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Written by Jim Oberg for us. 3,000 worder, and a great read:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5412
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Cool. Is this Jim's first piece for NSF?
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psloss - 27/4/2008 10:10 PM
Cool. Is this Jim's first piece for NSF?
No, we've been lucky enough to have a previous from him.
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First impression after two paragraphs: This isn't Chris' style.
Second impression after a few more paragraphs: I've seen this style before.
Third impression: Why didn't I read the by-line in the first place!
Good article. The Russians are certainly technically capable of getting this sorted out. I hope that management allows that to happen.
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Fascinating read, a great piece of news and very scary. Sounds like the whole USA/Russia partnership is in something of a mess and very worrying if Russia bury their collective heads in the sand over a serious flaw in the current construction of the Soyuz. I think this is going to have very serious consequences for that partnership further down the line.
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That was a great read. A definite eye opener!
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Nice piece. It's obvious that the Russians are taking the same attitude NASA did about the foam before it downed Columbia, playing Russian Roulette as it were. Now it maybe that the design can carry on doing ballistic entries like this indefinitely but if it can't what happens to the ISS in case of fatalities ? The Shuttle really can't be retired before a working US replacement is in place if the ISS is not to be put in jeopardy of early demise because of potential future Soyez failures. The President, Congress and NASA need to draw the proper due diligence conclusions from this incident
and act accordingly. The Moon is just a pipedream now but the ISS is a reality which needs proper maintainance after it's built and the current plan looks like it's based more on lots of hope than any cast-iron realities.
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Soyuz is a good design since it can tolerate some drastic failures and still bring the crew back in a healthy shape.
But a more open and honest policy would sure help finding and fixing the problems better.
Reality does not care about politics or public relations, the problems will not go away if you silence talking about them.
The longer you delay and hide, the worse the effects are and the stupider you look in the end. This was true with Francis Gary Powers' U-2 flight as well as Chernobyl accident.
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Gary - 27/4/2008 4:37 PM
I think this is going to have very serious consequences for that partnership further down the line.
I think it already has. Since the VSE was announced, NASA has been blunt that they have the resources (which they do) and the will (white house dependent) to go it alone in space. The next president may change this, but almost definately not in the Russian direction; the Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians are all much more friendly and open...
EDIT: Forgot the Indians, Brazilians, and South Koreans. Point is, US-Russian space is giving way to US-led multinational space (a better reflection of the real world)...
Simon ;)
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Great article, Jim Oberg. Yes, it's an eye-opener. The ISS badly needs a second crew launch/lifeboat/assured crew return option.
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This is a fairly well established pattern of response (as viewed from the outside) and doesn't seem like much of an eye opener to me. The focus should be on the problem rather whether it's a well-known problem or not. It is also perhaps an argument for crew return alternatives, but would need to be grouped with several other arguments to overcome the same old problem of finding money for alternatives.
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It is disturbing to me that there has been a pattern of Soviet/Russian coverups of spaceflight related incidents and accidents for decades, and it looks like old habits die hard. Jim Oberg's insight into the actions and history of our Russian partners also goes back decades and ought be read by every NASA official, Senator and Congressman who seem willing to blithely go along with relying on Russia as our SOLE means of ISS access for 5+ years.
I only hope that the "business as usual" approach that got us into trouble with Shuttle is not allowed to happen with the Russians. I can just imagine the hue and cry we would have had in the US if we had two incidents of this magnitude with Shuttle. There is no way we would still be flying.
We should insist that the root cause of this problem be determined before any more Astronauts ride the Soyuz, and that a replacement Soyuz cleared of the potential for this problem be flown unmanned to ISS to replace TMA-12.
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"Our Germans are better than their Germans. "
The excuses about the equipment failures make it sound like the people in charge are Russians not Germans.
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This has all the hallmarks of what happened with Challenger and Columbia. Knowing that there is a problem and ignoring it. What needs to be done are that all Soyuz flights are suspended until the problem has been found and fixed. If the Soyuz at ISS has the problem, a new Soyuz with the problem fixed should be flown and the existing Soyuz dumped. If this takes longer than six months, then the crew at ISS should come home on the Space Shuttle, and ISS be left in robotic mode until a fixed Soyuz can be launched.
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Steven Pietrobon - 27/4/2008 8:54 PM
This has all the hallmarks of what happened with Challenger and Columbia. Knowing that there is a problem and ignoring it. What needs to be done are that all Soyuz flights are suspended until the problem has been found and fixed. If the Soyuz at ISS has the problem, a new Soyuz with the problem fixed should be flown and the existing Soyuz dumped. If this takes longer than six months, then the crew at ISS should come home on the Space Shuttle, and ISS be left in robotic mode until a fixed Soyuz can be launched.
Agree whole-heartedly. ISS can be de-crewed for a while in any case. Heck, they planned on bringing home Expedition 10 in 2004 because they almost ran out of food. If there's a real safety issue, Russia needs to take a look before it results in the loss of three precious astronaut/cosmonaut lives.
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Might be some interesting lessons for the Orion designers in this - I wonder whether Orion could handle a service module separation failure.
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How's this for an argument for crew return alternatives:
If a future Soyuz were to meet a bad end - there are no guarantees that it won't happen, and it nearly happened in April 2008 - the International Space Station, a program supported by the taxpayers of the United States, many European nations, Canada, Russia, and Japan, an asset that has cost many billions of dollars to launch and to build, an asset with much scientific potential, humanity's only permanent presence in space, would have no means of transporting crews to and from the station until Soyuz were fixed. This could jeopardize the International Space Station's continued existence and would end most research aboard the station once the ISS is de-crewed. There are no guarantees as to how long the situation would last and the signature human spaceflight effort of the world community would be put at great risk.
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madscientist197 - 28/4/2008 3:06 AM
Might be some interesting lessons for the Orion designers in this - I wonder whether Orion could handle a service module separation failure.
The Soyuz had separation problems, so did the Reliant Robin dummy Shuttle and the 1km space tether experiment.
http://space.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn11836&feedId=online-news_rss20
This sounds like a low reliability area. Is triple redundancy needed?
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Chris Bergin - 27/4/2008 5:06 PM
Written by Jim Oberg for us. 3,000 worder, and a great read:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5412
Wow, very interesting, and troubling...
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Jim, an excellent article. It's late here and I am now off to bed. I am looking forward to reading it again in the morning when I am fresh. Seems like a typical closed society response. The only part that surprised me (well not really) was the blaming the Americans for certain failures. We can only hope that our elected officials take note of this and act accordingly. The TMA spacecraft are obviously very robust to be able to survive these types of failures (assuming that the described failure modes are accurate). But no one's luck can hold out forever.
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Thank you to Jim for writing the article. I can't imagine what the current ISS crew must feel about this. I remember reading the landing thread - crew aboard the ISS were told it was time for them to go to sleep and yet they were clearly worried about the missing crew (no communication).
It must be very unsettling to know that you must take your chances in the capsule currently docked to the station, knowing full well that your capsule may have the same defect, and your crew may not be as lucky as TMA-11. It's already up there (with possible problems) and I doubt they could fix anything to assure they will have a nominal safe landing. Not to mention - the findings/truth may be swept under the rug.
I feel it's a real slap in the face to the brave cosmo/astronauts when there are cover-ups that jeopardize their safety. It's as if to say - Your life isn't worth the time or money for us to admit to problems & stop to fully investigate/fix them.
I would think (hope) that, if it were NASA, that all flights would be cancelled/postponed until full investigations were performed, all future flight capsules were gone over with fine toothed combs until they are sure they've found the problem, tested it many times, and proclaim it fixed, not just throw on a new serial cable & call it good. I guess this would take months to years, lost time the program cannot/will not take off in the name of safety.
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Bubbinski - 27/4/2008 8:12 PM
How's this for an argument for crew return alternatives:
If a future Soyuz were to meet a bad end - there are no guarantees that it won't happen, and it nearly happened in April 2008 - the International Space Station, a program supported by the taxpayers of the United States, many European nations, Canada, Russia, and Japan, an asset that has cost many billions of dollars to launch and to build, an asset with much scientific potential, humanity's only permanent presence in space, would have no means of transporting crews to and from the station until Soyuz were fixed. This could jeopardize the International Space Station's continued existence and would end most research aboard the station once the ISS is de-crewed. There are no guarantees as to how long the situation would last and the signature human spaceflight effort of the world community would be put at great risk.
A question that should be asked of Mike Griffin right away, with special emphasis on "the gap" as presently planned.
Ideally, I'd like to see Orion, a crewed ATV (did that have a name?), and Soyuz all capable of servicing the ISS. Dreaming, I know.
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Nothing new and tech-related in this article, just political speculations.
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Thanks for the kind words and helpful suggestions. Chris has created the environment for candid exchanges, corrections, and arguing -- the best such forum on the planet. If anything I write has any hopes of approaching reality, it's only due in large part to inputs posted here, openly or in private messages, or emailed to me care of my home page www.jamesoberg.com. Spasibo.
I think there's plenty of talent and dedication in Moscow and Houston dedicated to fixing this problem. 'Attitude adjustment' of some leaders might be part of the prescription for recovery, too.
Regarding openness, one specific question for NASA. We don't yet know how far out of attitude last week's landing got before module separation -- the investigation is just beginning.
But the investigation of the landing anomalies on the October 2007 mission is complete. I hope NASA can release those results -- or explain why the Russians will share the results with NASA officials but require them NOT to pass the information on to the American public. Specifically, how far out of attitude did the spacecraft get, and how long after nominal separation before the modules finally broke free?
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Lee Jay - 27/4/2008 9:48 PM
Ideally, I'd like to see Orion, a crewed ATV (did that have a name?), and Soyuz all capable of servicing the ISS. Dreaming, I know.
Well, crewed ATV might never happen, but NASA is _already_ funding a Soyuz alternative, and it's called Dragon. (Yes, Jim, Cap D isn't formally funded, but the differences between the manned and unmanned versions are minimal). If both Dragon and Cygnus work out, NASA won't need to buy any Russian services during (or after) the gap...
Simon ;)
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Has the contract to use Soyuz when Shuttle is not longer available already signed and paid for?
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Quality article! We know they are looking at a couple of more years with Shuttle (L2), but these issues must resonate more with the politicians.
By the way, the South Korean astronaut is still suffering from the re-entry,
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gau0xECd5wjaHloPQaF1jairaUaA
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The criticism is most definitely warranted, lots of good factual data, but I can't help but feel it is a bit biased and seen through an exclusively american point of view itself.
It most certainly does nothing in the way of reconciling or encouraging the change it concludes as necessary (but that's clearly not the purpose of the article in the first place)
(edited for spelling)
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It's an interesting article on many levels. The problem seems to be just like NASA's pre-Challenger, an inbuilt military level "don't ask questions, just do it" complacency almost. These military guys, such as Perminov, even some on the US side, aren't going to change. I don't think US/Russian tensions ever fully went away and if NASA doesn't get FULL access to the investigation, they should pull out their astronauts from flying on Soyuz with immediate affect.
The big question is of course, does the world's only remaining superpower really want to lose their manned access to space? I find it mind-boggling that a country like the US wants to remove a working vehicle, have a gap of five years plus, using a "former" enemy (see*) as relance of getting its astronauts to the ISS. I find it even more mind-boggling that so many Americans are willing to vote in Obama, who is upfront about his distain for NASA (and literally WANTS the US to be removed from being a superpower).
* http://video.news.sky.com/skynews/video/?&videoSourceID=1280810 Politics may change on the face of things, but people don't, least not military.
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The problem with the private Dragon (or Cygnus but that's more just cargo) is that they could very well be wildly unreliable, especially early on. Just look at SpaceX's track record, or look at any manned spacecraft (perhaps except Apollo after the fire)...
Also, if ESA and the usual European industrial partners start working on a craft, it will take decades and cost many many billions, both to develop and to fly.
There is no easy fix to this problem.
I think this also can be seen as supporting evidence for a broad approach of space development. Instead of grand national prestige systems, you could have multiple more commercial and more modest operating capabilities.
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janmb - 28/4/2008 9:48 AM The criticism is most definitely warranted, lots of good factual data, but I can't help but feel it is a bit biased and seen through an exclusively american point of view itself. It most certainly does nothing in the way of reconciling or encouraging the change it concludes as necessary (but that's clearly not the purpose of the article in the first place) (edited for spelling)
I agree with this, the facts are hard and solid but are presented in a way that leads to the not-very-good-informed eye to conclude the Russian space program is a mess and the US shouldn't rely on them in anything important. That's not probably what Jim wants to transmit, but nevertheless it solely reflects America's problems with the Russian way of doing things, or just their fears.
While I agree some attitudes in the RSA should urgently change, as almost everyone agrees, I still don't think this type of articles are too useful. For the biased people, it gives arguments to bash Russians and reinforce their ideas, if they're pro-America, or just an excuse to say Americans are agressively accusing them of everything, for a pro-Russian. In my opinion, it should contain some counter-balance instead of focusing so much on every failure, listing them as an endless succession of near-disasters.
Also, as little as I like the man, I have to agree with Perminov in saying that some American nationalistic elements are very interested in troubling or breaking the existing cooperative partnership between Russia and the US. Note I am not in any way saying Jim is, or is supporting, any of these elements, but articles like this from space experts, as I say, can reinforce biased points of view.
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eeergo - 28/4/2008 11:24 AM
That's not probably what Jim wants to transmit, but nevertheless it solely reflects America's problems with the Russian way of doing things, or just their fears.While I agree some attitudes in the RSA should urgently change, as almost everyone agrees, I still don't think this type of articles are too useful. For the biased people, it gives arguments to bash Russians and reinforce their ideas, if they're pro-America, or just an excuse to say Americans are agressively accusing them of everything, for a pro-Russian.
My point precisely ;)
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meiza - 28/4/2008 5:38 AM
The problem with the private Dragon (or Cygnus but that's more just cargo) is that they could very well be wildly unreliable, especially early on. Just look at SpaceX's track record, or look at any manned spacecraft (perhaps except Apollo after the fire)...
Also, if ESA and the usual European industrial partners start working on a craft, it will take decades and cost many many billions, both to develop and to fly.
There is no easy fix to this problem.
I think this also can be seen as supporting evidence for a broad approach of space development. Instead of grand national prestige systems, you could have multiple more commercial and more modest operating capabilities.
I think the point should be, if we have multiple paths to ISS supply and crew rotation then, in the sad event one or more of them fails, one or more others will still be flying. Think back to 1967, when Apollo and Soyuz both killed crews. What if, in the wake of Columbia, a Soyuz had then gone down? I'd like to see an enhanced COTS program. I realize the problem is budget.
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pm1823 - 27/4/2008 11:50 PM
Nothing new and tech-related in this article, just political speculations.
And what is the matter with that? Also I wouldn't call them "speculations"?
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Well, on the other hand, would you rather have one system that is 98% reliable in not killing the crew or two independent systems which both are 96% reliable? You might get more dead people in the latter case, but can operate faster after crashes. :(
The ability to bring a crew safely back is needed just as much even when there are multiple systems.
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A great read, disturbing, Thanks to Jim Oberg. Makes the "GAP" seem even an even worse idea !
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simonbp - 28/4/2008 12:49 AM
Well, crewed ATV might never happen, but NASA is _already_ funding a Soyuz alternative, and it's called Dragon. (Yes, Jim, Cap D isn't formally funded, but the differences between the manned and unmanned versions are minimal). If both Dragon and Cygnus work out, NASA won't need to buy any Russian services during (or after) the gap...
Simon ;)
No, NASA is not funded a Soyuz alternative. It is paying to see some demos of a cargo ship. It never imposed any manrating requirements on SpaceX for the launch vehicle or spacecraft, except for the minimal amount that allow it to dock with the ISS.
"but the differences between the manned and unmanned versions are minimal"
Incorrect. The cargo dragon is nothing but a pressure shell. It is doesn't have a life support system or any features for crew. There is no escape system nor a hatch for the crew to escape.
Also, in Spacex's infinite wisdom and grand scheme to make SLC-40 their own, they just destroyed the UT and MST which could have served to provide access to a manned Dragon. This will only make a manned Dragon later
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Jim - 28/4/2008 7:31 AM
Also, in Spacex's infinite wisdom and grand scheme to make SLC-40 their own, they just destroyed the UT and MST which could have served to provide access to a manned Dragon. This will only make a manned Dragon later
Any early-up of Dragon (Option-D), will need to fly on an EELV.
Please take any followup to the Soyuz Alternative thread.
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From the article:
But if that were the case, the mystery remains as to why the rocket section eventually did detach itself, because it is constructed with attachment structures robust enough for coasting flight but fragile enough to teat apart once the aerodynamic stresses of entry begin.
The grammar here leaves me confused... was the module designed to separate by aerodynamic forces if the bolts failed or not? If so, then the designers should be applauded for having forseen such situation and successfully accommodated it. It's not a means of
returning you should rely on, so they should definitely put a lot of attention to fixing the separation problem. But I think this mishap demonstrates the robust design of Soyuz.
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Jim - 28/4/2008 7:21 AM
pm1823 - 27/4/2008 11:50 PM
Nothing new and tech-related in this article, just political speculations.
And what is the matter with that? Also I wouldn't call them "speculations"?
I agree with you, Jim. I am convinced that the knowledgable people on this site are looking at this from a safety of flight perspective, and there is action required before another crew flies on a Soyuz. Two incidents in a row are a valid cause for concern. This has nothing to do with Russia or NASA bashing.
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brihath - 28/4/2008 9:52 AM
Jim - 28/4/2008 7:21 AM
pm1823 - 27/4/2008 11:50 PM
Nothing new and tech-related in this article, just political speculations.
And what is the matter with that? Also I wouldn't call them "speculations"?
I agree with you, Jim. I am convinced that the knowledgeable people on this site are looking at this from a safety of flight perspective, and there is action required before another crew flies on a Soyuz. Two incidents in a row are a valid cause for concern. This has nothing to do with Russia or NASA bashing.
Two incidents in a row with a third currently docked at ISS as the crew's only way home. It most definitely is a cause for concern - from a purely technical point of view.
Aerodynamic-induced module separation may be a good backup, but once we begin to rely on the backup system in lieu of the primary system, it's time for a serious re-examination of the system as a whole.
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With the apparent problems of a pyrotechnic based explosive bolt configuration (atleast with the ones used by Soyuz,) I wonder if an all mechanical alternative could be used. Thinking like an engineer, using something like a 'spherical capture claw' to engage slotted pins might be a viable alternative. Using mechanical actuators gives the possibility of using a 'hand cranked' ultimate backup seperation system--that and with some pushoff springs ought to be a possible alternative. Granted--there would have to be substantial engineering involved, and maybe even a bit of weight penalty.
Also, does anyone know if the Russians use "Double Initiated" Pyro-devices for their seperation, and range safety hardware like most Western Space Agencies?
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TyMoore - 28/4/2008 4:15 PM
and range safety hardware like most Western Space Agencies?
No range saftey.
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A question I've been pondering: How does this module separation failure relate to launch abort systems?
Clearly, the reentry module must separate from the service and orbital modules during a launch abort sequence. If a module separation issue existed during the Soyuz TMA-11 and Soyuz TMA-10 launches, would it be fair to say that the crews unknowingly rode vehicles with unsurvivable abort systems?
- Ed Kyle
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Ed- Excellent point. I thought the abort mode pulled the complete spacecraft stack off the R-7, then separated the shroud, OM and SM. There could concievably be an abort survivability issue here, too. It would be nice if a Soyuz subject matter expert (Possibly Jim Oberg?) could weigh in on this possibility.
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edkyle99 - 28/4/2008 11:13 AM
A question I've been pondering: How does this module separation failure relate to launch abort systems?
Clearly, the reentry module must separate from the service and orbital modules during a launch abort sequence. If a module separation issue existed during the Soyuz TMA-11 and Soyuz TMA-10 launches, would it be fair to say that the crews unknowingly rode vehicles with unsurvivable abort systems?
- Ed Kyle
What are the loads in both situations, I was under the impression that the connection between the service and reenty modules was not strong enough to support the weight of a fully fueled service module. Meaning the shroud and reentry module would tear free of the service module even if the seperation pryo's failed to operate during an abort.
What worries me more is you have a service module with residual fuel undergoing heating before breaking free ... I fear something very bad could happen ...
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edkyle99 - 28/4/2008 11:13 AM
... would it be fair to say that the crews unknowingly rode vehicles with unsurvivable abort systems?
- Ed Kyle
I don’t think so Ed. Mind you this is opinion, based on what I know about Soyuz, but I believe the forces induced by a launch abort exceed the yield strength of the pyrotechnic bolts. It’s the same with the ballistic re-entry; the aerodynamic forces also eventually exceed the bolts yield strength, it just takes a little longer. Someone please correct me if I am wrong.
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It's still a crew abort survivability issue: the deployment of the reentry module's parachutes depends on the jettisoning of the orbital module. Even if the parachutes did not snarl or are cut from abrasion with the orbital module still attached, the added weight and the screwy CG would make the thing wholly uncontrollable. The whole mess would crash very hard, with dire consequences for the crew I'm afraid...
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eeergo - 28/4/2008 5:24 AM
janmb - 28/4/2008 9:48 AM The criticism is most definitely warranted, lots of good factual data, but I can't help but feel it is a bit biased and seen through an exclusively american point of view itself. It most certainly does nothing in the way of reconciling or encouraging the change it concludes as necessary (but that's clearly not the purpose of the article in the first place) (edited for spelling)
I agree with this, the facts are hard and solid but are presented in a way that leads to the not-very-good-informed eye to conclude the Russian space program is a mess and the US shouldn't rely on them in anything important. That's not probably what Jim wants to transmit, but nevertheless it solely reflects America's problems with the Russian way of doing things, or just their fears.
While I agree some attitudes in the RSA should urgently change, as almost everyone agrees, I still don't think this type of articles are too useful. For the biased people, it gives arguments to bash Russians and reinforce their ideas, if they're pro-America, or just an excuse to say Americans are agressively accusing them of everything, for a pro-Russian. In my opinion, it should contain some counter-balance instead of focusing so much on every failure, listing them as an endless succession of near-disasters.
Also, as little as I like the man, I have to agree with Perminov in saying that some American nationalistic elements are very interested in troubling or breaking the existing cooperative partnership between Russia and the US. Note I am not in any way saying Jim is, or is supporting, any of these elements, but articles like this from space experts, as I say, can reinforce biased points of view.
What??
There is a problem. Two ballistic entries in a row. The United States is about to become even more of a paying customer to Russia for access to the ISS. We should be concerned and I fail to see how somehow the US can be at fault for having these concerns.
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//With the apparent problems of a pyrotechnic based explosive bolt configuration (atleast with the ones used by Soyuz,)
In the modules separation process used "pyro-lock" or "pyro-knife" for cables. Where you all and JimO takes these "pyrobolts" in the Soyuz?!
If electrical ignition failed pyro-lock has own independent high-thermal initiator which should work before other significant thermal or aerodynamic load will open it. And it works, as we see on TMA-10 or TMA-11 descent.
//And what is the matter with that? Also I wouldn't call them "speculations"?
And what is purpose for a such politics? Crew safety? For Soyuz, which have been build only for descent survival capability?
As we can see, crews are alive and safe on the ground, other is a low-tech-based political speculation. No credible sources used (that "Interfax source" was talking before capsule and thermal shield arriving from Kazakhstan and telemetry data downloading), wrong terms used, shallow technical describing etc. It can be excusable, for ppl talking about rumors on the forum, but can't for expert's article.
If Mr.Oberg competent enough, he should know, that Soyuz' crew has more danger to stay on orbit for the very long time, if engine failed, than to die in the descent. And we haven't "always ready" Soyuz-rescue for the LON! Let's talk about it, where this main safety issue rising in that article? And its opening the question, is this article has more your political patriotic "gap" issue, than "Soyuz' crew safety"?
PS I'm really want to see that plutonium from Mars-96... and I DO NOT like some "s-words" used in that article, like "Pusillanimous pussy-footing with Russian paranoia".
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OV-106 - 28/4/2008 12:30 PM
eeergo - 28/4/2008 5:24 AM
janmb - 28/4/2008 9:48 AM The criticism is most definitely warranted, lots of good factual data, but I can't help but feel it is a bit biased and seen through an exclusively american point of view itself. It most certainly does nothing in the way of reconciling or encouraging the change it concludes as necessary (but that's clearly not the purpose of the article in the first place) (edited for spelling)
I agree with this, the facts are hard and solid but are presented in a way that leads to the not-very-good-informed eye to conclude the Russian space program is a mess and the US shouldn't rely on them in anything important. That's not probably what Jim wants to transmit, but nevertheless it solely reflects America's problems with the Russian way of doing things, or just their fears.
While I agree some attitudes in the RSA should urgently change, as almost everyone agrees, I still don't think this type of articles are too useful. For the biased people, it gives arguments to bash Russians and reinforce their ideas, if they're pro-America, or just an excuse to say Americans are agressively accusing them of everything, for a pro-Russian. In my opinion, it should contain some counter-balance instead of focusing so much on every failure, listing them as an endless succession of near-disasters.
Also, as little as I like the man, I have to agree with Perminov in saying that some American nationalistic elements are very interested in troubling or breaking the existing cooperative partnership between Russia and the US. Note I am not in any way saying Jim is, or is supporting, any of these elements, but articles like this from space experts, as I say, can reinforce biased points of view.
What??
There is a problem. Two ballistic entries in a row. The United States is about to become even more of a paying customer to Russia for access to the ISS. We should be concerned and I fail to see how somehow the US can be at fault for having these concerns.
Two in a row, a third on station and no alternate ride home on the manifest. That's a problem regardless of the flag.
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pm1823 - 28/4/2008 5:37 PM
I DO NOT like some "s-words" used in that article, like "Pusillanimous pussy-footing with Russian paranoia".
What "S words"? There's no swear words in what you quoted and no swear words in any article ever published on this site. Translators making a mess of it?
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TyMoore - 28/4/2008 5:00 PM
It's still a crew abort survivability issue: the deployment of the reentry modules parachutes depends on the jettisoning of the orbital module. Even if the parachutes did not snarl or are cut from abrasion with the orbital module still attached, the added weight and the screwy CG would make the thing wholly uncontrollable. The whole mess would crash very hard, with dire consequences for the crew I'm afraid...
That's what worries me the most with Soyuz. Whether the modules seperated OK and if the parachutes deployed successfully.
I really think they need to fix this urgently and if it's a major issue, fly a new Soyuz up before October to replace TMA-12 on orbit. It's not fair on anyone to put the crew in a vehicle that could kill them or give them extremely high Gs or injury during re-entry and landing.
An earlier post described the possibility of having the crew returning on the Shuttle in case of emergency. Do you think NASA would actually consider this if the Soyuz problem takes a long time to fix? Forget about Shuttle LON - they'd need ISS LON missions too if this were to happen. I suppose the only way they could launch a shuttle at such short notice, especially when all 3 orbiters are into large scale processing, is to take one orbiter out of nominal service all stacked up in the VAB, ready to roll out to the pad when needed. I suppose that would be the most efficient way, but still not as fast as a Soyuz already docked to the station...
Lets just hope they find the cause and deal with it ASAP! :(
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The fact that we needed to rely on the backup system to get home, two times in a row, also indicates that, two times in a row the primary system failed. To me, and again this is my opinion, it *suggests* a possible quality control issue in the production run for Soyuz manufacture, somewhere along the line.
There is no doubt in my mind that the primary system has *NO* design flaws. It has worked hundreds of times over many, many years. The design works - period. Something else failed. Personally, I suspect something on the assembly line wasn't done correctly or a subcontractor supplied substandard parts that slipped thru the quality control. Either way, it needs to be identified and corrected, with additional steps taken to prevent a recurrence.
For all our Russian participants on this forum - that is not anything against "Russian" – not at all. I have seen exactly the same kind of quality control issues creep in, over long periods of time, in American companies as well. We do the same thing over and over again, year after year. After a while we’re just not as careful as we otherwise would be. That’s not Russian or American – it’s human. It happens to individuals and companies from all over the earth.
The thing to do is for us to not get all upset over what nationality happened to be holding the cards this time because at some point that describes all of us, but to identify the shortcoming, fix it and take steps to prevent it from happening again.
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hmm. the first thing i wondered about is why they could not see the descent of the soyuz on radar, and locate it this way. But it seems that the russian early warning radar in balkhash can't see it because it's too far in the south of kazachstan. (Please correct me if i'm wrong). The russian early warning satellites which perhaps could detect it in infrared are at miminal configuration and are just covering the us. So at least this explains why they could not see where the soyuz comes down.(Which all might change with the new early warning radar going operational this year in the south caucasus and the new early warning system EKS in 2009)
now to the other issues, first of all, i find it impressive that the soyuz is able to do a survivable landing with a attachted propulsion module, and i believe that this kind of built in security is the way to go. Of course there are qualtity management issues in the russian industry as a whole. And energia is not sukhoi, which is currently implementing boeing management methods in it's production lines. But things are changing.
But i believe it's too early and not ok to draw a conclusion at this stage, an anonymous russian "expert" is not enough judge the one way or the other. I don't believe that the russians will risk the lives of anybody just because of pride or nationalism. Money is no issue for a country with a budget surplus of 70 billion, 520 billion in currency reserves, and close to no debt. in fact the russian state is rich compared to the united states these days. a 700 million dollar contract is not relevant for them any longer.
After each problem in the russian space industry, not just this landing, but for example the last Breeze-M failure people are questioning russian reliability, but i just have to say there was a centaur failure not long ago, and of course there was columbia. there is too much nationalism from both sides, and we have to overcome this on both sides. Nobody is making more launches than the russians, so it's no wonder that even with the same reliability there will be more problems on the russian side.
The russians have to investigate this problem, and if they say it's ok to land the next soyuz, or it's ok to launch the next soyuz, i would just trust them. And if people are suggesting that spacex with it's dragon could solve this problem - it's a joke. the soyuz has flown 1700+ times. the soyuz capsule, don't now exactly how often - but well since 40 years. The russians have to be more open, have to be more honest - but the rsa hasn't lost any people since 1971.
sorry for my bad english, i don't want to offend anybody, just my opinion.
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pm1823 - 28/4/2008 10:37 AM
PS I'm really want to see that plutonium from Mars-96...
Here's the IKI website for the mission, noting that the surface stations were powered by 2 small RTGs: http://www.iki.rssi.ru/mars96/08_mars_e.htm#%D0%A1%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B2%20%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%B1%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85%20%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BC
And the penetrators (specifically noting that used plutonium): http://www.iki.rssi.ru/mars96/09_mars_e.htm#%D0%A2%D0%B5%D1%85%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D1%85%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B8
There's noting sinister about using plutonium; it's a great power source. The issue was that parts of it may have landed on on land, which is still not really a problem, but scares a few paranoid types...
Simon ;)
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extropiandreams --
I do not think that anyone is questioning the abilities of our Russian partners in regards to either their ability or desire to fix the problem(s). I just think that the posturing and denying of a problem is troubling. Yes, there have been the Challanger and Columbia accidents but because of the nature of our society we put it all on the table for everyone to see. There was no hiding the problems after the failures (and yes there were management problems before hand that could be attributed to not stopping the failures because the root failure causes were know before hand). The whole world knew of all our dirty laundry. We just want our partners to be as open to us so we can be as sure as one can be of our people's (and anyone's) safety in this dangerous launch/orbit/landing business.
Off topic. How do you, or where can I find, how to include the topic that you respond to in the body of the post with the vertical bar on the left side? Pls email me or PM. TIA (Edit: Thanks for the answer!)
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I do agree that this is a typical Oberg article. I dislike the over reliance on Russian newspaper sources and the extrapolation from these "sources". We have had dozens of "stupid US media" threads in this forum, but should we suddenly take Russian newspapers for the printed thruth. The article is called "past smoke and flames" but it barely lives up to it's own name.
As far as I can tell, Oberg has to resort to newspaper sources because the real workings and decision making procedures remain unknown to outsiders. It just seems that Jim have taken speculation from Russian papers for truth, added some of his own experiences from his time in NASA (as described in Star Crossed Orbits) and viola: a 3000 word essay on how things are going wrong. Without actually having seen the data or talked to the people that make the decision.
There are things wrong in Russia, and two landing anomolies are indeed a grave concern. But leave the speculations based on Russian newspapers sources out of it, please...
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pm1823 - 28/4/2008 12:37 PM
As we can see, crews are alive and safe on the ground,
That is not a valid argument as the crews of the flights before Challenger and Columbia were also were alive and safe on the ground
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sammie - 28/4/2008 1:47 PM
But leave the speculations based on Russian newspapers sources out of it, please...
Why? Aren't they reliable? Aren't they open?
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sammie, not the sounds like a "Spelling Nazi" especially since my english is most of time very incorrect, but it's "voila" and NOT "viola" ... for some raison it's a very common mistake for non-french speaking folks ...
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excuse moi
as to Jim's response
Nope, I would rely even less on Russian newspapers for my daily news as I would on CNN/Fox and others.
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The perfect example that is a typical Russian response is the Kirsk accident.
The finger pointing and excuses started right away.
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extropiandreams - 28/4/2008 12:01 PM
the soyuz has flown 1700+ times. the soyuz capsule, don't now exactly how often - but well since 40 years.
Not as many as people seem to think, due to the fact that the Soyuz has had a low flight rate over most of those 40 years. When TMA-11 landed, it marked the 87th consecutive successful manned Soyuz landing since the Soyuz 11 accident in 1971.
Coincidentally, this now matches the streak of 87 consecutive successful space shuttle landings between STS-26 and STS-113. I won't be a party-pooper by noting what happened on the 88th.
The russians have to be more open, have to be more honest - but the rsa hasn't lost any people since 1971.
When measuring flight safety statistics, number of flights is all that matters. Years don't matter unless the flight rates are equivalent, and in this case they most certainly are not.
sorry for my bad english, i don't want to offend anybody, just my opinion.
Same here, not trying to offend, just stating the facts.
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OV-106 - 28/4/2008 5:30 PM What?? There is a problem. Two ballistic entries in a row. The United States is about to become even more of a paying customer to Russia for access to the ISS. We should be concerned and I fail to see how somehow the US can be at fault for having these concerns.
I thought I had let this clearer: I believe there's a serious problem that needs to be corrected with the Soyuz (but not to the extent of grounding systems or anything like that, or at least not yet, and with all the time they have until TMA-12 landing) Extropiandreams has made a good post that explains more or less what I tried to express.
I also agree more openness should be exhibited from the Russian side, most of all with the general public (how can it be we were told until a few days ago there were no separation problems with TMA-10!) If they aren't sure, by ground documentation, the same problem won't re-occur again, I think the way to go would be to orchestrate an EVA and inspect the separation systems, that I remember reading would be accessible. Strella could help, I think there's nothing technical that forbids this approach.
What I say is: of course the US has all the rights to request a thorough investigation and full access to it and its findings (I would even say the American, European and Japanese public should have it too) BUT I don't see how remembering past mismanagements in a long list of errors (some of them not technically related to the problem here) can help to get anywhere in mutual understanding and future open cooperation. It will only make biases more pronounced. And well, I did find the language a bit strong in some points, but I agree its importance may vary depending on the attitude you read it with.
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Jim - 28/4/2008 7:02 PM The perfect example that is a typical Russian response is the Kirsk accident. The finger pointing and excuses started right away.
Not to be nitpicking, but it's Kursk :)
I'm sorry, but this sounds like an extrapolation... while maybe being partly true something similar may be happening here, using a completely different accident isn't a very reliable way of arguing your views.
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--simonbp
Every organiztion in every country is doing this. The F-15 gets grounded, and your air force is trying to sell more f-22 to the congress. On the other hand things are invented and falsified, iraq war for example. Even boeing and airbus aren't honest all the time about potential serious problems. Sometimes if there is a whistleblower, they even try to silence them by pressure by law.(like the airbus case concerning the cabin pressure system).
There is no censorship concerning such problems(in the press) in russia(there might be some problems concerning political topics on russian tv, however, or some military programs), and it was interfax which first cited the unknown source.(russian press is as bad as the western press as far as this topic is concerned)
Ok, russia has a different culture, and they are somewhat special. And maybe the rsa and the russian companies don't want to see every conclusion in the public. But i believe they will work hard on the problem and will be honest with nasa. Maybe they are so silent because whatever they do, russian technology gets bashed anyway. I'm not from russia by the way, but from austria, which is a neutral country, i just want to get such a perspective on this. western media is trying to bash russia on every opportunity, and if it had gone after them, like they predicted there would be no russian spaceflight nowadays. (remember what the media said in 97,98 ?)
ok, perhaps the reason why they are so silent has it's ground in the reaction of western media, which try to see in every russian problem a systematic problem of the russian society. Russia has changed, and is changing rapidly, and many people seem to ignore it.
back to the topic: the soyuz fullfilled it's mission, but it's not ok for such a system to rely on backup modes constantly. perhaps they can change the flight profile, to minimize the risk for the next landing. russians are very flexible in this regard, so i hope that the greatest strength of the russian(improvisation) will help to minimize the risk, even if the backup landing mode has shown it's risky but workable.
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janmb - 28/4/2008 1:48 AM
The criticism is most definitely warranted, lots of good factual data, but I can't help but feel it is a bit biased and seen through an exclusively american point of view itself.
It most certainly does nothing in the way of reconciling or encouraging the change it concludes as necessary (but that's clearly not the purpose of the article in the first place)
This troubled me too. It is not the kind of article I would have expected to see on this site. I would reword this comment to read "seen through an exclusively american point of view" to read "seen through an exclusively older American point of view" though. There are so many vestages of the cold warriors hanging about on both sides of the issue that we are best off waiting for some technical results rather than indulging in politics.
JMO
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--Jim
the kursk incident is a different matter because those submarines contain military secrets of strategic nature, the soyuz is a different matter. There are no strategic secrets to hide.......you can't compare this to this case
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"Strategic secrets" have nothing to do with it. Same thing with Chernobyl. It is simply a matter of an entity not wanting to lose face by admitting there is a problem. We've seen that many times over the years, when details only came out by drips and drabs as a result of outside pressure.
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Norm Hartnett - 28/4/2008 7:24 PM
janmb - 28/4/2008 1:48 AM
The criticism is most definitely warranted, lots of good factual data, but I can't help but feel it is a bit biased and seen through an exclusively american point of view itself.
It most certainly does nothing in the way of reconciling or encouraging the change it concludes as necessary (but that's clearly not the purpose of the article in the first place)
This troubled me too. It is not the kind of article I would have expected to see on this site. I would reword this comment to read "seen through an exclusively american point of view" to read "seen through an exclusively older American point of view" though. There are so many vestages of the cold warriors hanging about on both sides of the issue that we are best off waiting for some technical results rather than indulging in politics.
JMO
This is to the three members (Norm, Eeergo and Jan)...on the above point (as all three are along these lines):
1) The article represents both points of views (notably including the Russian media angle, of which a lot of it is negative, with their "sources").
2) It also gives the counter points, including the heavy angles of so called "American" involvement with regards to said negative angles.
3) It gives several historical references of the above, with extensive background.
4) It's a hell of a lot better than paraphrasing those Russian media reports, as most have run with.
5) As noted, and despite so many reports already out there, this is not giving the results of the investigation, as that is still pending. It's giving a summary of historical references, the above points, and both sides of the argument.
Yes, it is a different type of article as you'd normally see here, as I write 99 percent of the content and I'm a quote based/documentation type writer, but given who the writer is (as opposed to someone without any insight), and given this is - imho - a lot better than the paraphrased copy-and-paste type articles already out there, it was viable to run and I stand by it.
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extropiandreams - 28/4/2008 1:23 PM
--simonbp
Every organiztion in every country is doing this. The F-15 gets grounded, and your air force is trying to sell more f-22 to the congress. On the other hand things are invented and falsified, iraq war for example.
So much for being "neutral". It seems you are just as guilty as taking certain media reports as gospel as well.
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Chris Bergin - 28/4/2008 1:45 PM
Yes, it is a different type of article as you'd normally see here, as I write 99 percent of the content and I'm a quote based/documentation type writer, but given who the writer is (as opposed to someone without any insight), and given this is - imho - a lot better than the paraphrased copy-and-paste type articles already out there, it was viable to run and I stand by it.
Chris,
As I read it, Jim's writeup seemed like a commentary, an editorial type piece. He raises good points worthy of consideration, but perhaps a "Special Editorial" type heading would have been appropriate for a piece that has obviously hit some nerves.
- Ed Kyle
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edkyle99 - 28/4/2008 2:11 PM
Chris Bergin - 28/4/2008 1:45 PM
Yes, it is a different type of article as you'd normally see here, as I write 99 percent of the content and I'm a quote based/documentation type writer, but given who the writer is (as opposed to someone without any insight), and given this is - imho - a lot better than the paraphrased copy-and-paste type articles already out there, it was viable to run and I stand by it.
Chris,
As I read it, Jim's writeup seemed like a commentary, an editorial type piece. He raises good points worthy of consideration, but perhaps a "Special Editorial" type heading would have been appropriate for a piece that has obviously hit some nerves.
- Ed Kyle
He did!
"By James Oberg - special to NASASpaceflight.com:"
There's three people who's nerves it's hit and notably, from their posts, they didn't read it properly, or thought Chris wrote it.
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edkyle99 - 28/4/2008 2:11 PM
Chris Bergin - 28/4/2008 1:45 PM
Yes, it is a different type of article as you'd normally see here, as I write 99 percent of the content and I'm a quote based/documentation type writer, but given who the writer is (as opposed to someone without any insight), and given this is - imho - a lot better than the paraphrased copy-and-paste type articles already out there, it was viable to run and I stand by it.
Chris,
As I read it, Jim's writeup seemed like a commentary, an editorial type piece. He raises good points worthy of consideration, but perhaps a "Special Editorial" type heading would have been appropriate for a piece that has obviously hit some nerves.
- Ed Kyle
I believe he did add it was a special, Ed.
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-- OV-106
(EDITED: I've already warned you about going on about Iraq. I've let you have your say, it's been answered, now leave it - James).
back to the topic:
i heard that the hatch wasn't burned at all, my question is was the container of the parachutes burned ? and are they specially protected ?(there are two of them as i know?)
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edkyle99 - 28/4/2008 8:11 PM
Chris Bergin - 28/4/2008 1:45 PM
Yes, it is a different type of article as you'd normally see here, as I write 99 percent of the content and I'm a quote based/documentation type writer, but given who the writer is (as opposed to someone without any insight), and given this is - imho - a lot better than the paraphrased copy-and-paste type articles already out there, it was viable to run and I stand by it.
Chris,
As I read it, Jim's writeup seemed like a commentary, an editorial type piece. He raises good points worthy of consideration, but perhaps a "Special Editorial" type heading would have been appropriate for a piece that has obviously hit some nerves.
- Ed Kyle
I thought I had tagged it as required, and it's also in the "Features" section, not the news sections ( http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/cat.asp?cid=12 ) - though that isn't obvious on a direct link. I'll add the word "Editorial" to the "Special" to be on the safe side :)
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janmb - 28/4/2008 1:48 AM -- The criticism is most definitely warranted, lots of good factual data, but I can't help but feel it is a bit biased and seen through an exclusively american point of view itself. It most certainly does nothing in the way of reconciling or encouraging the change it concludes as necessary (but that's clearly not the purpose of the article in the first place)
Norm Hartnett: 28/4/2008 1:24 PM -- This troubled me too. It is not the kind of article I would have expected to see on this site. I would reword this comment to read "seen through an exclusively american point of view" to read "seen through an exclusively older American point of view" though. There are so many vestages of the cold warriors hanging about on both sides of the issue that we are best off waiting for some technical results rather than indulging in politics.
Norm, I accept your comment as an ‘older’ American and a ‘cold warrior’ as a compliment (both for surviving this long, and for enlisting on the right side of that world conflict), and have to add that the best ‘America bashers’ in the world are Americans themselves… one of many odd traits of our popular culture (so knee-jerk nationalistic defensiveness is beaten out of us pretty thoroughly).
The point of view of my essays (and your point is well taken – perhaps they often should be labeled as ‘analysis’ rather ‘reportage’) reflect my experiences, which are mainly as a professional student of and participant in human spaceflight engineering and operations for more than four decades, as well as front-line activism in investigation of claims about Soviet/Russian aerospace technology, activities I conducted in close collaboration with English, Dutch, Belgian, Canadian, and even Russian colleagues.
Our concern was to find out what WAS, and we racked up an impressive string of successful revelations over the years -- often prodding or prompting officials to release hitherto concealed or distorted information. The approach certainly spilled over into political and ideological themes, whether it was the Moon Race, or space weapons, or the accused involvement of the space shuttle in the Korean Airlines flight 007 catastrophe – but by trying always to determine what made engineering sense, we could cut through all the enveloping nonsense spread by folks who picked their conclusions first, and manipulated the facts to fit.
That’s got to be the central focus of this site, and of our communal desires – first of all, what is real, what is true? Perhaps a good example of how some folks lose sight of this is the comments on the Mars-96 plutonium (my main criticism is of the US government, on this account, by the way, for not correcting its preliminary claims about the probe falling safely into the Pacific). There’s an impression some posts might leave here that plutonium canisters scattered on dry land are nothing to worry about and there’s no use warning local inhabitants by issuing warnings or other alarming announcements, and it’s best to keep the lid on this incendiary topic – or it’s somehow ‘biased’ or ‘American’ to object to that approach. Chris, do you want to start a separate discussion on this specific example, or would a brief exchange of comments here, pretty well cover all angles?
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Chris Bergin - 28/4/2008 7:45 PM This is to the three members (Norm, Eeergo and Jan)...on the above point (as all three are along these lines): 1) The article represents both points of views (notably including the Russian media angle, of which a lot of it is negative, with their "sources"). 2) It also gives the counter points, including the heavy angles of so called "American" involvement with regards to said negative angles. 3) It gives several historical references of the above, with extensive background. 4) It's a hell of a lot better than paraphrasing those Russian media reports, as most have run with. 5) As noted, and despite so many reports already out there, this is not giving the results of the investigation, as that is still pending. It's giving a summary of historical references, the above points, and both sides of the argument. Yes, it is a different type of article as you'd normally see here, as I write 99 percent of the content and I'm a quote based/documentation type writer, but given who the writer is (as opposed to someone without any insight), and given this is - imho - a lot better than the paraphrased copy-and-paste type articles already out there, it was viable to run and I stand by it.
I can see the points you're making, and I've re-read the article to see if I had somehow got a distorted impression of what its message was. Actually, I see two well-defined parts: the first half is quite balanced (for my point of view) and adresses real concerns, with sources in both the Russian non-babbling side and the American opinions.
However, after Gernstenmeier's part a more debatable point of view is progressively taken, starting with Cold-War-like accusations between the two parts, not related to the Soyuz problem. I can see this as a historical background, but I see it having more importance than it should. Same applies to the Soyuz-5 reference, and the last "chapter" ("The heart of the problem") is too accusatory for my liking, with the Mars96 reminder and the strong last paragraphs. This part, being at the end, is more easily remembered as the main message of the article.
Sometimes a bit more diplomatic approach helps in touchy subjects like this one.
I don't think the site shouldn't be featuring this type of articles from time to time, and in fact I find they spark an interesting debate, richer than the mere speculation media-quoting would yield. But a Russian author would write quite a different view, and probably be quite right in turn. I disagree on some ways of reasoning the article has, but one of this forum's greatness is the arena it provides to civily discuss these matters and maybe make our ideas converge. :)
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Is there any serious talk of grounding the Soyuz until an investigation determines the cause, or perhaps launching an unmanned Soyuz in order to test the landing without a crew on board?
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TJL - 28/4/2008 3:36 PM
Is there any serious talk of grounding the Soyuz until an investigation determines the cause, or perhaps launching an unmanned Soyuz in order to test the landing without a crew on board?
Soyuz is in flight right now and berthed to the ISS. This vehicle may be required as a crew escape vehicle during any given minute. Grounding it in the conventional manner is not really an option.
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extropiandreams - 28/4/2008 10:01 AM
The russians have to investigate this problem, and if they say it's ok to land the next soyuz, or it's ok to launch the next soyuz, i would just trust them.
Trust, but verify. To quote another biased American.
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pm1823 - 28/4/2008 11:37 AM
//With the apparent problems of a pyrotechnic based explosive bolt configuration (atleast with the ones used by Soyuz,)
In the modules separation process used "pyro-lock" or "pyro-knife" for cables. Where you all and JimO takes these "pyrobolts" in the Soyuz?!
If electrical ignition failed pyro-lock has own independent high-thermal initiator which should work before other significant thermal or aerodynamic load will open it. And it works, as we see on TMA-10 or TMA-11 descent.
pm1823,
Can you share or point to any more information on these "pyro-locks"?
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eeergo - 28/4/2008 2:31 PM
Sometimes a bit more diplomatic approach helps in touchy subjects like this one.
No argument here.
By all means let's use all approaches to seeking more openness from space officials of any organization of any nation. Sometimes 'quiet diplomacy' can work (any examples?), sometimes teasing and mockery (as in the 'erased cosmonauts'), sometimes appeals to greed (commercial launch services require credible safety data to get affordable insurance) sometimes nothing less ugly than confrontation proves adequate. And often, nothing at all works.
We'll have to use a wide variety of techniques for the indefinite future, so I'd be curious to ask, which have historically been most useful? For example, how well did it work to to 'go along' and 'talk privately' when it came to revealing the modular separation problem last October? Confrontation didn't work either -- since the coverup was effective. When were any such methods going to produce a successful outcome, and how can they be improved?
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Let's not overlook that even with occasional Russian passengers on shuttles, they were not invited to send observers to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. But regarding Soyuz, NASA is involved as a commercial -- as in paying cash -- customer.
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IIs there really a significant difference in scorching?
And by the way, does anybody know what is that sensor probe extending from the upper curve of the DM hull on the picture on the right?
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I've always wondered -- how far from the DM landing point does the heat shield usually come down? Has anybody ever seen a photo of the landed hheat shield? Could THAT have started a grass fire?
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JimO - 28/4/2008 4:52 PM
For example, how well did it work to 'go along' and 'talk privately' when it came to revealing the modular separation problem last October? Confrontation didn't work either -- since the cover-up was effective.
This is what is most worrisome to me personally because it is recent, and not a historical reference to old Soviet-style behavior patterns, which I am personally familiar with. This was just last October, the last Soyuz re-entry. It's one thing to simply remain silent about something. It is quite another to participate in an official cover-up.
This issue was deliberately covered up'd. Justified or not, such behavior patters do provide reason to pause, and do breed suspicion. It troubles me and makes we wonder what else is being covered up, if anything. That's a natural human reaction to learning that one has been duped by someone who was previously trusted.
To put the shoe on the other foot, I would be very interested in knowing the names of the people at NASA who actually knew about the module separation problem and then concealed it, keeping that information secret from the astronauts who had to depend on Soyuz and from the President, who would be asked to request an extension to the Soyuz use authorization. What are the legal implications for participating in the cover-up, if any?
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JimO - 28/4/2008 3:55 PM
IIs there really a significant difference in scorching?
And by the way, does anybody know what is that sensor probe extending from the upper curve of the DM hull on the picture on the right?
Wow, that's the first good pic I've seen of the DM. A picture can speak a 1000 words....
I think it would be interesting to see a comparison of the heat shield between this one and others to see if there is less wear.
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JimO - 28/4/2008 9:55 PM IIs there really a significant difference in scorching? And by the way, does anybody know what is that sensor probe extending from the upper curve of the DM hull on the picture on the right?
I think the probe is an really an antenna, one of the two that deploy approximately 10 minutes after landing. There's a schematic in L2 that shows where those are, and warns the rescue team to stand clear of those to avoid injuries.
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JimO - 28/4/2008 2:02 PM
I've always wondered -- how far from the DM landing point does the heat shield usually come down? Has anybody ever seen a photo of the landed hheat shield? Could THAT have started a grass fire?
If I've understood correctly, the heatshield is jettisoned quite hight up. Charles Simonyi's account says (http://www.charlesinspace.com/ "coming home" page 5 unfortunately, it's a flash site and you can't link directly):
Four minutes later we are at 15,000 ft (5 km) altitude. A bunch of the remaining pyrotechnics fire... We drop the heath shield to expose the soft landing rockets.
Given that the Soyuz is under parachute, and the heat shield is not, I'd expect it to fall quite far from the capsule.
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TR1 - 28/4/2008 3:46 PM
Can you share or point to any more information on these "pyro-locks"?
I have no picture of Soyuz' pyro-lock, but I know from books, that it is a charge-driven mechanical lock(piston) with electrical and thermal initiators, not a bolt with charge inside, like used in the Proton staging. There're a lot of such type - charge-driven locking mechanisms used the space industry.
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JimO - 28/4/2008 10:55 PM
And by the way, does anybody know what is that sensor probe extending from the upper curve of the DM hull on the picture on the right?
According to training info, the Soyuz Descent Module deploys 4 antennae: 3 ABM-274 VHF antennae at the bottom of the DM (one clearly seen in the lower part of the picture) and one ABM-279 SW/VHF antenna at the side of the DM. The "thing" seen in the picture seems to be the mount of the latter antenna. Communications through these antennae are available after landing, so it is understood that these deploy only after landing. The redundant arrangement ensure communications with any DM orientation on the ground.
Interesting to know that 2 SW antennae are also available in the parachute ropes. ABM-264 is associated to the primary parachute system and ABM-265 is associated to the backup parachute system. The two SW transmitter are connected to both antenna systems and available from parachute deployment to landing.
During the entry and landing phase a higher frequency slot antenna, ABM-273, is available close to the hatch.
(I added some additional info because I know somebody will find it of interest.)
Also, it seems nobody answered the query about the launch escape system. During an escape sequence, the DM separates from the Instrument/Assembly Module and it is carried away together with the Orbital Module. At altitude the DM separates from the OM and escape rocket and performs the landing phase.
Apparently, the same pyros discussed so far are therefore involved in a launch sequence separation. From a low fidelity drawing there are 5 Pyro Locks and 5 Spring Pushers.
A question. Could it be that the DM and the IAM remained joined by the bulky electrical harness that failed to be cut?
Edited with additional "official" info (CA=DM, ???=IAM):
"The ??? is a twelve-member aluminum alloy truss (see Figs. 34 and 35) connected to a
spherical bottom plate. Functionally, the ??? is designed for load-bearing connection
of the ?? and ???. On the ?? side, the truss members end in lugs, by which they are
attached to the bottom plate, while on the ?? side the truss members end in 10 hollow
bushings (structural elements) on which the front portion of the ?? is mounted.
Redundant pyro locks fastening the ?? to the ??? are installed in 5 of the 10 bushings
(on every other one). Spring-loaded push rods which separate the compartments are
installed in the other 5 bushings. There are a number of brackets on the ??? truss for
installation of oxygen tanks, the ???, antennas, breakaway bulkhead connector plates
for communications with the ??, and a cable mast rotary mount."
See a few posts later for the text with cyrillic characters
I do hope it helps.
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JimO - 28/4/2008 3:27 PM
The point of view of my essays (and your point is well taken – perhaps they often should be labeled as ‘analysis’ rather ‘reportage’) reflect my experiences, which are mainly as a professional student of and participant in human spaceflight engineering and operations for more than four decades,
James, a great piece.. loved it.. I like to see that ‘analysis’ in your work, especially when it comes from an expert in the field..
More please..
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//Edited with additional "official" info (CA=DM, ???=IAM):
PAO=IAM
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pm1823 - 29/4/2008 1:52 AM
//Edited with additional "official" info (CA=DM, ???=IAM):
PAO=IAM
Forum software doesn't like cyrillic :(
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hop - 29/4/2008 12:33 AM
JimO - 28/4/2008 2:02 PM
I've always wondered -- how far from the DM landing point does the heat shield usually come down? Has anybody ever seen a photo of the landed hheat shield? Could THAT have started a grass fire?
If I've understood correctly, the heatshield is jettisoned quite hight up. Charles Simonyi's account says (http://www.charlesinspace.com/ "coming home" page 5 unfortunately, it's a flash site and you can't link directly):
Four minutes later we are at 15,000 ft (5 km) altitude. A bunch of the remaining pyrotechnics fire... We drop the heath shield to expose the soft landing rockets.
Given that the Soyuz is under parachute, and the heat shield is not, I'd expect it to fall quite far from the capsule.
"Officially" it goes as follows:
The Primary Parachute System deploys at 10.5 km altitude.
From 6.5 km to 5.5 km, the automatics evaluate PPS operation based on the vertical
descent rate
Pre-landing operations begin at an altitude of 5 km:
– heat shield jettison;
- switching off of ballistic descent mode;
- pressure equalization;
– jettison of the port hole covers;
– symmetrical rehooking of the Descent Module under the parachute;
– raising (cocking) of the seats.
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eeergo - 28/4/2008 1:07 PM
BUT I don't see how remembering past mismanagements in a long list of errors (some of them not technically related to the problem here) can help to get anywhere in mutual understanding and future open cooperation.
Agreed. Reaching back to 1969 to make a point (which I did not get) is a real stretch, and one that consider to be borderline unfair. It's like a journalistic piece about Columbia claiming that the Apollo 1 fire was similar--implying that the organization had not fixed the problem in over 30 years.
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This is the image of the text with the offending characters in cyrillic.
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Norm Hartnett - 28/4/2008 1:24 PM
This troubled me too. It is not the kind of article I would have expected to see on this site. I would reword this comment to read "seen through an exclusively american point of view" to read "seen through an exclusively older American point of view" though.
There are 300 million Americans. Jim Oberg only speaks for one of them. So I object to people trying to claim that this article reflects "an American point of view" and then seeking to paint all (or at least lots) of Americans with a broad brush.
Anybody who has read Jim's material over the years knows that he has a strong bias against the Russians and has been highly critical of NASA for being involved with the Russians. He was making that kind of argument during the Shuttle-Mir days. You know what you're getting with his articles and you have to take them with a grain of salt.
I do think that the article should have contained a subheader along the lines of "News Analysis" to indicate that it was not intended to be straight reporting. That's how most American newspapers label articles where the writers are given more leeway to have an opinion.
I also think that the article was undercut by two things. First, it seemed to reach rather far back and rather wide to make the case that the Russians have a long history of covering up space accidents. I thought that was stretching things a little bit. Not a lot, but probably more than it should have. Second, I think that the last paragraph was way too strong and opinionated and actually tended to undercut the rest of the article.
That said, I thought it was a generally good, thought-provoking article. Having served as an investigator on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, I'll add a few comments based upon my own experience.
First, initial press reports are always wrong. Everybody is speculating with too little information. It's important to not conclude that _any_ of these reports is correct. Just wait for the details to unfold before developing any conclusions.
Second, in the case of Columbia, NASA already had a pre-existing contingency plan for dealing with an accident. That covered the initial stages of response, including media response and data preservation. I think that they got those things exactly right. That said, there was _no_ clear model for how to conduct an investigation, and the CAIB was established as a NASA investigation at first. It's worth remembering that CAIB didn't really earn its moniker of "independent" until _after_ it produced a hard-hitting report.
All of that said, I'm not at all encouraged by the Russians' initial response to this. The lashing out and blaming people--without evidence--is not a good sign. The proper response is for them to provide an initial limited amount of data and then explain what they are doing to conduct an investigation.
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eeergo - 28/4/2008 5:24 AM
Also, as little as I like the man, I have to agree with Perminov in saying that some American nationalistic elements are very interested in troubling or breaking the existing cooperative partnership between Russia and the US. Note I am not in any way saying Jim is, or is supporting, any of these elements, but articles like this from space experts, as I say, can reinforce biased points of view.
I think you misread this. What the article says is this:
"'People who are interested in destabilization of our relations with the American partners are fuelling the situation,' he told reporters. 'If we rush into panic and write what did not take place, this is wrong, and this will not come to anything good.'"
I interpreted that to mean that Perimov is claiming that some _Russian_ people want to destabilize "relations with the American partners."
I read just about everything that I can in the space press and I don't know about any efforts to "destabilize relations" with the Russian ISS partners (unless we want to include Jim Oberg's articles in that category). Indeed, there has been stronger anti-American rhetoric coming out of Russia for the past couple of years than there was "anti-Russian" rhetoric coming out of the United States. I've found that most American conservatives and liberals tend to ignore Russia completely. If they complain at all about a big foreign power, it is about China.
I think that there is another dimension to this that people are ignoring: Russian unhappiness with the American dominance of the ISS program. I assumed that Perimov is responding to that.
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Blackstar has a good point, about "....that Perimov is claiming that some Russian...". Perminov now under strong fire from the domestic critics. He lost "GLONASS case" in the last year, even his boss - Ivanov had to hit him on this field, and now those two Soyuz ballistic mode incidents... I don't think that US was in focus.
On the second raised point, about "American dominance of the ISS program", we haven't so clear answer,
Russians considered not about "dominace" itseft, but uncertainty which it bring to the ISS program. RSA have much less money in the budget, so they are in the situation, when they already now should stretch their money on the years. And without full certainty, that ISS after 2015 still be supported by US, they can't ask big money from the Government for the new modules. This makes them very nervous.
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OV-106 - 28/4/2008 5:30 PM
There is a problem. Two ballistic entries in a row.
Ballistic entry is a very-close-to-nominal mode, not in terms of how it behaves and what it subjects the astronauts to, but in terms of qualifications and expectations.
The real worry here is obviously the separation issue, not the ballistic entries themselves.
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Stowbridge - 28/4/2008 8:17 PM
He did!
"By James Oberg - special to NASASpaceflight.com:"
There's three people who's nerves it's hit and notably, from their posts, they didn't read it properly, or thought Chris wrote it.
Two people, not three ;)
I have no criticism about Chris running the article, nor could it ever been more clear who wrote it.
My points were regarding the article itself, not regarding the article being posted on this site. As I said in my first post - the article is clearly well educated and bring up plenty disturbing facts (not just opinions).
My criticism was entirely related to the tone used, lack of tact, and that in MY opinion, it can never serve the purpose it deems necessary - if anything the opposite.
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janmb - 29/4/2008 10:02 AM
OV-106 - 28/4/2008 5:30 PM
There is a problem. Two ballistic entries in a row.
Ballistic entry is a very-close-to-nominal mode, not in terms of how it behaves and what it subjects the astronauts to, but in terms of qualifications and expectations.
The real worry here is obviously the separation issue, not the ballistic entries themselves.
Absolutely right. Many times "ballistic descent" has been referred to as a "bad word". It is a nominal Motion Control System (GNC in the US) mode.
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janmb - 29/4/2008 10:02 AM
OV-106 - 28/4/2008 5:30 PM
There is a problem. Two ballistic entries in a row.
Ballistic entry is a very-close-to-nominal mode, not in terms of how it behaves and what it subjects the astronauts to, but in terms of qualifications and expectations.
The real worry here is obviously the separation issue, not the ballistic entries themselves.
Correct. Too much is being made of the ballistic re-entry itself. The re-entry isn't the problem because, as I said earlier, this *is* the backup mode to bring the crew home safely. The problem is that by happening twice in a row, it inticates to me that there definately is a problem with the primary system; it failed twice in a row. And it's not the 'design' of the primary, because it has worked flawlessly hundreds of times. It's somewhere in the manufacturing run of Soyuz, and imho, somewhere in the quality control procedures that allows something substandard to either go unnoticed or to allow acceptance of a substandard component. My opinion, fwiw.
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Alan Boyle who writes "Cosmic Log" (MSNBC/MSN) has an interesting take the subject. He also has a quote from James Oberg's piece ""Oberg takes a closer look at the blame game this week in an in-depth analysis for NASASpaceflight.com. "" As others above have pointed out we really do not have hard evidence on what happened yet and should wait for facts to come out (and of course that is the concern if our partners are not forth coming on them) before overreacting. The "Cosmic Log" article points out that the event already has begun people wanting movement towards
1) faster Ares/Orion developemint
2) keep Shuttle flying longer
3) faster COTS
4)all of the above
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Just gotta say -- I really appreciate the response and the kind words, the honest criticisms and helpful suggestions on the essay's tone, scope, and content. This is healthy and helpful, and maybe it sets an example for other groups assessing the same problems, elsewhere. This is an amazingly broad and deep team of discussants, I'm flattered to have elicited such a response. There's more quality content on any single page on this thread than on a week's worth of press releases, wire service output, or any other forum.
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I completely agree with the article's idea that investigation should be thorough and objective and share the view that the reaction to the incidents by Russian top space (and not only space) officials is awful. I actually hate the way they do it.
But the article's overall tone is making more harm then good in solving any issues and I was surprised to find it at this site which was always exceptionally sound on all technical issues. And the article is manipulating with limited set of facts rather then disclosing any reasonable information.
For example, one of the main blame towards the way investigations are made is the blame of senior official who with their remarks pre-judge the results of investigation. But the text itself give an example of the contrary with solar arrays vs. control computer issues. Bosses were blaming the Americans, technical investigation determined it was the cable! There is no understanding of cultural differences in the article, not a single attempt to analyze how different is mentality of US and Russian engineers. From the start of the space industry it was completely closed society and people working in it (as I understand) prefer to resolve their issues on their own. I do not like this approach but that is how they were trained and brought-up, as I understand. But that does not mean AT ALL that they would not find a real issue regardless of big bosses words. As many space engineers were writing at Novosti Kosmonavtiki forum it is quite common that there is a "safe" official reason in the report and then a real work to correct the real mistake made. Again, being a Russian tax payer I do not like such attitude but have respect to people who are used to this style.
Another problem with the report is that being able to read the Novosti Kosmonavtiki forum where the whole thing is discussed in details the article is not giving the full picture. The whole story about the burnt grass was all explained in details with clear explanation of the fire caused most probably by pyro devices used to detach the chutes. Similar pictures were observed on several landings, especially with strong wind.
Article is talking about "separation bolts failed to fire" as a fact, which is not confirmed. It was explained that there is a special back-up device at Soyuz which activate pyro-devices separating the modules in case of high temperature of off-nominal descent are measured.
Article is pretending the TMA-10 and TMA-11 incidents are similar though time of shift from normal mode to ballistic descent was very different on two flights. So it may or may not be the same and one has to wait until the results of investigation.
And the article has a lot of words which whether the author (and the whole NSF) like it or not would be considered as blames without any prove. Even the use of word failure related to ballistic mode is a blame - it is a standard authorized procedure. But Jim goes much further - "But that mainly seems to be so because the Russian engineers can't figure out a way to link them causally, one to the other or both to s single independent cause" - this is a direct blame of incompetence of those who did an investigation without any documentary prove. It is really bad that no report of TMA-10 accident is published but then the bosses should be blamed for not releasing it not engineers not being able to find a reason for failure.
Basically, after such report I can easily understand why some senior officials blame journalists and Americans for all their troubles. It is a pity such article is on the technically competent politically neutral site.
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clongton - 29/4/2008 12:21 PM
The problem is that by happening twice in a row, it inticates to me that there definately is a problem with the primary system; it failed twice in a row.
Especially if it's indeed the same root cause - but it's clearly premature to assume that just yet.
In either case it's clearly cause for a thorough investigation that in no way should keep a huge partner and paying customer out of the loop - no argument there.
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clongton - 29/4/2008 6:21 AM
Correct. Too much is being made of the ballistic re-entry itself. The re-entry isn't the problem because, as I said earlier, this *is* the backup mode to bring the crew home safely.
Is that really true? The problem is that ballistic reentry, although "normal," is not ideal. The Soyuz is bringing back people who have been in space a long time and are therefore fragile. Because of this, a gentler reentry is important. So subjecting them to high-gees poses a health risk.
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"Even the use of word failure related to ballistic mode is a blame - it is a standard authorized procedure"
It doesn't matter that ballistic mode is a standard authorized procedure, there still was a failure which lead to it being used. That is the issue.
"But the article's overall tone is making more harm then good in solving any issues"
What is the matter with the "tone"? It is asking questions and raising some issue wrong? Can't the Russian space program can't handle a little criticism? Especially since there were two failures in a row, 3 since the introduction of a new vehicle. Just because the crew is safe doesn't mean everything is ok
"It is a pity such article is on the technically competent politically neutral site."
you are very wrong here. American space policy and the NASA administrator are criticized all the time on this site
I would like for those who disagree with the article to point out the errors
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 8:49 AM
clongton - 29/4/2008 6:21 AM
Correct. Too much is being made of the ballistic re-entry itself. The re-entry isn't the problem because, as I said earlier, this *is* the backup mode to bring the crew home safely.
Is that really true? The problem is that ballistic reentry, although "normal," is not ideal. The Soyuz is bringing back people who have been in space a long time and are therefore fragile. Because of this, a gentler reentry is important. So subjecting them to high-gees poses a health risk.
2 engine aircraft can fly safely on one engine but that doesn't mean that nothing is wrong. Some went wrong for the aircraft to fly on one engine.
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To Jim.
The use of the word failure regarding the problems with separation is quite correct, but not to ballistic mode. It actually is a mode which saved the crew after the real failure and everything I read on this indicates that it went absolutely up to the books (books of ballistic mode). But the article (and many other press reports) is using failure to both separation issue and ballistic mode which is making officials crazy in Russia.
Tone is phrases like "Moscow space officials prejudged the results of the incident investigation" though investigation is not yet complete and such statement could only be true if its results would really coincide with the declaration of officials. Words in the form of bland denials and nasty insinuations of sinister motives is a tone, since it refers to the words of press officer who denied earlier rumors. The article says that the fact that as a result of excessive thermal overload the hatch was significantly burnt is enhancing the credibility of the source. But that is not true according to the reports and pictures from the ground, hatch is fine and thermal overload was in different sections of the capsule. So press officer had a quite legitimate ground to deny at least that. "Naked chauvinism" for Perminov's words is a tone, since he was very critical in his earlier comments on Energya and their review of the previous incident. And Energya is a Russian company so how can chauvinist, especially naked, criticize it? This wasn't the first case that patriotic judgments had threatened the integrity of accident investigation in Moscow (in relation to the computers on ISS) is a wrong tone because none of this patriotic judgments ever threatened the integrity, as article itself states (the proper root cause different from the one identified by bosses was discovered and repaired). And in general I do not think that the words "Russian paranoia" is a good tone.
The more criticism is of Russian space program the better. But it has to be a justified technical criticism, otherwise officials will not consider it as reasonable and would simply neglect it. It is a pity that overall tone at Novosti Kosmonavtiki is "well, another opus from Oberg" and good thoughts (issue with separation, need for NASA to participate in investigation, need for better disclosure of results of investigation) are neglected. That is why I think the article is doing more harm then good.
Politically neutral for me does not mean not criticizing politicians. That means criticizing them with good arguments and not simple acquisitions. And articles on the site (at least for the last year) were very accurate in their wording until this one.
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 8:49 AM
clongton - 29/4/2008 6:21 AM
Correct. Too much is being made of the ballistic re-entry itself. The re-entry isn't the problem because, as I said earlier, this *is* the backup mode to bring the crew home safely.
Is that really true? The problem is that ballistic reentry, although "normal," is not ideal. The Soyuz is bringing back people who have been in space a long time and are therefore fragile. Because of this, a gentler reentry is important. So subjecting them to high-gees poses a health risk.
Yes, that really is true. The ballistic re-entry is the backup. Nominal re-entry is much easier on the human occupants, but also requires considerably more control during re-entry. In the event of loss of that control, for whatever reason, that more benign re-entry can become very dangerous. That's why the flight computer switched to the ballistic re-entry. It is an uncomfortable ride, with higher g-loads, but not an especially dangerous ride. The spacecraft is spin stabilized and brought in. It is not designed for crew comfort. It is designed for crew survival. If the choice is disintegration in a comfortable re-entry, or survival in an uncomfortable one, there is only one sane choice. The flight computer recognized the loss of proper control for the nominal re-entry, and switched to the backup ballistic mode to get the crew home. It worked. They are home safe.
Let's put this uncomfortable backup re-entry into perspective. Uncomfortable or not, Shuttle does not have a backup re-entry mode, a source of extreme sadness to us all.
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clongton - 29/4/2008 9:09 AM
Yes, that really is true. The ballistic re-entry is the backup. Nominal re-entry is much easier on the human occupants, but also requires considerably more control during re-entry. In the event of loss of that control, for whatever reason, that more benign re-entry can become very dangerous.
We're talking semantics here. My point is that saying that ballistic reentry is an "acceptable" failure mode is misleading--ballistic mode subjects the crew to higher stresses during reentry. Considering that they have suffered bone and muscle loss during flight, this increases their danger.
I agree with Jim's analogy to a two-engined aircraft losing an engine and landing safely--the fact that the plane landed safely is not the issue, it's that they were placed at greater risk flying with only one engine.
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 10:17 AM
We're talking semantics here. My point is that saying that ballistic reentry is an "acceptable" failure mode is misleading
I never said that ballistic re-entry is an acceptable failure mode. There is no such thing as an "acceptable" failure mode. Failure is not an option. But it does happen, and the ballistic re-entry kept them alive. That is what it was designed to do, and it worked. When a system failure happens, for whatever reason, all other considerations become moot. Survival is the only goal.
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For those thinking that ballistic mode is ok, would you want to ride it?
If someone said to you, "there is a good probablity that your spacecraft will not function correctly leaving the service module attached. Don't be concerned because after a few minutes of reentering the atmosphere at the wrong attitude and hopefully not breaching the hull the spacecraft should be violently ripped apart along the modules. Your decent module should then hopefully right itself before breaking apart and then subjecting you to a nearly 10 g decent. Hopefully the parachutes which were put in harms way by this approved back-up mode have not been damaged and will ultimately keep you from cratering into the ground. But this is the approved back-up mode so enjoy your flight. "
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OV-106 - 29/4/2008 10:30 AM
For those thinking that ballistic mode is ok, would you want to ride it?
No, I would not want to ride it. But if it is a choice between life and death, I wouldn’t hesitate to. Not for even a nano-second. The crew of Columbia would have loved to have had this choice.
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daj24 - 29/4/2008 1:10 PM
Alan Boyle who writes "Cosmic Log" (MSNBC/MSN) has an interesting take the subject. He also has a quote from James Oberg's piece ""Oberg takes a closer look at the blame game this week in an in-depth analysis for NASASpaceflight.com. "" As others above have pointed out we really do not have hard evidence on what happened yet and should wait for facts to come out (and of course that is the concern if our partners are not forth coming on them) before overreacting. The "Cosmic Log" article points out that the event already has begun people wanting movement towards
1) faster Ares/Orion developemint
2) keep Shuttle flying longer
3) faster COTS
4)all of the above
Here's the link to that (folks, remember to cite with a link when possible please):
http://cosmiclog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/04/28/953554.aspx
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clongton - 29/4/2008 9:36 AM
OV-106 - 29/4/2008 10:30 AM
For those thinking that ballistic mode is ok, would you want to ride it?
No, I would not want to ride it. But if it is a choice between life and death, I wouldn’t hesitate to. Not for even a nano-second. The crew of Columbia would have loved to have had this choice.
Apples and oranges Chuck. I'm not even sure why you bring that up.
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There's one more thing I would add here.
Somebody referred to discussions on the Novosti Kosmonavtiki forum. I'd also make reference to the NK magazine. Although I don't read Russian, my colleagues who do note that NK has run a number of critical articles about the state of the Soviet space program, including critical comments from Russian officials themselves.
Oberg's articles tend to reference current media reports, presenting the impression that the Russians have not been frank and open about their problems.
But from what I've heard, they _have_ been frank and open about problems in the pages of NK. Maybe not all of them, and not always in the way that Oberg would like, but by dragging out old examples like the Mars 96 failure (Jim tends to beat dead horses a lot--the gun on the Soyuz being another example), he creates a misleading impression of what is actually happening in the Russian space field and in Russian space journalism.
As an example, see the comments by Pavel Vinogradov mentioned in this article:
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/824/1
(the article refers to an interview that appeared in the pages of NK)
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clongton - 29/4/2008 9:09 AM
Let's put this uncomfortable backup re-entry into perspective. Uncomfortable or not, Shuttle does not have a backup re-entry mode, a source of extreme sadness to us all.
Incorrect. The shuttle has the BFS, and the primary system (PASS) is quad-redundant.
It is true that the shuttle cannot survive an outright TPS breach during entry, but no other spacecraft can, either.
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OV-106 - 29/4/2008 9:49 AM
clongton - 29/4/2008 9:36 AM
OV-106 - 29/4/2008 10:30 AM
For those thinking that ballistic mode is ok, would you want to ride it?
No, I would not want to ride it. But if it is a choice between life and death, I wouldn’t hesitate to. Not for even a nano-second. The crew of Columbia would have loved to have had this choice.
Apples and oranges Chuck. I'm not even sure why you bring that up.
Ballistic mode would not have saved the Columbia crew; the TPS breach was fatal regardless of the profile flown.
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Jorge - 29/4/2008 11:11 AM
OV-106 - 29/4/2008 9:49 AM
clongton - 29/4/2008 9:36 AM
OV-106 - 29/4/2008 10:30 AM
For those thinking that ballistic mode is ok, would you want to ride it?
No, I would not want to ride it. But if it is a choice between life and death, I wouldn’t hesitate to. Not for even a nano-second. The crew of Columbia would have loved to have had this choice.
Apples and oranges Chuck. I'm not even sure why you bring that up.
To score debate points, natch. :)
Ballistic mode would not have saved the Columbia crew; the TPS breach was fatal regardless of the profile flown.
Shuttle’s backup mode is still an ‘actively controlled’ re-entry. That’s not what I was referring to. Soyuz backup assumes that there is no longer the ability to actively control the descent and simply spin stabilizes the crew capsule and drops it home. That’s the kind of “get me the hell out of here” last-ditch safety net that Soyuz has that Shuttle does not. Either Soyuz or Shuttle re-entering the atmosphere without active control would kill the crew. At least Soyuz has a last-ditch ace in the hole to get them down. That’s what I was referring to. Originally, the Shuttle crew cabin would have been jettisonable in such a situation, but that got traded away in the design phase for payload capacity. It was designed to make the same kind of emergency ballistic re-entry that Soyuz does.
I brought the whole thing up because the backup ballistic re-entry of Soyuz was being poo-pooed as not a good thing to do, in spite of the fact that Shuttle was originally designed to do the same thing. My comments were to the point that it was a survival thing to do. In that case who cares if it’s comfortable or not? I am grateful that Soyuz had the ability, as I’m sure the 6 people from the last 2 Soyuz re-entries are also. I have lamented for years the trade that cancelled the ballistic re-entry of a jettisoned Shuttle cabin, and my lament about Columbia was to that end. Soyuz has that ability. Shuttle was “supposed” to have that ability but payload proved to be more important. In hindsight, a very bad design trade.
As to the "scoring of debate points" – that was a cheap shot and not worth the electrons it took to put it on the thread.
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clongton - 29/4/2008 11:18 AM
I brought the whole thing up because the backup ballistic re-entry of Soyuz was being poo-pooed as not a good thing to do
It's NOT a good thing to do. It's not the way it was designed to happen so writing it off as being ok is missing the forest for the trees.
If shuttle had that capability and it was executed would you then be arguing to not "poo-poo" on it or that the problem needs to be found and corrected?
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OV-106 - 29/4/2008 12:30 PM
clongton - 29/4/2008 11:18 AM
I brought the whole thing up because the backup ballistic re-entry of Soyuz was being poo-pooed as not a good thing to do
It's NOT a good thing to do. It's not the way it was designed to happen so writing it off as being ok is missing the forest for the trees.
If shuttle had that capability and it was executed would you then be arguing to not "poo-poo" on it or that the problem needs to be found and corrected?
You left out the other half of what I said - completely changing it. "ballistic re-entry of Soyuz was being poo-pooed as not a good thing to do... in spite of the fact that Shuttle was originally designed to do the same thing."
So your argument is that they should have stayed on the normal re-entry profile and been incinerated instead of going ballistic and surviving? I don't think that's what you meant, just like what you are implying is not what I meant.
The ballistic re-entry is a last ditch survival mode. It's designed to save the crew when all else fails. It is NOT a good thing to HAVE to do, but it's a damn sight better than not being able to do it when it's the only way to stay alive.
THAT'S what I was saying - nothing more.
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Either way, the shuttle coming back on BFS or Soyuz coming back in a ballistic mode means something went wrong and it needs to be investigated. It doesn't matter that the crew is safe.
For those who think that the fact that Soyuz came back in a ballistic mode is no big issue, it is a issue since something went wrong to cause it. It might or might not be related to the separation issue, but until proven that it isn't, it must be considered as different issue
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Well look at it this way:
As a jet fighter pilot, your jet's engine might fail, then thats definitely a failure that needs to be addressed, however, if you have an ejector seat and that is executed, there is no point in lamenting that landing on a parachute is not nominal, of cause it's not. But its a nominal _failure_ mode, don't blame the ejector seat for the loss of you engine. In the same way, you can't blame the ballistic mode for the separation failure, the only thing you can blame the ballistic mode for is that nobody has to pay live assurances because the crew is alive.
Ballistic entry is not a failure, it's the only way to survive the failure that had already happened and in this case there is no point in saying there might be a risk to it.
Concerning the Shuttle comparison, I also think that it's a little bit like comparing apples and oranges, however, it's viable to note that a Soyuz definitely has a better history of bringing people back alive AFTER severe failures have occurred it siimply is more robust because it's less complex, the shuttle on the other hand is way to complex for the task of bringing people to space and back, simply because it was also designed to bring a lot of cargo into space and to be a technology demonstrator.
That said, I'd definitely choose the Soyuz if I'd have to choose a ride to space and back.
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 9:55 AM
He (Oberg) creates a misleading impression of what is actually happening in the Russian space field and in Russian space journalism.
With respect Mr Dwayne Day, you're not winning any points by presenting your opinions as facts. I'm finding your tone to be condescending.
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Spacenick - 29/4/2008 11:54 AM
Well look at it this way:
As a jet fighter pilot, your jet's engine might fail, then thats definitely a failure that needs to be addressed, however, if you have an ejector seat and that is executed, there is no point in lamenting that landing on a parachute is not nominal, of cause it's not. But its a nominal _failure_ mode, don't blame the ejector seat for the loss of you engine. In the same way, you can't blame the ballistic mode for the separation failure, the only thing you can blame the ballistic mode for is that nobody has to pay live assurances because the crew is alive.
Ballistic entry is not a failure, it's the only way to survive the failure that had already happened and in this case there is no point in saying there might be a risk to it.
Concerning the Shuttle comparison, I also think that it's a little bit like comparing apples and oranges, however, it's viable to note that a Soyuz definitely has a better history of bringing people back alive AFTER severe failures have occurred it siimply is more robust because it's less complex, the shuttle on the other hand is way to complex for the task of bringing people to space and back, simply because it was also designed to bring a lot of cargo into space and to be a technology demonstrator.
That said, I'd definitely choose the Soyuz if I'd have to choose a ride to space and back.
Exactly correct. But I would choose the shuttle.
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OV-106 - 29/4/2008 1:11 PM
Spacenick - 29/4/2008 11:54 AM
Well look at it this way:
As a jet fighter pilot, your jet's engine might fail, then thats definitely a failure that needs to be addressed, however, if you have an ejector seat and that is executed, there is no point in lamenting that landing on a parachute is not nominal, of cause it's not. But its a nominal _failure_ mode, don't blame the ejector seat for the loss of you engine. In the same way, you can't blame the ballistic mode for the separation failure, the only thing you can blame the ballistic mode for is that nobody has to pay live assurances because the crew is alive.
Ballistic entry is not a failure, it's the only way to survive the failure that had already happened and in this case there is no point in saying there might be a risk to it.
Concerning the Shuttle comparison, I also think that it's a little bit like comparing apples and oranges, however, it's viable to note that a Soyuz definitely has a better history of bringing people back alive AFTER severe failures have occurred it siimply is more robust because it's less complex, the shuttle on the other hand is way to complex for the task of bringing people to space and back, simply because it was also designed to bring a lot of cargo into space and to be a technology demonstrator.
That said, I'd definitely choose the Soyuz if I'd have to choose a ride to space and back.
Exactly correct. But I would choose the shuttle.
So would I. The two accidents with Shuttle were caused by flying with known, but uncorrected problems. If flown within the prescribed flight parameters, with all known issues actually retired, Shuttle is as safe as any spacecraft can be, in spite of the lack of a jettisonable cabin. I'd ride Shuttle in a heartbeat. I'd be more nervous about Soyuz because I don't know it as well.
The Russians are not as open and forthcoming with information as we are used to in the west. That's a cultural condition, nothing more. It implies nothing against their ability or honesty and it is wrong to assume otherwise. But in light of the last two re-entries of Soyuz and the way information was withheld about TMA-10, it makes me nervous about what else I might not be allowed to know before I got on board. That's the source of my hesitation.
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Spacenick - 29/4/2008 11:54 AM ... That said, I'd definitely choose the Soyuz if I'd have to choose a ride to space and back.
Disagree. Rather ride the Shuttle. Say what you like about it or not, rather fly with the best funded, most resource filled program that isn't over taxed to meet its schedules.The problems the Russians face are internal that injure the Russian Soyuz. Unfortunately, they need to have external transparency in order to achieve it. The CAIB was a good attempt at that. But it was difficult for the pride of the US. Given the cultural/political/geopolitical context of Russia now, its a lot harder even for a much simpler system. More easy/cheap to sweep under the rug. Tremendous pressure to do just that.
Which is why I'd rather fly Shuttle. Have been really pleased by post RTF missions. And have been enjoying the early success of ATV.
Soyuz is a different story. When all of us understand the details of the failures, see all of the elements fitting together, and see the sensible redesign and careful proof, then it will improve. Russian engineering prowess is incredible when its allowed to take action. But it needs resources, support, and a context within to work.
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Shuttle Man - 29/4/2008 12:01 PM
Blackstar - 29/4/2008 9:55 AM
He (Oberg) creates a misleading impression of what is actually happening in the Russian space field and in Russian space journalism.
With respect Mr Dwayne Day, you're not winning any points by presenting your opinions as facts. I'm finding your tone to be condescending.
I know Jim personally. I'm sure that if he has a problem with what I've written, he'll tell me so.
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OV-106 - 29/4/2008 11:30 AM
If shuttle had that capability and it was executed would you then be arguing to not "poo-poo" on it or that the problem needs to be found and corrected?
I think it's "pooh-pooh," which is different than "poo-poo"...
Which reminds me of an episode of The Simpsons:
Editor: Hey listen, I just had a thought. We’re looking for a new food
critic. Someone who doesn’t immediately pooh-pooh everything he eats.
Homer: No, it usually takes a few hours.
(now let's all snicker heartily!)
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Spacenick - 29/4/2008 9:54 AM
(chop)Concerning the Shuttle comparison, I also think that it's a little bit like comparing apples and oranges, however, it's viable to note that a Soyuz definitely has a better history of bringing people back alive AFTER severe failures have occurred it siimply is more robust because it's less complex, the shuttle on the other hand is way to complex for the task of bringing people to space and back, simply because it was also designed to bring a lot of cargo into space and to be a technology demonstrator.(chop)
It may not be popular, but I wish to defend the shuttles a bit here...
1. Yes, we have lost two orbiters, BUT the Russians have lost at least two Soyuz crews so I am not inclined to see the old Soyuz as such a perfect vehicle. Yes, losing a bigger crew has more of a cultural impact perhaps and it certainly gets the headlines etc (like the difference between a small plane crash and a larger plane crash) but a loss is a loss when just counting LOC events.
2. The shuttles DO have backup modes which some simply seem to gloss-over. When a Soyuz computer failure occurs, it may be that the acceptable failure mode is a ballistic entry; when an orbiter computer fails, the backup mode is... drum roll please... redundant computers with a nice normal runway landing. I'm sorry, but a ballistic entry failure mode should be viewed with as much alarm as a ballistic landing mode in a Cessna (it's a sign that very bad things happened, and NOBODY should be comforted if the occupants walk away from it owing their lives to chance and accidents of physics (like part of the vehicle burning off in time for the capsule to orient properly)) In my opinion, the better system would be sufficiently redundant that you never had a ballistic mode.
3. While Soyuz is much simpler than an orbiter (and some like to equate simplicity with safety), Soyuz needs to throw-off parts of itself during the re-entry process for a nominal flight and the vehicles seem to be accumulating a worrisome trend of failures in very mature (and therefore supposedly reliable) hardware required for this function. When I see failures of cutting-edge stuff, I worry about the design BUT when I see failures of mature stuff I worry about manufacturing, quality control, operator attentiveness, etc.
4. Neither the Challenger failure nor the Columbia failure would have been survived by a fall-back to a ballistic entry. Indeed, had the Soyuz suffered a hole in its TPS as large as the hole Columbia suffered, it would also have been destroyed.
The two systems are completely different, and while I suspect some (still lingering on the losses of orbiters) look to the simplicity of the capsule and yearn for the crew safety it seems to promise, I will miss the elegance of the orbiters. After we lose a crew on some future Orion, perhaps people will gain a better perspective on this stuff: any time fragile, vulnerable, fallible humans play with the energy levels required to fly into space or return back to Earth there is the potential for death. No clever vehicle design will ever provide complete safety. I am not so certain that clinging to simple capsules is, in the long term, a better thing than working to increase the safety of other more complex and capable architectures.
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MrTim - 29/4/2008 4:54 PM
3. While Soyuz is much simpler than an orbiter (and some like to equate simplicity with safety), Soyuz needs to throw-off parts of itself during the re-entry process for a nominal flight and the vehicles seem to be accumulating a worrisome trend of failures in very mature (and therefore supposedly reliable) hardware required for this function. When I see failures of cutting-edge stuff, I worry about the design BUT when I see failures of mature stuff I worry about manufacturing, quality control, operator attentiveness, etc.
Agreed. But 'throwing off stuff' also has a specific function in this case. Namely, protection of the TPS from launch- and orbit-based damage. Columbia, lacking this kind of protection, was catastrophically damaged. CEV and Dragon (should they come to fruition) will also jettison the equipment covering their TPS as late as possible before returning.
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DmitryP - 29/4/2008 7:16 AM
I completely agree with the article's idea that investigation should be thorough and objective and share the view that the reaction to the incidents by Russian top space (and not only space) officials is awful. I actually hate the way they do it.
But the article's overall tone is making more harm then good in solving any issues and I was surprised to find it at this site which was always exceptionally sound on all technical issues. And the article is manipulating with limited set of facts rather then disclosing any reasonable information.
....
I stand well rebuked, and properly corrected (re chute pyros, etc), and hope to converge futher on accuracy as additional material comes into my email box hourly. DmitryP, I want to thank you for the serious effort you put into this message, and for your implicit trust in me that the effort will be productive. That is my intent.
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MrTim - 29/4/2008 1:54 PM
4. Neither the Challenger failure nor the Columbia failure would have been survived by a fall-back to a ballistic entry. Indeed, had the Soyuz suffered a hole in its TPS as large as the hole Columbia suffered, it would also have been destroyed.
I agree about the Challenger, but disagree about Columbia.
Of course it's academic at this point, but a jettisonable crew cabin, designed to withstand an emergency ballistic re-entry (like in one of the many original concept designs), would likely have survived the breakup of the orbiter in the upper atmosphere during re-entry. I am of the opinion that the crew could have survived, brused and shaken, but alive. The cabin would have landed intact in east-central Texas under a big parachute.
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 9:55 AM
Oberg's articles tend to reference current media reports, presenting the impression that the Russians have not been frank and open about their problems.
But from what I've heard, they _have_ been frank and open about problems in the pages of NK. Maybe not all of them, and not always in the way that Oberg would like, but by dragging out old examples like the Mars 96 failure (Jim tends to beat dead horses a lot--the gun on the Soyuz being another example), he creates a misleading impression of what is actually happening in the Russian space field and in Russian space journalism.
I tried to focus my criticisms to comments by space officials, while giving praise to private Russian commentators and newsmen. In fact, I'd have to go even farther and express admiration for the tenacity and courage of independent Russian writers on these subjects, both those still active and those no longer with us.
Dropping plutonium onto the Andes Mountains and then never looking for it or even warning the populace isn't a 'dead horse' issue or even a 'dead llama' issue -- it's a still-open question of responsibility and honesty. So there are lots of people who resent it when it doesn't stay conveniently forgotten. The human health issue has to do with Latin American experience with discovered hardware containing radioactive materials -- as in Goiania, Brazil. Even in Russia, there's at least one case where a small RTG from a mid-winter launch abort was located by soldiers and then secretly kept as a hand warmer, potentially exposing them to lethal doses because of their repeated handling of it.
As I wrote in New Scientist: "In 1994, the German police were very excited to confiscate 350 grams of plutonium from Russians trying to smuggle it through the country (This Week,
20 August, 1994, p 5). By this token, the 200 grams in the probe would seem more
than enough to inspire attempts to retrieve it. "
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 12:48 PM
I know Jim personally. I'm sure that if he has a problem with what I've written, he'll tell me so.
Problems? Heck, no, I go BEGGING him to do it.
As with almost all the arguments here, these clashes strike sparks that illuminate darkness.
We are the flint and steel, and as long as we're tough enough to take the heat and shock, we fulfill a bright function.
We do you think I titled my essay, "Seeing through the smoke and flame"...?
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clongton - 29/4/2008 1:14 PM
MrTim - 29/4/2008 1:54 PM
4. Neither the Challenger failure nor the Columbia failure would have been survived by a fall-back to a ballistic entry. Indeed, had the Soyuz suffered a hole in its TPS as large as the hole Columbia suffered, it would also have been destroyed.
I agree about the Challenger, but disagree about Columbia.
Of course it's academic at this point, but a jettisonable crew cabin, designed to withstand an emergency ballistic re-entry (like in one of the many original concept designs), would likely have survived the breakup of the orbiter in the upper atmosphere during re-entry. I am of the opinion that the crew could have survived, brused and shaken, but alive. The cabin would have landed intact in east-central Texas under a big parachute.
Where are these original concept designs? If the shuttle then looks anything like the shuttle we have today, jettisoning the entire crew module is much more problematic than you are giving it credit.
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JimO - 29/4/2008 1:03 PM
I stand well rebuked, and properly corrected.
I get the feeling this is the first and last time an Opinion Editorial is going to be on this site, right Chris?
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Jonty McLee - 29/4/2008 2:38 PM
I get the feeling this is the first and last time an Opinion Editorial is going to be on this site, right Chris?
I would hope not... Doesn't make sense to avoid keeping NSF as the premiere site when it comes to manned spaceflight.
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OV-106 - 29/4/2008 1:32 PM
Where are these original concept designs? If the shuttle then looks anything like the shuttle we have today, jettisoning the entire crew module is much more problematic than you are giving it credit.
I'd have to look, but there have been a number of concept designs for jettisonable crew cabins for shuttle. (I believe at least one of these evaluations was performed by the ASAP and may be available online somewhere.) When I was with the CAIB I started collecting information on this (as well as information on early proposals for on-orbit tile repair). We were considering making it at least a sidebar in the final report. It never made it into the report because we ran out of time. Off the top of my head, I believe that the various capsule proposals resulted in at least 10-20K pound weight penalties. Essentially, you ended up with a much reduced payload capability on the shuttle.
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Just a space enthusiast here, but I see the ballistic entry as similar in purpose to the fire extinguisher that I bought for the house
Am I glad its available? Yes
Does it have the potential to save my my life? Yes
If a situation arose where it was needed, would I use it? Yes
However, would I welcome an event that would cause my actual use of my fire extinguisher? Hell no.
If an event occured that caused me to use my fire extinguisher would I investigate the circumstances surrounding that occurrence? Yes
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1. The journalism here is great. No, it isn't flight review, and the fact that it has nits is a total non issue. Get over it.
2. Agree with Chuck over Shuttle capsule - believe it was a conflicted response to budget and moving on to the next vehicle. Not focusing on finishing the current vehicle before understanding what to move on to. While we can rag on Russian weaknesses, lets not forget own own.
3. I see no issue with Blackstar's perspective on JimO - he's critical, which is what a good journalist wants/needs (separate issue is USING IT - JimO's writing to an audience, not necessarily Blackstar et al). And he can't always get the correct review in time.
4. I agree with MrTim that we have to look at the larger picture of multiple coordinated systems, many of which Soyuz does not and Shuttle does have. Basically, when something goes wrong with Soyuz, it jumps to "cannonball" mode and you cross your fingers. This neglects the possibility of managing the reentry dynamics with adaptive momentum budget and achieving a partially flying reentry, as well as coping with a chaotic/transient environment where parts are still attached that shouldn't be. Russians have always had this fatalism in design, where is you do the macho hard ride down, because space is a hard to survive environment. Its a holdover from Soviet times. They also are too cheap, not wishing (I suspect) to do the software engineering and test to actually finish Soyuz with the missing GNS components they've wrongly convinced themselves they can do without.
Ironically, both US and Russia screw up in identical ways - never wishing to finish just what they start.
Thank you again Chris for this fine location with all these fine people where you can discuss issues like this.
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Jonty McLee - 29/4/2008 2:38 PM
JimO - 29/4/2008 1:03 PM
I stand well rebuked, and properly corrected.
I get the feeling this is the first and last time an Opinion Editorial is going to be on this site, right Chris?
I thought it was a great article and JimO has posted the facts as I have seen them. We will have to wait until the investigation is complete, and with the comments expressed in this thread, I am sure that NSF will be able to get the answers once they are released.
Keep up the editorial opinions as it puts a lot more insight into the discussion
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clongton - 29/4/2008 11:14 AM
MrTim - 29/4/2008 1:54 PM
4. Neither the Challenger failure nor the Columbia failure would have been survived by a fall-back to a ballistic entry. Indeed, had the Soyuz suffered a hole in its TPS as large as the hole Columbia suffered, it would also have been destroyed.
I agree about the Challenger, but disagree about Columbia.
Of course it's academic at this point, but a jettisonable crew cabin, designed to withstand an emergency ballistic re-entry (like in one of the many original concept designs), would likely have survived the breakup of the orbiter in the upper atmosphere during re-entry. I am of the opinion that the crew could have survived, brused and shaken, but alive. The cabin would have landed intact in east-central Texas under a big parachute.
Chuck, this is headed a bit off-topic, but I think you are being a tad unfair to the orbiters here: Columbia suffered fatal TPS damage and any ballistic entry mode for Columbia would have solved nothing... just as equivalent TPS damage to a soyuz would have also doomed its occupants. To suggest a separable crew pod would be equivalent to suggesting an additional escape pod on soyuz. It's one bridge too far for either vehicle.
These are simply two very unique systems whose designers put into them all the safety they felt appropriate given all the constraints they faced. There is a lot of redundancy in an orbiter to cover many possibilities. In all but two of the flights the redundancy has been enough that we are used to seeing missions end with nice airplane-like landings and most people who see an orbiter land are never aware of any systems that failed while the vehicle was in flight. Unfortunately, there is no redundancy for a basketball-sized hole in the TPS of either an orbiter or a Soyuz. Had that soyuz taken too long to properly orient itself (something apparently left purely to chance) we would all be discussing a very different outcome and perhaps capsules would be looking a little less safe to people now (not something I am rooting for, I am happy to see anybody manage a safe return to Earth). My point to the earlier post is that neither system is perfect and I think the orbiter losses (which each killed a larger number of people and were each seen essentially live on TV) have given many a distorted view of the safety trade-offs and left some looking at the Soyuz capsule as superior (possibly because when its crews were lost, they were smaller crews and were not lost on live TV)
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OV-106 - 29/4/2008 1:32 PM
clongton - 29/4/2008 1:14 PM
MrTim - 29/4/2008 1:54 PM
4. Neither the Challenger failure nor the Columbia failure would have been survived by a fall-back to a ballistic entry. Indeed, had the Soyuz suffered a hole in its TPS as large as the hole Columbia suffered, it would also have been destroyed.
I agree about the Challenger, but disagree about Columbia.
Of course it's academic at this point, but a jettisonable crew cabin, designed to withstand an emergency ballistic re-entry (like in one of the many original concept designs), would likely have survived the breakup of the orbiter in the upper atmosphere during re-entry. I am of the opinion that the crew could have survived, brused and shaken, but alive. The cabin would have landed intact in east-central Texas under a big parachute.
Where are these original concept designs? If the shuttle then looks anything like the shuttle we have today, jettisoning the entire crew module is much more problematic than you are giving it credit.
The concept was dropped very early in the design process, before the shuttle looked like the shuttle. It would have been very heavy and, based on previous experience with escape capsules, would have provided only marginal improvement in survivability. There have been periodic proposals to retrofit the as-designed shuttle in this way, but none of the designs have been practical.
Not sure why Chuck agrees with Challenger and not Columbia. The aerothermal environment for crew module jettison was much more favorable with Challenger than it would have been with Columbia, and the odds of survivability correspondingly increased. Still not great, mind you, but better than Columbia.
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 2:05 PM
OV-106 - 29/4/2008 1:32 PM
Where are these original concept designs? If the shuttle then looks anything like the shuttle we have today, jettisoning the entire crew module is much more problematic than you are giving it credit.
I'd have to look, but there have been a number of concept designs for jettisonable crew cabins for shuttle. (I believe at least one of these evaluations was performed by the ASAP and may be available online somewhere.) When I was with the CAIB I started collecting information on this (as well as information on early proposals for on-orbit tile repair). We were considering making it at least a sidebar in the final report. It never made it into the report because we ran out of time. Off the top of my head, I believe that the various capsule proposals resulted in at least 10-20K pound weight penalties. Essentially, you ended up with a much reduced payload capability on the shuttle.
That's kind of my point. If this was way back in the late 60's early 70's when all kinds of concepts for the shuttle were being studied, that's one thing. With the vehicle we have flying today lopping off the the forward section of the orbiter, and then somehow seperating the actual pressurized crew module, which now has to have it's own entry and recovery system, from the rest of the pointy end of the vehicle is exceedingly difficult.
It has been studied time and time again all with the same results. EXTREMELY expensive, no one sure if it will ever work, how to engineer it, the performance hit in terms of payload and CG, the very long lead time implementation, etc. It just doesn't make sense for this architecture and that is also a lesson to be learned but accept the risk for now.
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Could it be that the difference between Columbia and Challenger is with a capsule that didn't need to be jettisoned (e.g. you go into a hypersonic spin/tumble, and you seperate/stablize from that). Challenger would have required a more elaborate means to separate from the Shuttle?
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I don't think it was viable for entry or had TPS. It was only for ascent aborts and not orbital emergencies.
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rdale - 29/4/2008 2:41 PM Jonty McLee - 29/4/2008 2:38 PM I get the feeling this is the first and last time an Opinion Editorial is going to be on this site, right Chris?
I would hope not... Doesn't make sense to avoid keeping NSF as the premiere site when it comes to manned spaceflight.
I hope that there are more articles like Jim's if it is in regards to a timely topic. I do not know if Chris wants to loose too much of his editor's oversite but I'd bet that he would vet the piece before he publishes it. Chris would still drive the topic and the timing. I did not consider Jim's piece to be an Op Ed but an informational piece (except maybe at the very end). It did, however, generate a LOT of responses which is good for us and the site. I think that Alan Boyle and Tariq Malik and others would do interesting pieces. JMHO.
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The crew cabin of Challenger, I believe, hit the sea still basically intact, so the concept of a crew cabin remaining intact after the orbiter itself is torn apart around it is valid. I just don’t think Challenger would have had enough time, but Columbia was much higher with more time to impact. That’s my reasoning. Note that is an opinion. YMMV
As far as the TPS being breached on Columbia, it melted wing structure which caused the wing to be ripped off, which then turned the orbiter into the violent air/plasma stream and ripped it apart. That’s not much different than what happened to Challenger with the ET explosion. In both cases, the orbiter was torn apart by external forces. The difference is time to impact. That’s why I think the Columbia crew could have survived in a crew cabin that was designed to survive a ballistic re-entry.
I apologize for getting off topic here. Hopefully my explanation will suffice and we can let this off-topic side discussion go away.
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OV-106 - 29/4/2008 2:29 PM
snip
That's kind of my point. If this was way back in the late 60's early 70's when all kinds of concepts for the shuttle were being studied, that's one thing. With the vehicle we have flying today lopping off the the forward section of the orbiter, and then somehow seperating the actual pressurized crew module, which now has to have it's own entry and recovery system, from the rest of the pointy end of the vehicle is exceedingly difficult.
It has been studied time and time again all with the same results. EXTREMELY expensive, no one sure if it will ever work, how to engineer it, the performance hit in terms of payload and CG, the very long lead time implementation, etc. It just doesn't make sense for this architecture and that is also a lesson to be learned but accept the risk for now.
I was working for NASA post Columbia and adding an emergency Mach 25 entry capsule to shuttle (or any vehicle like shuttle) would result in basically no payload capability.
Danny Deger
Read my story, "Houston, You Have a Problem" at http://www.dannydeger.blogspot.com
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OV-106 - 29/4/2008 2:29 PM
snip
That's kind of my point. If this was way back in the late 60's early 70's when all kinds of concepts for the shuttle were being studied, that's one thing.
My comments were back in early design. Retrofitting the existing design is out of the question.
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clongton - 29/4/2008 3:29 PM
>>>That's kind of my point. If this was way back in the late 60's early 70's when all kinds of concepts for the shuttle were being studied, that's one thing.
My comments were back in early design. Retrofitting the existing design is out of the question.
It was studied post-Challenger as a possible retrofit. I've seen some of the studies, although I have no idea where I would find them again. Maybe they're in my files from five years ago. Anyway, the cost is huge and the payload hit is huge too. Not really practical.
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OV-106 - 29/4/2008 3:30 PM
For those thinking that ballistic mode is ok, would you want to ride it?
Absolutely not.
I just pointed out that it is a normal backup mode. That doesn't mean it's something you want to happen and of course it should be investigated.
Main priority has to be the separation issue tho, and if that proves unrelated to the root cause of the ballistic entries, finding that root cause comes second.
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 3:42 PM clongton - 29/4/2008 3:29 PM >>>That's kind of my point. If this was way back in the late 60's early 70's when all kinds of concepts for the shuttle were being studied, that's one thing. My comments were back in early design. Retrofitting the existing design is out of the question.
It was studied post-Challenger as a possible retrofit. I've seen some of the studies, although I have no idea where I would find them again. Maybe they're in my files from five years ago. Anyway, the cost is huge and the payload hit is huge too. Not really practical.
The cost depended on the capabilities. Issue always is what contingencies you design for (and not). Plus lack of experience in this flight regime/environment.Prefer to look at it as to what might have allowed survival rather than presuming all eventualities. In this specific Soyuz case, believe that while the issue will turn out to be separation / vehicle assembly/test, contingency for failed separation is insufficient.
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MrTim - 29/4/2008 6:54 PM(it's a sign that very bad things happened, and NOBODY should be comforted if the occupants walk away from it owing their lives to chance and accidents of physics (like part of the vehicle burning off in time for the capsule to orient properly))
Not quite fair. It was not an entirely an 'accident of physics'. As per an earlier post in this thread the separation system was redesigned post Soyuz-5 to guarantee separation under thermal and aerodynamic loads to provide an additional level of redundancy.
From what has been said the attachment system is possibly deliberately weak in tension and the pyrotechnic unlatching system definately has independent local thermal triggers as well as the remote electrical trigger from the control system.
Rick
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nobodyofconsequence - 29/4/2008 5:03 PM
The cost depended on the capabilities. Issue always is what contingencies you design for (and not).
But even the cheapest option was expensive.
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 7:22 PM nobodyofconsequence - 29/4/2008 5:03 PM The cost depended on the capabilities. Issue always is what contingencies you design for (and not).
But even the cheapest option was expensive.
No sir.If all you wanted was Columbia/Challenger - yes you could.
The real question is: would that be enough for the next crisis? No one would agree.
Then we get project creep, ending up with a spacecraft within a spacecraft and unaffordable economics.
But like Chuck said earlier, we are going off topic. If you like, start a thread and we'll fill it. Please just don't pick a fight pointlessly. My on topic point with the post was that Soyuz has too little contingency for failed separation and that the issue is cost.
To your out of context edit of my post, software and testing is not too expensive. There. We are back on topic!
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A good article, and a thought-provoking read. I hadn't really thought about the Russians' approach to things with regards to ISS, but I think this latest Soyuz incident ought to be an important factor for the politcians dishing out policy and money. Personally, I think this makes the case for DIRECT all the more urgent. I don't think a COTS solution realistically will make the gap. I also wonder whether it's going to kickstart ACTS progress again?
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nobodyofconsequence - 29/4/2008 8:27 PM
Blackstar - 29/4/2008 7:22 PM nobodyofconsequence - 29/4/2008 5:03 PM The cost depended on the capabilities. Issue always is what contingencies you design for (and not).
But even the cheapest option was expensive.
No sir.If all you wanted was Columbia/Challenger - yes you could.
The real question is: would that be enough for the next crisis? No one would agree. Then we get project creep, ending up with a spacecraft within a spacecraft and unaffordable economics. But like Chuck said earlier, we are going off topic. If you like, start a thread and we'll fill it. Please just don't pick a fight pointlessly. My on topic point with the post was that Soyuz has too little contingency for failed separation and that the issue is cost.
To your out of context edit of my post, software and testing is not too expensive. There. We are back on topic!
I read what you wrote twice and I still don't know what you mean.
My point was that _any_ option for putting crew escape on the shuttle after it was built--and I've seen at least 3-4 different proposals, including "escape capsules" mounted on the upper deck--would have been expensive.
And if those capabilities had been included from the beginning, the vehicle would have paid a high weight and performance premium.
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clongton - 29/4/2008 11:18 AM
Jorge - 29/4/2008 11:11 AM
OV-106 - 29/4/2008 9:49 AM
clongton - 29/4/2008 9:36 AM
OV-106 - 29/4/2008 10:30 AM
For those thinking that ballistic mode is ok, would you want to ride it?
No, I would not want to ride it. But if it is a choice between life and death, I wouldn’t hesitate to. Not for even a nano-second. The crew of Columbia would have loved to have had this choice.
Apples and oranges Chuck. I'm not even sure why you bring that up.
To score debate points, natch. :)
Ballistic mode would not have saved the Columbia crew; the TPS breach was fatal regardless of the profile flown.
Shuttle’s backup mode is still an ‘actively controlled’ re-entry. That’s not what I was referring to. Soyuz backup assumes that there is no longer the ability to actively control the descent and simply spin stabilizes the crew capsule and drops it home. That’s the kind of “get me the hell out of here” last-ditch safety net that Soyuz has that Shuttle does not. Either Soyuz or Shuttle re-entering the atmosphere without active control would kill the crew. At least Soyuz has a last-ditch ace in the hole to get them down.
And it's a good thing they have it, because they sure seem to need it often. Three times in the last eleven entries now.
That’s what I was referring to. Originally, the Shuttle crew cabin would have been jettisonable in such a situation, but that got traded away in the design phase for payload capacity. It was designed to make the same kind of emergency ballistic re-entry that Soyuz does.
As Jim points out, the jettisonable capsule was designed for ascent and would not have had its own TPS.
in spite of the fact that Shuttle was originally designed to do the same thing.
I do not believe this is correct. *Some* shuttle *proposals* were designed thusly, but not all of them did, and I don't believe any of the designs that could reasonably be described as "baseline" did. At least, my hasty re-scan of Jenkins did not turn up any. Definitely not any that had sufficient TPS to survive entry in the event of orbiter main body breakup.
I have lamented for years the trade that cancelled the ballistic re-entry of a jettisoned Shuttle cabin, and my lament about Columbia was to that end. Soyuz has that ability. Shuttle was “supposed” to have that ability but payload proved to be more important. In hindsight, a very bad design trade.
I don't lament it at all. It would have cost a lot of money and weight and would have only marginally improved survivability during ascent, and not at all during entry. In hindsight, an excellent design trade.
As to the "scoring of debate points" – that was a cheap shot and not worth the electrons it took to put it on the thread.
Fair enough, I apologize and I'll delete the offending comment.
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Spacenick - 29/4/2008 11:54 AM
Well look at it this way:
As a jet fighter pilot, your jet's engine might fail, then thats definitely a failure that needs to be addressed, however, if you have an ejector seat and that is executed, there is no point in lamenting that landing on a parachute is not nominal, of cause it's not. But its a nominal _failure_ mode, don't blame the ejector seat for the loss of you engine. In the same way, you can't blame the ballistic mode for the separation failure, the only thing you can blame the ballistic mode for is that nobody has to pay live assurances because the crew is alive.
Ballistic entry is not a failure, it's the only way to survive the failure that had already happened and in this case there is no point in saying there might be a risk to it.
I'm pretty sure that any fighter jet type that experiences three ejections in eleven flights, with the root cause unknown, would be grounded. Even with no fatalities.
Concerning the Shuttle comparison, I also think that it's a little bit like comparing apples and oranges, however, it's viable to note that a Soyuz definitely has a better history of bringing people back alive AFTER severe failures have occurred it siimply is more robust because it's less complex
However, the *overall* record of the Soyuz of bringing the crew back alive is equivalent to that of the shuttle. (2 fatal accidents in 98 flights, vs 2 in 122 for the shuttle; 4 fatalities out of 237 person-trips vs 14 out of 733 for the shuttle, 87 consecutive successful crew returns for Soyuz (Soyuz 12 to Soyuz TMA-11) vs 87 for the shuttle (STS-26 to 113)).
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synchrotron - 29/4/2008 1:00 PM
MrTim - 29/4/2008 4:54 PM
3. While Soyuz is much simpler than an orbiter (and some like to equate simplicity with safety), Soyuz needs to throw-off parts of itself during the re-entry process for a nominal flight and the vehicles seem to be accumulating a worrisome trend of failures in very mature (and therefore supposedly reliable) hardware required for this function. When I see failures of cutting-edge stuff, I worry about the design BUT when I see failures of mature stuff I worry about manufacturing, quality control, operator attentiveness, etc.
Agreed. But 'throwing off stuff' also has a specific function in this case. Namely, protection of the TPS from launch- and orbit-based damage.
That was not, of course, the *purpose* of designing it that way - the purpose was to minimize the mass of the descent module. And while it reduces the risk of TPS damage, it increases risk in other areas. Performing module separation in the critical period between deorbit and entry carries three risks, which have now either caused or been implicated (in the cases of TMA-10 and 11) in one Soyuz fatal accident and four close calls:
1) The separation doesn't happen when it's supposed to (Soyuz 5, TMA-10, TMA-11 close calls)
2) The separation happens when it's not supposed to (Soyuz TM-5 close call)
3) The separation causes critical damage to another system (Soyuz 11 fatal accident)
So it's not at all clear to me that the design trade is a net win in favor of module separation.
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 2:05 PM
OV-106 - 29/4/2008 1:32 PM
Where are these original concept designs? If the shuttle then looks anything like the shuttle we have today, jettisoning the entire crew module is much more problematic than you are giving it credit.
I'd have to look, but there have been a number of concept designs for jettisonable crew cabins for shuttle. (I believe at least one of these evaluations was performed by the ASAP and may be available online somewhere.) When I was with the CAIB I started collecting information on this (as well as information on early proposals for on-orbit tile repair). We were considering making it at least a sidebar in the final report. It never made it into the report because we ran out of time.
I think General Deal mentioned it in his supplement. Would have to go back and look - I only have a hardcopy of volume 1.
Off the top of my head, I believe that the various capsule proposals resulted in at least 10-20K pound weight penalties. Essentially, you ended up with a much reduced payload capability on the shuttle.
The price tags were pretty gag-inducing too. The most expensive concept would have cost as much as two brand new orbiters just to retrofit the three existing ones.
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Blackstar - 29/4/2008 8:53 PM I read what you wrote twice and I still don't know what you mean. My point was that _any_ option for putting crew escape on the shuttle after it was built--and I've seen at least 3-4 different proposals, including "escape capsules" mounted on the upper deck--would have been expensive. And if those capabilities had been included from the beginning, the vehicle would have paid a high weight and performance premium.
I have seen more than that before the Shuttle was built. And listened to number of different ideas to bring down the weight penalty to a minimum. Some of them quite radical and within budget. But this is not the thread for it.So lets drop the issue and keep the thread on target. Read the title at the top of the screen. It says "The Real Soyuz Problem".
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All in all, we might do best to remember the old axiom, "if it ain't broke .... ". After all, the backup system DID work.
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Jonty McLee - 29/4/2008 7:38 PM
JimO - 29/4/2008 1:03 PM
I stand well rebuked, and properly corrected.
I get the feeling this is the first and last time an Opinion Editorial is going to be on this site, right Chris?
We'll always run viable content that is of interest to our readership - as this one was.
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nobodyofconsequence - 30/4/2008 4:03 AM
So lets drop the issue and keep the thread on target. Read the title at the top of the screen. It says "The Real Soyuz Problem".
Agreed. This thread is running away with itself a bit.
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Danderman - 29/4/2008 10:08 PM
All in all, we might do best to remember the old axiom, "if it ain't broke .... ".
I think we might do better to throw out that old axiom and replace it with a new one. "Listen to the hardware."
After all, the backup system DID work.
So did the secondary O-rings, for 24 flights. But on the 25th...
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You know what? In spite of all those different engineering styles I think it's time for some European engineering style. Which will hopefully work out as asystem based on modular components with redundancy and an overall simple design like a European built Eurosoyuz with an ATV derived propulsion section, some more high tech than Soyuz and of cause hopefully more capability, like being able to use the propulsion section to transport modules to a station and the capability of unmanned flight and docking.
I think the problem with the Russian style is, that their designs are great, but their tech is old and weak and their manufacturing hasn't got enough quality control, on the other hand the problem with the American style is their incapability to improve systems step by step. Either way, in the end it's only a question of money for all three.
Don't let us only built Hummers and Ladas but also BMWs
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Jim - 29/4/2008 1:58 PM
I would like for those who disagree with the article to point out the errors
I disagree with the general tone - not the technical content or conclusions.
And again regarding the ballistic entry, I think everyone understands that it is not something you desire - it's merely pointing out that it is not a disaster. Yes, root cause should be found, but that needs to be very much secondary to investigating the separation issue, which related or not is a much more serious problem.
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Just re-read this opus. It appears we cannot trust Russians, but, heck from the same article it follows that we cannot trust NASA (i.e. Americans) either. I am entirely confused.
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Don't trust anyone over 30. Or under 30.
Seriously though, there has been a noticeable trend in engineering to judge performance based solely on cost and schedule performance. I see it at work all the time. People tend to fixate on the criteria that others use to judge them and the cumulative pressure on a team can lead to mistakes. It's a human quality. The effect is a little like going to the ballpark and watching the scoreboard instead of the game. The scoreboard provides a function, but it's a measurement of how the function being performed, not the function itself.
A similar effect frequently occurs at the highest levels of a public company too. The leadership focuses on share price rather than on doing the job that is measured by the share value.
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Just curious, other than cost and schedule performance (which both are extremely important in my line of work, holding the client's requirements satisfaction constant), what metrics do you think are relevant here? (I couldn't gather any from your post) What is this "function itself" in terms of human spaceflight? Good luck.
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mikers - 30/4/2008 7:49 AM
Just curious, other than cost and schedule performance (which both are extremely important in my line of work, holding the client's requirements satisfaction constant), what metrics do you think are relevant here? (I couldn't gather any from your post) What is this "function itself" in terms of human spaceflight? Good luck.
Caution: This is an innocent question, sort of like my earlier observation, that can potentially take the discussion way off target. Please answer within context.
If this seems like it warrants its own thread, lets do that, because it could become very interesting indeed.
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I would welcome a separate thread if needed, Clongton, no need for caution. It's all good as far as I am concerned. The central 'Why' is an as good question as any. I am a (self-described) space exploration fan, but I do have my notions. Best to you all.
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Sorry for initiating a digression. I have a pernicious tendency to do that. I think the on-topic aspect of my point was that an approach that has too much focus on the program metrics (specifically cost and schedule) can lead to systemic corner-cutting and oversights that lead to failures during the performance of the mission. Energia's spacecraft industrial capacity is, in the words of their management, entirely consumed with the mass production of Progress and Soyuz vehicles. They are operating without margin in their schedule in a process, although an assembly operation, is considerably less automated than the production of Toyota Camrys.
So, what is the response of a highly competent workforce when something goes wrong due to schedule pressures? Something that has worked (apparently) quite well in the past? I would hope that I would have the cojones to use the Asoh defense (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asoh_defence), but there is real pressure on individuals to dilute the blame by implicating others outside of one's organization. One slick way to do this is to appeal to a conspiracy of unnamed and possibly foreign individuals, media, and organizations that can never fully accept or deny the blame. The buck doesn't stop anywhere and everyone gets to keep their job. And the underlying problem does not get fixed.
The CAIB and the Rogers Commission are exemplary cases of performing the right kind of failure assessment with transparency. Good short-term outcomes if perhaps a little slow due to our level of risk aversion. But sustainable broad spectrum change in the day-to-day way we do space exploration has been elusive.
I'd like someone to tell RSA/Energia, "You're smart, you're good at what you do, you f**ked up. Calm down, we still want to work with you. Now tell me what went wrong, and what you're going to do about it."
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South Korean Spacefarer Hospitalized With Back Pain
http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?ContentBlockID=a658dfc9-c659-42f9-8d01-f398e0fd329e
SKorea's first astronaut in hospital with back pain blamed on steep re-entry
http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5hUyZ2vJ-IV9_AWX-mSt88bq8yBtQ
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synchrotron - 30/4/2008 8:49 AM
The CAIB and the Rogers Commission are exemplary cases of performing the right kind of failure assessment with transparency. Good short-term outcomes if perhaps a little slow due to our level of risk aversion. But sustainable broad spectrum change in the day-to-day way we do space exploration has been elusive.
When I worked CAIB we considered the Rogers Commission the _wrong_ way to do an investigation.
Yeah, yeah, I'm digressing...
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More landing information from Yi So-yeon via an article on MSNBC.com. She recounts being "rescued" by nomads and how they helped the capsule occupants. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24386004/
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Rusty_Barton - 30/4/2008 11:36 AM South Korean Spacefarer Hospitalized With Back Pain http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?ContentBlockID=a658dfc9-c659-42f9-8d01-f398e0fd329e SKorea's first astronaut in hospital with back pain blamed on steep re-entry http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5hUyZ2vJ-IV9_AWX-mSt88bq8yBtQ
Not only can you have contused nerves, another situation likely here is rib fractures and intercostal nerve pulls (they often make themselves apparent with severe back pain). This is very common (and hard to diagnose - can't really see on an X-ray). Worse yet, you can get diaphragm spasms that start with every breath.So ballistic reentry is not a valid failsafe mode. More of a last ditch, like deciding if you want to eject and possibly kill/maim yourself. Really feel for all of them, would not wish an 8g 2minute load on my worst enemy.
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Ever considered writing an editorial yourself Chris?
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Bruce H - 2/5/2008 8:20 PM
Ever considered writing an editorial yourself Chris?
I don't think I'd be any good at it, to be honest. I'd prefer to continue to gain experience with my current style of reporting on space flight, which is a big learning curve on this subject matter.
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Jorge - 30/4/2008 3:34 AM
However, the *overall* record of the Soyuz of bringing the crew back alive is equivalent to that of the shuttle. (2 fatal accidents in 98 flights, vs 2 in 122 for the shuttle; 4 fatalities out of 237 person-trips vs 14 out of 733 for the shuttle, 87 consecutive successful crew returns for Soyuz (Soyuz 12 to Soyuz TMA-11) vs 87 for the shuttle (STS-26 to 113)).
Though it must certainly count for something that the Soyuz losses happened in the very earliest "test flight phase" (as I've also noted in another thread). One can reasonably argue that the design has worked very well after the initial faults were ironed out.
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Oersted - 4/5/2008 12:56 PM
Jorge - 30/4/2008 3:34 AM
However, the *overall* record of the Soyuz of bringing the crew back alive is equivalent to that of the shuttle. (2 fatal accidents in 98 flights, vs 2 in 122 for the shuttle; 4 fatalities out of 237 person-trips vs 14 out of 733 for the shuttle, 87 consecutive successful crew returns for Soyuz (Soyuz 12 to Soyuz TMA-11) vs 87 for the shuttle (STS-26 to 113)).
Though it must certainly count for something that the Soyuz losses happened in the very earliest "test flight phase" (as I've also noted in another thread).
It counts for something, but not as much as people like to think. It counts only inasmuch as the intervening years have allowed flight experience to accumulate.
Number of flights is the metric that matters, not number of years.
I find myself constantly dismayed that people are either unable or unwilling to grasp this simple concept.
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Jorge - 4/5/2008 5:01 PM
Oersted - 4/5/2008 12:56 PM
Jorge - 30/4/2008 3:34 AM
However, the *overall* record of the Soyuz of bringing the crew back alive is equivalent to that of the shuttle. (2 fatal accidents in 98 flights, vs 2 in 122 for the shuttle; 4 fatalities out of 237 person-trips vs 14 out of 733 for the shuttle, 87 consecutive successful crew returns for Soyuz (Soyuz 12 to Soyuz TMA-11) vs 87 for the shuttle (STS-26 to 113)).
Though it must certainly count for something that the Soyuz losses happened in the very earliest "test flight phase" (as I've also noted in another thread).
It counts for something, but not as much as people like to think. It counts only inasmuch as the intervening years have allowed flight experience to accumulate.
Number of flights is the metric that matters, not number of years.
Surely you are making use of hyperbole with this comment. Trend analyses are clearly valuable for extrapolating expected outcomes. At even probability, fatalities becoming more frequent over time is clearly worse than fatalities that are decreasing over time.
Likewise, the increasing frequency of Soyuz re-entry failures recently is a cause for concern.
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synchrotron - 4/5/2008 1:40 PM
Jorge - 4/5/2008 5:01 PM
Oersted - 4/5/2008 12:56 PM
Jorge - 30/4/2008 3:34 AM
However, the *overall* record of the Soyuz of bringing the crew back alive is equivalent to that of the shuttle. (2 fatal accidents in 98 flights, vs 2 in 122 for the shuttle; 4 fatalities out of 237 person-trips vs 14 out of 733 for the shuttle, 87 consecutive successful crew returns for Soyuz (Soyuz 12 to Soyuz TMA-11) vs 87 for the shuttle (STS-26 to 113)).
Though it must certainly count for something that the Soyuz losses happened in the very earliest "test flight phase" (as I've also noted in another thread).
It counts for something, but not as much as people like to think. It counts only inasmuch as the intervening years have allowed flight experience to accumulate.
Number of flights is the metric that matters, not number of years.
Surely you are making use of hyperbole with this comment.
No. I don't think you understood my comment. And don't call me Shirley.
Trend analyses are clearly valuable for extrapolating expected outcomes.
Of course. But trends are measured over flights, not over time.
Likewise, the increasing frequency of Soyuz re-entry failures recently is a cause for concern.
Of course. But that is still a per-flight trend, not a per-time trend.
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It must also count for something vs Soyuz that the two losses with shuttle were both faults that were not with the orbiter at the top of the fault tree.
Jorge - 4/5/2008 1:50 PM
And don't call me Shirley.
:laugh:
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synchrotron - 4/5/2008 1:40 PM
Surely you are making use of hyperbole with this comment. Trend analyses are clearly valuable for extrapolating expected outcomes. At even probability, fatalities becoming more frequent over time is clearly worse than fatalities that are decreasing over time.
Likewise, the increasing frequency of Soyuz re-entry failures recently is a cause for concern.
But you have to float the number, so that recent experience is much more heavily weighted than historical experience.
There was an interesting little hint at this in a recent article in Space News about a major launch insurance deal. A comsat company just bought a package deal for insurance for a number of upcoming launches. They are insured a different rates for different rockets (I'd have to go look up the specifics). Anyway, the worst deal is for the Proton. I believe that they're insured at a rate of 10.5% if they choose to launch on a Proton, meaning that they have to pay a premium of 10.5% of the overall value of the launch if they fly on the Proton. However, after seven successful Proton launches, the rate drops to 8.5%. That's the insurance industry's way of saying that they are taking into account recent experience over past historical experience.
Of course, when you're talking launch vehicles, none of this is absolute. There's a certain amount of perception involved in making these determinations, in part because it is so hard to put quantifiable values on things. When I was working on CAIB, I came up with the brilliant idea of doing a sidebar in the final report on launch vehicle reliability. But then I started talking with some people who had looked into this in the past and they said that it gets really difficult to make these kinds of calculations (heck, I talked to the USAF safety and mission assurance guys and got dispirited really fast). For instance, if you launch two vehicles in a row, but one of them is using updated flight software, do you count them as identical vehicles? At what point have modifications been introduced into the hardware (and software) to such a point that you should count it as a new version? And how do you even find out if those changes have been made? You can't, because a lot of that information is known only inside the companies building the rockets.
So beyond very crude categories, you cannot apply statistics to this kind of stuff. For all rocket launches N is a low number. You look at it and you apply common sense and gut instincts and say things like "the recent trend is not good..."
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Speaking of changes, it should be noted that the early Soyuz were very different from the current ones, unlike the Shuttle Soyuz made many incremental advances, especially Soyuz 1 lead to a lot of redesign.. However, that makes the last two incidents nothing less a cause of concern. On the other hand, this also means, that as long as Russia is willing to fund Soyuz flights (and I'm pretty sure in the event that it couldn't with the ISS still operational someone like Europe would pay) the likelyhood of loosing Soyuz as a vehicle is very small and I'm sure the current problem will be found as it might be caused by some gradual design change as well or maybe some kind of production problem.
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First of all, a new vehicle wouldn't solve anything. problems are solved by flying and not by theory. There can't be an alternative because it's simply riskier to fly a new vehicle than a soyuz. assembly of new soyuz spacecraft are halted, and they are investigating it. but what's the big deal ? they cosmonauts survived and they are trying to correct it. the fact that the soyuz is able to survive such problems is just a proof of the systematic reliability of the system. they have enough money, they have quite a lot of experience, i would even say on par with the us, so what ? does anybody really believe that the dragon is more reliable ? or the shuttle ? perhaps they'll even send a extra soyuz up there, i've heard they are even discussing it. My audi a6 limited me to 40 mph last time on the high way, so such problems are happening everywhere. but does that that mean that german companies do not know what they do ?
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extropiandreams - 4/5/2008 8:29 PM
First of all, a new vehicle wouldn't solve anything. problems are solved by flying and not by theory.
I don't think people are calling for a new vehicle. And problems are solved by flying AND theory. Applying theory during flight. I hate to keep referencing Challenger and Columbia, but were those problems solved by simply flying over and over? Nope. A lot of planning and redesign was put in after both accidents.
assembly of new soyuz spacecraft are halted, and they are investigating it. but what's the big deal ? they cosmonauts survived and they are trying to correct it.
What's the big deal? The propulsion module didn't separate, the capsule was pointed sideways, and the crew is fortunate they survived. If that propulsion module didn't separate, or the capsule didn't correct it's attitude, things could have gotten real bad real fast. And there still was a ballistic re-entry, something that shouldn't happen anyway.
And are they trying to correct it? To some extent, yes, I won't doubt that. But Perminov isn't giving me that feeling of confidence right now.
the fact that the soyuz is able to survive such problems is just a proof of the systematic reliability of the system.
Not in a million years. Three such problems among 12 TMA flights, and one toward the end of the TM program...all which are in recent memory? No way. Reliability would mean it would work correctly. It isn't, and we don't know that in the future this problem won't occur again, with more grave circumstances.
they have enough money,
Ha, nope. Money doesn't grow on trees.
they have quite a lot of experience, i would even say on par with the us, so what ?
Yeah, they have experience. We had experience with the shuttle before Columbia too. And did that prevent it?
does anybody really believe that the dragon is more reliable ? or the shuttle ?
That's not the point. Dragon doesn't even exist yet, there's no way to say. Comparing to the shuttle is comparing apples to oranges. The point is whether or not the appropriate measures are taken to ensure that this problem is actually solved. Because supposedly it was solved after TMA-10.
perhaps they'll even send a extra soyuz up there, i've heard they are even discussing it.
You "heard"? Where? And for what purpose? Is that purpose relative to this issue?
My audi a6 limited me to 40 mph last time on the high way, so such problems are happening everywhere. but does that that mean that german companies do not know what they do ?
This analogy makes no sense. I have no idea what you're even trying to say. There's a difference between your car being able to go over 40 mph and a capsule surviving descent from orbit at a speed of Mach 25. Again, apples to oranges.
I have no idea why you just want to shrug this off. Because that kind of attitude is the kind that will only lead to disaster.
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Russians considering spacewalk to investigate the Soyuz currently docked at ISS:
http://www.russianspaceweb.com/iss_soyuztma12.html#redocking
"A report on Novosti Kosmonavtiki web forum said that an emergency spacewalk by the station crew was considered to review the status of one of the pyrotechnic locks onboard Soyuz TMA-12, in case the ongoing investigation confirms that the device was a culprit in the failure of separation between the crew module and the propulsion module during the landing of the Soyuz TMA-11 spacecraft in May, as well the similar incident during the Soyuz-TMA-10 landing last fall."
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Blackstar - 4/5/2008 7:25 PM
Russians considering spacewalk to investigate the Soyuz currently docked at ISS:
http://www.russianspaceweb.com/iss_soyuztma12.html#redocking
"A report on Novosti Kosmonavtiki web forum said that an emergency spacewalk by the station crew was considered to review the status of one of the pyrotechnic locks onboard Soyuz TMA-12, in case the ongoing investigation confirms that the device was a culprit in the failure of separation between the crew module and the propulsion module during the landing of the Soyuz TMA-11 spacecraft in May, as well the similar incident during the Soyuz-TMA-10 landing last fall."
According to previous statements from Gerstenmaier, a similar spacewalk was considered and rejected for TMA-11 after the TMA-10 incident.
See http://www.space.com/news/080422-nasa-russia-soyuz-update.html (previously mentioned (http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/forums/thread-view.asp?tid=6531&start=711) )
Soyuz TM-9 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soyuz_TM-9) had a somewhat eventful spacewalk to deal with damaged blankets on the DM: http://www.astronautix.com/flights/mireo6.htm
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Blackstar - 5/5/2008 6:25 AM
Russians considering spacewalk to investigate the Soyuz currently docked at ISS:
http://www.russianspaceweb.com/iss_soyuztma12.html#redocking
"A report on Novosti Kosmonavtiki web forum said that an emergency spacewalk by the station crew was considered to review the status of one of the pyrotechnic locks onboard Soyuz TMA-12, in case the ongoing investigation confirms that the device was a culprit in the failure of separation between the crew module and the propulsion module during the landing of the Soyuz TMA-11 spacecraft in May, as well the similar incident during the Soyuz-TMA-10 landing last fall."
Just to be clear it was not a report, but a post in the forum by one of the users.
http://www.novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?p=309890#309890 . It actully said that the reallocation of Soyuz was cancelled due to the need to organize an unplanned EVA to dismantle (razborka) the pyro lock (in case it is confirmed that the same pyro lock malfunction on both TMA-10 and TMA-11. The official news report only sites Interfax news agency which is referring to the unspecified source in the space industry confirming the cancellation of reallocation based on the need to protect crew safety until the investigation is over.
PS: Shouldn't this discussion be moved to ISS-17 thread?
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I'll quote and copy the two posts into Ex.17 as a mirror, Dmitry.
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Jorge - 4/5/2008 5:50 PM
synchrotron - 4/5/2008 1:40 PM
Jorge - 4/5/2008 5:01 PM
It counts for something, but not as much as people like to think. It counts only inasmuch as the intervening years have allowed flight experience to accumulate.
Number of flights is the metric that matters, not number of years.
Surely you are making use of hyperbole with this comment.
No. I don't think you understood my comment. And don't call me Shirley.
Re-read and now understand your point in context. I picked a bad day to stop sniffing glue.
Trend analyses are clearly valuable for extrapolating expected outcomes.
Of course. But trends are measured over flights, not over time.
Likewise, the increasing frequency of Soyuz re-entry failures recently is a cause for concern.
Of course. But that is still a per-flight trend, not a per-time trend.
Per-flight trend is the dominant metric that matters. I agree. But things tend to go wrong with processes and organizations over calendar days; organizations must keep flights safe over time as well as over the number of flights. We shouldn't discount it entirely.
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I just posted my latest article over at the 'Expedition 17' thread...
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Was this already posted?
"Internal NASA Documents Give Clues to Scary Soyuz Return Flight"
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/may08/6229
Nice read... most interesting part for me:
But at some point, the aft section did tear free, probably because of the mounting aerodynamic torques and heating. This may have been no mere lucky break. Russia suffered a series of near disasters early in its program, including Yuri Gagarin's first mission in 1961 and a chillingly similar Soyuz nosedive in January 1969. So Russian engineers apparently modified module-to-module connectors to tear loose, if needed, under such entry stresses, even if the separation system fails entirely. If that modification was indeed made-which is unknown outside of Russian space circles-this may have been the first time this fail-safe system was flight-tested.
Still seems no one is certain if the module tearing away was luck or by design... I'm very surprised no one not involved in this knows...
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strangeluck - 8/5/2008 8:55 AM
Was this already posted?
Yep, scroll up one post :)
JimO - 7/5/2008 12:13 PM
I just posted my latest article over at the 'Expedition 17' thread...
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JimO - 7/5/2008 12:13 PM
I just posted my latest article over at the 'Expedition 17' thread...
Nice article and images!
I saw a diagram once that showed that the OM has no proper hatch where it connects to the DM - just a swing-down grill to cover the opening (obviously the DM has a proper hatch there). Could it be that the OM separation thrust is powered merely by air escaping the OM through the grill?
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Perilous Landings by Soyuz Worry NASA
U.S. to Be Dependent on Russian Capsule
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/11/AR2008051102101.html
By Marc Kaufman
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 12, 2008; Page A07
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ok. first of all money is really growing on trees in russia today. They have so much of it, that inflation caused by those great money inflows is a great burden for them. A new soyuz launch would cost them a hour of fossil fuel export, metals not counted.
They are discussing various ways to solve this problem, and are even suggesting spacewalks, so they don't deny anything, they are just working on it. i think that's the most important thing.
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Now it's potentially serious if they take this option....
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/content/?cid=5425
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It sounds like this whole situation is coming unravelled!
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They need to hurry up and draw some conclusions on the Soyuz. Is the Soyuz good or bad.
IMO, If this isn't finalised by the STS-124 launch then they should use the shuttle to remove all astronauts,
If at that suggestion, we reach a cultural impass re: acceptable risk, that's healthy.
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MB123 - 16/5/2008 12:12 AM
IMO, If this isn't finalised by the STS-124 launch then the US should suggest taking all astronauts off the ISS using the space shuttle.
I disagree... When you look over the history of ISS evacuations needed in an emergency (none) and combine with the number of astronauts killed on Soyuz returns from ISS (none) and the odds of something happening that 1) requires emergency return and 2) failure of Soyuz to make it back then 3) I think the impact of abandoning ISS doesn't weigh in.
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rdale - 17/5/2008 3:19 PM I think the impact of abandoning ISS doesn't weigh in.
What are the impacts?
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The US leaving ISS would have a major impact on the entire program... I don't think that's relevant to the Soyuz problem though, maybe worthy of a new thread.
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Maybe Washington will tell them to move on.. I don't think that there is any wish to make this a bigger deal with two nations that NASA may impact if they stall.
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I guess I don't understand the rationale behind removing American Astronauts from ISS. How is it that the Russians would have the confidence to fly their crew, but we wouldn't have the confidence to fly Astronauts in the same vehicle? I would hope there is some serious interchange of information during the investigation of the incidents on the two most recent Soyuz returns. I agree that there needs to be enough confidence in the vehicle to fly, but that should apply to all crew, American, Russian or any other nationality.
If NASA and the RSA can't agree on something as basic as safety of flight, we have some real problems here. I don't think the Russians welcome the prospect of losing crew members any more than we do.
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brihath: It could be that the Russians are lulled into a sense of false security over the ballistical descents, just like NASA was with repeated SRB O-ring blow-bys and the falling ET foam.
Only because you got away with it last time doesn't mean you will get away with it forever. Why should the Russians and the Soyuz be immune to the same management and technological base problems that doomed 17 astronauts and 3 spacecrafts?
For NASA, Columbia is still very fresh in everyone's mind and no-one would dare trying to fly with a problem that they doesn't understand completely. For Russian's the last time they lost a crew was back in 1971, nearly 37 years ago.
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Sometimes you have to convince russians by your actions. You don't yell, you don't intimate ... you just do. Coldly.
They think that you're setting them up for a fall. Which may in this case be right. Then they'll take the appropriate measures.
Smartest thing NASA could do right now. But the other international partners, especially the Japanese, will be PO'd - and will blame the Russian's for evading flight safety. They are used to this kind of situation.
And it will be another reason for ESA to go ahead with the DLR proposal for ATV Evolution in November - you don't wand to backed into a corner when the Russian's override their better, more careful judgment. Read the DLR proposal as a "safe Soyuz" replacement where they can ignore Russian options, forcing them to do a Orion equivalent (CSTS) from the ground up on there own rubles, before looking at it.
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If I were a cynical sort, I might speculate that there are some folk within NASA who would welcome any lever to re-direct the $2bn annual budget for ISS over to Exploration if the opportunity were ever to present itself. $2bn extra each year would certainly represent quite a shot-in-the-arm given the present budget.
Can't see Congress ever capitulating to this reasoning though - especially given the strong ISS support clearly present in the wording of the recent bills, so ISS should be safe for a while to come.
Ross.
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DaveS - 17/5/2008 3:39 PM
brihath: It could be that the Russians are lulled into a sense of false security over the ballistical descents, just like NASA was with repeated SRB O-ring blow-bys and the falling ET foam.
Only because you got away with it last time doesn't mean you will get away with it forever. Why should the Russians and the Soyuz be immune to the same management and technological base problems that doomed 17 astronauts and 3 spacecrafts?
For NASA, Columbia is still very fresh in everyone's mind and no-one would dare trying to fly with a problem that they doesn't understand completely. For Russian's the last time they lost a crew was back in 1971, nearly 37 years ago.
Oh, I agree that the Russians could be lulled into a false sense of security, but they have had many warning flags since Soyuz 11. I guess the big question in my mind is what level of transparency NASA is insisting upon during the Soyuz TMA-12 investigation before we are comfortable flying with them again. I wonder if any knowledgable individuals could address that question. The corollary would be what level of transparency did we offer the Russians during the Columbia investigation and subsequent flights with the foam issues.
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Novosti Kosmonavtiki news #704 notes that the reasons for the ballistic descent of the TMA-11 capsule will be established by 30 May (says Anatolii Perminov).
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Suzy - 19/5/2008 5:00 AMwill be established by 30 May (says Anatolii Perminov).
How convenient, isn't it? :O
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Jim - 29/4/2008 7:58 AM
you are very wrong here. American space policy and the NASA administrator are criticized all the time on this site
And sincere thanks to you for not just acknowledging the criticism, but also for participating in it.
JimO - 29/4/2008 1:22 PM
Problems? Heck, no, I go BEGGING him to do it.
As with almost all the arguments here, these clashes strike sparks that illuminate darkness.
We are the flint and steel, and as long as we're tough enough to take the heat and shock, we fulfill a bright function.
What a nice remark! If we can't have the courage and bravery to use our frontal lobes, to apply basic critical thinking skills, and to describe and explain why we feel the way we do about a topic, then we needn't even bother leaving the cave.
Jim Oberg: I admire your integrity in welcoming others' feedback--often critically negative--of your writing. Thank you for the enlightening (if sobering) account of the fallout of the TMA-11 descent anomaly. You're right--we (NASA, RSA, or society in general) can't afford to fix problems like TMA-11 without discussing them in a critical context.
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kraisee - 17/5/2008 3:50 PM
If I were a cynical sort, I might speculate that there are some folk within NASA who would welcome any lever to re-direct the $2bn annual budget for ISS over to Exploration if the opportunity were ever to present itself. $2bn extra each year would certainly represent quite a shot-in-the-arm given the present budget.
Can't see Congress ever capitulating to this reasoning though - especially given the strong ISS support clearly present in the wording of the recent bills, so ISS should be safe for a while to come.
Ross.
It'd be more than $2bn, though -- if we stop flying to ISS to save that $2bn, most of the Shuttle's $3.3bn budget could be re-directed as well after the Hubble mission...
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rsnellenberger - 20/5/2008 3:40 PM
It'd be more than $2bn, though -- if we stop flying to ISS to save that $2bn, most of the Shuttle's $3.3bn budget could be re-directed as well after the Hubble mission...
That's Griffin's game plan.
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Oy! What does Mr. Oberg suggest we replace the Soyuz with, for station emergency escape purposes?
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MSNBC.COM
"Russians admit spaceship suffered a snag"
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24776333/
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Soyuz TMA-11 landing photos (http://www.novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/content/photogallery/gallery_152/index.shtml) are up at Novosti Kosmonavtiki website.
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Soyuz TMA-11 landing photos (http://www.novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/content/photogallery/gallery_152/index.shtml) are up at Novosti Kosmonavtiki forum
WOW.
Does this look like a broken outer shell on #48?
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Check out #42 as well.
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WOW.
Does this look like a broken outer shell on #48?
If you look at this hi-res picture from TMA-6 in 2005: http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/station/crew-11/html/jsc2005e41361.html (http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/gallery/images/station/crew-11/html/jsc2005e41361.html)
what looks like a crack in this picture is clearly a designed-in "channel" that runs around the exterior of the upper hatch.
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The parachute is deployed from the side of the module. Then parachute's risers are re-rigged using that channel, or crack as you put it, to allow the capsule to hang vertically before landing. You can see in #42 one of the risers is behind the man, the other in front.
From the upturned soil it looks like the capsule hit the ground very hard and then bounced and/or got dragged a bit.
Thanks for the link Suzy.
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Does this look like a broken outer shell on #48?
No, it doesn't, just opened channels where chute's strops were stored. Mentioned already in this topic...
From the upturned soil it looks like the capsule hit the ground very hard and then bounced and/or got dragged a bit.
Agree with you, wind speed was ~15m/s. That should be rough landing with "good" horizontal speed, and DMPs can't manage such thing.
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Ah, OK, now I see it, too. Especially the TMA--6 picture helped understand it. Thanks.
On that one it also looks much more "clean". Is there some ablative shielding above the channel that breaks away on chute deployment and just got burnt more this time?
EDIT: Or that broke away this time while it usually doesn't?
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Is there some ablative shielding above the channel that breaks away on chute deployment and just got burnt more this time?
Looks like.
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Call me a sentimental fool, but the Novosti slide show linked to by Suzy put a lump in my throat. The essential humanity of the Russian recovery staff and medical personnel shines through... The Russian helicopter pilot awkardly standing there with a bouquet of flowers for the Korean astronaut... to think that for decades in the Cold War, we were close to war with these people... seems incredible.
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Why do NASA astronauts often look so beat up after Soyuz landings? Malenchenko and Whitson are roughly the same age and had been in space for the same amount of time. Malenchenko was sitting on the ground outside the capsule, looking durable. Whitson had to be carried and looked weak. Is this training-related?
- Ed Kyle
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Why do NASA astronauts often look so beat up after Soyuz landings? Malenchenko and Whitson are roughly the same age and had been in space for the same amount of time. Malenchenko was sitting on the ground outside the capsule, looking durable. Whitson had to be carried and looked weak. Is this training-related?
- Ed Kyle
Those were my thoughts exactly when I saw the pictures yesterday. All I think of is after the Shuttle era; all landings are going to be similar with parachutes and a good chance to get banged up when hitting the ground.
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Why do NASA astronauts often look so beat up after Soyuz landings? Malenchenko and Whitson are roughly the same age and had been in space for the same amount of time. Malenchenko was sitting on the ground outside the capsule, looking durable. Whitson had to be carried and looked weak. Is this training-related?
Yuri was also carried to the helicopter (pictures 19 & 20), and he doesn't look all that durable in the (candid) pictures 21 and 25. He looks better in pictures 11 & 12, but for all we know the photographer has just said "Now, we need to take some shots where you look like a Hero of the Russian Republic!"
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I don't think, that there's place for setup, of course except "say cheese", and "gimme smile" for Yuri. %) Maybe because Russians feel themselves already home. But Americans know that their homeland still on the other side of the Planet, and they now somewhere in the steppe in the foreign darn'stan country. It's rather "Mind Over Matter" issue.
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I was looking at (www.spacefacts de/) and found these 2 photos of the Soyuz TM 29 landing in August 1999.
Upon landing, you can see the flames as the surrounding brush starts burning.
The second photo shows how burnt the module actually got.
Does anyone know what the "broken" ring in the foreground is?
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It's a thermal protection cover for parachute strops channel which placed around the SA hatch.
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Might be some interesting lessons for the Orion designers in this - I wonder whether Orion could handle a service module separation failure.
No. I tried to get this requirement in, but it was shot down. It wouldn't have even cost that much or weighed that much. Expose the sep mechanizms to the airstream and make the cabin out of titanium or stainless is about all it would take.
The Russians tend to build more robust systems than we do.
Danny
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madscientist197 - 28/4/2008 3:06 AM
Might be some interesting lessons for the Orion designers in this - I wonder whether Orion could handle a service module separation failure.
The Soyuz had separation problems, so did the Reliant Robin dummy Shuttle and the 1km space tether experiment.
http://space.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn11836&feedId=online-news_rss20
This sounds like a low reliability area. Is triple redundancy needed?
The pyros have redundancy, but one piece of metal in the wrong place can leave you stuck together. In a Soyuz, you get to live, in Orion, you will die.
Danny
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snip
Aerodynamic-induced module separation may be a good backup, but once we begin to rely on the backup system in lieu of the primary system, it's time for a serious re-examination of the system as a whole.
Good point. Backups shouldn't be used two times in a row.
Danny
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FYI - an update. The pyro returned from the Soyuz during the EVA last summer was detonated on the ground with no issues. Apparently fired just fine.
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Suffradini says they filed it as an 'unexplained anomaly' and have moved on.
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madscientist197 - 28/4/2008 3:06 AM
Might be some interesting lessons for the Orion designers in this - I wonder whether Orion could handle a service module separation failure.
The Soyuz had separation problems, so did the Reliant Robin dummy Shuttle and the 1km space tether experiment.
http://space.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn11836&feedId=online-news_rss20
This sounds like a low reliability area. Is triple redundancy needed?
The pyros have redundancy, but one piece of metal in the wrong place can leave you stuck together. In a Soyuz, you get to live, in Orion, you will die.
Danny
Orion could be changed to a biconic, Discoverer or lifting body shape with a PICA nose and SIRCA side wall.
Then SM attached reentry would still have the TPS facing the reentry.
The blunt cone design also could be covered with SIRCA or LRSI/HRSI tiles on it's top side which should protect the capsule long enough for the SM attachments to burn through.
The biggest worry would be keeping the front hatch and parachutes from getting cooked.
Plus the added protection must not impact reusability of the capsule so nothing that will leave hard to remove deposits.
Though SM sep failure would be fatal on a lunar mission for any vehicle since a ballistic reentry at those speeds is not survivable.
On a side note I know of no instances of a SM separation failure on a US space vehicle I believe they use a very different method of attachment that lends it's self to redundancy.