you realize that this is the INVERSE of the economies of scale, and many are ill-prepared for the consequences.
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I bet Tom Mueller has a special glint in his eyes when he hears these news! >:]
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If PWR's costs (as opposed to prices) have gone up proportionally to their prices, then they have some serious down-sizing to do. They must stay competitive or someone will come by and steal their lunch (launch? sorry. :) ).
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If PWR's costs (as opposed to prices) have gone up proportionally to their prices, then they have some serious down-sizing to do. They must stay competitive or someone will come by and steal their lunch (launch? sorry. :) ).
Really? Who? Think about it. Jim's famous words "rockets aren't Legos". You can't toss another into a pre-existing design without spending gobs of money to re-design & re-certify.
Now for NEW designs, you have options, but this is still a VERY narrow industrial base. Of course other companies would love the business, but they would all face the same issues at the end of the day.
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If PWR's costs (as opposed to prices) have gone up proportionally to their prices, then they have some serious down-sizing to do. They must stay competitive or someone will come by and steal their lunch (launch? sorry. :) ).
Really? Who? Think about it. Jim's famous words "rockets aren't Legos". You can't toss another into a pre-existing design without spending gobs of money to re-design & re-certify.
Now for NEW designs, you have options, but this is still a VERY narrow industrial base. Of course other companies would love the business, but they would all face the same issues at the end of the day.
XCOR (in partnership with ULA), for one. They are considered by some to be a nobody, now, but have actually lots of real experience with firing rocket engines. But at $30 million a pop for an engine that not that long ago was once made for an order of magnitude cheaper, there's room. There's also Aerojet. And SpaceX.
At $30 million a pop for a lousy 25klb thrust hydrolox engine (a wonderful engine, but shouldn't cost so much), it's worth ULA's while to look around. And if ULA doesn't find anything (which I find unlikely), there's always the possibility that ULA will lose more and more customers to folks like Orbital (some sort of upgrade of Taurus II or even a new launcher) or SpaceX.
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If PWR's costs (as opposed to prices) have gone up proportionally to their prices, then they have some serious down-sizing to do. They must stay competitive or someone will come by and steal their lunch (launch? sorry. :) ).
Really? Who? Think about it. Jim's famous words "rockets aren't Legos". You can't toss another into a pre-existing design without spending gobs of money to re-design & re-certify.
Now for NEW designs, you have options, but this is still a VERY narrow industrial base. Of course other companies would love the business, but they would all face the same issues at the end of the day.
XCOR (in partnership with ULA), for one. They are a nobody, now. But at $30 million a pop for an engine that not that long ago was once made for an order of magnitude cheaper, there's room. There's also Aerojet. And SpaceX.
At $30 million a pop for a lousy 25klb thrust hydrolox engine (a wonderful engine, but shouldn't cost so much), it's worth ULA's while to look around. And if ULA doesn't find anything (which I find unlikely), there's always the possibility that ULA will lose more and more customers to folks like Orbital (some sort of upgrade of Taurus II or even a new launcher) or SpaceX.
Even if they license out the design, you're looking at a (what) 5 year timeframe to fabricate and test? Totally unrealistic. If there were ways for ULA to reduce costs, they could be factored over that period of time and perhaps reduce the per/unit cost down.
But the simple fact is that low production rates increase per unit costs. No different than buying obsolete 1-of parts for machines.
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If PWR's costs (as opposed to prices) have gone up proportionally to their prices, then they have some serious down-sizing to do. They must stay competitive or someone will come by and steal their lunch (launch? sorry. :) ).
Really? Who? Think about it. Jim's famous words "rockets aren't Legos". You can't toss another into a pre-existing design without spending gobs of money to re-design & re-certify.
Now for NEW designs, you have options, but this is still a VERY narrow industrial base. Of course other companies would love the business, but they would all face the same issues at the end of the day.
XCOR (in partnership with ULA), for one. They are a nobody, now. But at $30 million a pop for an engine that not that long ago was once made for an order of magnitude cheaper, there's room. There's also Aerojet. And SpaceX.
At $30 million a pop for a lousy 25klb thrust hydrolox engine (a wonderful engine, but shouldn't cost so much), it's worth ULA's while to look around. And if ULA doesn't find anything (which I find unlikely), there's always the possibility that ULA will lose more and more customers to folks like Orbital (some sort of upgrade of Taurus II or even a new launcher) or SpaceX.
Even if they license out the design, you're looking at a (what) 5 year timeframe to fabricate and test? Totally unrealistic. If there were ways for ULA to reduce costs, they could be factored over that period of time and perhaps reduce the per/unit cost down.
But the simple fact is that low production rates increase per unit costs. No different than buying obsolete 1-of parts for machines.
ULA apparently has a stock-pile of RL-10 engines (how many, I'm not sure... but probably a few years' worth). It's not unrealistic for them to switch, or they wouldn't be spending money working with XCOR on it. There have been plans for a modified upper stage for a while (whether common centaur or ACES), and Aerojet has been working on a hydrogen turbopump for a 40K class upper stage engine for the Air Force for a while, now.
EDIT:I'd really be interested in what industry insiders think about the situation.
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What about the RS-68 engine? How much has it gone up?
This seems to be assuming the RS-68 price has gone up some non-zero amount.
Right, but why does it automatically mean they raise the prices on all their other engines?
This makes that assumption more explicit. Are you asking whether, or asserting that, there have been prices increases on "all their other engines?" To build a theory about this one might investigate the facilities where each engine is produced, and see if SSME and RL10 have some shared overhead costs not borne by e.g. RS-68.
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There have been plans for a modified upper stage for a while (whether common centaur or ACES), and Aerojet has been working on a hydrogen turbopump for a 40K class upper stage engine for the Air Force for a while, now.
I actually didn't recall seeing anything about this, so I googled and found this from last year:
"Aerojet Delivers Upper Stage Engine Technology (USET) Liquid Hydrogen Turbopump to AFRL"
http://www.aerojet.com/news2.php?action=fullnews&id=249
To support IHPRPT goals, the USET program has incorporated several technologies which will improve upper-stage engine developments methods and designs. These technologies have been incorporated into a liquid hydrogen, lightweight and high-speed turbopump delivered to AFRL. The primary program goal to develop advanced computational tools and methods to improve the capability to develop advanced 40K class upper-stage engines for the USAF was completed in 2007 and anchored through hydrogen-scaled water rig tests. The USET turbopump is designed to rotate at 90,000 rpm which is approximately two and one half times faster than the Space Shuttles Main Engines (SSME) high-pressure hydrogen turbopump while generating the equivalent stage pressure rise. The USET hydrogen turbopump is roughly the size of a swimming pool pump and could drain the average-size swimming pool in 12 minutes, if water was to replace the liquid hydrogen fuel.
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Been pondering this a bit. If the RL-10 is to stay at $30 million, then the J-2X is not that bad of a price at $45 million a piece.
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Been pondering this a bit. If the RL-10 is to stay at $30 million, then the J-2X is not that bad of a price at $45 million a piece.
Oh, I wouldn't count that price to remain that low either. Would you?
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So I realize that the don't have all of the proper tooling in place, but if there are really a trained manufacturing staff looking for something to do, wouldn't this be a great time to bring the RD-180 production in-house ? Sure the US labor is more expensive than Russian labor, but if you want to retain a talented labor pool, how about giving them something useful to do.
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What about the RS-68 engine? How much has it gone up?
This seems to be assuming the RS-68 price has gone up some non-zero amount.
Right, but why does it automatically mean they raise the prices on all their other engines?
This makes that assumption more explicit. Are you asking, or asserting, that there have been prices increases on "all their other engines?" To build a theory about this one might investigate the facilities where each engine is produced, and see if SSME and RL10 have some shared overhead costs not borne by e.g. RS-68.
I would think the far safer assumption is that SSME and RS-68 have shared overhead costs (not SSME and RL-10), since RS-68 has SSME heritage and they are much nearer each other in thrust (and are both sea-level engines).
It's because of this that I think it's a pretty darned safe assumption that if RL-10 has such a big price increase because of SSME ending that RS-68 will have at least some sort of price increase. Please correct me if you have evidence (or personal experience) that I'm wrong.
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If the RL-10 is to stay at $30 million, then the J-2X is not that bad of a price at $45 million a piece.
yes it is
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So, $30 million for an RL-10? All because SSME is going away (maybe)?
does PWR have marketing rights to the RD-0146?
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What about the RS-68 engine? How much has it gone up?
This seems to be assuming the RS-68 price has gone up some non-zero amount.
Right, but why does it automatically mean they raise the prices on all their other engines?
This makes that assumption more explicit. Are you asking, or asserting, that there have been prices increases on "all their other engines?" To build a theory about this one might investigate the facilities where each engine is produced, and see if SSME and RL10 have some shared overhead costs not borne by e.g. RS-68.
I would think the far safer assumption is that SSME and RS-68 have shared overhead costs (not SSME and RL-10), since RS-68 has SSME heritage and they are much nearer each other in thrust (and are both sea-level engines).
It's because of this that I think it's a pretty darned safe assumption that if RL-10 has such a big price increase because of SSME ending that RS-68 will have at least some sort of price increase. Please correct me if you have evidence (or personal experience) that I'm wrong.
From what I am aware, there is more overhead sharing between the SSME and RL-10 than between either and the RS-68. I also have heard that the J-2X was to take advantage of this overhead capacity as well. This would mean the tools needed to work on the engines more than anything I could imagine. The RL-10 and SSME share a lot of the same needs in this regards, and I can see the J-2X from it's diagrams sharing those same needs. While the parts may not be the same, the methods to manufacture are. The RS-68, by comparison, has far less manual labor involvement, more automation from what I have seen, which means it's tooling is more focused, less able to be shared between it and other product lines.
The RD-180 would be in a similar situation to the RL-10 and SSME, and likely if domestic production of it were to occur, it would share this overhead costs as well.
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To build a theory about this one might investigate the facilities where each engine is produced, and see if SSME and RL10 have some shared overhead costs not borne by e.g. RS-68.
I would think the far safer assumption is that SSME and RS-68 have shared overhead costs (not SSME and RL-10). [...] Please correct me if you have evidence (or personal experience) that I'm wrong.
I have no affirmative proof to offer you, just two carefully couched questions: (1) Is there any evidence that any RS-68 has ever been built anywhere other than the Stennis Engine Assembly Facility, which is reportedly "capable of producing as many as 40 RS-68 engines per year?" (2) Is there any evidence that any SSME has ever been built anywhere other than Canoga Park, California?
My personal assumptions are quite obviously embedded in those questions! ;)
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What about the RS-68 engine? How much has it gone up?
This seems to be assuming the RS-68 price has gone up some non-zero amount.
Right, but why does it automatically mean they raise the prices on all their other engines?
This makes that assumption more explicit. Are you asking, or asserting, that there have been prices increases on "all their other engines?" To build a theory about this one might investigate the facilities where each engine is produced, and see if SSME and RL10 have some shared overhead costs not borne by e.g. RS-68.
I would think the far safer assumption is that SSME and RS-68 have shared overhead costs (not SSME and RL-10), since RS-68 has SSME heritage and they are much nearer each other in thrust (and are both sea-level engines).
It's because of this that I think it's a pretty darned safe assumption that if RL-10 has such a big price increase because of SSME ending that RS-68 will have at least some sort of price increase. Please correct me if you have evidence (or personal experience) that I'm wrong.
From what I am aware, there is more overhead sharing between the SSME and RL-10 than between either and the RS-68. I also have heard that the J-2X was to take advantage of this overhead capacity as well. This would mean the tools needed to work on the engines more than anything I could imagine. The RL-10 and SSME share a lot of the same needs in this regards, and I can see the J-2X from it's diagrams sharing those same needs. While the parts may not be the same, the methods to manufacture are. The RS-68, by comparison, has far less manual labor involvement, more automation from what I have seen, which means it's tooling is more focused, less able to be shared between it and other product lines.
The RD-180 would be in a similar situation to the RL-10 and SSME, and likely if domestic production of it were to occur, it would share this overhead costs as well.
Tooling costs driving design and prices on engines costing tens of millions each? Ridiculous. What's the tooling made out of, solid gold?
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What about the RS-68 engine? How much has it gone up?
This seems to be assuming the RS-68 price has gone up some non-zero amount.
Right, but why does it automatically mean they raise the prices on all their other engines?
This makes that assumption more explicit. Are you asking, or asserting, that there have been prices increases on "all their other engines?" To build a theory about this one might investigate the facilities where each engine is produced, and see if SSME and RL10 have some shared overhead costs not borne by e.g. RS-68.
I would think the far safer assumption is that SSME and RS-68 have shared overhead costs (not SSME and RL-10), since RS-68 has SSME heritage and they are much nearer each other in thrust (and are both sea-level engines).
It's because of this that I think it's a pretty darned safe assumption that if RL-10 has such a big price increase because of SSME ending that RS-68 will have at least some sort of price increase. Please correct me if you have evidence (or personal experience) that I'm wrong.
From what I am aware, there is more overhead sharing between the SSME and RL-10 than between either and the RS-68. I also have heard that the J-2X was to take advantage of this overhead capacity as well. This would mean the tools needed to work on the engines more than anything I could imagine. The RL-10 and SSME share a lot of the same needs in this regards, and I can see the J-2X from it's diagrams sharing those same needs. While the parts may not be the same, the methods to manufacture are. The RS-68, by comparison, has far less manual labor involvement, more automation from what I have seen, which means it's tooling is more focused, less able to be shared between it and other product lines.
The RD-180 would be in a similar situation to the RL-10 and SSME, and likely if domestic production of it were to occur, it would share this overhead costs as well.
Tooling costs driving design and prices on a engines costing tens of millions each? Ridiculous. What's the tooling made out of, solid gold?
Not just the tooling costs but the people to work those tools. Those people cost money, used or not. You cannot hire people for 3 months, fire them, then rehire them a year later. With no SSME, the RL-10 has to support the full employment cost for the engines, which means we now can see roughly how much of the SSME cost was just in salary and tooling.
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Tooling costs driving design and prices on a engines costing tens of millions each? Ridiculous. What's the tooling made out of, solid gold?
Not just the tooling costs but the people to work those tools. Those people cost money, used or not. You cannot hire people for 3 months, fire them, then rehire them a year later. With no SSME, the RL-10 has to support the full employment cost for the engines, which means we now can see roughly how much of the SSME cost was just in salary and tooling.
Sounds like a lot of rationales and assumptions. If a business can't adapt to changing markets it should cease to exist.
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Tooling costs driving design and prices on a engines costing tens of millions each? Ridiculous. What's the tooling made out of, solid gold?
Not just the tooling costs but the people to work those tools. Those people cost money, used or not. You cannot hire people for 3 months, fire them, then rehire them a year later. With no SSME, the RL-10 has to support the full employment cost for the engines, which means we now can see roughly how much of the SSME cost was just in salary and tooling.
Sounds like a lot of rationales and assumptions. If a business can't adapt to changing markets it should cease to exist.
Agreed.
I have a feeling PWR will learn to adapt. Either them, or ULA will. Or ULA's customers will. $30 million per RL-10 is not a stable situation.
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Tooling costs driving design and prices on a engines costing tens of millions each? Ridiculous. What's the tooling made out of, solid gold?
Not just the tooling costs but the people to work those tools. Those people cost money, used or not. You cannot hire people for 3 months, fire them, then rehire them a year later. With no SSME, the RL-10 has to support the full employment cost for the engines, which means we now can see roughly how much of the SSME cost was just in salary and tooling.
Sounds like a lot of rationales and assumptions. If a business can't adapt to changing markets it should cease to exist.
A price change is an adaptation, however. It is a business tactic, that their product is worth the higher pricetag. And, truth be told, as it is right now, they're right. The RL-10 offers the best in-space performance out there right now. Only a single Russian engine compares, and it is within spitting distance price-wise due to the demand.
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Tooling costs driving design and prices on a engines costing tens of millions each? Ridiculous. What's the tooling made out of, solid gold?
Not just the tooling costs but the people to work those tools. Those people cost money, used or not. You cannot hire people for 3 months, fire them, then rehire them a year later. With no SSME, the RL-10 has to support the full employment cost for the engines, which means we now can see roughly how much of the SSME cost was just in salary and tooling.
Sounds like a lot of rationales and assumptions. If a business can't adapt to changing markets it should cease to exist.
Agreed.
I have a feeling PWR will learn to adapt. Either them, or ULA will. Or ULA's customers will. $30 million per RL-10 is not a stable situation.
For ages, we've had a situation of limited options, with the quasi-monopolies producing this situation. For the intermediate future, this will remain the case. However, as demonstrated by Aerojet, XCOR and SpaceX, the market is changing, with hungrier businesses smelling blood in the water. PWR will be able to keep this for a year or two, then we shall see what happens. I suspect Aerojet will be first with an RL-10 alternative, although Northrup has also listed one in the past that may be brought forth. XCOR is making leaps and bounds with their engine tech. I am not seeing the same movements from SpaceX, which surprises me.
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A price change is an adaptation, however. It is a business tactic, that their product is worth the higher pricetag. And, truth be told, as it is right now, they're right. The RL-10 offers the best in-space performance out there right now. Only a single Russian engine compares, and it is within spitting distance price-wise due to the demand.
does PWR have US marketing rights to the RD-0146?
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A price change is an adaptation, however. It is a business tactic, that their product is worth the higher pricetag. And, truth be told, as it is right now, they're right. The RL-10 offers the best in-space performance out there right now. Only a single Russian engine compares, and it is within spitting distance price-wise due to the demand.
does PWR have US marketing rights to the RD-0146?
They have worldwide marketing rights for any application of the engine outside of Russia.
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A price change is an adaptation, however. It is a business tactic, that their product is worth the higher pricetag. And, truth be told, as it is right now, they're right. The RL-10 offers the best in-space performance out there right now. Only a single Russian engine compares, and it is within spitting distance price-wise due to the demand.
does PWR have US marketing rights to the RD-0146?
They have worldwide marketing rights for any application of the engine outside of Russia.
And that's the "Russian engine .. within spitting distance price-wise" ?
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A price change is an adaptation, however. It is a business tactic, that their product is worth the higher pricetag. And, truth be told, as it is right now, they're right. The RL-10 offers the best in-space performance out there right now. Only a single Russian engine compares, and it is within spitting distance price-wise due to the demand.
does PWR have US marketing rights to the RD-0146?
They have worldwide marketing rights for any application of the engine outside of Russia.
And that's the "Russian engine .. within spitting distance price-wise" ?
Bingo.
Funny how that works, they control access to the other engine which could compete... and how it's pricetag is not that much different.
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A price change is an adaptation, however. It is a business tactic, that their product is worth the higher pricetag. And, truth be told, as it is right now, they're right. The RL-10 offers the best in-space performance out there right now. Only a single Russian engine compares, and it is within spitting distance price-wise due to the demand.
does PWR have US marketing rights to the RD-0146?
They have worldwide marketing rights for any application of the engine outside of Russia.
And that's the "Russian engine .. within spitting distance price-wise" ?
Bingo.
Funny how that works, they control access to the other engine which could compete... and how it's pricetag is not that much different.
"Only a single Russian engine compares, and it is within spitting distance price-wise due to the demand."
really?
I hope the executives at PWR are proud of their 'patriotic' and 'honorable' service to our country.
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A price change is an adaptation, however. It is a business tactic, that their product is worth the higher pricetag. And, truth be told, as it is right now, they're right. The RL-10 offers the best in-space performance out there right now. Only a single Russian engine compares, and it is within spitting distance price-wise due to the demand.
does PWR have US marketing rights to the RD-0146?
They have worldwide marketing rights for any application of the engine outside of Russia.
And that's the "Russian engine .. within spitting distance price-wise" ?
Bingo.
Funny how that works, they control access to the other engine which could compete... and how it's pricetag is not that much different.
"Only a single Russian engine compares, and it is within spitting distance price-wise due to the demand."
really?
I never said it was *market* demand, did I?
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A price change is an adaptation, however. It is a business tactic, that their product is worth the higher pricetag. And, truth be told, as it is right now, they're right. The RL-10 offers the best in-space performance out there right now. Only a single Russian engine compares, and it is within spitting distance price-wise due to the demand.
does PWR have US marketing rights to the RD-0146?
They have worldwide marketing rights for any application of the engine outside of Russia.
And that's the "Russian engine .. within spitting distance price-wise" ?
Bingo.
Funny how that works, they control access to the other engine which could compete... and how it's pricetag is not that much different.
Which makes me think it has little to do with SSME-specific overhead and more with PWR trying to leverage their position to get an extension to SSME or an engine development contract or something like that.
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You have to have certain folks just to manage an organization. So producing no engines a year still has a cost. There's really very little fat to cut in a private sector organization. The SSME contract was paying most of the PWR overhead. $45M is probably not the real price of a J2X since it was being done under the SSME contract. Some of West Palm's RL10 fixed costs were supported by the SSME contract as well because of the "Alternate Turbopumps." RS68 parts are fabricated in Canoga Park and at suppliers and then the big components are integrated at Stennis.
If you expect a business to adapt, then you have to get away from the government being the only customer. Executive agencies don't like systems to change from a proven configuration when they carry 9 or 10 figure cargo. Congress doesn't like systems to change when it could mean fewer jobs in their districts. This problem is not the contractors' faults.
What evidence do you have that the RL10 shouldn't cost so much? Please cite data or don't post opinions.
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I am surprised no one has thrown out the concept of Parkinson's Law and how it applies to PWR...
(for the googlely challenged)
http://www.economist.com/node/14116121?story_id=14116121
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Parkinson-s-Law.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parkinson%27s_Law
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What evidence do you have that the RL10 shouldn't cost so much? Please cite data or don't post opinions.
What evidence do you have that it should? I bet very few people know the honest answer - but as tax payers, we deserve it.
Antares, please tell us. What has been the price history of the RL10? Why has it become so expensive? Is PWR using massive price hikes to sustain itself now that the Shuttle is retiring because they have to, or because they can?
How about its parent companies, Pratt & Whitney and United Technologies Corporation, themselves massive beneficiaries of US government contracts - shouldn't they pick up some of the workers and capacity, at least temporarily?
Is PWR holding back the RD-0146, which according to this thread they control the marketing rights to, in order to secure their monopoly on the RL10?
Should the US tax payer be encouraging and enabling this type of behavior?
Is this a company that is unable to navigate business cycles - a process so basic and fundamental that every company in the US has to do it? Should a company unable to manage these business cycles be entrusted as sole provider of a product which is critical to national security?
If you expect a business to adapt, then you have to get away from the government being the only customer. Executive agencies don't like systems to change from a proven configuration when they carry 9 or 10 figure cargo. Congress doesn't like systems to change when it could mean fewer jobs in their districts. This problem is not the contractors' faults.
Not the contractor's fault? Do they need a keeper?
"If you expect a business to adapt, then you have to get away from the government being the only customer."
It's PWR choice and responsibility as to what they make, who they work for and how they diversify, not the US government's. A company with the capability to make high tech engines, critical to national security, shouldn't need a babysitter.
One more question - how long have they known the Shuttle was retiring?
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You have to have certain folks just to manage an organization. So producing no engines a year still has a cost. There's really very little fat to cut in a private sector organization. The SSME contract was paying most of the PWR overhead. $45M is probably not the real price of a J2X since it was being done under the SSME contract. Some of West Palm's RL10 fixed costs were supported by the SSME contract as well because of the "Alternate Turbopumps." RS68 parts are fabricated in Canoga Park and at suppliers and then the big components are integrated at Stennis.
If you expect a business to adapt, then you have to get away from the government being the only customer. Executive agencies don't like systems to change from a proven configuration when they carry 9 or 10 figure cargo. Congress doesn't like systems to change when it could mean fewer jobs in their districts. This problem is not the contractors' faults.
What evidence do you have that the RL10 shouldn't cost so much? Please cite data or don't post opinions.
Thanks for the response!
My "evidence" is only the past figures given for the cost of the RL-10, which range from ~$2-4 million to ~$13 million or so (depending on the source) within the last twenty or thirty years. Unfortunately, I don't have any good sources to show, but my evidence is merely the past cost figures given for producing the engine.
I would suspect that almost any hard figures coming directly from the company would be "proprietary" (I hate that word), so it's pretty hard to blame someone for not giving hard evidence in this case (though I certainly would prefer hard evidence to hand-waving).
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You have to have certain folks just to manage an organization. So producing no engines a year still has a cost. There's really very little fat to cut in a private sector organization. The SSME contract was paying most of the PWR overhead. $45M is probably not the real price of a J2X since it was being done under the SSME contract. Some of West Palm's RL10 fixed costs were supported by the SSME contract as well because of the "Alternate Turbopumps." RS68 parts are fabricated in Canoga Park and at suppliers and then the big components are integrated at Stennis.
If you expect a business to adapt, then you have to get away from the government being the only customer. Executive agencies don't like systems to change from a proven configuration when they carry 9 or 10 figure cargo. Congress doesn't like systems to change when it could mean fewer jobs in their districts. This problem is not the contractors' faults.
What evidence do you have that the RL10 shouldn't cost so much? Please cite data or don't post opinions.
Thanks for the response!
My "evidence" is only the past figures given for the cost of the RL-10, which range from ~$2-4 million to ~$13 million or so (depending on the source) within the last twenty or thirty years. Unfortunately, I don't have any good sources to show, but my evidence is merely the past cost figures given for producing the engine.
I would suspect that almost any hard figures coming directly from the company would be "proprietary" (I hate that word), so it's pretty hard to blame someone for not giving hard evidence in this case (though I certainly would prefer hard evidence to hand-waving).
Well, first things first. We don't *know* that the prices are more than doubling. That is the claim made by someone in this thread, but we have little supporting evidence. We know that some price increases are happening, so we assume the worse.
Now, I was told $12 million each not even a few months ago. This was itself a price jump over the $8 million from two years ago. With the increase in price of commodity components, this fits in well. Lack of viable competition can also drive the cost up as well. This would also cause an increase in launch costs for ULA, it's a 50% price increase.
This could also be a case of volume procurement vs one-offs as well. If, originally, the engines were purchased in order volumes of 100, but now per the new procurement process they must be purchased individually, this would similarly increase the price.
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Here is how to understand the situation.
In 1998, for example, a total of 60-62 rocket engine chamber flights were made by engines manufactured by Rocketdyne or Pratt & Whitney. They flew on five different launch vehicle systems.
In 2010, a total of only 20 rocket engine chamber flights were made by PWR engines. They flew on four launch vehicle types.
By 2013 or so, only about 12 PWR engines will fly annually on only two launch vehicle types.
This isn't just about Shuttle.
- Ed Kyle
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These increases are scary.
IMO unless a cheaper replacement is found this ends ACES.
$90 million extra for about 6,000 kg to LEO not happening.
This also makes the J-2X for ACES a possibility unless it suffers similar increases.
Also I just ran across a $3 million dollar replacement engine.
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/04/12/darma-initiative-affordable-upper-stage-rocket-engine/
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These increases are scary.
IMO unless a cheaper replacement is found this ends ACES.
$90 million extra for about 6,000 kg to LEO not happening.
This also makes the J-2X for ACES a possibility unless it suffers similar increases.
Also I just ran across a $3 million dollar replacement engine.
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/04/12/darma-initiative-affordable-upper-stage-rocket-engine/
THey don't list the isp at all, so it may not compare at all. The issue is, as both I and Ed keep pointing out, is lack of volume. We simply don't make enough engines to keep the price down. Projects like ACES would improve that.
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... The issue is, as both I and Ed keep pointing out, is lack of volume. We simply don't make enough engines to keep the price down ...
I bet a competitor could, without the overhead and constraints of an existing design. PWR might want to start thinking like that potential competitor.
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... The issue is, as both I and Ed keep pointing out, is lack of volume. We simply don't make enough engines to keep the price down ...
I bet a competitor could, without the overhead and constraints of an existing design. PWR might want to start thinking like that potential competitor.
In theory, yes, if a competitor wished to invest the estimated $2 billion to develop a comparable engine for a production volume of 10/year. Investors would demand that they get repaid within 5 years, so, ($2 billion/5 years)/10 per year would mean that on top of the actual production cost, you would have to add $40 million.
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Here is how to understand the situation.
In 1998, for example, a total of 60-62 rocket engine chamber flights were made by engines manufactured by Rocketdyne or Pratt & Whitney. They flew on five different launch vehicle systems.
In 2010, a total of only 20 rocket engine chamber flights were made by PWR engines. They flew on four launch vehicle types.
By 2013 or so, only about 12 PWR engines will fly annually on only two launch vehicle types.
This isn't just about Shuttle.
- Ed Kyle
(thanks, Ed. Good post.)
...and...
To build a theory about this one might investigate the facilities where each engine is produced, and see if SSME and RL10 have some shared overhead costs not borne by e.g. RS-68.
I would think the far safer assumption is that SSME and RS-68 have shared overhead costs (not SSME and RL-10). [...] Please correct me if you have evidence (or personal experience) that I'm wrong.
I have no affirmative proof to offer you, just two carefully couched questions: (1) Is there any evidence that any RS-68 has ever been built anywhere other than the Stennis Engine Assembly Facility, which is reportedly "capable of producing as many as 40 RS-68 engines per year?" (2) Is there any evidence that any SSME has ever been built anywhere other than Canoga Park, California?
My personal assumptions are quite obviously embedded in those questions! ;)
That PWR have two places where they manufacture only a handful of engines a year makes me think that PWR are thinking hard right now about how they can consolidate to one site.
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... The issue is, as both I and Ed keep pointing out, is lack of volume. We simply don't make enough engines to keep the price down ...
I bet a competitor could, without the overhead and constraints of an existing design. PWR might want to start thinking like that potential competitor.
In theory, yes, if a competitor wished to invest the estimated $2 billion to develop a comparable engine for a production volume of 10/year. Investors would demand that they get repaid within 5 years, so, ($2 billion/5 years)/10 per year would mean that on top of the actual production cost, you would have to add $40 million.
How about an existing engine, like the two mentioned in this thread.
How about an engine with lower performance that costs a fraction of the amount? How about another launch provider that's already doing this?
One thing I've realized about the US space industry is that we are willing to spend enormous amounts of money for tiny increases in isp. We will spend enormous amounts time and money optimizing a design - so much time and money that the development costs start to dwarf the manufacturing costs - When there isn't necessarily a case to do so (unless that case is to provide jobs).
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That PWR have two places where they manufacture only a handful of engines a year makes me think that PWR are thinking hard right now about how they can consolidate to one site.
for how many years has PWR known that the Shuttle was retiring?
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... The issue is, as both I and Ed keep pointing out, is lack of volume. We simply don't make enough engines to keep the price down ...
I bet a competitor could, without the overhead and constraints of an existing design. PWR might want to start thinking like that potential competitor.
In theory, yes, if a competitor wished to invest the estimated $2 billion to develop a comparable engine for a production volume of 10/year. Investors would demand that they get repaid within 5 years, so, ($2 billion/5 years)/10 per year would mean that on top of the actual production cost, you would have to add $40 million.
How about an existing engine, like the two mentioned in this thread.
How about an engine with lower performance that costs a fraction of the amount? How about another launch provider that's already doing this?
One thing I've realized about the US space industry is that we are willing to spend enormous amounts of money for tiny increases in isp. We will spend enormous amounts time and money optimizing a design - so much time and money that the development costs start to dwarf the manufacturing costs - When there isn't necessarily a case to do so (unless that case is to provide jobs).
You said a competitor. Those engines are not competitors, they don't have the isp to match the RL-10. Even the close Russian engine PWR sells does not match the RL-10. To use those you would require more fuel, and reduce your payload. PWR is really in a situation where to compete, you must develop, but the act of developing will make you uncompetitive.
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That PWR have two places where they manufacture only a handful of engines a year makes me think that PWR are thinking hard right now about how they can consolidate to one site.
for how many years has PWR known that the Shuttle was retiring?
Enough to get it down to two. They used to have more.
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How many engines does PWR have in development right now ?
The majority of the J-2X work is funded by NASA.
Do they have anything else going on ?
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How many engines does PWR have in development right now ?
The majority of the J-2X work is funded by NASA.
Do they have anything else going on ?
NGE for the USAF, RS-68A for ULA.
And that's about it.
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How many engines does PWR have in development right now ?
This is a key point. During the 1990s, rather than compete and innovate, Rocketdyne withdrew from the Atlas IIAR competition to build the engine that ultimately would power today's Atlas V.
A few years ago, Orbital decided to develop a new rocket. There was no U.S. propulsion competitor able to offer a first stage engine. Subsequently, Orbital decided to buy a liquid upper stage for that new rocket. Ditto on the U.S. propulsion offerings.
These two rockets are going to account for a big percentage of total U.S. launches in coming years. That is market share, and technological prowess, ceded, without a fight, by U.S. propulsion companies.
- Ed Kyle
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This is a key point. During the 1990s, rather than compete and innovate, Rocketdyne withdrew from the Atlas IIAR competition to build the engine that ultimately would power today's Atlas V.
That was because they didn't think they could handle RS-68 and Altas IIAR development at the same time.
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These two rockets are going to account for a big percentage of total U.S. launches in coming years.
- Ed Kyle
Perhaps. Perhaps not.
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... The issue is, as both I and Ed keep pointing out, is lack of volume. We simply don't make enough engines to keep the price down ...
I bet a competitor could, without the overhead and constraints of an existing design. PWR might want to start thinking like that potential competitor.
In theory, yes, if a competitor wished to invest the estimated $2 billion to develop a comparable engine for a production volume of 10/year. Investors would demand that they get repaid within 5 years, so, ($2 billion/5 years)/10 per year would mean that on top of the actual production cost, you would have to add $40 million.
How about an existing engine, like the two mentioned in this thread.
How about an engine with lower performance that costs a fraction of the amount? How about another launch provider that's already doing this?
One thing I've realized about the US space industry is that we are willing to spend enormous amounts of money for tiny increases in isp. We will spend enormous amounts time and money optimizing a design - so much time and money that the development costs start to dwarf the manufacturing costs - When there isn't necessarily a case to do so (unless that case is to provide jobs).
You said a competitor. Those engines are not competitors, they don't have the isp to match the RL-10. Even the close Russian engine PWR sells does not match the RL-10. To use those you would require more fuel, and reduce your payload. PWR is really in a situation where to compete, you must develop, but the act of developing will make you uncompetitive.
The rd-0146 does indeed match the performance of the rl-10 used on Atlas, in terms of thrust and Isp. It's heavier, but the mixture ratio is better (6:1). At least that's what it says on the P&W web site (http://www.pratt-whitney.com/StaticFiles/Pratt%20&%20Whitney%20New/Media%20Center/Assets/1%20Static%20Files/Docs/pwr_RD-0146.pdf).
Murray Anderson
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Wonder if Pratt and Whitney would be interested in selling RocketDyne? As their engine production volume is declining, instead of milking RocketDyne for all its worth perhaps they would be interested in selling to one of their customers. ULA?
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These two rockets are going to account for a big percentage of total U.S. launches in coming years.
- Ed Kyle
Perhaps. Perhaps not.
They will, the "Perhaps. Perhaps not" is applicable to Spacex.
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The rd-0146 does indeed match the performance of the rl-10 used on Atlas, in terms of thrust and Isp. It's heavier, but the mixture ratio is better (6:1).
There is no "better" when it comes to mixture ratio.
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The rd-0146 does indeed match the performance of the rl-10 used on Atlas, in terms of thrust and Isp. It's heavier, but the mixture ratio is better (6:1).
There is no "better" when it comes to mixture ratio.
If it has the same Isp but more oxygen (i.e. a little closer to stoic), you get a greater bulk density and lower tank mass. I don't know if that's the case for the engine in question, but that's what a "better" mixture ratio would be.
EDIT: A hydrolox engine with the same Isp but a (O:F mass) mixture ratio of 6:1 would have lower tank mass than a hydrolox engine with a 5.85:1 ratio (which is what some say the RL-10B2 has, though I don't have a good source). Assuming the inlet pressures are the same.
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The rd-0146 does indeed match the performance of the rl-10 used on Atlas, in terms of thrust and Isp. It's heavier, but the mixture ratio is better (6:1).
There is no "better" when it comes to mixture ratio.
If it has the same Isp but more oxygen (i.e. a little closer to stoic), you get a greater bulk density and lower tank mass. I don't know if that's the case for the engine in question, but that's what a "better" mixture ratio would be.
EDIT: A hydrolox engine with the same Isp but a (O:F mass) mixture ratio of 6:1 would have lower tank mass than a hydrolox engine with a 5.85:1 ratio (which is what some say the RL-10B2 has, though I don't have a good source). Assuming the inlet pressures are the same.
No, it does not have the same isp. It has the same isp as one model of the RL-10, but that model is not the only one.
Check it here:
http://www.pratt-whitney.com/StaticFiles/Pratt%20&%20Whitney%20New/Media%20Center/Assets/1%20Static%20Files/Docs/pwr_RD-0146.pdf
isp 451
Compare to the RL-10 in the Delta IV:
http://www.pw.utc.com/StaticFiles/Pratt%20&%20Whitney%20New/Products/Pratt%20&%20Whitney%20Rocketdyne/1%20Static%20Files/pwr_rl10b-2.pdf
isp 465
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The rd-0146 does indeed match the performance of the rl-10 used on Atlas, in terms of thrust and Isp. It's heavier, but the mixture ratio is better (6:1).
There is no "better" when it comes to mixture ratio.
If it has the same Isp but more oxygen (i.e. a little closer to stoic), you get a greater bulk density and lower tank mass. I don't know if that's the case for the engine in question, but that's what a "better" mixture ratio would be.
EDIT: A hydrolox engine with the same Isp but a (O:F mass) mixture ratio of 6:1 would have lower tank mass than a hydrolox engine with a 5.85:1 ratio (which is what some say the RL-10B2 has, though I don't have a good source). Assuming the inlet pressures are the same.
No, it does not have the same isp. It has the same isp as one model of the RL-10, but that model is not the only one.
Check it here:
http://www.pratt-whitney.com/StaticFiles/Pratt%20&%20Whitney%20New/Media%20Center/Assets/1%20Static%20Files/Docs/pwr_RD-0146.pdf
isp 451
Compare to the RL-10 in the Delta IV:
http://www.pw.utc.com/StaticFiles/Pratt%20&%20Whitney%20New/Products/Pratt%20&%20Whitney%20Rocketdyne/1%20Static%20Files/pwr_rl10b-2.pdf
isp 465
Again, I never claimed it had the same Isp, but you do realize the 465s is for the RL-10B2, which has the extensible nozzle extension and which I believe are being converted to the fixed nozzle version with less Isp (as used on the Atlas V), so the demand may be for an engine with ~451s Isp.
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These two rockets are going to account for a big percentage of total U.S. launches in coming years.
- Ed Kyle
Perhaps. Perhaps not.
They will, the "Perhaps. Perhaps not" is applicable to Spacex.
PWR's price increases will inevitably be passed along by ULA, driving the cost of both the Atlas V and Delta IV even higher than they already are after ULA's own massive price increases. Both companies are relying on their monopoly positions, which is a dangerous gamble in the long run.
I've seen nothing to indicate that PWR is working on becoming more competitive. And while it's true that ULA is starting to look at other engines, it will be many years before they have anything operational. I suspect their collaboration with XCOR is more of "warning shot" at PWR, in hopes of motivating them to keep engine prices under control.
In the interim, SpaceX's launchers will be far, far more competitively priced than anything ULA can offer. Some back-of-the-envelope calculations (taking into account the higher cost of the RL-10, but assuming that the RS-68 and RD-180 remain at their current price point) show that even if SpaceX misses its price targets by 50%, they will still have better pricing (both per-launch and per-kilogram) than ULA. And if the AV and DIVH first-stage engines increase in cost (though I don't see why the RD-180 would), it gives SpaceX an even greater price advantage.
Even once ULA has a new engine to replace the costly RL-10, they'll find themselves in the position that SpaceX is in now -- i.e., putting a new and unproven launch vehicle up against a (by then) well-established competitor.
Of course, all this assumes that SpaceX will continue to be successful, which is by no means guaranteed. It's early days yet, and they still have a long way to go.
However, I hope that they are successful, since otherwise a lot of science missions (and manned missions) won't happen at all.
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Again, I never claimed it had the same Isp, but you do realize the 465s is for the RL-10B2, which has the extensible nozzle extension and which I believe are being converted to the fixed nozzle version with less Isp (as used on the Atlas V), so the demand may be for an engine with ~451s Isp.
According to this paper on upper stage evolution:
http://www.ulalaunch.com/site/docs/publications/UpperStageEvolutionJPC2009.pdf
They are upgrading the RL-10A-4 with technologies from the RL-10B-2, making the RL-10A-4-3. From what I understand, the RL-10A series will retain the fixed nozzle, but have additional improvements from the RL-10B series added to it. In addition, the RL-10B-2 is getting improvements from RL-10A. One of the goals is to improve isp for the A's, so I understand.
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These two rockets are going to account for a big percentage of total U.S. launches in coming years.
- Ed Kyle
Perhaps. Perhaps not.
They will, the "Perhaps. Perhaps not" is applicable to Spacex.
PWR's price increases will inevitably be passed along by ULA, driving the cost of both the Atlas V and Delta IV even higher than they already are after ULA's own massive price increases. Both companies are relying on their monopoly positions, which is a dangerous gamble in the long run.
And don't forget NASA.
J-2X was a development contract to supply a certain number of test engines. Once that contract is complete, NASA would have to put out a solicitation (order) for 'X' number of flight engines (likely FFP). Depending on that quantity, the price of the J-2X engine would be known, and you could almost guarantee that it's going to be a lot more than originally planned.
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1. PWR's price increases will inevitably be passed along by ULA, driving the cost of both the Atlas V and Delta IV even higher than they already are after ULA's own massive price increases. Both companies are relying on their monopoly positions, which is a dangerous gamble in the long run.
2. In the interim, SpaceX's launchers will be far, far more competitively priced than anything ULA can offer. Some back-of-the-envelope calculations (taking into account the higher cost of the RL-10, but assuming that the RS-68 and RD-180 remain at their current price point) show that even if SpaceX misses its price targets by 50%, they will still have better pricing (both per-launch and per-kilogram) than ULA. And if the AV and DIVH first-stage engines increase in cost (though I don't see why the RD-180 would), it gives SpaceX an even greater price advantage.
1. Huh? What do you think cause the "massive" ULA price increases in the first place?
2. You can't make such statements. How do you the prices to compare them? How do you know the price of ULA products? And Spacex website prices are not what the gov't pays.
Know something before posting
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Both companies are relying on their monopoly positions,
[/quote}
What proof do you have of this?
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I really don't want to fan the flames of conspiracy, but $30M for a single RL-10, a mature, fully amortized design that depending who you listen to just recently cost $8-15M does give one pause. So much so that you would think PWR would try to spin the pricing to reduce the bad PR. So I checked their recent press releases and found nada, nothing.
You would think they would try to explain themselves to their customers; predatory pricing does anger people even in the defense industry. That is, unless they don't care what anyone thinks about it, which would lend credence to the theory that PWR knows the power they have over the market and aren't afraid to use it.
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These two rockets are going to account for a big percentage of total U.S. launches in coming years.
- Ed Kyle
Perhaps. Perhaps not.
They will, the "Perhaps. Perhaps not" is applicable to Spacex.
PWR's price increases will inevitably be passed along by ULA, driving the cost of both the Atlas V and Delta IV even higher than they already are after ULA's own massive price increases. Both companies are relying on their monopoly positions, which is a dangerous gamble in the long run.
I've seen nothing to indicate that PWR is working on becoming more competitive. And while it's true that ULA is starting to look at other engines, it will be many years before they have anything operational. I suspect their collaboration with XCOR is more of "warning shot" at PWR, in hopes of motivating them to keep engine prices under control.
In the interim, SpaceX's launchers will be far, far more competitively priced than anything ULA can offer. Some back-of-the-envelope calculations (taking into account the higher cost of the RL-10, but assuming that the RS-68 and RD-180 remain at their current price point) show that even if SpaceX misses its price targets by 50%, they will still have better pricing (both per-launch and per-kilogram) than ULA. And if the AV and DIVH first-stage engines increase in cost (though I don't see why the RD-180 would), it gives SpaceX an even greater price advantage.
Even once ULA has a new engine to replace the costly RL-10, they'll find themselves in the position that SpaceX is in now -- i.e., putting a new and unproven launch vehicle up against a (by then) well-established competitor.
Of course, all this assumes that SpaceX will continue to be successful, which is by no means guaranteed. It's early days yet, and they still have a long way to go.
However, I hope that they are successful, since otherwise a lot of science missions (and manned missions) won't happen at all.
Not sure why they're driving cost up so much SLS if built is pretty much guaranteed to give them a contract on the RS25e.
PWR probably needs to cull some of their upper and middle management to get costs under control but they're not willing to do so.
Xcor is not their only potential competitor.
This is not an RL-10 equivalent a stage built around it would only have 70 to 80% of the impulse of a Centaur but it's not too massive a jump to go from a methane engine to a hydro lox engine.
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/04/12/darma-initiative-affordable-upper-stage-rocket-engine/
Though for some missions the lower performance of a methane upper stage maybe not be an issue.
Aerojet also could decide to offer a hydrogen engine http://www.aerojet.com/news2.php?action=fullnews&id=249
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Go read an interview from Jim Maser where he admitted the RL10 price quote was obscenely high to prove a point to the government on the dire state of the liuid engine industry. As much as the vox populi amateurs are trying to make something nefarious out of this, it's all quite open. PWR is as peeved about the state of the industry as you are.
PWR has only known of the end of the SSME / overhead sustainment contract since the FY11 Obama budget was announced in February 2010. Prior to that it was planned by both NASA and PWR as a follow-on to the SSME contract that would develop J2X and the liquid booster engine for some HLV.
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1. PWR's price increases will inevitably be passed along by ULA, driving the cost of both the Atlas V and Delta IV even higher than they already are after ULA's own massive price increases.
1. Huh? What do you think cause the "massive" ULA price increases in the first place?
Sorry, Jim, I was unclear. When I said "price increases" in the plural, I was not referring just to the most recent PWR price increases (which contributed to the corresponding recent price increases by ULA). I meant that whenever PWR increases their prices, ULA will pass along those increased costs to their customers.
And from your question, it sounds like you agree with me.
It's true that my "back of the envelope" calculations were using the most recent PWR increase as an example. However, since I don't know the magnitude of their next price increase, it's the best I could do. :-)
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Both companies are relying on their monopoly positions,
What proof do you have of this?
Jim, are you saying that PWR does not have a monopoly position in the supply of engines to ULA?
Are you saying that ULA does not have a monopoly position in providing launch vehicles to DOD and NRO?
Or are you saying that both companies are simply too noble and self-sacrificing to take advantage of their monopoly positions in order to increase their profitability?
Boeing, LM and UTC are all publicly-traded companies, so they have an obligation to their shareholders to maximize profits. If I held shares in those firms, I'd be very happy to see these price increases.
However, I don't hold any stock in the aerospace industry. The only thing I'm interested in is seeing affordable access to space, and I'm sure many people on these forums feel the same way. That's why many of us are concerned that the pricing of EELVs is going in exactly the wrong direction.
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Go read an interview from Jim Maser where he admitted the RL10 price quote was obscenely high to prove a point to the government on the dire state of the liuid engine industry.
Oh great, if what you say is accurate it sounds like he's playing games with both tax payer's money and US national security. I read all the recent interviews with Maser I could find but didn't see anything about 'proving a point'. Do you have a link to that interview?
As much as the vox populi amateurs are trying to make something nefarious out of this, it's all quite open. PWR is as peeved about the state of the industry as you are.
I doubt that. I don't have a monopoly on a critical item that I can ratchet up the price on.
PWR has only known of the end of the SSME / overhead sustainment contract since the FY11 Obama budget was announced in February 2010. Prior to that it was planned by both NASA and PWR as a follow-on to the SSME contract that would develop J2X and the liquid booster engine for some HLV.
Oh please, the industry has had the better part of a decade to plan for the Shuttle's retirement.
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And what do you know to counter Or doubt Antares?
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And what do you know to counter Or doubt Antares?
Antares didn't actually say much that requires doubt or countering. It was more of a vague whining about the "dire state of the liuid engine industry", and complaining that fat government contracts aren't coming through fast enough for PWR.
But to answer your question specifically; 1)The RL10 enjoys a monopoly on the EELVs, which launch the countries security satellites. Th EELVs can't launch anytime soon without them. 2)The industry has had the better part of a decade to plan for the Shuttle's retirement. PWR should have prepared better. Now they are using the RL10's monopoly status to gouge the tax payer.
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But to answer your question specifically; industry has had the better part of a decade to plan for the Shuttle's retirement, and the RL10 enjoys a monopoly on the EELVs which launch our countries classified satellites - PWR is taking advantage of that.
Again, you have no proof that it is taking advantage or gouging. Just an outsider's uninformed opinion.
It is not the shuttle retirement causing the problem, it is the cancelation of CxP.
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But to answer your question specifically; industry has had the better part of a decade to plan for the Shuttle's retirement, and the RL10 enjoys a monopoly on the EELVs which launch our countries classified satellites - PWR is taking advantage of that.
Again, you have no proof that it is taking advantage or gouging. Just an outsider's uninformed opinion.
It is not the shuttle retirement causing the problem, it is the cancelation of CxP.
And the cancellation of the RL60. Plus the slow pace of the USAF US NGE. I'f I'm not mistaken they are still receiving proposals.
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But to answer your question specifically; industry has had the better part of a decade to plan for the Shuttle's retirement, and the RL10 enjoys a monopoly on the EELVs which launch our countries classified satellites - PWR is taking advantage of that.
Again, you have no proof that it is taking advantage or gouging.
Jim, if you hit yourself on the head with a hammer what kind of 'proof' would you require that it hurts?
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Jim, if you hit yourself on the head with a hammer what kind of 'proof' would you require that it hurts?
No, I get headaches from people who don't know what they are talking about making statement as though they do
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Jim, if you hit yourself on the head with a hammer what kind of 'proof' would you require that it hurts?
No, I get headaches from people who don't know what they are talking about making statement as though they do
Then help me, what's my error. Does the RL10 not enjoy a monopoly driven by national security launches? Did PWR not have a very long time to prepare for the Shuttle's retirement? Has not PWR raised their prices by a huge amount and indicated that the Shuttle retirement is behind it?
Do you think you might have a different perspective, Jim, if you spent your career designing the most sophisticated semiconductor fabrication machines in the world. At a company that has to have regular layoffs instead of whining for more government contracts? Especially when it's your tax dollars paying for the companies with this sense of entitlement?
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I looked into a bit more; the problem is they went from a production rate of 40 to 60 RL10s a year all the way down to 4. Let's pick some low numbers: 40 RL10s at @ $8M per is $320M/year. Even at $30M a pop the program's income has dropped by almost two-thirds. That's gotta sting.
Usually in this case someone with deep pockets steps in to order more, get the production rate up and stick the extras in a warehouse, but that doesn't seem to be happening here. Perhaps someone's warehouse is already full?
Unshackle ULA, give them some of the SLS money for ACES, and our RL10 problems will disappear rather quickly. Other solutions is to sell RocketDyne to ULA to get some vertical integration, or encourage Aerojet to make a RL10 clone.
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sell RocketDyne to ULA to get some vertical integration
I like that idea a lot.
Rocketdyne belonged to Boeing at one time (until shortly before the creation of ULA, if I recall correctly), and it makes sense for them to be owned by the company that consumes essentially all of its engines. Vertical integration is part of what gives SpaceX its competitive advantage, and it would undoubtedly benefit ULA as well.
encourage Aerojet to make a RL10 clone.
I like that even better, since it would introduce an element of competition that will help keep prices from going out of control. However, realistically, it will take *years* before Aerojet is in a position to compete with PWR on hydrolox engines.
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sell RocketDyne to ULA to get some vertical integration
I like that idea a lot.
Rocketdyne belonged to Boeing at one time (until shortly before the creation of ULA, if I recall correctly), and it makes sense for them to be owned by the company that consumes essentially all of its engines. Vertical integration is part of what gives SpaceX its competitive advantage, and it would undoubtedly benefit ULA as well.
encourage Aerojet to make a RL10 clone.
I like that even better, since it would introduce an element of competition that will help keep prices from going out of control. However, realistically, it will take *years* before Aerojet is in a position to compete with PWR on hydrolox engines.
Given that national security launches are dependent on the RL10, and that PWR has a monopoly on this part and has raised prices dramatically, and that PWR has a possible competitor sewn up with marketing rights (according to this thread), I wonder if there are any antitrust issues.
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Given that national security launches are dependent on the RL10, and that PWR has a monopoly on this part and has raised prices dramatically, and that PWR has a possible competitor sewn up with marketing rights (according to this thread), I wonder if there are any antitrust issues.
You would think so, but then again the FTC didn't have an issue with the creation of ULA five years ago. I doubt they're paying much attention to these things.
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1. Given that national security launches are dependent on the RL10,
2. and that PWR has a monopoly on this part and
3, has raised prices dramatically, and that PWR has a possible competitor sewn up with marketing rights (according to this thread),
4. I wonder if there are any antitrust issues.
1. Not by any fault of PWR. Both Boeing and LM chose the engine, it was not forced on them.
2. There is no monopoly, ULA is free to choose another engine
3. Raised prices because the market shrunk and less products to cover overhead
4. None what so ever
Again, people making statements about things they know nothing about.
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Then help me, what's my error. Does the RL10 not enjoy a monopoly driven by national security launches? Did PWR not have a very long time to prepare for the Shuttle's retirement? Has not PWR raised their prices by a huge amount and indicated that the Shuttle retirement is behind it?
No, a. it is not a monopoly and be it is not driven by national security launches. PWR was "preparing" for shuttle retirement by working on CxP engines, J-2X and SSME. CxP is gone.
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2. There is no monopoly, ULA is free to choose another engine
Hence, ULA throwing some money XCOR's way to work on an Al Nozzle LH/LOX concept for an upper stage engine.
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Relevant:
UTC unit moves to diversify as shuttle ends (Reuters) (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/14/us-prattrocketdyne-idUSTRE73D23A20110414)
'He said the industry could undergo "some structural changes" after the shuttle program ends this summer. "I think it could get very traumatic and damaging by the end of this year," Maser added.'
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The best fix might be the earlier suggestion of giving some of the SLS money to ULA to build ACES.
Maybe also start on the side mount SLS as well.
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At a company that has to have regular layoffs instead of whining for more government contracts?
The assumption you make is that they wouldn't seek commercial contracts if they could. Atlas and Delta infrequently compete for commercial launches because Russian and Chinese vehicles are so much cheaper. The current version of each rocket was designed for minimum cost from the heritage expertise available in the mid to late 90s when they were conceived. SpaceX, starting from zero infrastructure and technical heritage, designed an even cheaper vehicle since they didn't have a bias toward an existing solution.
So Delta and Atlas require a set number of labor hours, no less. The only way to decrease the price is a dismantling of the aerospace wage structure, which is affected by FAR clauses that protect unions and the GS scale of the civil servants doing the mission assurance work.
You can wish this isn't so or make a cynical stereotyped assumption, but it doesn't make you right.
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My intent with starting this thread was not to foster cynicism for PWR, but to discuss the cause and effects of the cost increases, and their extent. Just so it's clear. It's my opinion that PWR will probably need to change this somehow (or have it changed for them... like continuing SSME or J-2x, etc), and that this isn't a stable situation.
Does anyone have primary sources on the cost figures that they'd like to share?
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For those who have the time, here's a good report on some of the issues.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/32677509/RAND-National-Security-Space-Launch-Report
Lots of good info in there.
Jumping to page 18:
"It is noteworthy that, however capable these rockets, they do not compete on a price basis with those of many foreign launch providers...
"Therefore, the U.S. government must be prepared to bear virtually the entire financial burden of retaining either or both of these rocket families for the period we evaluated (2005– 2020)."
"Further, given that the U.S. government is the only likely customer, the probability that launch demand may drop below a demand that will sustain team proficiency for two families is increased, giving rise to questions of reliability that often stem from low production rates."
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For those who have the time, here's a good report on some of the issues.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/32677509/RAND-National-Security-Space-Launch-Report
The management summary is definitely worth the read. They address the RL-10 in particular:
Finding 6
Te use of the RL-10 as a common component in the upper stage of both the Atlas V and Delta IV
has been raised as a potentially troubling source of a single-point failure. A failure that affects
the RL-10 will most likely ground both vehicles.
Recommendation 6: Since the RL-10 is common to both EELV families, the Air Force should
immediately assess and then implement appropriate product improvements to reduce risk.
That was in 2005. Does anyone know if this recommendation was followed up on?
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For those who have the time, here's a good report on some of the issues.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/32677509/RAND-National-Security-Space-Launch-Report
The management summary is definitely worth the read. They address the RL-10 in particular:
Finding 6
Te use of the RL-10 as a common component in the upper stage of both the Atlas V and Delta IV
has been raised as a potentially troubling source of a single-point failure. A failure that affects
the RL-10 will most likely ground both vehicles.
Recommendation 6: Since the RL-10 is common to both EELV families, the Air Force should
immediately assess and then implement appropriate product improvements to reduce risk.
That was in 2005. Does anyone know if this recommendation was followed up on?
That really deserves its own thread (as, we could debate that one in detail, it's OT for this thread/topic of discussion)
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That was in 2005. Does anyone know if this recommendation was followed up on?
Yes, there is an RL-10 reliability program
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At a company that has to have regular layoffs instead of whining for more government contracts?
The assumption you make is that they wouldn't seek commercial contracts if they could. Atlas and Delta infrequently compete for commercial launches because Russian and Chinese vehicles are so much cheaper. The current version of each rocket was designed for minimum cost from the heritage expertise available in the mid to late 90s when they were conceived. SpaceX, starting from zero infrastructure and technical heritage, designed an even cheaper vehicle since they didn't have a bias toward an existing solution.
So Delta and Atlas require a set number of labor hours, no less. The only way to decrease the price is a dismantling of the aerospace wage structure, which is affected by FAR clauses that protect unions and the GS scale of the civil servants doing the mission assurance work.
You can wish this isn't so or make a cynical stereotyped assumption, but it doesn't make you right.
Sorry about the cynical posts - they are directed at the system and not at people. My cynicism comes form my own experience - long ago I worked in the aerospace industry, more recently the semiconductor industry. They can't be more different.
Imagine designing semiconductor tools - they are more complicated than rocket engines, more sophisticated, have more parts including banks of computers and plcs, dangerous chemicals, robots, annealing ovens, plating baths, vacuum chambers, and so on ... Humans never touch the product inside these machines. They have to run 24/7.
Once or twice a year your machine will go head to head with a competitor's on the fab floor to see which can run more wafers. This is done prior to large contracts being awarded. The manufacture requires that the bus sized tools be essentially plug-and-play replaceable among the competitors. You don't have years and billions to analyze your plasma chamber, you have weeks or months and you have to know a little calculus instead of how to run a custom piece of software that cost $100 million in taxpayer funded research. You make do with what you have, and if you are really smart and good at what you do, you keep your job. By the next competition, your machine will have to be much faster.
The semiconductor industry has a global market is around $300 billion, aerospace - even more. They are both high tech endeavors. So why does the semiconductor industry move at light speed compared to companies like PWR? Despite PWR's tens of billions of government funded research, a 50 year history of design experience and custom computer code and testing methods - working on machines that haven't changed significantly in decades? The answer is clear to anyone who's worked in both industries.
The aerospace industry is, in many cases, government directed. Competition is encumbered with secrecy laws and corporate executive strategies. Some of these machines are not worth the expense for private industry to do it on their own, not without billions in government funded R&D. This might be because the government and manufacturer set performance requirements that few can achieve, even though it isn't really needed. The government doesn't require head-to-head competition of product that can easily replace each other in a plug-n-play fashion. The executives at these companies have it good - and they know it - it's not in their interest to foster competition, work any faster, take risks or make things less expensively. Certain products enjoy monopolies, for decades.
After talking with space industry insiders here for a few months, it's clear that some of these people believe they know all the answers, and they are smug in their certainty that no one outside the industry can possible understand. But in reality, they have no clue what's it's like out in the real world.
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Yes, there is an RL-10 reliability program
I though NGE and ULA's work with XCOR were part of the solution? No matter how reliable RL-10 is, it's still a potential single-point failure for both EELVs until there is an alternative upper stage engine available.
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My intent with starting this thread was not to foster cynicism for PWR, but to discuss the cause and effects of the cost increases, and their extent. Just so it's clear. It's my opinion that PWR will probably need to change this somehow (or have it changed for them... like continuing SSME or J-2x, etc), and that this isn't a stable situation.
Since the only customer for these engines is the U.S. government, the fault ultimately rests with that government.
The Pentagon launched the EELV program as a promised way to cut launch costs, by 25% or some-such. It then torpedoed its own plans by awarding two, rather than the originally planned one, EELV contracts, even as it cut its number of planned launches for the total life of the program. The results have been predictable. Launch costs, rather than dropping by 25%, have essentially doubled.
- Ed Kyle
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The Pentagon launched the EELV program as a promised way to cut launch costs, by 25% or some-such. It then torpedoed its own plans by awarding two, rather than the originally planned one, EELV contracts, even as it cut its number of planned launches for the total life of the program. The results have been predictable. Launch costs, rather than dropping by 25%, have essentially doubled.
So the mistake was awarding two EELV contracts? What about commercial crew? Will it share the same fate?
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The answer is clear to anyone who's worked in both industries.
The aerospace industry is, in many cases, government directed. Competition is encumbered with secrecy laws and corporate executive strategies. Some of these machines are not worth the expense for private industry to do it on their own, not without billions in government funded R&D. This might be because the government and manufacturer set performance requirements that few can achieve, even though it isn't really needed. The government doesn't require head-to-head competition of product that can easily replace each other in a plug-n-play fashion. The executives at these companies have it good - and they know it - it's not in their interest to foster competition, work any faster, take risks or make things less expensively. Certain products enjoy monopolies, for decades.
After talking with space industry insiders here for a few months, it's clear that some of these people believe they know all the answers, and they are smug in their certainty that no one outside the industry can possible understand. But in reality, they have no clue what's it's like out in the real world.
Wrong.
You can't compare the industrys. One is mass production, consumer oriented. The other is boutique industry.
You have no prove of any of your points in the second paragraph
And you are an outsider and have no clue about the real aerospace world
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Wrong.
You can't compare the industrys. One is mass production, consumer oriented. The other is boutique industry.
Wrong, for some of the specific tools I mentioned, only a few dozen are sold per year, world wide.
You have no prove of any of your points in the second paragraph
You'd probably ask me for proof If I told you that hitting youself on the head with a hammer hurts.
And you are an outsider and have no clue about the real aerospace world
Coming from a man who just asked "whats wrong with monopolies". (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24829.msg724967#msg724967)
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I think pummuf's (edit: next to) last post was one of his better, realizing that it is a hard comparison. I would disagree that aerospace industry folks don't know what it's like in the real world. We just don't waste time wishing the American space launch market were like a real market. However, within the allowances of laws and regulations, cheaper emerging providers are supported. I also don't think he's ever met any executive at ULA or PWR, so the inaccuracies of cynical stereotypes are stated once again.
PS: Robotbeat, I think the numbers your OP was seeking are highly proprietary. You might be able to find some in UTC's SEC filings or in NASA records from the SSME contract. Outside of that, you're probably at a loss. You might also look to see if there are any papers from AIAA conferences, but those typically stay on the technical or at worst policy side rather than getting into dollars.
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[Coming from a man who just asked "whats wrong with monopolies". (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24829.msg724967#msg724967)
And the fact you keep posting this shows that you don't know what you talking about. There are monopolies everywhere, electrical power, water, air traffic control, etc
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[Coming from a man who just asked "whats wrong with monopolies". (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24829.msg724967#msg724967)
And the fact you keep posting this shows that you don't know what you talking about. There are monopolies everywhere, electrical power, water, air traffic control, etc
With those 'Natural Monopolies" traditionally comes regulatory oversight. Your electric company does not get to charge you whatever they think they can get away with, like PWR appears to be doing now with the RL10.
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You'd probably ask me for proof If I told you that hitting youself on the head with a hammer
No, I would ask why you keep on insisting on hitting yourself.
And, again, this is not an applicable analogy. You don't a have proof and there is no proof, visible or derived. Just your uninformed opinion
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... I also don't think he's ever met any executive at ULA or PWR, so the inaccuracies of cynical stereotypes are stated once again...
You are right, I've never met an executive of ULA or PWR. But it doesn't require cynicism to acknowledge that executives will do what's right by their shareholders in the end, and that without competition they have no reason to work hard reducing costs and making their company smaller and more efficient.
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[Coming from a man who just asked "whats wrong with monopolies". (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24829.msg724967#msg724967)
And the fact you keep posting this shows that you don't know what you talking about. There are monopolies everywhere, electrical power, water, air traffic control, etc
With those 'Natural Monopolies" traditionally comes regulatory oversight. You electric company does not get to charge you whatever they think they can get away with, like PWR appears to be doing now with the RL10.
That was already covered earlier in this thread. They are not charging whatever they think they can get away with, they are charging the amount needed to keep their business running. We've gone from over 60 engines per year to under a dozen in only a few years, with the promise of new engine contracts now under threat.
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[Coming from a man who just asked "whats wrong with monopolies". (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24829.msg724967#msg724967)
And the fact you keep posting this shows that you don't know what you talking about. There are monopolies everywhere, electrical power, water, air traffic control, etc
With those 'Natural Monopolies" traditionally comes regulatory oversight. You electric company does not get to charge you whatever they think they can get away with, like PWR appears to be doing now with the RL10.
Proof that you dont know what you are talking about. They are "regulated". PWR has to show their costs to the gov't. They aren't "getting away" with anything. The govt isnt happy with the cost increases but it understands them.
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The government doesn't require head-to-head competition of product that can easily replace each other in a plug-n-play fashion.
This is exactly what the government did with the EELV program. Boeing won the first round, it turned out that they'd cheated, Lockheed won the second, and Boeing threatened to leave the business because they were losing lots of money.
In order for competition to work, there needs to be enough business to support multiple competitors. The government would have to buy more rockets, let their vendors sell products developed for the government to other customers at a discount, or reduce their specifications to something for which there is a wider market.
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In order for competition to work, there needs to be enough business to support multiple competitors.
Not exactly. If barriers to entry are low, the threat of new entrants can motivate existing market participants to act as if those new entrants had in fact already entered the marketplace.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barrier_to_entry
In a sense, evidence indicates ULA did not have a monopoly on domestic launch of EELV-sized payloads, specifically because SpaceX has been able to enter the marketplace and offer the service.
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[Coming from a man who just asked "whats wrong with monopolies". (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24829.msg724967#msg724967)
And the fact you keep posting this shows that you don't know what you talking about. There are monopolies everywhere, electrical power, water, air traffic control, etc
With those 'Natural Monopolies" traditionally comes regulatory oversight. You electric company does not get to charge you whatever they think they can get away with, like PWR appears to be doing now with the RL10.
That was already covered earlier in this thread. They are not charging whatever they think they can get away with, they are charging the amount needed to keep their business running. We've gone from over 60 engines per year to under a dozen in only a few years, with the promise of new engine contracts now under threat.
What if you had a competitor who could replace your engines with minimal effort and time, and if you didn't lower your prices you'd cease to exist as a company? Do you think your executives might make some different choices?
I don't say this to be cruel, but it's a reality that most businesses have to face daily.
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[Coming from a man who just asked "whats wrong with monopolies". (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24829.msg724967#msg724967)
And the fact you keep posting this shows that you don't know what you talking about. There are monopolies everywhere, electrical power, water, air traffic control, etc
With those 'Natural Monopolies" traditionally comes regulatory oversight. You electric company does not get to charge you whatever they think they can get away with, like PWR appears to be doing now with the RL10.
That was already covered earlier in this thread. They are not charging whatever they think they can get away with, they are charging the amount needed to keep their business running. We've gone from over 60 engines per year to under a dozen in only a few years, with the promise of new engine contracts now under threat.
What if you had a competitor who could replace your engines with minimal effort and time, and if you didn't lower your prices you'd cease to exist as a company? Do you think your executives might make some different choices?
I don't say this to be cruel, but it's a reality that most businesses have to face daily.
It depends, could the company continue to be viable if you fought the competing company in this manner? I know of more than one fresh faced company which tried to undercut the established business, and went out of business three years later because they found out *why* the established business operated how it did. If a new company showed up, with an ideal RL-10 engine, at 1/3rd the cost, does not mean they will take away the business. Shoot, they may still take away the business, and go under anyways because they were too agressive in pricing, undercutting themselves to the point that they went out of business.
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[Coming from a man who just asked "whats wrong with monopolies". (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24829.msg724967#msg724967)
And the fact you keep posting this shows that you don't know what you talking about. There are monopolies everywhere, electrical power, water, air traffic control, etc
With those 'Natural Monopolies" traditionally comes regulatory oversight. You electric company does not get to charge you whatever they think they can get away with, like PWR appears to be doing now with the RL10.
That was already covered earlier in this thread. They are not charging whatever they think they can get away with, they are charging the amount needed to keep their business running. We've gone from over 60 engines per year to under a dozen in only a few years, with the promise of new engine contracts now under threat.
What if you had a competitor who could replace your engines with minimal effort and time, and if you didn't lower your prices you'd cease to exist as a company? Do you think your executives might make some different choices?
I don't say this to be cruel, but it's a reality that most businesses have to face daily.
It depends, could the company continue to be viable if you fought the competing company in this manner? I know of more than one fresh faced company which tried to undercut the established business, and went out of business three years later because they found out *why* the established business operated how it did. If a new company showed up, with an ideal RL-10 engine, at 1/3rd the cost, does not mean they will take away the business. Shoot, they may still take away the business, and go under anyways because they were too agressive in pricing, undercutting themselves to the point that they went out of business.
Not sure what your point is ... yes, a new company with low prices might go under, and it might disrupt the market before doing so. That's what competition is. If you are good at what you do and can compete, you'll usually survive. If not, you go under. PWR shouldn't be sheltered from these market forces. It just hurts everyone in the long run; the tax payers, the employees at PWR who could do much more with their expertise in a different environment, prospective competitors who find roadblocks in the form of uncompetitive companies being propped up by the government, purchasers of launch vehicles.
Also, I think the government has helped create an anti-competitive atmosphere, or at lease failed to encourage a migration from 'natural monopoly' to free market. The science of rocket engine design and manufacture has matured and become well enough understood that new start-up companies are succeeding - and not just a single company, several. That tells me it's time encourage competition, not block it by propping up companies who are unable to evolve.
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---snip---
What if you had a competitor who could replace your engines with minimal effort and time, and if you didn't lower your prices you'd cease to exist as a company? Do you think your executives might make some different choices?
I don't say this to be cruel, but it's a reality that most businesses have to face daily.
How I wish this was a reasonably global, transparent and elastic market with minimal nationalistic distortions. Unfortunately it is not. It is a different reality than typical "main street business" and why typical market and business analogies are imperfect at best. (There are more fundamental issues, but that's an OT discussion better had over a few beers.:)
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[Coming from a man who just asked "whats wrong with monopolies". (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=24829.msg724967#msg724967)
And the fact you keep posting this shows that you don't know what you talking about. There are monopolies everywhere, electrical power, water, air traffic control, etc
With those 'Natural Monopolies" traditionally comes regulatory oversight. You electric company does not get to charge you whatever they think they can get away with, like PWR appears to be doing now with the RL10.
That was already covered earlier in this thread. They are not charging whatever they think they can get away with, they are charging the amount needed to keep their business running. We've gone from over 60 engines per year to under a dozen in only a few years, with the promise of new engine contracts now under threat.
What if you had a competitor who could replace your engines with minimal effort and time, and if you didn't lower your prices you'd cease to exist as a company? Do you think your executives might make some different choices?
I don't say this to be cruel, but it's a reality that most businesses have to face daily.
It depends, could the company continue to be viable if you fought the competing company in this manner? I know of more than one fresh faced company which tried to undercut the established business, and went out of business three years later because they found out *why* the established business operated how it did. If a new company showed up, with an ideal RL-10 engine, at 1/3rd the cost, does not mean they will take away the business. Shoot, they may still take away the business, and go under anyways because they were too agressive in pricing, undercutting themselves to the point that they went out of business.
Not sure what your point is ... yes, a new company with low prices might go under, and it might disrupt the market before doing so. That's what competition is. If you are good at what you do and can compete, you'll usually survive. If not, you go under. PWR shouldn't be sheltered from these market forces. It just hurts everyone in the long run; the tax payers, the employees at PWR who could do much more with their expertise in a different environment, prospective competitors who find roadblocks in the form of uncompetitive companies being propped up by the government, purchasers of launch vehicles.
Also, I think the government has helped create an anti-competitive atmosphere, or at lease failed to encourage a migration from 'natural monopoly' to free market. The science of rocket engine design and manufacture has matured and become well enough understood that new start-up companies are succeeding - and not just a single company, several. That tells me it's time encourage competition, not block it by propping up companies who are unable to evolve.
You've made a lot of presumptions, that without PWR the market would be better. I look at the market and see that right now, PWR is the gold standard of the market. Loose them, investment will vanish immediately, all US launch capacity would be gone overnight. You'd have no SpaceX, no Orbital, no ULA, nobody.
PWR is not being sheltered, if it were her prices would be a lot higher. They are being realistic with the demand of the market. There's a reduced demand, their prices go up. 60 engines per year to 12, that is the normal cause of any price rising. Add to that the cost of commodities needed to produce has gone through the roof in the past 24 months, I can easily see a tripling of prices.
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You'd have no SpaceX, no Orbital, no ULA, nobody.
ULA would indeed lose their US.
But I thought spacex and orbital do not rely on PWR for their US-engines. (although i am not sure about the ORION-50)
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You'd have no SpaceX, no Orbital, no ULA, nobody.
ULA would indeed lose their US.
But I thought spacex and orbital do not rely on PWR for their US-engines. (although i am not sure about the ORION-50)
Engines, no, but other systems, yes. PWR does not make just engines, don't forget. They make solar panels, power generators, RTG, and Molten Salt Reactor technology. They make components which are used by all US and several international firms.
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---snip---
You've made a lot of presumptions, that without PWR the market would be better. I look at the market and see that right now, PWR is the gold standard of the market. Loose them, investment will vanish immediately, all US launch capacity would be gone overnight. You'd have no SpaceX, no Orbital, no ULA, nobody.
PWR is not being sheltered, if it were her prices would be a lot higher. They are being realistic with the demand of the market. There's a reduced demand, their prices go up. 60 engines per year to 12, that is the normal cause of any price rising. Add to that the cost of commodities needed to produce has gone through the roof in the past 24 months, I can easily see a tripling of prices.
I don't understand the assertion "Loose them, investment will vanish immediately, all US launch capacity would be gone overnight. You'd have no SpaceX, no Orbital, no ULA, nobody."
Granted, US EELV's today depend on PWR RL-10 and losing them would be a major hurt--assuming NSS would let that happen, which IMHO will not happen until there are alternatives. (ULA was a shotgun marriage, and IIRC NSS subsidizes ULA facilities to the tune of ~$1B/yr? If PWR RL-10 is critical path, I'd expect they'll pony up the $ to keep production going.)
However, neither SpaceX or OSC's LV's depend on PWR RL-10. Why would PWR's RL-10 production collapse cause investment in them to disappear? If anything, I'd think it would be the opposite?
---snip---
PWR does not make just engines, don't forget. They make solar panels, power generators, RTG, and Molten Salt Reactor technology. They make components which are used by all US and several international firms.
Assuming those other LOB's are viable, no reason they could not or would not be spun out or sold off. IMHO Whether those other LOB's are viable as an independent entity or single-source critical path for US/NSS efforts (unlike the RL-10) is a very different (OT?) discussion.
edit: Clarify "PWR" vs. "PWR RL-10" vs. "PWR other".
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You've made a lot of presumptions, that without PWR the market would be better.
I didn't mean to imply that. Many of the space industry companies grew into what they are with government money, back when commercial industry wasn't in the position to create the technology. But that seems to be slowly changing, so companies like PWR will have to slowly change.
I look at the market and see that right now, PWR is the gold standard of the market.
PWR can produce solid gold Lamborghinis, but the market might just prefer Chevys if they had a choice.
Loose them, investment will vanish immediately, all US launch capacity would be gone overnight. You'd have no SpaceX, no Orbital, no ULA, nobody.
Incorrect (i love this auto-anti profanity filter)
PWR is not being sheltered, if it were her prices would be a lot higher. They are being realistic with the demand of the market. There's a reduced demand, their prices go up. 60 engines per year to 12, that is the normal cause of any price rising. Add to that the cost of commodities needed to produce has gone through the roof in the past 24 months, I can easily see a tripling of prices.
I think PWR is doing everything they can to retain their core competency. But eventually they will have to compete with new companies with less overhead, unencumbered by legacy designs and expectations.
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Rl-10 is not gold plated nor a Lamborghini
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---snip---
You've made a lot of presumptions, that without PWR the market would be better. I look at the market and see that right now, PWR is the gold standard of the market. Loose them, investment will vanish immediately, all US launch capacity would be gone overnight. You'd have no SpaceX, no Orbital, no ULA, nobody.
PWR is not being sheltered, if it were her prices would be a lot higher. They are being realistic with the demand of the market. There's a reduced demand, their prices go up. 60 engines per year to 12, that is the normal cause of any price rising. Add to that the cost of commodities needed to produce has gone through the roof in the past 24 months, I can easily see a tripling of prices.
I don't understand the assertion "Loose them, investment will vanish immediately, all US launch capacity would be gone overnight. You'd have no SpaceX, no Orbital, no ULA, nobody."
Granted, US EELV's today depend on PWR RL-10 and losing them would be a major hurt--assuming NSS would let that happen, which IMHO will not happen until there are alternatives. (ULA was a shotgun marriage, and IIRC NSS subsidizes ULA facilities to the tune of ~$1B/yr? If PWR RL-10 is critical path, I'd expect they'll pony up the $ to keep production going.)
However, neither SpaceX or OSC's LV's depend on PWR RL-10. Why would PWR's RL-10 production collapse cause investment in them to disappear? If anything, I'd think it would be the opposite?
Those other LOB depend on the skill sets which are supported by their engine technologies division. Loose the division, the other units then need to support that same cost which is forcing the RL-10's prices up. So, you force RL-10's to collapse, you would then force these other lines of business costs to grow their prices in the same manner, crippling all other launchers within the US, and many outside of the US as well.
You cannot develop these pieces without the tools to do so. The tools, in this case, are the people with the know-how to produce them. No RL-10, they still need to be paid, which means the same unit costs go elsewhere in the company.
---snip---
PWR does not make just engines, don't forget. They make solar panels, power generators, RTG, and Molten Salt Reactor technology. They make components which are used by all US and several international firms.
Assuming those other LOB's are viable, no reason they could not or would not be spun out or sold off. IMHO Whether those other LOB's are viable as an independent entity or single-source critical path for US/NSS efforts (unlike the RL-10) is a very different (OT?) discussion.
edit: Clarify "PWR" vs. "PWR RL-10" vs. "PWR other".
See above. You loose the RL-10, the support costs then get applied elsewhere.
We need to better utilize our existing assets. Our under utilization of PWR and Aerojet have driven our costs up. This is a simple reflection of that. You don't like that, then work with me to get the production volume up to bring the prices in-line.
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See above. You loose the RL-10, the support costs then get applied elsewhere.
We need to better utilize our existing assets. Our under utilization of PWR and Aerojet have driven our costs up. This is a simple reflection of that. You don't like that, then work with me to get the production volume up to bring the prices in-line.
I agree that we need to make better use of our assets. Operative question is: Who and what decides on "better use of our assets"?
Yes, I would like to "get the production volume up to bring the prices in-line", but in the grand scheme of things, the relationship is largely immaterial with respect to this discussion. If RL-10 production is 2/yr @$100M/ea or 4/yr @$50M/yr it makes no difference if that is all the EELV market needs--it's going to be $200M/yr regardless.
The US EELV market is not going to go away although it may limp along. We're going to pay whatever it takes, whether that's $200 for 4 RL-10's or for 2. If there is another market that increases volume and reduces RL-10 unit costs, wonderful. But that is not the case today; hoping and wishing for higher volume will not make it happen.
There may be synergy within PWR that reduces costs across LOB's. However, many industries have chased that chimera and few have succeeded. What inspires confidence that PWR has or will be any more successful?
Moreover, PWR appears to be diversifying into other areas in order to decrease their dependence on niche markets--markets that have nothing to do with RL-10 production. Do you think synergy with RL-10 production is key to their success in those other areas? (I hope no PWR exec worth their salt would stake their business plan on such an assumption.)
PWR's RL-10 price increase (and the topic of this thread) is justified primarily on reduced production rates. It is what it is, and I don't have a problem with it--and if necessary NSS subsidizing RL-10 production to maintain our EELV capability until alternatives are available.
In short, IMHO, justifying maintaining PWR as a unified business entity based on synergy and cost benefits across various LOB's is highly dubious based solely on RL-10 production costs or purported synergy across LOB's. I suggest if necessary to maintain EELV capability, split out and if needed subsidize RL-10 LOB separate from other PWR LOB's.*
* And I hope and expect that NSS is examining at PWR in exactly that manner and scrutinizing RL-10 production as if it were a separate LOB/P&L.
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To bring this back to the RL-10, to manufacture an RL-10 requires a lot more setup than a mask and die change. Many of the tools used for it are customized, and the skills to operate it similarly custom. You cannot take, say, the tools needed to make the primary LOX turbine impeller and swap them easily to manufacture something else.
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To bring this back to the RL-10, to manufacture an RL-10 requires a lot more setup than a mask and die change. Many of the tools used for it are customized, and the skills to operate it similarly custom. You cannot take, say, the tools needed to make the primary LOX turbine impeller and swap them easily to manufacture something else.
I agree that the comparison with semiconductor manufacturing has some value. Both aerospace and chip fab are close to the edge of what's physically possible with today's technology. However, the value lies in the differences: mem fab is actually a good one. Chip makers are loath to throw anything away; the more waste in a process, the more the waste in materials but more importantly the lost time in making the garbage in the first place. So modern memory chips have a testing procedure that, when it detects portions of a chip that are just bad, can blow fuses so that part of the chip is inaccessible. Now you have a good if not somewhat smaller chip, which you can still sell. I'm no LOX turbine impeller machinist, but it's my impression that in aerospace if you see a defect in a component, you guys melt it down and try again, with the resulting extra cost of labor and materials, not to mention what it may do to a schedule.
I hate to keep bringing up SpaceX but it's not a mistake that Musk's other company builds a car. With the demands of performance, emissions and the price of fuel, automobiles are a high tech, mass produced product. As an example let's assume that you could get the car and rocket engine guys in the same room, and the two agree on an impeller design that worked well in both a LOX pump and a turbocharger. So, when mass producing these impellers the rocket guys get the best of the best, the zero defect parts and the car guys get parts at are good enough for the demands of a car. No waste in labor or materials, and mass production quantities the rocket guys can only dream of.
If a common design isn't possible, the engineers could at least agree to a common fabrication plant, metal choice, toolsets and operator skills so that the same line can be used to create the impellers both teams need. Save money that way, and makes the car parts better in the process.
Aerospace components have to be of the highest quality; you can't call out for a RMA at Max Q 11km up because a component fails. However, greater commonality with mass production can not only reduce component cost but help with some of the issues of low production assemblies.
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To bring this back to the RL-10, to manufacture an RL-10 requires a lot more setup than a mask and die change. Many of the tools used for it are customized, and the skills to operate it similarly custom. You cannot take, say, the tools needed to make the primary LOX turbine impeller and swap them easily to manufacture something else.
I agree that the comparison with semiconductor manufacturing has some value. Both aerospace and chip fab are close to the edge of what's physically possible with today's technology. However, the value lies in the differences: mem fab is actually a good one. Chip makers are loath to throw anything away; the more waste in a process, the more the waste in materials but more importantly the lost time in making the garbage in the first place. So modern memory chips have a testing procedure that, when it detects portions of a chip that are just bad, can blow fuses so that part of the chip is inaccessible. Now you have a good if not somewhat smaller chip, which you can still sell. I'm no LOX turbine impeller machinist, but it's my impression that in aerospace if you see a defect in a component, you guys melt it down and try again, with the resulting extra cost of labor and materials, not to mention what it may do to a schedule.
To discuss semiconductors a bit, we had a major problem with one of our supplied components. We learned how it failed, and we created a pair of chips which fixed the issue, an external solution added after the fact. Of course, this would not work on a rocket engine, can't just add another turbomachine assembly when the primary LOX supply line looses pressure 50 seconds into a flight.
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To bring this back to the RL-10, to manufacture an RL-10 requires a lot more setup than a mask and die change. Many of the tools used for it are customized, and the skills to operate it similarly custom. You cannot take, say, the tools needed to make the primary LOX turbine impeller and swap them easily to manufacture something else.
It's not impossible, though. Modern CNC machine tools are getting more flexible, not less. You can print regeneratively cooled rocket engines in 3D, for instance. The same machine can (and does) make all sorts of other things in 3D (during the same day or even shift...). This is the direction manufacturing is going, more flexibility with less cost in changing the tooling (less need to change the tooling). So, even less set-up than in the silicon fab industry.
Whatever replaces the RL-10 will use less specialized manufacturing equipment. I think that many of the very small aerospace start-ups don't have their own big machine shop; they order parts digitally from a machinist (perhaps in a totally different part of the country), and they receive their rocket engine via fedex or whathaveyou. This sort of horizontal integration needs to become more common. Flightweight components with the right material compatibility are very expensive right now if you go the traditional aerospace route. The smaller companies end up looking for short-cuts... parts used in other industries that happen to work good enough for rocket engines, though they often have to make their own solution to the low-cost, flightweight, material compatibility optimization problem. Many of them are starting to offer these solutions to other small aerospace companies. This sort of horizontal integration needs to happen more often, not less. That XCor is offering their experience in medium-sized (initially soft-)cryogenic propellant pumps as part of a cooperative venture with ULA is evidence of this.
XCor has actually a lot of experience testing engines repeatedly, and is willing to sell engines or even whole vehicles to other companies to operate, instead of having the vehicle manufacturer be also the operator. In spite of the seeming success of SpaceX's vertical integration, one sign of a healthy market is horizontal integration, IMHO. If you try to horizontally integrate in an unhealthy market, you tend to go out of business. That's why Orbital is using foreign parts when they're doing horizontal integration but SpaceX can do it domestically with vertical integration: the liquid rocket engine market in the US has been stagnant. Elon had initially talked about doing horizontal integration when he started SpaceX, but now are the poster boy for vertical integration because of the fact that it's just SO expensive to do horizontal integration in the domestic US rocket market. These small guys like Armadillo Aerospace and XCor are doing all they can to improve it, and there are signs they are succeeding, though there's a long, long ways to go.
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Actually was just discussing this the other day. You're quite right, with the rise of 3D printing, additive manufacturing, the whole dynamic of the industry is turned on its head. It's not there yet, but it's getting there very rapidly. I have worked with 3D printers before, and the potential is absolutely mind boggling.
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Go read an interview from Jim Maser where he admitted the RL10 price quote was obscenely high to prove a point to the government on the dire state of the liuid engine industry. As much as the vox populi amateurs are trying to make something nefarious out of this, it's all quite open. PWR is as peeved about the state of the industry as you are.
PWR has only known of the end of the SSME / overhead sustainment contract since the FY11 Obama budget was announced in February 2010. Prior to that it was planned by both NASA and PWR as a follow-on to the SSME contract that would develop J2X and the liquid booster engine for some HLV.
Since no-one has linked these:-
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/07/us-unitedtechnologies-space-idUSTRE72663L20110307 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/07/us-unitedtechnologies-space-idUSTRE72663L20110307)
http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110204-engine-costs-drive-atlas5-prices.html (http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110204-engine-costs-drive-atlas5-prices.html)
Lots of downsizing planned and going on...
Jim Maser, president of Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, said his company already had plans to close half its office and factory space over the next three years, and might have to lay off hundreds of employees unless NASA mapped out a shuttle successor plan within the next four to eight months.
The United Technologies Corp unit also winnowed its list of suppliers from 600 to 200 over the past year, Maser told reporters, underscoring his commitment to cutting costs and making space systems more affordable.
cheers, Martin
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http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110204-engine-costs-drive-atlas5-prices.html (http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110204-engine-costs-drive-atlas5-prices.html)
Thanks for posting that, Martin.
Some interesting quotes:
prices for the Russian-built RD-180, a liquid oxygen/kerosene engine that powers the Atlas 5’s main stage, are also on the rise. The RD-180, the single most expensive Atlas 5 component, is built by NPO Energomash of Khimki, near Moscow.
[...]
Sowers said the Russians are simply charging what the customer is willing to pay. “The Russians have learned over the years the wonders of capitalism, and have become really good at letting the market drive their prices up,” he said.
Yes, yes indeed. Not that we have any capitalists here as well. No, of course not. That couldn't possibly be the reason for the recent price increases.
between 1999 and 2010, the cost to launch an Atlas 5 rocket was between $100 million and $125 million. Under NLS 2, which NASA signed with ULA and other rocket manufacturers in September, the Atlas 5 cost range grew to between $102 million and $334 million per mission.
$334 per mission!
Norman cautioned there are risk factors that could drive Atlas 5 prices even higher than the upper range of the NLS 2 prices [...] A failure to reach agreement, Norman said, could raise NASA’s Atlas 5 costs by as much as $140 million per mission as ULA’s overhead costs are swept into individual launch contracts.
So we're talking what, up to $474 million for an Atlas V launch?
It also appears that ULA is making the launch vehicle heavier, therefore reducing its performance:
We’ve lost about 400 to 500 kilograms of performance in terms of what is being offered.
*sigh*
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Modern CNC machine tools are getting more flexible, not less. You can print regeneratively cooled rocket engines in 3D, for instance. The same machine can make all sorts of other things in 3D. This is the direction manufacturing is going, more flexibility with less cost in changing the tooling.
Whatever replaces the RL-10 will use less specialized manufacturing equipment.
Agreed. Of course, an engine would have to be designed from the outset to take advantage of these new manufacturing techniques. You couldn't simply print up an RL-10 from existing blueprints, for example. (I know you know this already, Robotbeat -- I'm just mentioning it in case anyone thinks that would be a possibility).
Of course, the RL-10 was designed half a century ago. Given the recent tenfold increase in pricing, it appears its days are numbered. ULA is looking at alternatives (though not quickly enough to remain competitive, I suspect), and they're the only customer for the engine.
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the two agree on an impeller design that worked well in both a LOX pump and a turbocharger.
If a common design isn't possible, the engineers could at least agree to a common fabrication plant, metal choice, toolsets and operator skills so that the same line can be used to create the impellers both teams need. Save money that way, and makes the car parts better in the process.
Not feasible. There are many requirements that are incompatible.
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Incorrect (i love this auto-anti profanity filter)
So you're confrontational, distruptive and admit to using profanity. Classy.
If people want to post on this site, you're going to be civil, or I'm going to kick you the incorrect off this site.
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http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110204-engine-costs-drive-atlas5-prices.html (http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110204-engine-costs-drive-atlas5-prices.html)
$334 per mission!
EELV costs have long been much higher than commonly believed. Note that the article says that the Launch Capabilities Contract covers another $140 million per launch that is not usually quoted as a launch cost! In other words, even the most basic Atlas V launch has always cost well more than $200 million when the true program costs of the launch complex and factories, etc, were included. Delta IV too.
- Ed Kyle
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No. That's only since the ELC contract has been in place, and the ELC contract is with the DoD not NASA. The share of the ELC for non-DoD customers is added to the price of the launch contract or task order, be it another government customer or a commercial customer.
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No. That's only since the ELC contract has been in place, and the ELC contract is with the DoD not NASA. The share of the ELC for non-DoD customers is added to the price of the launch contract or task order, be it another government customer or a commercial customer.
ELC has been in place since, what, 2005? Prior to that the costs were eaten by the contractors, presumably, but the costs still existed.
It doesn't matter if DoD pays or NASA pays or if the contractor writes it off. The end result is still the same. It is money spent to launch rockets - and the grand total is a lot more than the usually-quoted sums.
- Ed Kyle
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No. That's only since the ELC contract has been in place, and the ELC contract is with the DoD not NASA. The share of the ELC for non-DoD customers is added to the price of the launch contract or task order, be it another government customer or a commercial customer.
ELC has been in place since, what, 2005? Prior to that the costs were eaten by the contractors, presumably, but the costs still existed.
It doesn't matter if DoD pays or NASA pays or if the contractor writes it off. The end result is still the same. It is money spent to launch rockets - and the grand total is a lot more than the usually-quoted sums.
- Ed Kyle
No, when NASA or commercial customer quotes a price it includes ELC.
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One more significant player in the field of hydrolox engines:
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=10685.msg726156#msg726156
Blue Origin also proposes to speed development of its Reusable Booster System through accelerated testing of its 100,000 lbf liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen (LOx/LH2) engine. Development of Blue Origin's restartable, deep-throttle engine is pacing the entire orbital RBS program. Under CCDev 2, Blue Origin proposes to test the full-scale thrust chamber at NASA's Stennis Space Center and, optionally, perform development testing of the engine's fuel and oxidizer turbopumps.
Blue Origin requests $10,400,000 in NASA funding for the RBS Engine Risk Reduction Project with the possibility of an additional $3,000,000 for optional milestones. Partnering with NASA will not only accelerate the Reusable Booster System; it will also speed development of a low-cost LOx/LH2 engine suitable for a variety of other upper stage applications and deep-throttling exploration missions.
They won the $10,400,000, and it should get them through pressure-fed testing of the full-scale thrust chamber assembly (TCA) by May, 2012.
It's been known for a while that Blue Origin sucked up a lot of hydrolox propulsion experts, and this is the fruit. 100,000lbf hydrolox deeply throttleable, low-cost engine (supposed to be reusable, too). PWR, watch out!
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Hmmm, I wonder if Musk and Mueller would swallow their pride and use someone else's engine.... (jeopardy music).... No, I think they'd buy the company instead.
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What? LOX/LH2? Stupid people. Didn't they get the buzz memo?
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What? LOX/LH2? Stupid people. Didn't they get the buzz memo?
It's quite true that the "New Space" companies (with the notable exception of Blue Origin) have, until quite recently, been pretty prejudiced against hydrogen as a rocket fuel. They are "warming up" to hydrogen, now, as evidenced by XCor and ULA's joint project and our Jon Goff's Altius Space Machines and ULA joint project (Jon Goff has also done a few papers extolling the virtues of a hydrolox-based depot).
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Hmmm, I wonder if Musk and Mueller would swallow their pride and use someone else's engine.... (jeopardy music).... No, I think they'd buy the company instead.
Bezos net worth is $18 billion. If there was an improbable buyout scenario, it would be that he'd buy SpaceX if Musk ran into trouble, not that he'd sell Blue Origin.
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Musk will never sell SpaceX. The only way he leaves is if he goes public and somehow loses a majority of shares. But the subject of this thread is not SpaceX and Blue Origin.
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No. That's only since the ELC contract has been in place, and the ELC contract is with the DoD not NASA. The share of the ELC for non-DoD customers is added to the price of the launch contract or task order, be it another government customer or a commercial customer.
ELC has been in place since, what, 2005? Prior to that the costs were eaten by the contractors, presumably, but the costs still existed.
It doesn't matter if DoD pays or NASA pays or if the contractor writes it off. The end result is still the same. It is money spent to launch rockets - and the grand total is a lot more than the usually-quoted sums.
- Ed Kyle
No, when NASA or commercial customer quotes a price it includes ELC.
So the Atlas 401 for MAVEN cost NASA (last year) $187 million, $140 million for ELC and only $47 million for the rocket?
http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2010/oct/HQ_C10-065_Maven_Services.html
- Ed Kyle
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No. That's only since the ELC contract has been in place, and the ELC contract is with the DoD not NASA. The share of the ELC for non-DoD customers is added to the price of the launch contract or task order, be it another government customer or a commercial customer.
ELC has been in place since, what, 2005? Prior to that the costs were eaten by the contractors, presumably, but the costs still existed.
It doesn't matter if DoD pays or NASA pays or if the contractor writes it off. The end result is still the same. It is money spent to launch rockets - and the grand total is a lot more than the usually-quoted sums.
- Ed Kyle
No, when NASA or commercial customer quotes a price it includes ELC.
So the Atlas 401 for MAVEN cost NASA (last year) $187 million, $140 million for ELC and only $47 million for the rocket?
http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2010/oct/HQ_C10-065_Maven_Services.html
- Ed Kyle
It is the marginal cost of the ELC
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It is the marginal cost of the ELC
The Marginal Cost or the Average cost considering that launch? I was under the impression that it was the new average (ELC/(n+1)). It's very difficult to calculate a MgC of a mostly fixed price.
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It is the marginal cost of the ELC
The Marginal Cost or the Average cost considering that launch? I was under the impression that it was the new average (ELC/(n+1)). It's very difficult to calculate a MgC of a mostly fixed price.
ULA got $928 million for ELC in FY2010. During FY2010, ULA launched nine EELVs, but one of those may have been a planned FY2009 flight. The per-launch ELC average for $928 million (the marginal cost?) would be $103 million over nine flights, $116 million over eight, or $132.6 million over seven flights.
That seems to indicate that the ELS (launch services) per-flight total accounts for less than half of the total launch costs. I presume there are pro-rating factors for Heavies versus Mediums, etc., that complicate things more than I've suggested here, but recall that there were no Heavies during FY2010.
- Ed Kyle
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---snip---
So the Atlas 401 for MAVEN cost NASA (last year) $187 million, $140 million for ELC and only $47 million for the rocket?
http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2010/oct/HQ_C10-065_Maven_Services.html
Is that true for NASA missions today?
Currently, DOD pays the entire launch infrastructure cost for EELVs. However, NASA may be required to pay a share of costs associated with base support and infrastructure for EELVs after 2012. ... If the decision is made to have NASA share in the funding for launch services infrastructure, we estimate that it could result in an average increase of $100 million for each NASA EELV mission (see Appendix B).
http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY11/IG-11-012.pdf (http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY11/IG-11-012.pdf)
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That's my point. The Marginal Cost, would be the added cost of ELC for the additional mission. If I understand it right, it's basically zero. What they charge, is a prorata share of the ELC. This is a burden that takes the EELV out of the market. First because the ELC is sized for assured access to space, and thus includes both CC and Vandenberg, both Atlas and Delta and the heavy delta. Which for commercial quite probably would only need the Atlas at CC part, and unfairly have to pay for Van and Delta extra cost.
But more importantly. Let's say that without the ELC price, the EELV were competitive. Now, let's say that they have 9 govt and 9 commercial launches, the prorata of the ELC would be around 51M (928M / 18), and that price they could get the 9 launches per year (all hypotetical, I'm making a point). But each time someone ask for a quotation, they have to quote the 928/10 share of the ELC. So nobody signs the first contract, and thus you can never achieve the commercially competitive price.
What I'm basically saying, is that the very way that the DOD charges for ELC, might be one of the reasons for the commercial failure of the EELV.
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No, that is not how it works. It is not prorata. It is a fixed amount.
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Hmmm, I wonder if Musk and Mueller would swallow their pride and use someone else's engine.... (jeopardy music).... No, I think they'd buy the company instead.
Max Vozoff has said SpaceX would be happy to, if the product was superior and the price was fair (in SpaceX's eyes).
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1) The Marginal Cost, would be the added cost of ELC for the additional mission. If I understand it right, it's basically zero.
2) But each time someone ask for a quotation, they have to quote the 928/10 share of the ELC. So nobody signs the first contract, and thus you can never achieve the commercially competitive price.
3) What I'm basically saying, is that the very way that the DOD charges for ELC, might be one of the reasons for the commercial failure of the EELV.
1) Not true. All of the procured components, which are driving the recent increases, would be in the marginal cost. This would include engines, avionics, sensors, raw materials, batteries, ordnance, solids, etc.
2) Yes, AIUI.
3) EELV were mostly priced out of the market prior to ELC.
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1) The Marginal Cost, would be the added cost of ELC for the additional mission. If I understand it right, it's basically zero.
2) But each time someone ask for a quotation, they have to quote the 928/10 share of the ELC. So nobody signs the first contract, and thus you can never achieve the commercially competitive price.
3) What I'm basically saying, is that the very way that the DOD charges for ELC, might be one of the reasons for the commercial failure of the EELV.
1) Not true. All of the procured components, which are driving the recent increases, would be in the marginal cost. This would include engines, avionics, sensors, raw materials, batteries, ordnance, solids, etc.
2) Yes, AIUI.
3) EELV were mostly priced out of the market prior to ELC.
1) I might have older information. But I understand that ULA had an ELC and an ELS. The ELC is the capabilities for X launches from CC and Y launches from Vandenberg. I've taken that information from this article (http://www.losangeles.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123032296). Each launch is is handled through the ELS. So the price quoted is ELC/N (with N the number of launches, included the quoted) plus the cost according to ELS of each launch. So the MgC of the Launch is the cost according to the ELS. But the MgC of the ELC portion, should be zero, since is the minimum capability guaranteed.
3) That's possible, but they were also encumbered with the requirements of certain capabilities. It's very difficult if you cater to the most exquisite clientele, to price your product so you also are the price leader. Ariane haven't had an easy time doing it, they had to be subsidized, and they don't offer the flexibility nor scalability of the EELV program (at least, not yet).
No, that is not how it works. It is not prorata. It is a fixed amount.
Can you elaborate on how is it calculated such a fixed amount?
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1) The Marginal Cost, would be the added cost of ELC for the additional mission. If I understand it right, it's basically zero.
2) But each time someone ask for a quotation, they have to quote the 928/10 share of the ELC. So nobody signs the first contract, and thus you can never achieve the commercially competitive price.
3) What I'm basically saying, is that the very way that the DOD charges for ELC, might be one of the reasons for the commercial failure of the EELV.
1) Not true. All of the procured components, which are driving the recent increases, would be in the marginal cost. This would include engines, avionics, sensors, raw materials, batteries, ordnance, solids, etc.
2) Yes, AIUI.
3) EELV were mostly priced out of the market prior to ELC.
1) I might have older information. But I understand that ULA had an ELC and an ELS. The ELC is the capabilities for X launches from CC and Y launches from Vandenberg. I've taken that information from this article (http://www.losangeles.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123032296). Each launch is is handled through the ELS. So the price quoted is ELC/N (with N the number of launches, included the quoted) plus the cost according to ELS of each launch. So the MgC of the Launch is the cost according to the ELS. But the MgC of the ELC portion, should be zero, since is the minimum capability guaranteed.
3) That's possible, but they were also encumbered with the requirements of certain capabilities. It's very difficult if you cater to the most exquisite clientele, to price your product so you also are the price leader. Ariane haven't had an easy time doing it, they had to be subsidized, and they don't offer the flexibility nor scalability of the EELV program (at least, not yet).
No, that is not how it works. It is not prorata. It is a fixed amount.
Can you elaborate on how is it calculated such a fixed amount?
1.A nit but important to note: ELS contracts awarded to ULA; ELC contracts awarded to Boeing and LM. Different animals; different contract rules; different goals. [edit: ULA has ELC contract, per notherspacexfan link in post below.]
2. That appears to be an incorrect assumption. ELC provides base capability for infrastructure and is paid for by DoD. NASA missions are not charged for it (but may change in 2012); DoD missions are not charged for it (at least directly); commercial customers weren't charged for it (at least as of 2008).1,2
I have no idea how incremental costs above the minimum number of launches provided by ELC to ensure DoD capabilities are charged or amortized, but it does not appear as simple as $ELC/#launches. Given the difference between ELC and ELS, I expect it's more "You [Boeing,LM] get $X for ELC to guarantee Y DoD launches. If Y+N launches costs more than provided for by ELC, then you negotiate with the launch service provider."2
3. See (2).
1 A Review of Costs of US Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV), NASA KSC, Feb 2008.
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/EELV_main.htm (http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/EELV_main.htm)
For a commercial customer the infrastructure subsidy can be expected to lower the price, as it is picked up by the Air Force. For NASA this too applies, as the launch provider does not attempt to recover this cost for the Air Force via any other customers, even if government. [sec 5, pg. 7]
2 Based on NASA figures, incremental cost above that provided by ELC is at best zero, and at worst noise. c.f., Review of NASA’S Acquisition of Commercial Launch Services, NASA IG, Feb 2011.
http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY11/IG-11-012.pdf (http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY11/IG-11-012.pdf)
Currently, DOD pays the entire launch pad infrastructure cost for EELVs such as the Atlas V, vehicles capable of carrying intermediate and larger payloads. However, the U.S. Government does not provide the same financial support for small- and medium-class launch vehicles. Without Government funding for infrastructure such as launch pads, most U.S. vehicles will remain too expensive to compete with similar vehicles provided by other nations. [pg 4]
Currently, DOD pays the entire launch infrastructure cost for EELVs. However, NASA may be required to pay a share of costs associated with base support and infrastructure for EELVs after 2012. ... If the decision is made to have NASA share in the funding for launch services infrastructure, we estimate that it could result in an average increase of $100 million for each NASA EELV mission (see Appendix B). [pg 11-12]
edit: add relevant quotes and specific section/page references.
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The first source is not valid. He is not in LSP
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1. A nit but important to note: ELS contracts awarded to ULA; ELC contracts awarded to Boeing and LM. Different animals; different contract rules; different goals.
This seems to show ULA getting an extension to an ELC:
http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=4503
What am I missing?
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1. A nit but important to note: ELS contracts awarded to ULA; ELC contracts awarded to Boeing and LM. Different animals; different contract rules; different goals.
This seems to show ULA getting an extension to an ELC:
http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=4503
What am I missing?
You didn't miss anything. I missed it Duh. I was looking at 2009-2010 contracts. Thanks for the pointer.
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The first source is not valid. He is not in LSP
Point taken; the author seems to have... ummm... some strong opinions.
However, the relevant quote seems straightforward and consistent with other information. Specifically: ELC costs are--today for NASA and recently for commercial launches--not represented in launch service costs (ELS, NLS, etc.)
Is that a correct interpretation? Pointers to other publicly available data that would provide more insight? Thanks.
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The first source is not valid. He is not in LSP
Point taken; the author seems to have... ummm... some strong opinions.
However, the relevant quote seems straightforward and consistent with other information. Specifically: ELC costs are--today for NASA and recently for commercial launches--not represented in launch service costs (ELS, NLS, etc.)
Is that a correct interpretation? Pointers to other publicly available data that would provide more insight? Thanks.
This is the question!!! It doesn't matter if NASA or commercial users really pay the true ELC part of the cost. Someone will pay the total, true cost of launching these rockets - like the $300 million mentioned for an intermediate size Atlas V launch, and that someone is the U.S. Government.
- Ed Kyle
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But the whole point is if the commercial clients have to pay a share of the ELC or not. I'm completely confused. Jim first said they had to pay a fixed amount. Then said that not. Since he's so cryptic (probably ITAR related), does anyone else can find an authoritative source?
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But the whole point is if the commercial clients have to pay a share of the ELC or not. I'm completely confused. Jim first said they had to pay a fixed amount. Then said that not. Since he's so cryptic (probably ITAR related), does anyone else can find an authoritative source?
Lots of PWR news in this report. Worries about workforce and funding. Canoga Park to close (the SSME plant), but it's probably still not enough downsizing. Deliveries of RS-68A engines. Work on RL-10C, with a smooth wall combustion chamber. End of RL-10B.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/awst/2011/04/18/AW_04_18_2011_p46-307321.xml&headline=Rocketdyne%20Worries%20About%20Retaining%20Workforce
- Ed Kyle
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But the whole point is if the commercial clients have to pay a share of the ELC or not. I'm completely confused. Jim first said they had to pay a fixed amount. Then said that not. Since he's so cryptic (probably ITAR related), does anyone else can find an authoritative source?
Lots of PWR news in this report. Worries about workforce and funding. Canoga Park to close (the SSME plant), but it's probably still not enough downsizing. Deliveries of RS-68A engines. Work on RL-10C, with a smooth wall combustion chamber. End of RL-10B.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/awst/2011/04/18/AW_04_18_2011_p46-307321.xml&headline=Rocketdyne%20Worries%20About%20Retaining%20Workforce
- Ed Kyle
The RL-10C is nothing new, they used those on the Delta III so I understand. A modified form of it was in the DC-X as well, so I understand.
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RL-10C is new. Delta III used the B and DC-X used something completely different.
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RL-10C is new. Delta III used the B and DC-X used something completely different.
Interesting. I was going by Wade's website which listed the D3 as using the RL-10C. Should let him know the error.
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RL-10C is new. Delta III used the B and DC-X used something completely different.
RL-10A-5. Throttleable to 30%.
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RL-10C is new. Delta III used the B and DC-X used something completely different.
RL-10A-5. Throttleable to 30%.
I see that on the DC-X, but what about the Delta 3?
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RL-10C is new. Delta III used the B and DC-X used something completely different.
RL-10A-5. Throttleable to 30%.
I see that on the DC-X, but what about the Delta 3?
RL10B-2.
http://replay.web.archive.org/20080229125518/http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/delta/delta3/delta3.htm
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RL-10C is new. Delta III used the B and DC-X used something completely different.
RL-10A-5. Throttleable to 30%.
I see that on the DC-X, but what about the Delta 3?
RL10B-2.
http://replay.web.archive.org/20080229125518/http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/delta/delta3/delta3.htm
Wade let me down!! 8)
It happens I suppose. In any case, the RL-10C does seem to be a serious improvement over the RL-10B in terms of production cost.
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http://satellite.tmcnet.com/topics/satellite/articles/201039-pratt-whitney-rocketdyne-frustrated-nasa-sls-rocket-delays.htm
NASA’s delay moving forward with its next-generation Space Launch System (SLS) heavy rocket has caused consternation in Congress and concern in the aerospace industry. Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR), makers of the space shuttle’s main engine, faces a significant gap in planning for the future and uncertainty in its workforce. No surprise the division of United Technologies Corp. may be up for sale, reported the Wall Street Journal .
“It’s a real challenge on a couple of fronts,” PWR Vice President John Vilja said in an interview with me last week. “We don’t have any way to spend our discretionary resources on whatever the government plans to do next... People are getting out of the industry and it’s causing a brain drain like we’ve never seen before.”
Uncertainty and the lack of a clear future means engineers who worked on the space shuttle’s engines are now looking at other employment options and bailing out of aerospace. The skills to develop and modify new rocket engines goes out the door with them.
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http://satellite.tmcnet.com/topics/satellite/articles/201039-pratt-whitney-rocketdyne-frustrated-nasa-sls-rocket-delays.htm
NASA’s delay moving forward with its next-generation Space Launch System (SLS) heavy rocket has caused consternation in Congress and concern in the aerospace industry. Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR), makers of the space shuttle’s main engine, faces a significant gap in planning for the future and uncertainty in its workforce. No surprise the division of United Technologies Corp. may be up for sale, reported the Wall Street Journal .
“It’s a real challenge on a couple of fronts,” PWR Vice President John Vilja said in an interview with me last week. “We don’t have any way to spend our discretionary resources on whatever the government plans to do next... People are getting out of the industry and it’s causing a brain drain like we’ve never seen before.”
Uncertainty and the lack of a clear future means engineers who worked on the space shuttle’s engines are now looking at other employment options and bailing out of aerospace. The skills to develop and modify new rocket engines goes out the door with them.
ughhh. Well, it seems to be working (gutting the SLS option).
Thanks for the link.
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America is it's own worst enemy, I'm sorry to say...