Last I heard was NET 26 January 2010, but that was before OCO.
The June date slipped several months ago.
Last I heard was NET 26 January 2010, but that was before OCO.
The June date slipped several months ago.
Really? That's news to me
News to me, too. We were carrying it on our schedule as early fall.
Has Orbital given any indication of what they have done to mitigate the fault that caused the failure of the OCO launch?
VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. – In Orbital Sciences Corp. Building 1555 at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, the first and second stage of the Taurus XL rocket is being loaded onto an Assembly Integration Trailer in preparation for moving to Pad 576-E on north Vandenberg later this month. The Orbital Sciences Taurus XL rocket, targeted to lift off Feb. 23, 2011, from Vandenberg's Space Launch Complex 576-E, will take NASA's Glory satellite into low Earth. Glory is scheduled to collect data on the properties of aerosols and black carbon. It also will help scientists understand how the sun's irradiance affects Earth's climate. Photo credit: NASA/Randy Beaudoin
Workers move one half of the fairing, wrapped in plastic protective covering, into a cargo container for transport from the Orbital Sciences Corp. Building 1555 at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California to the Astrotech Payload Processing Facility. Once both halves of the fairing are delivered to Astrotech they will be installed around NASA's Glory satellite to protect it from the weather at the launch pad as well as from the atmosphere during flight.
GLORY unwrapped at the Astrotech facility, and stage 0 being raised to the pad:
http://mediaarchive.ksc.nasa.gov/search.cfm?cat=4
-- At Space Launch Complex 576-E at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, workers have moved NASA's Glory spacecraft into position where it will be joined with the Taurus XL rocket's third stage already delivered to a temporary processing tent near the pad. The Orbital Sciences Corp. Taurus XL rocket will carry Glory into low Earth orbit. Once Glory reaches orbit, it will collect data on the properties of aerosols and black carbon. It also will help scientists understand how the sun's irradiance affects Earth's climate. Launch is scheduled for 5:09 a.m. EST Feb. 23. For information, visit www.nasa.gov/glory. Photo credit: NASA/Randy Beaudoin, VAFB
Can you provide the technical details of Glory spacecraft including Mass?
Taurus-XL is a strange looking beast really. It reminds me somewhat of the configuration of the Starchaser rocket. I think it is the effect of the narrow upper stages with the wider core and fairing.
NASA'S GLORY CLIMATE SATELLITE READY FOR LAUNCH FEB. 23
Vandenberg AFB Notice to Editors
2011 February 10
VANDENBERG AFB, Calif. - The launch of NASA's Glory spacecraft aboard
an Orbital Sciences Taurus XL rocket is scheduled for Wednesday, Feb.
23. Liftoff will be from Space Launch Complex 576-E at Vandenberg Air
Force Base (VAFB), Calif. Liftoff is targeted for 2:09:43 a.m. PST
(5:09:43 a.m. EST) in the middle of a 48-second launch window. The
spacecraft's final polar orbit will be 438 nautical miles (508 miles)
at an inclination of 98.2 degrees.
Data from the Glory mission will allow scientists to better understand
how the sun and tiny atmospheric particles called aerosols affect
Earth's climate. Both aerosols and solar energy influence the planet's
energy budget, which is the amount of energy entering and exiting
Earth's atmosphere. An accurate measurement of these impacts is
important in order to anticipate future changes to our climate and how
they may affect human life.
The first of NASA's Educational Launch of Nanosatellite, or ELaNa,
missions also will be launched on the Taurus XL. These auxiliary
payloads are small satellites called CubeSats. Each is designed and
created by university and college students. Three satellites will be
deployed on ELaNa-1.
Could it be related to the number of Taurus launches (this is the 9th)? While the Pegasus and Minotaur vehicles share the same basic Orion Motor designs, I believe that they are unique enough to be on separate drawings, and therefore separate from a serial numbering perspective.GLORY unwrapped at the Astrotech facility, and stage 0 being raised to the pad:
http://mediaarchive.ksc.nasa.gov/search.cfm?cat=4
Picking my way through the images, I noted (I think) the following numbers stamped on the four stage motors.
Stage 0: C120-19
Stage 1: BF010
Stage 2: BS009
Stage 3: BT009
Not sure about the nomenclature, but these look like serial numbers. Kind of a bummer that we're seeing such low numbers for a rocket that started flying 16 years ago. Castor 120 has, of course, seen use on Athena too, explaining its higher numeration.
- Ed Kyle
What is the meaning of Hong on the GLORY Taurus? Far right.
Is there a timeline of launch events available?
Is there a timeline of launch events available?
I find myself in Huntington Beach tonight, can the launch be seen from here?
Observers within 150 miles of the vehicle's flight path should see ahttp://mailman.qth.net/pipermail/launch-alert/2011-February/000657.html
bright, moving orange object. For observers further away, the Taurus
may resemble a faint, moving orange or red star.
working a ground computer problem. We're done.
Ok, so that means Thursday is officially crazy, with this, ATV-2 docking and STS-133.There's also a Soyuz launch in the early morning.
Ok, so that means Thursday is officially crazy, with this, ATV-2 docking and STS-133.
Oh dear, guy in the blue shirt looks like he wants to go home now :)I think I can hear the "D'oh!" from here. ;D
Oh dear, guy in the blue shirt looks like he wants to go home now :)
30th Space Wing FB page says the problem is FTS-related:
http://www.facebook.com/30thSpaceWing/posts/10150123618494897
Sounds like either a failure to arm the FTS, or a faulty FTS status talkback, or something like that.
30th Space Wing FB page says the problem is FTS-related:
http://www.facebook.com/30thSpaceWing/posts/10150123618494897
Sounds like either a failure to arm the FTS, or a faulty FTS status talkback, or something like that.
No, that statement from 30th is incorrect. There was a conflict in holdfire status & commands within one of the ground computers. Nothing to do with FTS.
Good to hear it's not FTS-related. That would be a can of worms...
No attempt tonight; re-posturing for a Friday morning attempt.
Good to hear it's not FTS-related. That would be a can of worms...
So's this one.
Glory now slipped to March 3, tentatively. Not yet official.
Novice question...
Do launches to orbit from Vandy follow easterly trajectories, over the US?
As I understand it, there's significant benefit launching to the east in the direction of the earth's rotation. On the other hand, this would put the trajectory over land, and for some inclinations, over populated areas in the near range.
Most VAFB science launches follow a sun-synchronous orbit, which is slightly retrograde.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inclination (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inclination)Most VAFB science launches follow a sun-synchronous orbit, which is slightly retrograde.
Thanks! Oh course! I see from earlier in this thread that Glory's orbit will have an inclination of 98 degrees. I assume that means 98 degrees north of east, which would be a compass direction of 352. But that trajectory would also be over land. I guess I don't understand how to interpret inclination. Please explain.
You are pretty much correct. A sun synchronous orbit is slightly retrograde. In the case of Vandenberg rockets are launched south. Due to the shape of the US west coast flying north out of Vandenberg would mean flying over populated land. Here is a graphic that might be of some help. Its was made for the Space Shuttle but any rocket flying out of those bases to those inclinations would take those paths.Most VAFB science launches follow a sun-synchronous orbit, which is slightly retrograde.
Thanks! Oh course! I see from earlier in this thread that Glory's orbit will have an inclination of 98 degrees. I assume that means 98 degrees north of east, which would be a compass direction of 352. But that trajectory would also be over land. I guess I don't understand how to interpret inclination. Please explain.
You are pretty much correct. A sun synchronous orbit is slightly retrograde. In the case of Vandenberg rockets are launched south. Due to the shape of the US west coast flying north out of Vandenberg would mean flying over populated land. Here is a graphic that might be of some help.
So 98 degrees inclination apparently can mean 98 south of east?It can mean north or south of east. Think about it like this. Glory will launch out of Vandenberg heading south and will be heading south when it crosses the equator. When it crosses the equator there its orbital track will be inclined at 98 degrees south of east. Then on the other side of the planet it is now heading north so when it crosses the equator the orbit is 98 degrees north of east.
When it crosses the equator there its orbital track will be inclined at 98 degrees south of east. Then on the other side of the planet it is now heading north so when it crosses the equator the orbit is 98 degrees north of east.
30th Space Wing FB page says the problem is FTS-related:
http://www.facebook.com/30thSpaceWing/posts/10150123618494897
Sounds like either a failure to arm the FTS, or a faulty FTS status talkback, or something like that.
No, that statement from 30th is incorrect. There was a conflict in holdfire status & commands within one of the ground computers. Nothing to do with FTS.
NET March 4 Taurus • Glory
Launch time: 1009 GMT (5:09 a.m. EST; 2:09 a.m. PST)
OCO all over again.
What was the cause of the OCO launch failure? Wasn't the same failure?
What was the cause of the OCO launch failure? Wasn't the same failure?
Well, it was a failure to separate the fairing but, from what little has been announced so far, it seems to have a different root cause. IIRC, the OCO failure was caused by an electrical fault that caused the separation system to fail to pressurise. This time, the system did pressurise (as far as the telemetry told them) but the fairing still didn't separate.
This could be bad news for Taurus-XL (although not for Orbital, as Minotaur continues to perform adequately).
Are there common features between the Taurus XL and the Taurus II fairings ? who designs them ? produces them ?
Are there common features between the Taurus XL and the Taurus II fairings ? who designs them ? produces them ?
My understanding is that this new post-OCO faring separation system has been flown successfully on Minotaur IV, but I'm not sure if the faring itself is common.
Launch Video:
Well, it was a failure to separate the fairing but, from what little has been announced so far, it seems to have a different root cause. IIRC, the OCO failure was caused by an electrical fault that caused the separation system to fail to pressurise. This time, the system did pressurise (as far as the telemetry told them) but the fairing still didn't separate.
OCO failure was not electrical in nature.
Bolden said he is confident that commercial space firms can deliver.Quote“At least one has been doing it for more than 20 years,” Bolden said, citing Orbital Sciences, one of several references made during the hearing to the well-established Dulles, Va.-based company.
“I’m not concerned about their ability to deliver,” he said.
Condolences to the Glory team, and especially to the Taurus folks. I can only imagine the anguish of the Taurus team that suffered through OCO, then worked their butts off 2 years to fix the problem.I can't say it any better than this.
Those are good, smart people who deserved a better fate. I am truly sorry.
I am concerned that they are going to find that whatever mistake caused the OCO failure will be the same as the cause of the Glory failure.
Good point!I am concerned that they are going to find that whatever mistake caused the OCO failure will be the same as the cause of the Glory failure.
I think that would be good actually... I'd rather it be one problem causing both, as opposed to two different issues and then you aren't sure what to fix.
AC-70 and -71 failed for the same cause (iced up turbopump, not rag-ed up turbopump), and we didn't pick the right cause after the first one.
AC-70 and -71 failed for the same cause (iced up turbopump, not rag-ed up turbopump), and we didn't pick the right cause after the first one.Is there any typical "strategy" for return to flight after back-to-back failures caused by similar issues like these? Demo flights with no real value or some low risk payload or would Taurus be eligible for another several hundred million $ mission?
Basically, would this cause NASA to think twice before flying again before the fairing problems have demonstrably been rectified?
AC-70 and -71 failed for the same cause (iced up turbopump, not rag-ed up turbopump), and we didn't pick the right cause after the first one.
Is there any typical "strategy" for return to flight after back-to-back failures caused by similar issues like these? Demo flights with no real value or some low risk payload or would Taurus be eligible for another several hundred million $ mission?
Basically, would this cause NASA to think twice before flying again before the fairing problems have demonstrably been rectified?
I don't see this happening; in fact, I am wondering if this launch failure would mark the end of the Taurus program; after all, when:AC-70 and -71 failed for the same cause (iced up turbopump, not rag-ed up turbopump), and we didn't pick the right cause after the first one.
Is there any typical "strategy" for return to flight after back-to-back failures caused by similar issues like these? Demo flights with no real value or some low risk payload or would Taurus be eligible for another several hundred million $ mission?
Basically, would this cause NASA to think twice before flying again before the fairing problems have demonstrably been rectified?
I would suggest a suborbital launch to demonstrate clean separation of the fairing - the jettison event doesn't happen very high, so suborbital would be sufficient.
Glory News Conference
http://www.space-multimedia.nl.eu.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6510
Glory News Conference
http://www.space-multimedia.nl.eu.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6510
When I try to download it, I get the STS-133 - ISS Flight Director Update FD 7-8 instead. ???
Since 2001, inclusive, there have been nine U.S. launch vehicle failures. Six of these were failures to reach orbit. Those six included the first three Falcon 1 launches and three of the four Taurus launches performed during that period.
As far as we know Falcon 1E has been discontinued in favor of payload deliveries aboard Falcon 9. That would bring an end to the Falcon 1 line.
As far as we know Falcon 1E has been discontinued in favor of payload deliveries aboard Falcon 9. That would bring an end to the Falcon 1 line.
"Since 2001, inclusive, there have been nine U.S. launch vehicle failures. Six of these were failures to reach orbit. Those six included the first three Falcon 1 launches and three of the four Taurus launches performed during that period".
I assume of the three that made orbit you are counting the Delta IV Heavy Demo and Atlas NRO L-30 as two of the failures that made orbit.
Sad to see a vehicle fail reminds us how hard this really is
I assume it was insured ?
Honestly, the Minotaur IV would look to be a more proven and more reliable option.
ORBCOMM satellites have been moved from Falcon 1E launches to Falcon 9 as reported last fall at spacenews.com. There are no planned flights for the Falcon 1E as far as anyone outside of Spacex knows.
Honestly, the Minotaur IV would look to be a more proven and more reliable option.
The Minotaur has government furnished equipment in it and is therefore not a commercial launch vehicle. It requires a waiver any time it is used.
"Since 2001, inclusive, there have been nine U.S. launch vehicle failures. Six of these were failures to reach orbit. Those six included the first three Falcon 1 launches and three of the four Taurus launches performed during that period".
In total, there have been 40 launch failures during that period, so the US accounts for 22.5% of those, and Taurus 7.5%.
Sad to see a vehicle fail reminds us how hard this really is
I assume it was insured ?
Nope, US Gov't self insures
Sad to see a vehicle fail reminds us how hard this really is
I assume it was insured ?
Nope, US Gov't self insures
Was this a "process error"?
Orbital believes that it is likely that sufficient data was gathered to be able to determine the cause of the fairing separation failure.
1. a relatively cheap $30-$40m test launch to prove the modifications ?
2. The Shuttle guys take a lot of flak, even from their own Administrator recently !!, for taking their time in solving problems but you just know when they say they have found root cause they have with duplications of failure mode and demonstration of successful correction, so there are lessons to be learned from them about professionalism in space operations rather than just the sneering abuse they seem to get from the commercial crowd and their fans about how expensive/unproductive they supposedly are which I would dispute as well considering what the Shuttle gives you in its entire functionality.
A test launch wouldn't prove the fairing would open when requested ? As to Challenger/Columbia engineers were over ruled in both cases by management. Not sure if Columbia could have been saved but at least they could have tried if they had taken the data seriously.
Rereading the OCO report just reconfirms my feeling at the time that there was no certainty involved in finding root cause and the language of the report was fair in stating that. The question then arises why risk a $400m satellite on something you are not certain about without even a relatively cheap $30-$40m test launch to prove the modifications ?
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/369037main_OCOexecutivesummary_71609.pdf
The MIB was unable to determine which component or subcomponent was the direct cause for the fairing not to separate, but identified a number of hardware components whose failure modes could be potential causes: fairing base ring frangible joint, electrical subsystem and the pneumatic system hot gas generator (HGG) including its pressure cartridges. The potential causes with specific recommendations are summarized below.
It could not be determined if the frangible joint base ring fractured completely as designed. An incomplete fracture could have resulted in the fairing not separating.
It could not be determined if the transient bus supplied sufficient electrical current to initiate the required ordnance devices. Insufficient current could have resulted in an insufficient quantity of ordnance devices firing causing the fairing not to separate.
It could not be determined if the fairing pneumatic system supplied sufficient pressure to separate the fairing.
It could not be determined if the FCDC snagged on the frangible joint side rail nut plate preventing the fairing from separating.
The Shuttle guys take a lot of flak, even from their own Administrator recently !!, for taking their time in solving problems but you just know when they say they have found root cause they have with duplications of failure mode and demonstration of successful correction, so there are lessons to be learned from them about professionalism in space operations rather than just the sneering abuse they seem to get from the commercial crowd and their fans about how expensive/unproductive they supposedly are which I would dispute as well considering what the Shuttle gives you in its entire functionality.
A test launch wouldn't prove the fairing would open when requested ? As to Challenger/Columbia engineers were over ruled in both cases by management. Not sure if Columbia could have been saved but at least they could have tried if they had taken the data seriously.
That can be done on the ground. As for the shuttle, I was referring to flying with defects which caused the problems
Exact flight fairing separation conditions may be a bit tough to mimic accurately on the ground.
They just have to separate. The issue isn't separation dynamics. Don't need to fly an airplane to see if the landing gear will deploy
They just have to separate. The issue isn't separation dynamics. Don't need to fly an airplane to see if the landing gear will deploy
I agree with you about the fairing, but this isn't a good analogy. There have been many, many cases of airplane landing gear working perfectly on the ground while on jacks and then failing in flight due to vibration, aerodynamics or other causes. In fact, just a few weeks ago the pilot of Rare Bear (John Penney) told us a story of just such a case on his airplane and showed us images of the gear failing in flight, in both directions (didn't go all the way up, and wouldn't go back out at first).
http://www.kbvp.com/Photo/rare-bear-right-landing-gear-failure-reno-national-championship-air-race-and-airshow-2008+
Rereading the OCO report just reconfirms my feeling at the time that there was no certainty involved in finding root cause and the language of the report was fair in stating that. The question then arises why risk a $400m satellite on something you are not certain about without even a relatively cheap $30-$40m test launch to prove the modifications ?
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/369037main_OCOexecutivesummary_71609.pdf
The MIB was unable to determine which component or subcomponent was the direct cause for the fairing not to separate, but identified a number of hardware components whose failure modes could be potential causes: fairing base ring frangible joint, electrical subsystem and the pneumatic system hot gas generator (HGG) including its pressure cartridges. The potential causes with specific recommendations are summarized below.
It could not be determined if the frangible joint base ring fractured completely as designed. An incomplete fracture could have resulted in the fairing not separating.
It could not be determined if the transient bus supplied sufficient electrical current to initiate the required ordnance devices. Insufficient current could have resulted in an insufficient quantity of ordnance devices firing causing the fairing not to separate.
It could not be determined if the fairing pneumatic system supplied sufficient pressure to separate the fairing.
It could not be determined if the FCDC snagged on the frangible joint side rail nut plate preventing the fairing from separating.
The Shuttle guys take a lot of flak, even from their own Administrator recently !!, for taking their time in solving problems but you just know when they say they have found root cause they have with duplications of failure mode and demonstration of successful correction, so there are lessons to be learned from them about professionalism in space operations rather than just the sneering abuse they seem to get from the commercial crowd and their fans about how expensive/unproductive they supposedly are which I would dispute as well considering what the Shuttle gives you in its entire functionality.
They should edit their summary report better. It refers to two halves of the fairing shell, a 90 degree half, stretching from 0 to 180 degrees, and a 270 degree half, stretching from 180 to 360 degrees. That must take some doing.
I hope the 270 degree "half" didn't get hung up on the spacecraft.
Murray Anderson
They should edit their summary report better. It refers to two halves of the fairing shell, a 90 degree half, stretching from 0 to 180 degrees, and a 270 degree half, stretching from 180 to 360 degrees. That must take some doing.
I hope the 270 degree "half" didn't get hung up on the spacecraft.
Exact flight fairing separation conditions may be a bit tough to mimic accurately on the ground.
They just have to separate. The issue isn't separation dynamics. Don't need to fly an airplane to see if the landing gear will deploy
Makes sense.Rereading the OCO report just reconfirms my feeling at the time that there was no certainty involved in finding root cause and the language of the report was fair in stating that. The question then arises why risk a $400m satellite on something you are not certain about without even a relatively cheap $30-$40m test launch to prove the modifications ?
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/369037main_OCOexecutivesummary_71609.pdf
The MIB was unable to determine which component or subcomponent was the direct cause for the fairing not to separate, but identified a number of hardware components whose failure modes could be potential causes: fairing base ring frangible joint, electrical subsystem and the pneumatic system hot gas generator (HGG) including its pressure cartridges. The potential causes with specific recommendations are summarized below.
It could not be determined if the frangible joint base ring fractured completely as designed. An incomplete fracture could have resulted in the fairing not separating.
It could not be determined if the transient bus supplied sufficient electrical current to initiate the required ordnance devices. Insufficient current could have resulted in an insufficient quantity of ordnance devices firing causing the fairing not to separate.
It could not be determined if the fairing pneumatic system supplied sufficient pressure to separate the fairing.
It could not be determined if the FCDC snagged on the frangible joint side rail nut plate preventing the fairing from separating.
The Shuttle guys take a lot of flak, even from their own Administrator recently !!, for taking their time in solving problems but you just know when they say they have found root cause they have with duplications of failure mode and demonstration of successful correction, so there are lessons to be learned from them about professionalism in space operations rather than just the sneering abuse they seem to get from the commercial crowd and their fans about how expensive/unproductive they supposedly are which I would dispute as well considering what the Shuttle gives you in its entire functionality.
They should edit their summary report better. It refers to two halves of the fairing shell, a 90 degree half, stretching from 0 to 180 degrees, and a 270 degree half, stretching from 180 to 360 degrees. That must take some doing.
I hope the 270 degree "half" didn't get hung up on the spacecraft.
Murray Anderson
The "90" and "270" refer to the centerline of the two halves.
It could not be determined if the transient bus supplied sufficient electrical current to initiate the required ordnance devices. Insufficient current could have resulted in an insufficient quantity of ordnance devices firing causing the fairing not to separate.
Over the last ten years, Taurus has flown four times and failed three of them. I wonder if this flight rate is just too low to sustain reliable operations. In retrospect we'd have come out ahead paying extra to fly these satellites on a Delta II that would almost certainly of worked.
The Minotaur IV is also looking appealing, although it would require some sort of waiver due to the use of surplus military components.
Over the last ten years, Taurus has flown four times and failed three of them. I wonder if this flight rate is just too low to sustain reliable operations. In retrospect we'd have come out ahead paying extra to fly these satellites on a Delta II that would almost certainly of worked.
The Minotaur IV is also looking appealing, although it would require some sort of waiver due to the use of surplus military components.
I'm sorry, but that's bogus. There's a problem with PLF deployment, nothing more. If we were seeing issues here and there, in different systems, then I *might* consider something like that, but this is just one of those disappointments that they will be able to come away with a more robust system.
The rocket must be doing something damaging to itself - to the separation hardware - between T-0 and the fairing separation command.
I wonder the if the PLF deployment issues are related to the high Max Q on this vehicle or maybe due to vibration induced damage to the structure and
Look how it leaves the pad.
The rocket must be doing something damaging to itself - to the separation hardware - between T-0 and the fairing separation command.
Not necessarily. There is also the pedigree of the parts involved to consider. There still exists the potential to fly with components of insufficiently vetted pedigree. The rigor applied to tracking the history of production for a component on an ELV is not the same as that applied to a component used on a human rated vehicle.
It could be both. It could be that a good part can survive the flight shocks, but a borderline part, a part that passes all ground testing, does not survive the flight shocks.
Wouldn't the parts pedigree have been exhaustively reviewed after the OCO loss? I suspect that the entire system was exhaustively reviewed.
It could be both. It could be that a good part can survive the flight shocks, but a borderline part, a part that passes all ground testing, does not survive the flight shocks.
That should only hold true if qual testing was not done to proper levels.QuoteWouldn't the parts pedigree have been exhaustively reviewed after the OCO loss? I suspect that the entire system was exhaustively reviewed.
It can only be reviewed to the extent that records were kept and still exist. That's why I mentioned the differentiation between the pedigree of HR components versus ELV components.
There are some unconfirmed reports that Glory reentered very close to the island of Rikitea in French Polynesia and alarmed quite a few inhabitants by lighting up the night sky and making loud noises. It's unlikely and yet to be proven that debris actually landed on the island, but apparently the French and Tahitian governments are a bit upset about this incident.
Witnesses said they heard a heavy impact shake the ground, which suggests that a portion of the debris crashed on the island.
Witnesses said they heard a heavy impact shake the ground, which suggests that a portion of the debris crashed on the island.
More likely a sonic boom than something crashing into the ground and producing earth shaking noise.
Rick Obenschain, deputy director at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Md., will lead the mishap investigation board.
The board consists of four other voting members:
-- Jose Caraballo, safety manager at NASA's Langley Research Center in Hampton, Va.
-- Patricia Jones, acting chief of the Human Systems Integration Division in the Exploration Technology Directorate at NASA's Ames Research Center at Moffett Field, Calif.
-- Richard Lynch, Aerospace Systems Engineering, Goddard Space Flight Center
-- Dave Sollberger, deputy chief engineer of the NASA Launch Services Program at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
The ex officio member is Ruth Jones, Safety and Mission Assurance manager at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala.
An article from Space News dated 3/18/2011 and titled "Taurus XL Failure Investigation Could Delay TacSat-4 Launch" can be read at http://www.spacenews.com/military/20110318-taurus-delay-tacsat-4-launch.html.
SpaceX did, many times. It's part of the business.An article from Space News dated 3/18/2011 and titled "Taurus XL Failure Investigation Could Delay TacSat-4 Launch" can be read at http://www.spacenews.com/military/20110318-taurus-delay-tacsat-4-launch.html.
I am curious as to the utter lack of talk around here about Orbital Sciences "failure" and its impact on commercial manned space flight. If SpaceX had suffered a similar failure, the critics would be having a field day.
An article from Space News dated 3/18/2011 and titled "Taurus XL Failure Investigation Could Delay TacSat-4 Launch" can be read at http://www.spacenews.com/military/20110318-taurus-delay-tacsat-4-launch.html.
I am curious as to the utter lack of talk around here about Orbital Sciences "failure" and its impact on commercial manned space flight. If SpaceX had suffered a similar failure, the critics would be having a field day.
An article from Space News dated 3/18/2011 and titled "Taurus XL Failure Investigation Could Delay TacSat-4 Launch" can be read at http://www.spacenews.com/military/20110318-taurus-delay-tacsat-4-launch.html.
I am curious as to the utter lack of talk around here about Orbital Sciences "failure" and its impact on commercial manned space flight. If SpaceX had suffered a similar failure, the critics would be having a field day.
It's probably because Orbital has a much longer track record compared to SpaceX. Yes, there are these two Taurus-XL failures, and I remember that Pegasus was unreliable for quite a while. However, this needs to be offset against the reliability of Minotaur, which is so reliable that NRO are using the type, which is the 'gold standard' of US space launch....
Wouldn't fit. Minotaur's fairing is the wrong size. What they did do was use portions of the Minotaur's fairing separation system for the Taurus XL, on the calculation that the separation system is what failed.An article from Space News dated 3/18/2011 and titled "Taurus XL Failure Investigation Could Delay TacSat-4 Launch" can be read at http://www.spacenews.com/military/20110318-taurus-delay-tacsat-4-launch.html.
I am curious as to the utter lack of talk around here about Orbital Sciences "failure" and its impact on commercial manned space flight. If SpaceX had suffered a similar failure, the critics would be having a field day.
It's probably because Orbital has a much longer track record compared to SpaceX. Yes, there are these two Taurus-XL failures, and I remember that Pegasus was unreliable for quite a while. However, this needs to be offset against the reliability of Minotaur, which is so reliable that NRO are using the type, which is the 'gold standard' of US space launch....
It's my understanding the last Taurus XL launch used the payload fairing from the Minotaur IV.
Wouldn't fit. Minotaur's fairing is the wrong size. What they did do was use portions of the Minotaur's fairing separation system for the Taurus XL, on the calculation that the separation system is what failed.An article from Space News dated 3/18/2011 and titled "Taurus XL Failure Investigation Could Delay TacSat-4 Launch" can be read at http://www.spacenews.com/military/20110318-taurus-delay-tacsat-4-launch.html.
I am curious as to the utter lack of talk around here about Orbital Sciences "failure" and its impact on commercial manned space flight. If SpaceX had suffered a similar failure, the critics would be having a field day.
It's probably because Orbital has a much longer track record compared to SpaceX. Yes, there are these two Taurus-XL failures, and I remember that Pegasus was unreliable for quite a while. However, this needs to be offset against the reliability of Minotaur, which is so reliable that NRO are using the type, which is the 'gold standard' of US space launch....
It's my understanding the last Taurus XL launch used the payload fairing from the Minotaur IV.
Orbital Chief Operating Officer J.R. Thompson said during the call that the company is nearing a conclusion of the investigation — NASA has a separate panel looking at what happened — and expects to be able to “focus on corrective actions and a go-forward plan by the end of this month. The fairing problem that occurred is one we think we have a pretty good understanding of. We need to complete some additional testing this week and next week to confirm we are on the right track.”
FWIW, I strongly recommend a no-payload dry run of the post-modification vehicle this time.
Michael Freilich, director of NASA’s Earth Sciences Division, said NASA has lost nearly $700 million in Earth science payloads to Taurus XL over the past two years. In a May 11 interview Freilich said he would like to see the rocket fly successfully before putting another Earth-monitoring probe atop it.
“I would go more than recertified, personally,” he told Space News. “I would go demonstrated.”
Absent a demo flight, “I don’t know what anybody would say about how [we] were good stewards of the taxpayer money if we had a third consecutive launch vehicle failure; $693 million-worth of payload has gone down between the two,” Freilich said...
Bad news, this.
In April the agency stopped payments on a Taurus XL launch vehicle contract with Orbital Sciences for a February 2013 re-flight of the OCO satellite, dubbed OCO 2.
FWIW, I strongly recommend a no-payload dry run of the post-modification vehicle this time.
Yes but bad news that modern methods haven't prevented a second failure unless you are sure it was a QA or workmanship issue.Bad news, this.
Isn't it good news that they're keeping Taurus as an option?
It looks like NASA agrees with you:
http://spacenews.com/civil/110516-nasa-add-delta2-list-launchers.htmlQuoteMichael Freilich, director of NASA’s Earth Sciences Division, said NASA has lost nearly $700 million in Earth science payloads to Taurus XL over the past two years. In a May 11 interview Freilich said he would like to see the rocket fly successfully before putting another Earth-monitoring probe atop it.
“I would go more than recertified, personally,” he told Space News. “I would go demonstrated.”
Absent a demo flight, “I don’t know what anybody would say about how [we] were good stewards of the taxpayer money if we had a third consecutive launch vehicle failure; $693 million-worth of payload has gone down between the two,” Freilich said...
Bad news, this.
This whole affair has made me really unhappy with Orbital as a company. Thats two failures because of the same thing. In a row. At least spacex's early pains were separate issues but Orbital has been around for quite some time. I just hope the COTS rocket they are developing does not experience the same kinds of issues.
Frankly have alot more faith in Spacex at this point.
This whole affair has made me really unhappy with Orbital as a company. Thats two failures because of the same thing. In a row. At least spacex's early pains were separate issues but Orbital has been around for quite some time. I just hope the COTS rocket they are developing does not experience the same kinds of issues.
Frankly have alot more faith in Spacex at this point.
HAHA....That's too funny.
I actually put more faith in Orbital. This situation is the business: these things can (and have) happened. That's life, you fix it, and move on. As long as a company can weather these times, it only makes them stronger in the long run.
This whole affair has made me really unhappy with Orbital as a company. Thats two failures because of the same thing. In a row. At least spacex's early pains were separate issues but Orbital has been around for quite some time. I just hope the COTS rocket they are developing does not experience the same kinds of issues.
Frankly have alot more faith in Spacex at this point.
For all of the second guessers out there, it's not like a test flight wasn't considered after T8/OCO. The highest levels of NASA weighed the additional cost and schedule needed to do it and decided the cost-benefit wasn't there. Obviously they were wrong, but risk management is what every executive team does. Hindsight is always 20-20. I'm not sure how the calculus is different because it's happened twice. It's a dictum of Decision Analysis that sunk costs do not enter into the cost-benefit calculation. To do otherwise is not rational.
This whole affair has made me really unhappy with Orbital as a company. Thats two failures because of the same thing. In a row. At least spacex's early pains were separate issues but Orbital has been around for quite some time. I just hope the COTS rocket they are developing does not experience the same kinds of issues.That is funny.
Frankly have alot more faith in Spacex at this point.
There were/are separate NASA and Orbital investigation boards for both of these failures, as well as many NASA and Orbital return to flight executive review meetings where both sides bought into the cause and corrective action. It's not proper to leave NASA out of the blame process (cf. "Orbital did not have enough data after the first one," and "how likely you think Orbital is right when they say"). NASA was wrong too.
Is there any way of testing a moving fairing without having to blast it into space?Well, I got a few SRB's laying around here, I guess I could get you one for a good price... Let's talk money;)
Could a cheaper rocket, such as a sounding rocket, be used?
Is there any way of testing a moving fairing without having to blast it into space?
Could a cheaper rocket, such as a sounding rocket, be used?
Right. The previous poster said it wasn't done for OCO. The link refutes that.
1.7.1 The investigating authority shall conduct an investigation and include the following products in the mishap report according to the requirements listed in Figure 5:
a Investigating authority and ex officio signatures per paragraph 6.1.9 and 6.1.10 (Requirement).
b Each advisor's signature per paragraph 6.1.11 (Requirement).
c. List of the investigating authority's consultants (Requirement 44310).
d. An executive summary that does not contain privileged or proprietary information, material subject to the Privacy Act, ITAR information, or EAR information (Requirement 44311).
e. The OSHA Final Mishap Summary (OSHA 301 Form: Injury and Illness Incident Report, or an equivalent form), if the mishap is an OSHA recordable incident (Requirement 44312).
f. Description of the type of data gathered and evaluated during the investigation (Requirement 44313).
g. Narrative description of the facts including what, when, and where (Requirement 44314).
h. Timeline (Requirement 44315).
i. Description of all structured analysis techniques used and how they contributed to determining the findings (Requirement 44316).
j. Event and causal factor tree or similar graphical representation of the mishap (Requirement 44317).
k. Description explaining why the mishap/close call occurred including all finding(s) such as proximate cause(s), root cause(s), contributing factor(s), failed barrier(s), observation(s), and the evidence upon which the findings are based (Requirement 44318).
l. Conclusions and recommendations (Requirement 44319).
m. Minority report, if there is one (Requirement 44320).
6.1.3 The mishap report shall be technically accurate; properly documented; easily understood; have traceability between facts, findings, and recommendations; and include the products required in Figure 5 in this NPR, in the following order:
a. Section 1: Signature page(s), list of consultants, executive summary, and OSHA summary (when applicable) (Requirement 44631).
Note: The OSHA summary goes in Section 1. The OSHA 301 Form or equivalent should be placed in the Appendix rather than Section 1 with the summary.
b. Section 2: Narrative description and facts (what, when, where, how) (Requirement 44632).
c. Section 3: Type of data gathered and data analysis (level of detail and products dependent upon Figure 5 in this NPR) (Requirement 44633).
d. Section 4: Finding(s) (Requirement 44634).
e. Section 5: Recommendation(s) (Requirement 44635).
f. Section 6: Minority Report(s) (Requirement 44636).
6.4.2 Within 10 workdays of the request, the Export Administrator, OPA, Office of Protective Services, Procurement, and legal counsel shall review the mishap report and specify in writing which sections of the mishap report are authorized for public release (Requirement 44684).
NASA has completed the agency’s assessment of the OCO MIB report. The report is NASA-sensitive, but unclassified (SBU), because it contains company proprietary information; the report also contains information restricted by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). As a result, the OCO mishap investigation report was deemed
not releasable to the public.
Recommendations
1. The team recommends that the Glory mission not fly until the frangible joint system is adequately qualified per existing project requirements for its intended-use environments (i.e., using flight-like test conditions and current flight-like hardware). This recommendation is based on the following evidence:
a. The LSP considers this system as “not qualified.”
b. The multiple NASA SMA re-qualification recommendations from those involved in the Pegasus and Taurus systems over the years.
c. The MIB report that stated “complete separation of the base ring frangible joint could not be concluded” and “the base ring frangible joint cannot be eliminated as a potential intermediate cause for fairing separation failure” [ref. 2, p. 47].
d. The multiple issues associated with the 2002 test.
a. Differences in fracture separation widths between front and back.
b. The possibility of unfractured frangible joints.
c. The small sample size of the testing.
d. Shock environment.
e. Non-initiated end of the test segments and the “sleeve” were not flight-like.
e. The lack of documentation of adequate dual manifold shock/vibration testing.
f. The OSC analysis of unfractured joints (all locations not considered).
g. The Ensign-Bickford “Go Forward Plan” where they recommended further testing to understand the numerous issues of the 2002 test.
2. Recommendations to adequately qualify the frangible joint system:
a. Develop finite element fracture stress model.
b. Update unfractured ligament analysis on top of the frangible joint rail.
c. Review the number of qualification tests to ensure adequate confidence levels in the test results.
d. Address the concerns related to shock environment testing documented in this white paper.
e. Ensure adequate ELAT testing to meet requirements of accepted standards.
g. Conduct qualification testing on the dual-input manifold.
3. Develop a system-level model of the fairing deployment system in order to systematically identify and evaluate additional risk factors and evaluate potential failure scenarios where multiple individual risks are coupled. Candidate systems analysis tools include, but are
not limited to, FMEA, state transition diagrams, and PRA.
1. Orbital should establish frangible joint system manufacturing process controls sufficient to assure that variability in materials properties and hardware component dimensions, within both maximum and minimum
tolerances, will not invalidate design performance requirements.
2. An extensive failure analysis (for example, detailed fault tree or failure mode analysis) of the Taurus frangible joint design should be performed.
3. Design and implement a qualification and test activity for the Taurus frangible joint system based on the results of an extensive failure analysis (for example, detailed fault tree or failure mode analysis) and with consideration for the environments in which the joint is operated.
“The MIB believes that if this recommendation were implemented, it could address all the possible frangible failure scenarios identified in the investigation.”
Why didn't you stop the Glory launch then?
Second guesses and $3.50 will get you a latte.
Why didn't you stop the Glory launch then?The more interesting question is why neither Orbital itself, nor the customer stopped the launch. It's major egg on your face to lose two launches in a row to the same reason (as the saying goes, intelligence is not avoiding mistakes, it's avoiding making the same mistake twice).
Second guesses and $3.50 will get you a latte.
See AC-70 and AC-71Here's a whole article on these two failures, and how the first review board got it wrong and they diligently fixed the wrong problem. It places the blame squarely on private industry and says the best practice is have the government run the reviews:
See AC-70 and AC-71Here's a whole article on these two failures, and how the first review board got it wrong and they diligently fixed the wrong problem. It places the blame squarely on private industry and says the best practice is have the government run the reviews:
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1321/1
Here the problem appears different - it's not that the review board identified the wrong problem, it's that the recommendations were not completely followed. As the article states, normally the review board states a whole slew of fixes to make sure the problem will not recur. Here, Orbital used a different set of fixes, which they presumably thought sufficient, but were not. From an engineering view, this makes sense - there may be many ways to fix a problem in addition to the ones the review board outlined. This may even make capitalist sense if the launch provider is on the hook if the failure re-occurs. But from a customer point of view, it seems that if the manufacturer chooses a different set of fixes than those recommended by the review board, you would want to demand the review board re-convene and sign off on the new fixes. It appears NASA didn't do that....
See AC-70 and AC-71Here's a whole article on these two failures, and how the first review board got it wrong and they diligently fixed the wrong problem. It places the blame squarely on private industry and says the best practice is have the government run the reviews:
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1321/1
Everything is a cost-benefit. Chicken Littles can demand all kinds of checks and tests, but:Note the results compared to the questions you asked:
Does the spacecraft want to stay on the ground that long?
How much will the tests cost?
Are the tests even possible?
Are the tests flight-like?
Will the test results be conclusive or will they raise more questions?
All of these things have to be weighed.[...] Once in a while they get the weights wrong.
The proper response, I think, would be to convene a failure board to investigate why the failure board did not work.
It's certainly theoretically possible that the second board could conclude they could not figure out why the first board did not work, or could come to wrong conclusion about what made it fail.The proper response, I think, would be to convene a failure board to investigate why the failure board did not work.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
How could one know that the failure mode that struck the first review board wouldn't also be present in the second board? Do you have any suspicions or assumptions about what caused the first board to fail?
Aviation week has an article on the Glory failure.
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/asd_02_22_2013_p03-01-551139.xml
"Board Fails To Find Root Cause For Glory Loss"
The contents of the article are mainly that of the title, but it repeats the claim that NASA has not cleared the Antares shroud for flight to ISS. I would assume, without knowing anything about it, that this was one of the main objectives of the first test flight of Antares.
it's worth taking a look back and see what you missed.
.. Those public summaries concluded that the launch vehicle fairing — a clamshell structure that encapsulates the satellite as it travels through the atmosphere — failed to separate on command, but no technical root cause had been identified. From NASA’s investigation, it is now known that SPI altered test results and provided false certifications to Orbital Sciences Corporation, the manufacturer of the Taurus XL, regarding the aluminum extrusions used in the payload fairing rail frangible joint. ...
I think the first bolded line is taken out of context. I see it as meaning "no technical root cause had been identified" ...until now. Other places in the article state that the cause of the failure was the faulty aluminium extrusions.Quote.. Those public summaries concluded that the launch vehicle fairing — a clamshell structure that encapsulates the satellite as it travels through the atmosphere — failed to separate on command, but no technical root cause had been identified. From NASA’s investigation, it is now known that SPI altered test results and provided false certifications to Orbital Sciences Corporation, the manufacturer of the Taurus XL, regarding the aluminum extrusions used in the payload fairing rail frangible joint. ...
Yes but....
There is a logical disconnect between the two bolded statements.
They don't say that the improper material caused the fairing separation failure.
Sapa Profiles likely deserves every bit of their fines, maybe more, maybe jail time, but did NASA determine that their material was the cause of the failure?
This says no, the "technical root cause" has not been identified.
The statements by Jim Norman are all true, no doubt, but do not assign responsibility of the SPI material for the failures.
SPI was just unlucky enough that the thorough investigation into the back to back failures uncovered their malfeasance.
The failures may remain unexplained.
Quote.. Those public summaries concluded that the launch vehicle fairing — a clamshell structure that encapsulates the satellite as it travels through the atmosphere — failed to separate on command, but no technical root cause had been identified. From NASA’s investigation, it is now known that SPI altered test results and provided false certifications to Orbital Sciences Corporation, the manufacturer of the Taurus XL, regarding the aluminum extrusions used in the payload fairing rail frangible joint. ...
Yes but....
There is a logical disconnect between the two bolded statements.
They don't say that the improper material caused the fairing separation failure.
Sapa Profiles likely deserves every bit of their fines, maybe more, maybe jail time, but did NASA determine that their material was the cause of the failure?
This says no, the "technical root cause" has not been identified.
The statements by Jim Norman are all true, no doubt, but do not assign responsibility of the SPI material for the failures.
SPI was just unlucky enough that the thorough investigation into the back to back failures uncovered their malfeasance.
The failures may remain unexplained.